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Sommaire: Étude sur le système organisationnel et la
performance de projets de reconstruction à la suite de
catastrophes naturelles
Des efforts importants associés à une grande quantité de ressources
(économiques, matérielles, humaines, etc.) sont constamment investis pour
contribuer à la réhabilitation et à la reconstruction des communautés affectées
par des catastrophes naturelles dans les pays en voie de développement.
Cependant, ces initiatives de reconstruction font fréquemment l’objet de
critiques à cause de leur performance qui est souvent insuffisante pour atteindre
des niveaux acceptables de réhabilitation et de développement. Il n’est donc pas
surprenant que des praticiens et des chercheurs à la fois dans les pays en voie
de développement et dans les pays industrialisés reconnaissant aujourd’hui le
besoin d’améliorer la performance des projets de reconstruction à la suite des
catastrophes naturelles. Néanmoins, les efforts proposés - et d’ailleurs
appliqués - pour améliorer la performance de ces projets ont été concentrés
d’une façon dogmatique à la fois sur l’importance de la participation de la
communauté (et en particulier sur les chantiers lors des activités d’auto
construction) et sur l’importance de l’utilisation des ressources et des
technologies locales. Cette approche (parfois exagérée — puisque certains ont
même proposé le rejet des solutions techniques provenant de l’étranger) a été
acceptée par plusieurs organisations et par la majorité des spécialistes dans le
domaine de la reconstruction.
Suivant cette approche, UNDRO (The United Nations Disaster Relief
Organisation) a proposé en 1982: “La clé du succès reste finalement sur la
participation de la communauté locale — les survivants”.
Bien sûr, la considération des décisions tactiques, telles que le choix de la
méthode d’auto construction à la place d’une solution technologique étrangère
ou la décision d’utiliser des matériaux locaux et des technologies « indigènes »
à la place des solutions « de haute technologie » est importante pour tout projet
de logements économiques. Cependant, ces décisions restent à un niveau
tactique, et donc elles ont seulement une influence à l’échelle de la construction
du projet; alors qu’en réalité, les organisations qui développent des projets de
reconstruction évoluent - souvent - non seulement en tant que constructeurs
mais aussi en tant que promoteurs d’initiatives. Ce double rôle implique que ces
organisations ne réalisent pas seulement l’exécution des projets en assurant la
coordination des activités de construction (en tant que constructeurs) mais
qu’elles réalisent également les tâches de lancement et de planification des
projets (en tant que promoteurs). Ces activités de « promotion » incluent
souvent le financement, la gestion et la recherche de fonds pour le projet.
Cette étude suggère que la performance des projets de reconstruction à la suite
des catastrophes naturelles est moins affectée par les décisions tactiques
correspondant aux activités de construction (propres au rôle du constructeur)
que par le système organisationnel du projet et par l’influence de
l’environnement sur les activités dites « de promotion ». Cela veut dire que
l’argument, généralement accepté, qui propose que la performance de ces
projets dépend d’une part de la participation de la communauté aux activités de
construction et d’autre part de l’utilisation des ressources locales, contribue fort
peu à l’amélioration de la performance d’un projet de reconstruction surtout si
l’on ne reconnaît pas que le projet est un système qui est inévitablement
vulnérable aux influences d’un environnement hostile (le contexte post
catastrophe en pays en voie de développement est, sans aucun doute, un
environnement très hostile).
C’est pour quoi, cette étude argue qu’une organisation peut être très
performante, et avoir les meilleures intentions pour organiser un projet d’auto
construction en utilisant des technologies locales à partir d’une approche
participative. Cependant, si — par exemple — cette organisation n’est pas bien
préparée pour obtenir des fonds sur le marché compétitif du financement
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international, ou bien si cette organisation est affectée d’une façon négative par
un changement politique ou économique inattendu (en particulier lors des
activités liées à la promotion du projet), peu importe si le plan d’auto
construction et l’approche participative sont bien considérés, le projet aura très
peu de chances d’atteindre un niveau désirable de performance.
Cette approche exige d’aller au-delà de la vision traditionnelle (qui a tendance à
mettre l’accent sur les décisions tactiques), et de plutôt considérer les décisions
stratégiques dans une échelle de participants plus large — autrement dit la multi
organisation dans son environnement — sur une période de temps plus longue.
Selon cette approche, les décisions stratégiques par rapport à la configuration
du système organisationnel et la capacité de ce système pour mitiger les effets
de l’environnement jouent un rôle fondamental à l’égard de la performance du
projet. En particulier les décisions stratégiques importantes concernent: (j)
l’intégration entre les organisations; (ii) l’obtention de fonds; (iii) la mitigation et
la réponse aux risques; et (iv) le type de participation qui s’avère nécessaire de
la part des usagers.
A partir d’une analyse de plus de trente cas de reconstruction et de la révision
d’approches similaires déjà valables dans l’industrie « normale » du bâtiment,
cette étude propose l’hypothèse suivante:
Dans le cadre d’une organisation adoptant les rôles de « promoteur » et de
« constructeur » d’un projet de reconstruction à la suite d’une catastrophe
naturelle, la performance de ce projet (c’est-à-dire la capacité d’atteindre les
objectifs avec un maximum d’optimisation de ressources) dépend notamment:
1. Des niveaux « d’intégration et de différentiation)) à l’intérieur de la multi
organisation qui développe le projet, incluant l’intégration du projet dans
un programme plus large de reconstruction;
2. De la capacité stratégique de la multi-organisation pour attirer des fonds;
V3. De la capacité de la multi-organisation pour mitiger les risques de
l’environnement ou pour les partager entre plusieurs participants;
4. Du niveau de responsabilité de la part des usagers en ce qui concerne la
prise de décisions entre une série de choix offerts.
La validation de cette hypothèse change la direction du débat relatif aux aspects
considérés « clés » pour la réussite des projets de reconstruction (notamment la
participation de la communauté et l’utilisation de ressources locales). De plus,
elle propose la ré-formulation des « aspects critïques du succès » (Critical
Success Factors, pour utiliser le terme développé par Leidecker and Bruno,
1986) des projets de reconstruction. La validation de l’hypothèse (vraie ou
fausse) exige de trouver les relations qui existent entre le design du cadre
organisationnel du projet et la performance globale de celui-ci. Dans ce but,
quatre études de cas ont été étudiées d’une façon détaillée en utilisant la
méthode traditionnelle de recherche qualitative (telle que proposée par Robert
Yin, 1984). Ces quatre projets sont: (i) un projet rural de reconstruction en El
Salvador développé par l’organisation FUNDASAL après les tremblements de
terre de 2001, (ii) un projet urbain de reconstruction à San Salvador développé
par la Municipalité de San Salvador après les tremblements de terre de 2001,
(iii) un projet rural de reconstruction en Colombie développé par les
Organisations de Cultivateurs de Café de la Colombie après le tremblement de
terre de 1999, et (iv) un projet semi urbain de reconstruction en Honduras
développé par une ONG Québécoise (CECI) après l’ouragan Mitch (1998).
Une méthode permettant de déterminer la performance de ces quatre projets a
été développée en utilisant comme modèle de base les méthodes d’évaluation
utilisées dans l’industrie du bâtiment et celles utilisées dans le domaine du
développement international. Ainsi, une nouvelle version de ce qu’on appelle
« Le Cadre Logique)) (Logical Framework Analysis) a été utilisée pour évaluer
les projets à partir d’une approche qui met l’accent sur les processus, leurs
effets et leurs impacts à court et à moyen terme. L’objectif étant d’évaluer les
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projets d’une façon plutôt objective, afin de réduire au maximum la subjectivité
de l’évaluateur, les critères de performance ont été choisis à partir de principes
cohérents. Ces critères ont permis d’établir 62 formulaires (chaque formulaire
correspond à un critère de performance) et de les remplir d’une façon claire et
précise. Pour résumer l’information contenue dans ces formulaires, un tableau
de synthèse, utilisant un système graphique, a été réalisé pour chaque projet.
Ces tableaux permettent de visualiser d’une façon standardisée la performance
des projets et d’établir une échelle permettant de comparer les niveaux de
performance (Benchmarkïng).
Même si les quatre projets ont utilisé une approche participative, ils ont eu des
niveaux de performance très variés. Les projets ont eu des systèmes
organisationnels et des approches de gestion différents de sorte qu’il a été
possible de comparer les variables de l’hypothèse et d’obtenir différents
modèles (patterns). Par rapport à l’hypothèse proposée, les modèles suivants
on été identifiés dans les cas étudiés:
variable (la performance du « Patterns»
projet_est_une_variable...)
Première Des niveaux « d’intégration et La performance d’un projet est une variable
variable de de différentiation » à l’intérieur dépendante des niveaux « d’intégration et
l’hypothèse de la multi-organisation qui de différentiation » a l’intérieur de la multi
développe le projet, incluant organisation qui développe le projet, incluant
l’intégration du projet dans un l’intégration du projet dans un programme
programme plus large de plus large de reconstruction
reconstruction
Deuxième De la capacité stratégique de la La performance d’un projet n’est pas
variable de multi-organisation pour attirer nécessairement une variable dépendante
l’hypothèse des fonds de la capacité stratégique de la multi
organisation pour attirer des fonds;
Cependant, un plan stratégique bien établi
afin de positionner l’organisation dans
l’environnement est le moyen le plus
efficace pour attirer des ressources
Troisième De la capacité de la muiti- La performance d’un projet est une variable
variable de organisation pour mitiger les dépendante de la capacité de la muiti
l’hypothèse risques de l’environnement ou organisation pour mitiger les risques de
pour les partager entre l’environnement ou pour les partager entre
plusieurs participants plusieurs participants
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Cependant, les facteurs externes
n’influencent pas nécessairement d’une
façon négative la performance du projet, ils
influencent le système qui réalise le projet
et de ce fait conduisent les organisations à
prendre des décisions qui se manifestent de
façon positive ou négative dans la
performance du projet
Quatrième Du niveau de responsabilité de La performance d’un projet est une variable
variable de la part des usagers pour la dépendante du niveau de responsabilité de
l’hypothèse prise de décisions entre une la part des usagers pour la prise de
série de choix offerts décisions entre une série de choix offerts
Ces résultats modifient la façon traditionnelle de percevoir la performance des
projets de reconstruction et confirment plusieurs propositions et concepts
développés dans le domaine de la gestion des projets. Ainsi, plusieurs
généralisations analytiques - telles que proposées par Yin (1984) - peuvent être
établies. Les résultats démontrent qu’il existe, en fait, une relation directe entre
le système organisationnel et la performance des projets de reconstruction mais
que la considération des aspects stratégiques joue également un rôle
fondamental dans la réussite des projets de reconstruction suite aux
catastrophes naturelles. Par ailleurs, cette étude transfère au domaine de la
reconstruction suite aux catastrophes naturelles, des concepts qui ont été
validés dans le domaine de la gestion des projets d’aménagement. Cependant,
la contribution de l’étude ne se limite pas seulement à l’évaluation des résultats
de recherche, elle inclut aussi des méthodes d’évaluation plus fines, pour la
détermination de la performance des projets. La reformulation des aspects ayant
une influence sur la performance des projets de reconstruction peut, sans doute,
profiter d’une approche systématique du processus de gestion. Dans cette
approche, les aspects organisationnels et stratégiques jouent un rôle
prépondérant.
Mots clés : reconstruction; catastrophes naturelles; logement; gestion de
projets; système organisationnel; performance; évaluation de projets; pays en
voie de développement.
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Abstract
Due to the major shortcomings frequently found in post-disaster reconstruction
projects, practitioners and academics agree that important improvements are
required in order to help affected famiNes recover and to optimise the use of
available resources. As the number and impact cf natural disasters increase
every year, the performance of reconstruction projects is increasingly a major
concern for various disciplines in both developing and developed countries.
However, the efforts to improve the performance of these projects (mostly for
developing countries) have been obsessively concentrated on arguing for the
importance of community participation (particularly in construction activities,
through self-help programs) and on the importance of using local resources and
technologies while rejecting the use cf imported and foreign solutions.
This study demonstrates that, very often, organisations working in post-disaster
reconstruction in fact act strategically, both as promoters and builders of the
initiatives. Consequently, they are in a situation where the ptojects are (or
should be) less influenced by the tactical decisions made in regard to the actual
building process (e.g. on the role of builder) and more by the organisational
system adopted for the project and by the influence of the broader environment
on the activities of promotion. Building up on this hypothesis and within the
framework of qualitative research, four reconstruction projects are analysed in
detail and are compared with other cases reported in the literature. After
responding to the challenge of determining the performance cf the projects (and
for this a method cf evaluation has been expressly developed), the research
identifies important organisational decisions that can greatly contribute to
improve the way we help affected communities recover after natural disasters.
Keywords: post-disaster reconstruction; housing; project management;
organïsational design; performance; project evaluation; developing countries
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Glossary - Basic terms and acronyms
The foilowing terms, proposed by different organisations, are included in the
United Nations Department cf Humanitarian Affairs’ book: “Glossary:
Internationally agreed g!ossai’y of basic terms related to disaster management”
(UNDHA, 1992). This publication collects the internationally agreed definitions of
disaster-related terminology.
Disaster: A serious disruption cf the functioning of a society, causing
widespread human, material, or environmental losses which exceeds the ability
of affected society to cope using only its own resources.
Disaster management: The body cf policy and administrative decisions and
operational activities which pertain to the varicus stages cf a disaster at ail
levels.
Evaluation: Post-disaster appraisal cf ail aspects cf the disaster and its effects.
Hazard: A threatening event, or the probability cf occurrence of a potentïally
damaging phenomenon within a given time period and area.
Mitigation: Measures taken in advance cf a disaster aimed at decreasing or
eliminating its impact on society and on environment.
Lifelines: The public facilities and systems that provide basic life support
services such as water, energy, sanitation, communications and transportation.
Population at risk: A well-defined population whose lives, property and
livelihoods are threatened by given hazards.
Reconstruction: Actions taken to reestablish a community after a period of
rehabilitation subsequent te a disaster. Actions would include construction cf
permanent housing, full restoration cf services, and complete resumption cf the
pre-disaster state.
Rehabilitation: The operations and decisions taken after a disaster with a view
to restoring a stricken community to its former living conditions, while
encouraging and facilitating the necessary adjustments to the changes caused
by the disaster.
Secondarv hazards: Those hazards that occur as a resuit cf another hazard or
disaster, i.e. fires or landslides following earthquakes, epidemics following
famines, food shortages following drought or floods.
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USAID: US Agency for International Development
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Chapter I, Introductïon
2Chapter I, Introductïon
1.1. Introduction
Major efforts and large amounts of resources are constantly invested to help
communities devastated by natural disasters in developing countries to recover.
While the performance of these projects is largely criticised, the need to improve
reconstruction practices is recognised today by practitioners and academics
world-wide. However, the efforts to improve the performance of post-disaster
reconstruction projects in developing countries have been obsessively
concentrated on arguing for the importance of community participation
(particularly in construction activities through self-help programs) and on the
importance of using local resources and technologies while rejecting the use of
imported and foreign solutions.
The consideration of tactical decisions, such as deciding upon the use of self-help
instead of industrialised construction, or deciding upon the use of local materials
and indigenous technologies instead of imported techniques is indeed important
for every low-cost housing project — but they remain at the level of tactics.
Nevertheless, very often, organisations working in post-disaster reconstruction act
strategically both as promoters and builders of the projects. This means that not
only do they adopt the role of executing the project by organising construction
activities (build) but they also plan and initiate (promote) the project, including
financing it and/or assu ring resources for its funding.
This research argues that the performance of post-disaster reconstruction
projects is less influenced by tactical decisions made in the building process (on
the role of builder) than by the organisational system of the project and by the
influence of the environment on the activities 0f promotion, that is to say, by the
strategic decisions concerning the system as a whole. This means that the widely
accepted argument about the crucial importance of community participation in
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construction and the use of local resoutces contributes — in reality — very littie to
improve the performance of reconstruction if the project is not considered as a
system that ïs greatly affected by its generatty hostile environment (typical of the
post-disaster situation of developing cou ntries).
In other words, this study argues that you can be extremely proficient in
organising a self-help project that uses local technologies of construction through
a grass-roots approach. However, if your organisation is flot well prepared - for
example - to obtain funds in the competitive market of international funding or
your organisation is negatively affected by a sudden political or economic change
(particularly in the activities related with promotion of the project), it does flot
maller how good your self-help and community participation plan is, your project
has hile chance of attaining a desirable level of performance.
This approach implïes going beyond the traditional emphasis on tactical
decisions, considerïng instead strategic decisions in a wider scale of participants
(the multi-organisation and ïts environment) within a longer sequence of time.
According to this approach, strategic decisions regarding the configuration of the
organisational system and the capacity of that system to mitigate the effects of the
environment play a fundamental role in the performance of the project. In
particular the most important of the strategic decisions concern: (i) the integration
between organisations; (ii) obtaining funds; (iii) sharing and preparing for risks;
and (iv) the type of users’ participation.
From the analysis of more than thirty cases of reconstruction and the review of
similar approaches already vahidated in the regular building industry, this study
proposes the following hypothesis:
In the context of an organisation adoptïng the roles of promoter and builder of a
reconstruction project, the performance of the project (that is to say, the capacity
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to reach the objectives with the maximum optimisation of resources) depends to
a great extent on:
7. The level of integration and differentiation within the multi-organisation (that
is formed to carry out the project), including inserting the project in a larger
program of reconstruction;
2. The multi-organisation’s strategic capacity to attract funding,
3. The multi-organisation’s capacity to share and react to the nsks of the
environment;
4. The level 0f user’s responsibility for individual decision-making among a
series of choices offered.
If proved right, thïs hypothesis changes the direction of the current debate built
atound the so-called “key aspects” for success in reconstruction (namely the
participation of end-users and the use of local resources and know how) and
proposes a re-evaluation of the Critical Success Factors of reconstruction
projects, using the concept developed by Leidecker and Bruno (1986).
Validating this hypothesis requires associating the organisational design cf the
projects to their overall performance. In a traditional case-study methodology four
detailed case studies were used for the purposes of demonstrating that the
hypothesis is true or false.
A method for assessing the performance of the projects needed to be developed
using, as a basis, the evaluation methods used both in construction and in the
international development field. The surprising resufts that were obtained highlight
the vulnerability of low-cost housing projects to their environments, and give
valuable information for the design and implementation of future projects of post
disaster reconstruction in developing countries.
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l.tl. The document
The document is presented in four chapters: (i) introduction, (ii) methods, (iii)
results and (iv) discussion. The introduction (this chapter) includes the rationale,
the theoretical framework of the study and the analysis of the literature in the field.
The methods of research developed in chapter two are applied to the four case
studies presented in chapter three. The third chapter also presents the analysis of
the results, and finally, in chapter four the main conclusions of the study are
proposed and discussed. The append ix includes numerous supporting tables of
evaluation that are also submiffed on a CD as MS Excel files.
1.2. Database of case studies
The argument proposed in this study is based on the analysis of several cases of
reconstruction projects reported in the literature and eight others visited and
studied through information gathered first hand. Table 1.1 presents a summary of
the 34 case studies that were studied in the research. More than 30 additional
projects, documented by UNDRO (1982), Maskrey (1989), the World Bank
(2000), Yasemin and Oliver (1987), Davis (1987) and Oliver-Smith (1990) were
also considered while developïng the argument and in the process of validating
the hypothesis.
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Table 1.1 Database of projects used forthe study
projects visited and_studied_through_intormation gathered first hand
location type disaster organisation main outputs number o visited in
responsible housing
units built
I Choluteca, semi-rural hurricane 1995 CECI masonry units, education 52 2002
Honduras relocation Mitch and training
2 rural area rural earthquake 1999 Coffee Growers’ housing, infrastructure, 2000, 2002
Colombia reconstruction Organisations services, employment,
education, information
3 Tebaida, semi-rural earthquake 1999 Antioquia Presente masonry houses, 952 2002
Colombia relocation infrastructure, community
services
6 Armenia, urban temporary earthquake 1999 Universidad timber units, education, 9000 2002
Colombia housing Nacional information, tood, temporary
infrastructure
5 Calarca, semi-rural earthquake 1999 FENAVID- prefabricated housing and 150 2002
Colombia relocation Servivienda infrastructure
6 Amenia, urban relocation earthquake 1999 ONG Restrepo costumed-made houses, 64 2002
Colombia Barco infrastructure and
community services
7 San Salvador, urban relocation earthquake 2001 Municipality 0f San infrastructure 0 2002
El Salvador Salvador
8 La Paz, El rural earthquake 2001 FUNDASAL pre-fab and masonry units, 4400 2002
Salvador reconstruction municipal education
projects documented in the literature documentedby
Andhra consultancy various ATMA consultancy, studies n/a Jayaraj, 2001
Pradesh, India disasters
10 Peu rural preparedness n/a n/a CRYRZA - UNCHS studies, R&D, traïnïng, n/a UNCHS,
education, technology 1989
11 Yungay, Peu town relocation earthquake 1970 CRYRZA pre-fab core houses for Oliver-Smith,
100.000 1990
12 El Asnam, semi-rural earthquake 1980 UNCHS (Habitat) pre-fab housing, urban 40000 UNCHS,
Alegria reconstruction planning and studies 1989
13 Dominica rural hurricane 1980 UNCHS (Habitat) studies, R&D, trainïng, 1 UNCHS,
reconstruction education, technology prototype 1989
transfer
14 Lamu, Kenya urban planning tire 1982 UNCHS (Habitat) urban planning studies, risk n/a UNCHS,
and prevention mapping and preparedness 1989
studies
15 Dhamar, Yemen rural earthquake 1982 UNCHS (Habitat) housing, technology 280 UNCHS,
reconstruction — transfer, education 1989
16 Titicaca, Bolivia rural floods 1985 UNCHS (Habitat) housing, reinforcementof 300 UNCHS,
reconstruction institutions 1989
17 Mexico, Mexico urban planning earthquake 1985 UNDP - UNCHS seismic hazard analysis, n/a UNCHS,
and prevention vulnerability assessment 1989
studies seismic-nsk mitigation
18 Armero urban relocation landslides 1985 Local Government housing n/a Andersen
Colombia and
Woodrow,
1989
19 San Salvador, urban planning earthquake 1986 UNCHS (Habitat) urban planning studies, risk n/a UNCHS,
El Salvador studies mapping and preparedness 1989
20 San Salvador, urban earthquake 1986 Municipality of San condominiums 1000 Solo, 1991
El Salvador reconstruction Salvador
21 San Salvador, urban earthquake 1986 Cooperative mesones (traditional urban 150 Solo, 1991
El Salvador reconstruction Housing typology cf housing units)
Foundation
22 Cayambe, rural earthquake 1987 CAP (Centro housing, education, tool 1700 Dudley, 1988
Ecuador reconstruction Andino de Accion kits, subsidies, matenals
Popular)
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23 Philippines rural typhoon 1987 Local government, cote housing project, 16000 Diacon, 1992
reconstruction UNDP, UNDRO training, education,
community organisation
24 Ecuador rural earthquake 1987 UNCHS (Habitat) studies, R&D, ttaining, nia UNCHS,
reconstruction education, technology 1989
transfer fot housing and
inftasttuctute
25 Bangladesh rural floods 1988 UNCHS (Habitat) studies, logistics, n/a UNCHS,
reconstruction management 1989
26 Nepal urban earthquake 1988 UNDP - UNCHS studies, R&D, training, n/a UNCHS,
reconstruction education, technology 1989
transfer for housing and
infrastructure
27 Al-Burjain, urban civil war 1991 Local governments housing, infrastructure nia El-Masri and
Lebanon reconstruction Kelleif, 2001
28 Bangladesh rural cyclones 1991 Local Government community housing and n/a Karim, 2001
reconstruction 1996 “killas”, planning,
preparedness,
infrastructure
29 Lio, Indonesia village relocation earthquake 1992 Local government houses and urban/regional 127 Ijahjono,
— clan 1999
30 Maharashtra, village relocation earthquake 1993 Maharashtra’s housing 24000 Salazar,
India Government and house- 1999
World Bank holds
relocated
31 Marathwada, village relocation earthquake 1993 Local Govemment housing 27000 Jigyasu,
India and World Bank 2000
32 Kutchch, India village earthquake 1993 Vastu-Shilpa housing, education, n/a Vastu-Shilpa,
reconstruction and Foundation training, studies, 2001
reseftlements community mobilisation
33 Konaseema, rural recovery cyclones 1996 Local Task Forces medical cote, rescue, food, n/a Sivaji, 2002
India subsidies, temporary
shelters
34 Marmara, Bolu, temporary earthquake 1999 Local Government temporary units 47000 Johnson,
Turkey relocation 2001
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1.3. The current debate around reconstruction practices
“In the earthquake I was with my wïfe, Rubiela, in the town, and we were
surprised to see the houses falling down.. .. we almost had to walk to my
farm as there was no transportation. When we arrived, I feit happy to
know that my family was alive, but at the same time very sad to see the
house totally destroyed... We thought we could not rebuild our house
again because we didn’t have any resources...”
Oscar Bermudez. citizen and farmer of Calarca, Colombia; when asked about his
experience in the earthquake (Translated from Cafered, January 25, 2000).
This family, as well as millions of families in the world, were recently affected by a
disaster. In 1999 alone, disastets left 105,000 deaths and Iosses for 100 billion
dollars (Swiss Insurance Company Swiss Re, as reported by the AP. Journal de
Montréal, Match 8, 2000). In earthquakes alone, 15 million people suffered
serious injuries and 100 million had their homes destroyed in the last century
(Hewiff,1997). Disasters are common scenarios calling forthe contribution and
co-operation of international institutions. Canada alone invested US$ 174 million
in 1996 in international programs that include post-disaster interventions.
Disasters draw the attention of local and international media, and in several cases
institutions put up enormous economic resources in places where the pre-disaster
economic conditions were already critical. The major problem lies on the fact that,
instead of decreasing, disasters occur every year more often, and are more
destructive. It is difficult to know if the natural events are actually more frequent,
they are, however, beller documented and occur in locations where populations
are now densely seffled. In fact, it is estimated that the population affected by
disasters world-wide increases 6 % per year since 1960 (DIRDN, 1996).
Central and South America are areas of continuous disasters. Over the Iast
hundred years, the Latin American and Caribbean region has been affected by an
estimated total of 1,309 natural disasters, During the last 30 years alone, the
region was affected by 972 disasters, i.e., 32,4 disasters annually on average.
Peak years (1998 and 1999) witnessed 60 or more disasters.
9Even though several strategies have been proposed for post-disaster
interventions, housing provision has frequently been a controversial aspect of the
reconstruction and mitigation stages in developing countties. Therefore, the kind
of housing units that can, or should be provided, the interaction of international
agencies with regional institutions, the role of the local government in housing
provision, and the participation of the community in the construction of units, are
major concerns and constant targets of discussion.
In order to provide the fastest relief, the most efficient shelter and the most
adequate mitigation program to affected communities, different strategies have
been proposed. However, most of the strategies adopted in housing
reconstruction in the last fifty years can be grouped in two extreme approaches.
1. A community-based or boffom-up approach (so called by El-Masri and Kelleif,
2001). It is frequently supported by the so-called ‘enabler’ policy of housing
provision (as proposed by the World Bank, cited by Zaneffa, 2001). It usually
includes a central self-help project and promotes community participation. It is
targeted to “grass roots” development and is based on the argument that this
approach helps build self-reliance into the affected communities (Davis, 1981;
Yasemin and Oliver-Smith, 1987; Anderson and Woodrow, 1989; UNCHS, 1989;
Maskrey, 1989; Oliver-Smith, 1990).
2. A technology-based or top-down approach (so called by El-Masri and Kelleif,
2001). Almost exclusively based on prefabricated technologies and external
provision of resources, it is usually accompanied by a ‘provider’ policy. With great
reliance on the import of dwellings, it has been promoted because of the alleged
speed with which housing can be completed (Donato et ai, 1972; Latina, 1988;
Ban, 1996; Chalinder, 1998; Richard, 2002).
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In both the technology and the community-based approaches extreme solutions
have been adopted resulting in either high-tech imported units delivered through
complicated and expensive logistics or in labour-intensive self-help construction
practices (for example, construction work for food programs). Fig. 1.1 illustrates
some of the extreme attitudes adopted in post-disaster reconstruction. Fig. 1.2
shows examples of technology-based imported solutions used for housing after
disasters.
r::.Ij;!
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Fig. 1.1 The two extreme approaches to housing reconstruction. Left: images of labour
intensive work in self-help initiatives organised in a community-based approach. Right:
images of ready-to-use imported pre-fab units developed in a technology-based
approach. Source: http://instantshleters.com (October, 1999)
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Fig. 1.2 Technology-based imported solutions used for housing after disasters. Left:
Polyurethane domes Uesigned in 1970 by the West Getman Red Cross in collaboration
with the Bayer Chemical Company. Center and right: Emergency shelters designed by
the ‘Affordable instant storage and greenhouses” Source: http://instantshleters.com
(October, 1999).
11
Within the community-based approach, ambitious plans of community
reconstruction, users’ participation, self-help construction and holistic measures
targeted to long-term development have been proposed. A relevant discourse
arguing for this approach is proposed by Andrew Maskrey (1989), who presents,
in Disaster Mitigation: A Communïty Based Approach, lessons obtained from
several cases of disaster mitigation in Peru. Maskrey associates the resuits of
disastet mitigation strategies with a special emphasis on the community
participation components of the projects. His research is conducted from the
assumption that disasters are the resuit of the conjunction between a natural
hazard, and socio-economic and political processes. Years later, this approach
was illustrated by Blaike and colleagues (1994) in the disaster-pressure model
that is explained in section 1.3.1. Maskrey’s study, encouraging the practice ofthe
community-based mitigation program, suggests guidelines for other institutïons
and establishes a number of priorities and principles for successful
implementation. A similar approach is presented by Yasemin Aysan and Paul
Oliver’s (1987) book Housing and Culture afler Earthquakes. In their study, after
presenting a particular case study in Turkey, appropriate policies to follow in the
future are suggested. The policies and guidelines suggested by Maskrey, Aysan
and Cliver have been widely accepted and have been adopted by major
organisations such as the United Nations’ agencies. In these guidelines,
relocation, temporary housing and imported solutions are widely ctiticised and are
often salU to be associated with problems in the acceptability of the outputs and
with negative effects in long term development.
Yasemin and Oliver’s (1987) study strongly recommends avoiding forcing the
relocation of sefflements unless there are “strong ecological problems, continuing
risk of immediate hazards, or insuperable problems in moving debris.” — an
approach that is shared by many other authors such as Frederick Cuny (1983).
The argument also discourages the use of emergency imported shelters, by
considering them not to be feasible solutions, as UNDRO in the book Shelterafter
Disaster (1982) explains:
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“Universal standard shelter is flot feasible because it ignores: [j] The
high price and poor cost effectiveness of the product in the disaster
affected country, [ii] the need to involve disaster survivors in satisfying
their own needs, [iii]... climatic variations, [iv] variations in cultural
values and house forms [vJ variations in family size, [vi] the need of
familles to earn their livelihood in their houses, [vii] local capacity to
improve shelter, [viii] the problems of obtaining suitable land at low cost
on which to build such shelters, [ix] the Iogistical problem of transporting
and distributing, [X] problems cf appropriate technology”.
The influence and ïmportance of social aspects in the post-disaster housing
process are discussed by Oliver-Smith in the article “post-disaster housing
reconstruction and social inequality”, published in 1990, in the journal Disasters.
According to Oliver-Smith “greater affention needs to be paid to the issue of social
stratification and its relationship to post-disaster reconstruction for social change
and development.”
A similar article by Souheil El-Masri “Learning from the People: A Fieldwork
Approach in War-damaged Villages in Lebanon”, published in the book
Reconstruction after Disaster: Issues and Practices in 1997, documents how an
understanding of both the social context and the peopte’s needs is a fundamental
pre-requisite to meet the challenges of reconstruction after a disaster. The article
presents an approach called “reconstruction with people”, where the response is
based on an understanding cf the social environment of the disaster and where
the tole of the end-users is articulated in the reconstruction program.
This approach to post-disaster housing reconstruction has also influenced the
application of so-called appropriate technology. Contemporary theories in this
regard encourage the practice of relying on training methods instead of
technology transfer for the improvement of construction and the reduction of
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vulnerability. The article “Learning to Build Safe Roofs: UNESCO’s role”,
published by the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs on the DHA
News Journal (1997), is an example of the curtent concern regarding roofing
technology and the training methods’ approach. On the other hand, the
technology transfer of imported solutions and industrialised solutions has been
considered to be “disappointing” (UNDRO, 1982) and is frequently criticised by
many scholars. lnfluenced by these concepts, Weldelibanos’ (1993) thesis at
McGilI University argues for the application of traditional technologies and
indigenous materials combined with efficient structural systems. This practice has
been qualified, in the context of traditional seillements, as a more convenient
response for risk mitigation and reduction.
Table 1.2 summarises some of the publications contributing to post-disaster
reconstruction theories. The date of publication, the author, and a simplified
descrïptïon of their theoretical approach are listed. The table illustrates that,
during the last twenty years, several authors have investigated the social aspects
of the housing reconstruction process. While doing so, some authors have gone
even further in disqualifying the use of the approach that associates housing as
an industrialised product that is provided to the affected community. This is an
argument that is easy to support, considering the numerous cases of
dissatisfaction and failure in the use of industrialised solutions within the Iast three
decades. However, before falling into the trap of drawing categorical conclusions,
it is important to evaluate individual cases and to pay special attention to local
factors, notably to the climate. Extreme weather conditions (extreme hot, ram or
cold) can not be excluded as a priority when selecting the type of approach to be
implemented. In fact, in cases where extreme temperatures rapidly endanger
survival, construction speed is a relevant factor and the fastest shelter solutions
can in fact be the most advantageous.
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Table 1.2 Recent approaches to post-disaster reconstruction
Author Publication Year approach
The World Bank Risks and reconstruction: 2000 Housing for refugees and
Experiences of resettlers and resettiement projects
refugees
El-Masri, Reconstruction after disaster: 1997 Reconstruction with people
Souheil. Edited by Issues and practices
Awotona, Adenrele
UNDHA - DHA News Journal 1997 Programs of education,
UNESCO participation and women
involvement
United Nations UNDRO. Shelter after 1982 The social reconstruction of the
disaster community
UNDRONews 1992
Weldelibanos, A su,vey ofearthquake 1993 The importance and
Fitsum berhan mitigation strategies and possibilities of traditional
Thesis at McGill building principles for small technologies in the
traditional dwellings reconstruction process
Oliver-Smith, Post-disasterhousing 1990 The importance of social
Anthony reconstruction and social aspects in post-disaster
inequality: A change to policy reconstruction
and practice
Maskrey, Andrew Disaster mitigation: A 1989 Community based mitigation
community based approach programs
Yasemin, Aysan Housing and culture after 1987 Permanent reconstruction and
and Oliver, Paul disasters: A guide for future social consequences after
policy making on housing in resettlement. The importance of
seismic areas the community in the
reconstruction process
Davis lan “Developments in the 1987 The importance ofthe
provision of culturally participation of survivors and
sensitive housing within education programs
seismic areas 1981-1 986”
Proceedings of Middle East
and Mediterranean regional
conference on earthen and
10w —strength masonry
buildings in seismic areas
Davis, lan Disasters and the small 1981 The importance of
dwelling understanding low-cost
residential reconstruction
beyond the technical aspects
Some of the documents listed above encourage the policies of indigenous
permanent solutions for post-disaster strategies in developing countries while
discouraging the use of imported solutions, high-technologies and non-traditional
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construction systems. However, for other authors in the low-cost housing fielU,
the disadvantages of prefabtication for housing solutions in developing cou ntries
do flot seem to be that clear; or at least, they seem to be dependent on several
factors. Such is the case of Melanie Stallen, Yves Chabannes and Florian
Steinberg, (1994) who constituted a research team in the Institute for Housing and
Urban Studies (IHS), in the Netherlands. Iheir study, published in the l8th
Volume of the Journal Habitat International; presents an alternative point of view
with regard to the advantages or disadvantages of housing prefabrication in
Colombia, India, Mexico, China and Nicaragua.
In their report, the authors demonstrate that prefabrication can make a positive
contribution to low-income housing solutions. The applicability of light
prefabrication can be based on the pallern of local resources and reflect the state
of the local “technical culture”. IHS suggests that a change of scale in the
construction market can be introduced by combining prefabrication and self
help/mutual-aid for large-scale low-income projects. The study shows that, “given
the right circumstances, costs can be reduced, employment opportunities
generated, low skill levels utilised, opportunities created for women and the local
resources can provide the basis of such prefabrication.” However, those
circumstances depend mainly on the use of ‘light’ prefabrication systems that,
unlike the ‘heavy’ systems, do not rely on external inputs with acquisition of
patents, equipment, know-how, and raw materials from “the outside”. The proper
circumstances are ascertained through the careful articulation between local and
external resources.
The major problem with which we are confronted now is that either by adopting
one approach or the other (the community- or the technology-based), thete is
evidence that shows that existing housing reconstruction strategies have failed in
enabling vuinerable communities to recover in the short run and in achieving long
term development over time. Extensive criticism of post-disaster reconstruction
projects in developing countries have been exposed by Davis, (1981), and
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multiple examples of the faïlure of these strategies are reported by Anderson
and Woodrow (1989); Davis (1978); Dudley (1988); Oliver-Smith (1990); Salazar
(1999); Solo (1991); Tjahjono (1999) and Wisner (2001). Section 1.7.3 highlights
some of the frequent risks that influence the performance of reconstruction
projects. However, let us dwell first on the basic concepts that will permit us to
develop a different approach.
1.3.1. Disasters and the concept ofvulnerability
It is commonly accepted by international organisations that a disaster is “a serious
disruption of the functioning of a society, causing widespread human, material or
environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected society to cope
using only its own resources” (UNDHA, 1992). Even though there is liffle
controversy around this definition, it is flot enough to explain why disasters
happen. In other words, why there is a limit of destruction beyond which societies
cannot cope wïth their own resources. b overcome this limitation, Blaike et al.
(1994), Hewiif (1997) and other contemporary authors have developed the
concept of vulnerability to explain the causes of ‘natural’ disasters. The notion of
vulnerability examines the reasons that lead a community to a certain level of
‘weakness’, such that, influenced by a natural hazard, it is Ied to a level of
destruction from which the community cannot recover without external aid.
The United Nations agencies define vulnerability as the “degree of loss (from 0%
to 100%) resulting from a potentially damaging phenomenon” (UNDHA, 1992).
Even though this definition is accepted in the internationally agreed glossary of
disaster management, this definition does not describe what Blaike et al. (1994),
Hewiif (1997) and Maskrey (1989) - among othets - try to communicate in their
vulnerability approach to disasters. In reality, the vulnerability model daims that
the vulnerabilities correspond to unsafe conditions originated by dynamic
pressures. Very often these dynamic pressures (caused by social, political,
economic and cultural factors) originate - in reality - in historic events called “root
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causes”. According to this approach when unsafe conditions meet with a
natural hazard the disaster occurs. Fig. 1.3 shows (as a way of exemplifying this
argument) the vulnerability model applied to the 1999 ear[hquake in Turkey.
1999 Turkish earthquake disaster
root dynamic
causes pressures
migration
to cities
industriali
sation rapid
urbanisation
Iack of
control by
building
codes
vuinerabilities
Fig. 1.3 The vulnerability model (after Blaike et aI. 1994) applied — as an examole — to
the Turkish disaster in 1999.
This analysis is very useful to understand the causes of disasters and the
accumulation in time of unsafe conditions. However, it indicates very liffle about
what type of actions are required to overcome the disaster. Here, it is proposed to
take the concept of vulnerability even further in order to clarify what it really
means in terms of reconstruction activities. In fact, vulnerability is the Iack of up
front access to resources (material, such as finance, housing, roads,
infrastructure, public services, etc.- and organisational, such as insurance,
individual decision making, education, information, etc.). According to this
definition, the unsafe conditions and dynamic pressures correspond, in reality, to
inappropriate or insufficient access to the tesources that permit a community to
deal with the effects of natu rai hazards.
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This approach flot only builds up on the concepts and ideas elaborated by
previous research (Blaike et ai, 1994 and Hewiil, 1997) but also permits taking a
step forward in identifying what the role cf reconstruction is after a natu rai hazard.
Ihe following section explains in detail that role.
1.3.2. The concept of reconstruction
From the community-based approach to reconstruction described earlier, a
concept of sustainable reconstruction has been developed and commonly
accepted by most scholars. In this concept, the reconstruction is the group of
“actions taken f0 re-estabiish a community after a period of rehabilitation
subsequent to a disaster. Actions would ïnclude construction of permanent
housing, full restoration of services, and complete resumption of the pre-disaster
state” (UNDHA, 1992).
This concept has frequently been accompanied by the idea that the reduction of
the vulnerabilities and sustainable reconstruction are only achieved through the
reinforcement cf local strengths. “The key to success uitimately lies in the
participation of the focal community — the survivors — in reconstruction” (UNDRO,
1982).
However, if we consider the vulnerabiiity as the lack of access to resources, and
we consider that the natural hazard (that triggers a disaster) reduces even more
that access f0 resources (banks, offices, housing and commerce are destroyed),
we understand what the process of reconstruction is for: improving the peopie’s
access to resources lost and f0 develop access to the basic resources that people
did not have before the disaster. Oniy through the improvement of these two
levels of resources wil I the community be prepared to face the next natural
hazard. Fulfihlina this condition is a reauirement to facilitate the lona-tecrn
sustainability of the intervention.
The orocess cf reconstruction is also concerned with articulating the local
resources available with the external aid reauired, and relating ail of them to the
end-users and their needs and expectations. It is usually recognised that there
are two types of resources that determine the “level of development” a communîtv
has: (ï) ‘hard’ resources (which describe tangible and phvsical resources such as
housing, infrastructure, public services, etc) and (ii) ‘soft’ resources (which
describe non tangible or not physical resources such as employment, education,
information, etc.)
Consequentiy, from the previous analysis it is possible to propose the following
definition of post-disaster housing reconstruction: “the process of improvement of
pre-disaster housing conditions: targeted to achieve long term local development
through the articulation of local and external resources giving to residents
increased access to the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ factors of reconstruction”. This definition
is represented by Figure 1.4, which illustrates in a vertical scale the level 0f
access to resources (that is to say the level of vulnerability), and a horizontal
scale of time. The level of access to resources is affected by the hazard
(earthquake, flood, storm, etc). If the hazard is strong enough and the pre-disaster
access to resources of the population is Iow, the community cannot cope with the
losses and damages exclusively with its own resources. This particular case,
where external aid is required, is called a disaster. The process of recovery
(represented by the blue curve) corresponds to the reconstruction process,
leading to an increase in the pre-disaster level of access to resources.
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Fig. 1.5 Model illustrating the concept of crisis recovery
This definition of disaster. contrasts with the equivalent definition of housing crises
represented in Fig. 1.5 In this case, the community affected by the hazard of
magnitude ‘y’ (where ‘y’ may be as great as ‘x’) still has enough ‘hard’ resources
(such as materials, technology, financial resources, etc) combined with ‘soft’
resources (such as education, qualified labour force, active decision-making,
politic saying, know-how, etc) to recover on its own without the need of external
aid. In this particular case the community ‘only’ goes through a crisis.
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In conclusion, these definitions of reconstruction and vulnerability imply three
important aspects:
First, that the reduction of vulnerabilities is a dependent variable of the access to
resources (this does not ignore that vuinerabilities correspond to added-up
weaknesses and root causes, as suggested in previous models such as Blaike et
al., 1994). However, this clarifies what the process of reconstruction is intended
for, namely, the improvement of access to resources.
Second, that reconstruction is the process in which pre-disaster housing
conditions are improved to a sustainable level of access to resources for long
term development. This notion has been previously suggested in studies related
with international aid for development (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989) and in
environmental studies for developing countries (OECD, 1995). This means that
reconstruction is not only the recovery of normal activities but also improvement
above the previous level of development.
Third, by definition, post-disaster reconstruction is a process required when (and
only when) the community cannot cope with a situation with its own resources and
therefore, external resources are required (UNDHA, 1992). This view emphasises
the difference between crisis solutions and post-disaster reconstruction. It
contrasts with some extreme tendencies that lay almost ail the emphasis on the
use of local resources and on community action, sometimes underestimating the
inescapable need for external resources. The lower the access to resources
befote the disaster, and therefore the Iower after the disaster (Le. the lower the
curve goes down in Fig. 1.4), the more resources are needed for the community
to be re-established or developed in co-ordination with external aid. Even though
this might sound obvious, research shows that, in fact, the recognition of the
impact - in terms of sustainability - of external resources is frequently not
achieved in reconstruction (Davis, 1981).
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1.4. The problem
The current acceptance and diffusion of the community based (or boffom-up)
approach among NGOs, practitioners and researchers in the field of
reconstruction has iead to the belief that the best (and oniy) way to achieve
success in reconstruction practices is through the participation of local residents
and use of local resources. This approach has leU many academics and
practitioners to concentrate their efforts to improve the performance of
reconstruction projects through aspects that can be considered at a tactical level
(that is to say on a project-by-project basis). In fact, the review of several cases in
the literature and some of the cases presented in the Montreal conference (i-Rec,
2002) prove that much of these efforts have been devoted to the implementation
of two major tactical measures: fi) the use of local (sometïmes vernacular)
construction technologies instead of foreign (imported) technologies; and (ii)
increased levels of users’ participation in the construction process.
Several examples can be used to illustrate this tendency. However, the research
and practice conducted by Annie Jayaraj in India illustrates the particular interest
to emphasise, almost as a matter of doctrine, the relevance of these two aspects.
According to Jayaraj (2002):
“Several principles and best practices in post-disaster reconstruction work
have been identified [in twenty years of research and practice in the field]
and they are listed below:
• The reconstruction work should be community managed, controlled and
owned, sociaily and culturally acceptable. It should promote mutual support
of the communities, eniist self-heip and ensure voluntary labour.
• The locally existing ecologically friendly, low cost materials should be used.
Ail of the available local resources, local talents, subsidies and various
schemes of the governments [must be exploitedJ.
23
• Simple, current, cost effective, research-based technology and indigenous
technology that is easily adaptable and maintainable must be preferred.
• Efforts should be made ta make use of the old and useful building
materials and thereby avoidîng wastage and minimïse the cost of
construction.
• The labour intensive technology should be encouraged and mechanisation
of construction and labour displacing technology should be opposed and
discouraged.
• The program should facilitate skiN development, up-grading of traditional
skiNs and encourage learning by doing. It should encourage and make use
of the materials produced by village industries and rural artisans”
As it was mentioned before, this tactïcal approach has been recommended by
Maskrey (1989), the United Nations agencies (UNDRO, 1982), NGOs (CECI,
2001), funding bodies such as CIDA (CIDA website, Feb, 2004) and others. It has
been implemented in projects in FI Salvador, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras,
Equator, the Philippines and Vietnam, among others.
In the regular building industry, the tactical approach to processes (and the
performance of these ptocesses) contrasts with the strategic approach, in which
long-term aspects - that are not necessarily related ta any one project - are
considered. In the strategic approach, performance is associated with the
development of an organisation over a longer period of time and according ta an
organisation’s mission, objectives and strategy. The strategy permits to position
the organisation in its environment and determines the way to affain the mission
and objectives (that go beyond the interests of individual projects). As proposed
by Lloyd Byars (1984), strategic planning requires the following sequence of
activities: 1. Defining the organisation’s mission (its philosophy and purpose), 2.
Formulating policies (guides of action ta select objectives and strategies), 3.
Establishing long- and short-range objectives, 4. Identifying strategic alternatives
ta achieve the objectives, 5. Selecting a strategy.
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A concentration of efforts on the tactical aspects of the building process instead of
the strategic aspects (as a way to improve the performance of projects) is flot
surprising in the building industry, and in a way it is understandable due to the
characteristics of the organisations that work in ilial. seotufTÏnâlly, even though
reconstruction activities have a humanitarian and development component, they
follow in many aspects the logic of regular construction (they are made by
temporary multi-organisations that work in a project-by-project basis).
As demonstrated by Katsanis (1998), several firms in the building industry operate
mostly on a tactical basis: “firms in the building industry (particularly those in
architecture business) are tactically dtiven rather than strategically driven and
they focus on short term actions”. Furthermore, multiple cases suggest that
strategic planning has not always been applied in organisations working in
reconstruction projects (Dudley, 1988). Due to the nature of the building industry,
architects, engineers, consultants and contractors work on a project-by-project
basis, that is to say, participating in a project for only a limited perïod of time,
namely: the duration of the project, after the end of which they direct their efforts
elsewhere. In fact, it is flot surprising that the tactical approach responds to four
particular characteristics of construction projects:
a. By nature a project is “a sequence of activities with a beginning, an end and an
identified objective” (Davidson, 1988). This means that the decisions taken by an
organisation during its participation in a project have a short-term influence over
the process associated with that project (even if the consequences in the building
are almost permanent).
b. Most construction projects are unique; they respond to the environment and the
participants that develop them. Contrary to other industries in which products and
the modes of production are relatively standardised, in the construction industry
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knowledge and experience gained in one project cannot be directly applied to
the next one.
c. Construction projects are usually made by temporary multi-organisations
(Davidson, 1988) that disperse once the project is finished. After one project is
done, participants usually change partners to work on a new project. This means
that preparing a strategic plan and accumulating expertise among ail the
participants is very difficuit, if not impossible.
d. Temporary multi-organisations are made by individuals, companies or
institutions that have their own long-term strategic interests (they might be explicit
or flot). Evidence shows that (i) the objectives of the project are flot aiways
compatible with the strategic interests of the participants; and (ii) those interests
might also be sources of conflict in between the participants (Mohsini and
Davidson, 1991, 1992; Mohsini et al. 1995), thus lowering the level of
performance of the project ‘team’.
Despite the limitations existing in the building industry regarding the
implementation of strategic planning other than at the level of the individual
participating firms, the importance and the potential of adopting the strategic
approach cannot be neglected (Langford and Male, 2001).
In the light ofthis recognition ofthe differences between strategic and tactical
views, it is regrettable that flot only indïvidual NGOs but also academics have
concentrated on tactical decisions in the search to improve the performance of
reconstruction projects. In fact, and despite aIl the possible benefits of adopting a
strategic approach, even the major organisations in the field of reconstruction
seem to have concentrated on tactical decision-making. In a World Bank
publication called Doing more for those made homeless by natural disasters, Roy
Gilbert provides “a good practice thumbnail sketch for [WorIdJ Bank Task Teams”
in which a list of 31 guidelines is suggested in the form of a best practice check
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list. This list includes a great number of tactical recommendations such as: “do
flot involve major land acquisïtions”, “follow good practice building and land-use
standards from the outset”, “respond quickly but with due diligence”, “be
emotionally commiffed, but sure that solutions are rational, relevant and efficient”,
“first attention to the poor that suffered most, but also to those suffering less
through mitigation”, “resist temptation to solve broader poverty problem through
reconstruction alone”. This list of seemingly rather naïve and elementary
recommendations is accompanied by only three recommendations dealing with a
real strategic level: (i) “Coordinate Bank’s reconstruction with relief efforts,
meeting with the relief agencies early on” (ii) “Involve existing housing agencies
with good track records where they exist” and (iii) “Consider housing
sector/market as a whole, especially that unsafe areas are not occupied”.
Despite great efforts to improve the performance of projects with the community
based (boftom-up) approach, very liille has actually been improved, as now will
be shown. In reality, the 10w level of performance and the obstacles frequently
encountered in reconstruction projects are still a preoccupation of researchers
and practitioners. UNCHS explains that these obstacles are sometimes affached
to obtaining affordable land, to the costs of materials and to delays caused by the
training period required when using unskilled labour. Other common problems are
associated with the lack of resources to build infrastructure and facilities and with
the acceptability of the projects, which even with the use of local labour and
resources is sometimes compromised by cultural reasons (UNCHS, 1989).
Research proves that, indeed, major difficulties in the construction of new Iow
cost housing in developing countries are associated more with the provision of
infrastructure and, often in parallel, with the creation of ghettos than with the
construction of housing units themselves (Bhaft, 1999). In the case of relocation,
Iack of affordable land in areas Iocated close f0 the sources of work (i.e.
downtown or central areas) results in relocation to peripheral areas, where land is
less expensive. Bringing infrastructure and services to these remote areas is
usually extremely expensive and the new sefflements have very lift le mix of use
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and concentrate low-income residents together, increasing the formation of
ghettos and facilitating segregation between economïc classes.
Even in cases where the community-based approach has been rigorously
implemented and the level of performance of the projects has been higher, the
resuits of the initiatives have been limited to small-scale projects, with very liffle
impact in the overail recovery of the community. Examples of this are found in the
project conducted by the Cooperative Housing Foundation in San Salvador
(project No. 21 in the database 0f projects) and in the one conducted in Bolivia
(project No. 16 in the database of projects).
Even when self-help programs have been implemented and controlled in a
systematic manner, stiil the low performance of projects has been criticised and
reported due to aspects that are flot necessarily related with the construction of
housing units. Such is the case of the post-Mitch relocation project in Nueva
Choluteca, Honduras (project No. 1 in the database of projects), which was
qualified by The Washington Post as “an incomplete model town”; the study
conducted by the journal proved that “new home for storm survivors in Honduras
lacks basic services”.
The 10w performance, limitations and obstacles found in reconstruction projects
lead us to believe that even though the community-based (or boffom-up)
approach might improve certain aspects of the project at the tactical level, it
misses three important problems found in reconstruction:
Problem 1: Even though the community-based approach puts out a daim for the
use of community participation as a way to allain maximum performance of
projects, it rarely defïnes what is the type of participation that is required. This has
probably contributed to the fact that, in reality, this participation is often Iimited to
the involvement of end-users in the process of constructïon of units. In fact, this
narrow approach to community participation was recognised by Da Silva (1980) in
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housing provision in general in developing countries. According to Da Silva,
even though spontaneous self-help initiatives cover the aspects of design,
management, financing and construction, aided self-help initiatives usually
concentrate exclusively on the participation of end users in construction activities.
These activities frequently involve assembly of components and in some cases
the production of construction components (usually bricks, tues, doors, windows,
etc). However, self-help as a principle can involve (or should involve, according to
Da Silva) the participation of users in other aspects of the housing delivery
ptocess, such as design, financing and management of the project.
Even though it has been extensively argued about the importance of involving
end users in the process of reconstruction, this partnering with local residents has
rarely been one in which risks associated with decision making are involved or
shared. In reality, this partnering (concentrated in construction activities) seems to
have been adopted as if it were only a way of guaranteeing acceptability of the
final product and of guaranteeing some level of transfer of best practice. However,
as we will see later, knowledge in the project management field argues for the
transfer and sharing of risks in complex projects, particularly where risks are high.
Problem 2: the limitations and obstacles found in most of the case studies of the
database demonstrate that the performance of the projects is flot that much
affected by tactical aspects of the projects (such as the choice of labour force, the
technology used or the tactical strategy adopted) but more by strategic aspects
that permit the organisation to be prepared (even before the disaster) to respond
to the requirements of the project. These strategic aspects seem to upset the
development 0f the projects particularly in the activities related with the
management of the project and the collection of resources; this is especially true
when organisations responsible of the ptojects act as promoters (very often
including fund raising).
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Problem 3: In many cases, the performance of the project seems to be more
affected by the hostile environment in which the project is deveioped than by
internai aspects under the control of the organisation. These external aspects are
related with the economic, social, cultural and political environments in which the
organisations have to perform.
These three problems lead to the belief that the traditional approach to describing
the performance of the reconstruction process (based on tactical aspects of the
project) is not enough to respond to the particularities of reconstruction initiatives.
A different approach seems then to be required. The basis for a different
approach that considers the delicate relations between the projects and the
environment can be found in the so-called “systems approach”.
1.5. The systems approach
The systems approach has been used in engineering, social sciences, and in
many other fields of science to explain the complex relations between the
elements and the environment. In a “systems view” both the organisation and the
projects are considered as systems that influence and are influenced by their
immediate environments. A system is defined as a group of eiements with
relations between them and between their attributes. The environment of a
system is ail the elements outside the system which: fa) affect the system when
they are changed, and fb) are affected by a change in the system fDavidson,
2001). In the case of post-disaster reconstruction, the project is particularly
influenced by an even broader and more complex environment over which the
organisations in charge of the project have very hile or absolutely no control. Due
to the nature of reconstruction projects, they are especially susceptible to a large
environment that includes the political, economic, social and cultural contexts in
which they are inscribed.
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Fig. 1.6 represents the project (as a system represented by a blue box) which is
embedded in an influenced and influencing environment (dark grey box) which is
also influenced by an even larger environment ovet which the system has no
control (light grey box).
Fig. 1.6 The project in a systems approach
1.6. The hypothesis
Keeping in mmd the obvious interest to improve the performance of reconstruction
projects, but also considering the limitations and obstacles frequently found in
current approaches to the understanding 0f performance, a different approach is
suggested here. Building on the systems approach described above, this study
hypothesises that the performance of reconstruction projects depends more on
the influences of the environment and the strategic decisions made by the
organisations than on the tactical aspects of the implementation of the project.
The study of the projects compiled in the database coupled with the analysis of
previous research in the field of project performance permits to focus this
preliminary hypothesis. In fact, the review of these projects and the results of
studies conducted by Roberts (1972), Katsanis (1998), Mohsini (1985), Haviland
(1984), Davidson and Abdel Meguid (1997) and others, suggests that the level of
performance of the projects seems to be closely related with four variables
concerned with: (i) the relations existing between the organisations participating in
the project and (ii) the relations between the multi-organisation and its
system
(the project)
iniiuWced rdlencing
—
the larger influencing context
over which the system has no control -
31
environment. It is now clear what is the basis for the research hypothesis; which
(as stated above) is:
In the context of an organisation adopting the roles of promoter and builder of a
reconstruction project, the performance of the project (that is to say, the capacity
to reach the objectives with the maximum optimisation of resources) depends to a
great extent on:
7. The level of integration and differentiation within the multi-organisation (that
is formed to carry out the project), including inserting the project in a larger
program of reconstruction;
2. The multi-organisation’s strategic capacity to attract funding;
3. The multi-organisation’s capacity to share and react to the risks of the
environment (mitigating the risks or spreading them among vanous
participants);
4. The level of user’s responsibility for individual decision-making among a
serïes of choices offered.
Let us see some aspects related wïth each of the four varïables of the hypothesis:
First variable: This variable argues that, as much as it has been shown that the
level of integration and differentiation is a key aspect of the performance of
regular building projects, it can also be a relevant (and sometimes
underestimated) factor in the performance of post-disaster reconstruction
projects. The complexity of reconstruction projects seems to require, in reality, flot
only a proper integration of participants with different expertise but also including
(integrating) the project into a larger program or plan of reconstruction. Provïding
only housing units is insufficient to enable the community to recover and to deal
with the broad problems of habitat. Integrating the housing component in a larger
program of recovery (including other services and products) seems, therefore, to
be mandatory for the success of reconstruction. Obviously, one organisation can
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rarely have the expertise and resources to deal with ail the aspects required for
overail recovery (education, information, infrastructure, training, community
services, etc,). Inter-organisational cooperation therefore plays a fundamental
roie.
Second variable: This one is related with the level of development of strategic
planning, particulariy in fi) positioning the organisation in the environment; (ii)
deveioping a particular expertise and (iii) creating an appropriate image. These
three variables seem to play a fundamentai role in obtaining funds, which is a
crucial activity in the role of ‘promoting’ the project.
Third variable: Difficulties and limitations in post-disaster interventions in poor
areas are usually justified by the degree of complexity and the tact that the
contexts where projects are conducted are particulariy difficuit and hostile.
Sometimes the argument is “at least we did that, the situation was even worse
before” (Martinez, personal communication). This — no doubt — is true. However,
organisations working in reconstruction know for are supposed to know) that the
contexts are difficult and the risks very high. Therefore, for the purposes of project
management they can be considered ‘just’ as cases in which uncertainty is high
and therefore risk mitigation plans need to be developed before starting the
project.
Fourth variable: This variable hypothesises that by determining what is best for
local residents (that is to say selecting a product to give to beneficiaries)
organisations assume extra rîsks in the project. in tact, this decision increases the
risks associated with the acceptability of the project; which contradicts the spirit
with which self-hetp construction is usually adopted. To emphasise this
contradiction it can be suggested that selecting a self-help approach is usually
(yet not necessariiy should be) accompanied by selecting a construction model
that is to be replicated by users. This approach is usually justified by the tact that
it is very difficult to manage a mutual-aid self-help program in which each family
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“Universal standard shelter is flot feasible because it ignores: [i] The
high price and poor cost effectiveness of the product in the disaster
affected country, [ii] the need to involve disaster survivors in satisfying
their own needs, [iii]... climatic variations, [iv] variations in cultural
values and house forms [y] variations in family size, [vi] the need of
families to earn their livelihood in their houses, [vii] local capacity to
improve shelter, [viii] the problems of obtaining suitable land at 10w cost
on which to build such shelters, [ixl the Iogistical problem of transporting
and distributing, [X] problems of appropriate technology”.
The influence and importance of social aspects in the post-disaster housing
process are discussed by Oliver-Smith in the article “post-disaster housing
reconstruction and social inequality”, published in 1990, in the journal Disasters.
According to Oliver-Smith “greater attention needs to be paid to the issue of social
stratification and its relationship to post-disaster reconstruction for social change
and development.”
A similar article by Souheil El-Masri “Learning from the People: A Fieldwork
Approach in War-damaged Villages in Lebanon”, published in the book
Reconstruction after Disaster: Issues and Practices in 1997. documents how an
understanding of both the social context and the people’s needs is a fundamental
pre-requisite to meet the challenges of reconstruction after a disaster. The article
presents an approach called “reconstruction with people”, where the response is
based on an understanding of the social environment of the disaster and where
the role 0f the end-users is articulated in the reconstruction program.
This approach to post-disaster housing reconstruction has also influenced the
application of so-called appropriate technology. Contemporary theories in this
regard encourage the practice of relying on training methods instead of
technology transfer for the improvement of construction and the reduction of
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builds a customised unit (i.e. with different technology, materials, design, etc).
At the same time, self-help is regarded as a way to guarantee that people will
‘like’ the final products. Yet it should be obvious that, in reality, transferring the
responsibility of decision making to users (that is to say, the responsibility to
select the products they like - or they prefer - according to their own needs and
expectations) is a powerful way to reduce the risks of non-acceptability; note that
this does not necessarily contradict the possibility of using a self-help approach.
Ihis variable is closely related with the previous one as both relate to the multi
organisation’s capacity to mitigate (share or transfer) risks. Even though this
particular variable could be seen to be close to the tactical management of the
project, it has major repercussions in the structure of the responsible multi
organisation (reaching even beyond project-by-project situations) as it determines
the type of relationship that needs to exist between the organisations and the end
users. This relationship can then, potentially influence the strategy of the
organisations responsible for conducting the project.
1.7. Prevïous work in the field
The hypothesis of the study leads us to consider four important notions closely
related to the project management field: (j) procurement, (ii) organisational
integration and differentiation, (iii) risk management and (iv) performance.
1.71. Procurement
Finding the relations between the organisational design of a project and its
performance is not new in the field of project management. In fact, several
authors have developed the concept that a direct relation exists between the
structure in which the client (or build owner) arranges the participants of the
project (that is to say the procurement strategy) and the overall results of the
project. Mohsini and Davidson (1991), Walker and Hampson (2003), Ogunlana
(1997), Abdel Meg uid (1997) and others have examined the effects of using non-
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traditional approaches to procurement in both the private and public sectors,
conciuding that — very often
— non-traditional strategies Iead to uncertainty and,
thetefore, to additionai difficulties in the process.
Several of the documents presented in the C1B conference on procurement and
innovation held in Montreal in 1997 argue that a direct relation exists between the
procurement strategy chosen by the client and the capacity of innovation within
the muiti-organisation (Davidson and Abdel Meguid, 1997). Davidson (2001)
concludes that “any building system — with its appropriately designed organisation
— must fit info the broader environments (a) of the building industry in the country
or region in question, and (b) aiso fit into the political, social and economic
environment surrounding the industry [..J a technicai innovation — particularly a
major one like industrialisation
— must be accompanied by systematic
organisational redesign if if iS to succeed”. Similar documents aiso highiight the
relations between the procurement strategy used and the perception and
influence of risks (Akintoye and Taylor, 1997).
The main lesson Iearned from ail fhis previous work is thaf a careful
organisational design is required for the improvement of performance in
construction projects. Doubtless, this notion perfectly fits post-disaster
reconstruction where the assembly of participants usually happens in a turbulent
and chaotic environment, and where temporary multi-organisations are
particularly complex due f0 the different nature of participants and the
international character of the projects.
1.7.2. Organisational differentiation and integration
As demonstrated by Roberts (1972), successful inter-organisational design is
correlated with a high level of integration and differentiation. Even though the two
terms seem confradictory, Robert’s research shows that fogether they play a
fundamental role in the performance of construction projects. Differentiation
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refets to the clear distinctions and statement of roles, whereas integtation
depends on the proper coordination of resources between different organisations.
In the general construction industry, the level of integration and differentiation
depends on the procurement strategy applied by the client. However in
reconstruction, the complex procurement arrangements are flot necessarily
controlled by a single institution (i.e. a team leader) and therefore integration and
differentiation might not be sufficiently defined. In fact, several of the projects of
the database Iead one to believe that the lack of a unified procurement strategy
has a negative impact in the performance of reconstruction projects.
The work conducted by Roberts (1972) applies a notion that was deveioped in the
context of industrial and commercial organisations to the context of multi
organisations. It is well known in the field of organisational management that the
level of response of an organisation to the environment in which it is inscribed
depends 0f the level of integration and differentiation between the internai units of
the company (Lawrence, 1967; Lorch and Lawrence, 1970). In the case of multi
organisations, an internai structure for each participatory organisation, adapted to
optimise its performance within the context of multi-discipiinary human resources
and relations with other participants, is crucial. In the case of reconstruction
projects, this implies the consolidation of the capacity to deal with multidisciplinary
problems that go beyond the construction of buildings, inciuding — for example —
dealing with financial and legal complex situations. It also implies creating
relations with the beneficiaries and local organisations. In fact, a general
consensus exists among experts that a direct and constant relation of the
organisation in charge of the project with the residents increases the acceptability
of the project. It is weII known in reconstruction literature that pre-disaster
relations of the organisation with local residents contribute to the success of the
project (Jigyasu, 2002; Juyaraj, 2002; Sivaji, 2002).
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1.7.3. Risk management and the effects of the environment (particularly in
international projects)
Post-disaster reconstructïon projects demand the intervention of local and
international organisations. Ihis means that foreign organisations (such as donor
bodies, NGOs, partners, construction companies and suppliers) are challenged
with additional difficulties when participating in international contexts. International
projects of construction represent increased risks for organisations, even when
the conditions in which the projects are developed are not as critical as in post
disaster scenarios (Langford and Male, 2001).
In the project management field, a distinction is made between risks and
opportunities. A risk is defined as the possibility of sufferïng harm or Ioss (a
negative consequence), while an opportunity corresponds to a positive outcome
(PMI, 1996). Three types of responses can be adopted by the project Ieader(s)
when risks have been identified:
1. Avoidance: eliminating a specific threat, usually by eliminating the cause or
the risk event
2. Mitigation: reducing the expected risk event value
3. Acceptance: accepting the consequences of the risk (PMI, 1996)
In the context of multi-organisations, the mitigation of risks is sometimes
associated with risk sharing or risk transferring among participants. In
construction projects, partnering has been regarded as a beneficial way of sharing
risk between the parties (Black, Akintoye and Fitzgerald, 2000). Risk sharing is
defined by David Moore (2002) in Project Management: Designing Effective
Organisational Structures in Construction as “a diminution of a risk by sharing it
with others, usually for some consideration”; whereas risk transfer corresponds to
“a contractual arrangement between two parties for delivery and acceptance of a
product where the Iiability for the cost of a risk is transferred from one party to
another”.
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The major risks for international construction have been identified by Langford
and Male (2001) as being related with the environment in which the projects are
conducted. According to Langford and Maie, it is important to consider - in this
environment - two dimensions: (i) the economic performance assessment of the
country and (ii) the political risk. Besides, in a strategic plan analysis, other
aspects need to be also considered: the project size and potential, the costs and
resources, location, language, market similarity (with the original location of the
organisation), project funding, legal and fiscal aspects, assessment of the client,
the indigenous construction environment and competition. Ail these aspects can
potentially disturb the development of the project and, therefore, organisations
need to carefully consider them whiie assessing the viabïlity of entry into a new
context. From the analysis of these variables, organisations can assess the
country’s attractiveness and the organisation’s competitive strength in the country,
and several strategies can then be adopted: joint venture, enter, project-by-project
or no interest (see Fig. 1 .7).
country aftractiveness
. jointhigh enter
venture
. projectby
medium project
. project by10w no interest project
Iow medium high
Organisation’s competitive strength in the country
Fig. 1.7 Based on Langford and MaIe (2001), the matrix of country affractiveness and
organisation’s competitive strength
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In Langford and MaIe’s approach, the strategy adopted needs to assess two
considerations: strategic positioning and competitive intelligence. Strategic
positioning means “performing activities that are different from competitors’ or
performing similar activities in different ways”. The information used to define the
strategy is known as: “competitive intelligence” which is defined as “the activïty of
monitoring the environment external to the firm for information that is relevant for
the decision-making process in the firm” (Langford and Male, 2001).
The review of the debate about reconstruction approaches and the review of the
projects compiled in the database shows that four variables are constantly
evaluated in reconstruction projects:
1. Speed of construction;
2. Respect of traditional culture: values, know-how, technology, heritage, etc.;
3. Use of local resources: particularly local labor force and local materials;
4. Capacity to improve local development: reinforcement of local institutions,
creation of employment opportunities, improved construction practices, etc.
These four variables are closely related to seven potential sources of risks for
reconstruction projects; indeed, it can be said that the following risks are major
recurrent threats for every reconstruction project:
• Non acceptability: the outputs of the project not being accepted by end-users.
Research conducted by UNDRO (1982) demonstrates that even in extremely poor
communities, social, cultural and typological values play a fundamental role in the
acceptability of housing solutions
• Time delays: the outputs of the project being provided late, when spontaneous
solutions have been already conducted by users.
• Poor adaptation to local conditions: insufficient adaptations of the outputs
being offered to the weather, geographical conditions, cultural values, etc;
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• Transport difficulties: extra costs and obstacles in the transportation of pre
fabricated un ifs, components or even construction materials.
• Influence of the political environment: negative effects in the development of
the project due to unforeseen changes in national policies, or due to non forecast
limitations of the legal environ ment of the project.
• Inadequate resistance to subsequent disasters: particularly in later additions
and changes made to the original units provided by the project.
• Lack of funding: difficulties to collect funds and find economic support for the
initiatives.
UNDRO (1982) also identifies major risks (based on frequent problems)
associated with post-disaster relocation:
1. “Relocation away from urban centers is largely motivated by the availability of
cheap (and often undesirable) land.
2. Distances from jobs and the costs of commufing are a cause of either a
reduction of income, or missed opportunities for employment.
3. Urban services are frequently missing (schools, hospitals, shops, markets,
etc.)
4. Utïlity systems such as water, sewerage, and electricity are often insufficient,
or non-existent, for lack of planning and preparation.
5. Few assisting groups are equipped to master-plan this type of development as
part of relief management. The situation is worsened when the local
authorities also lack planners, atchitects and administrators, and also capital
resources.
6. If the economic and environmental situation worsens beyond endurance,
people mig rate back towards their original sites and jobs, leaving a vacuum
behind them, quickly filled by rural-to-urban migrants, thus compounding the
problems of uncontrolled urbanisation.
7. There are, [in some financial arrangements] problems of default and difficulty
to pay instalments on time, creating, for example, problems of overcrowding in
order to obtain additional rent.
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8. [...J Seillements outside municipal boundaries subsist in a kind of limbo, with
neither the local nor the regional authorities willing to bear the costs et
development and maintenance.
9. In developing countries, urban infrastructure costs are extremely high, the per
capita costs far exceeding the per capita capacity to amortise such costs. The
price of serviced land has risen out of ail proportion to the costs of [other]
resources and services, and especially in relation with wages.” (UNDRO,
1982)
1.7.4. Performance
Different definitions of project performance have been proposed; frequently
emphasising different aspects of the desired outcomes. in generai, the degree of
success cf a project cannot be defined without determining the traditionai
constraints cf a project: the duration, the budget and the quality cf the product
produced. These three components have been considered in the traditional
approach to performance, resuiting in the trilogy cf evaluation that considers the
individual performance of cost, schedule and quaiity. An extra dimension has
been proposed by Kliem and Ludin (1992) to represent the tacit aspects reiated
with the peopie (particularly users’ satisfaction). This four-folU approach is
particularly useful for understanding the delicate relations between housing
projects and the end users. Indeed, sufficient literature exists to prove the
importance of users’ participation and acceptance of a project in considering the
performance of housing and international development projects in developing
countries. However, this three or four-foid approach fails to consider the important
relations between the multiple participants that deveiop the project (on the ‘supply’
side) and it aise fails to take into account the relations between them and the
environment.
An approach based on projects deveioped by multi-organisations seems to be
required. Defined by Roberts (1972), in the context of the analysis of muiti
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organisations, performance is “the level of utilisation of resources which resuits
in the maximum benefits to ail participants not consïdered separately, without
resortïng to exploitation”. Roberts also proposes that “benefits gained by one
organisation at the expense of another are flot conducive to high overali
performance”. in this definition, performance has two aspects: (j) effectiveness:
the level of affainment of the formai objectives of the organisation or multi
organisation within the prevailing organisational conditions; and (ii) efficiency: a
measure of the amount of resources used to produce a unit of output”.
Confirming this approach, Mohsini (1985) demonstrates that “the performance of
a project is flot merely a function of input resources, but instead of the state of
collaboration which exists among the project team members in fulfilling their
tasks”.
lnter-organïsational conflict has been regarded as a form of low performance in
the building process. Gardiner and Simmons (cited by Abdel Meguid, 1997),
define conflict as “any divergence of interests, objectives or priorities between
individuals, groups, or organisations; or non-conformance to requirements of a
task, activity or process.”
As it was explained before, the concept of multi-organisatîonal dïfferentiation and
integration was associated — in the study conducted by Roberts — to the level of
performance of a project. Treated with different names, Handy (cited by Abdel
Meguid, 1997), also identifies different situations (related with multi-organisation
differentiation and integration) in which conflïct can arise:
- Formai objectives overlap
- Role definitions overlap
- Unclear contractual relationship
- Simultaneous roles, and
- Hidden objectives.
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In a similar manner, Mohsini (1985) also identifies the following factors that
influence the performance of the project organisation:
1. Domain consensus: The greater the clarity of scope of participation and the
degree of specialisation the beller the project performance
2. Availability and access to information: The more successful the exchange of
information the beffer the project performance.
3. Interdependence of tasks: The greater the coordination and cooperation in
dependent tasks the beffer the project performance.
Building up on the work conducted by Mohsini (1985), Roberts (1972) and
Haviland (1984), Abdel Meguid (1997) concludes that “maximising the overali
project performance means a high level of coordinated decision making, which in
turns means affaining the lowest possible level of inter-organisational conflict (i.e.
conflict between participating task-organ isations)”.
1.8. Wrap-up
As it has been discussed in this chapter, enough reasons exist to believe that a
different approach to looking at the performance of post-disaster reconstruction
projects is required. The basis of a new approach can be found in previous
studies conducted in the field of project management in the regular building
industry, where the notions of performance and organisational design have been
studied by a stream of research of which one of the earliest examples is Roberts’
in 1972 and to which several researchers (Davidson, Haviland, Abdel Meguid,
Mohsini, Katsanis and others) have contributed since then. lt is possible now to
knit together this knowledge (that in some cases was reinforced by knowledge
transferred from other industries to the building sector) with the specific problem
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of post-disaster reconstruction. However, as we have shown, this new approach
requires defining some specific terms of disaster management such as
‘reconstruction’ and ‘vulnerability’. A hypothesis based on a systems approach of
the reconstruction process is proposed after the review of a number of cases
described in the literature and some others visited and reported with first hand
information. The following chapter develops the methods required for the
validation of the hypothesis.
Chapter II, Methods
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Chapter II, Methods
The hypothesis of the study requires developing research methods at different
levels, from the general design of the research to the detailed methods used to
assess the performance of a project and analyse its organisational system. The
methods developed here combine the methods used in fi) the performance
evaluation of the general building industry, (ii) the international development field
and (iii) project management studies. Taking advantage 0f existing methods
permits to adapt them to the particular needs of the field 0f post-disaster housing
reconstruction.
2.1. The design of the research
The characteristics of the case study methodology make if a suitable approach
for the study 0f the performance 0f reconstruction projects, particularly if a
systems approach is used. Due to the advantages 0f case study methods in the
field of social sciences, if has been widely used to study subjects such as project
management and construction project performance. As proposed by Robert Yin
(1984), case study methods develop an empirical approach to research of a
contemporary phenomenon within ifs own context. It is particularly useful when
the researcher has liille or no control over the behaviour of the most important
elements under study, and therefore the researcher is not able to manipulate the
variables. Contrary to scientific experimentation, case studies analyse the
phenomenon in its own environment considering, as much as possible and in a
holistic manner, the elements 0f the context that interact with the phenomenon
under study. Qualitative data and observation are considered here to be
valuable f0 the study and understanding of the variables, particularly in complex
situations where individual components cannot be isolated from the whole.
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Ail of these characteristics appear compatible with the systems apptoach used
here and as proposed in Chapter I (section 1.5). in fact, consïdering the
phenomenon under study (the ptocess of reconstruction, considered as a
system) in its own environment and investigating the relations between that
system and the environment is both a case study ‘attitude’ and a systems
approach ‘premise’. As we will see in this section, this approach is useful if some
rules are carefully followed and some strategies are used to be able to relate the
empirical research to the existing body of knowledge.
Considering the different types of research, as proposed by Davidson (notes de
cours 2001), finding the relations between organisational design and
performance constitute what is called “fundamental research”. Contrary to
“applied research” which seeks to find a solution to an urgent problem,
fundamental research seeks an understanding of the world through a theoretical
or empirical approach. The empirical approach — which becomes our concern for
this study — is developed through an observation of reality and perm its one to
validate a hypothesis linked to an existing theory or field of study. Keeping this in
mmd, the design of the research needs to clarify (I) the method used to study
existing theories and approaches, (i) the way to develop the empirical
observations, (iii) the methods of validation of the hypothesis and (iv) the means
to obtain information and to draw conclusions.
Figure 2.1 represents the methodological process used for the research.
Following Yin’s case study research method, this process proposes four major
methodological stages: (i) the review of previous research; (ii) the definition of
tools; (iii) the application of the tools selected and (iv) drawing together findings
and arriving at conclusions. As proposed by Yin (1994), this ïs flot a linear
process but rather a cyclic exchange between the experimental research and
previous knowledge existing in the field.
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Within this approach, the research began with the review of the main theories
and approaches in post-disaster housing reconstruction, followed by the analysis
of previous examples reported in the literature. Following this, new cases of
housing reconstruction were visited and, through observation and analysis of
them, a preliminary hypothesis was suggested. Ihis preliminary hypothesis
stressed the relations between the performance of reconstruction projects and
the organisational design of them. This relation was not totally clear at this
stage; however, its analysis proved worth doing and led to the review 0f the
main concepts and approaches (theories) 0f both of the aspects under
consideration: performance in the building industry and organisational systems.
The review of the literature about these two main subjects demonstrated that, in
fact, several relations have been proposed - and validated - between the
performance 0f construction projects and the organisational design of them.
However, very few indicators were found about these relationships in post
disaster reconstruction projects. This very fact proved that a methodology of
analysis of those particular aspects did not exist in the field of reconstruction and
that the methods used in other fields would need f0 be adapted before being
applied to post-disaster housing projects. Several methods 0f evaluation were
studied to develop the evaluation system finally used. As we wilI see in this
chapter, the definition of the evaluation criteria was one of the most demanding
and time-consuming elements of the development of the evaluation method that
was finally used.
Consequently, in parallel to the study of methods to determine the performance
of projects was the study of the methods used to represent and analyse
organisational systems. In this process, methods from the project management
field were borrowed and adapted to the post-disaster scenario. Once the
methods were clarified, a revised hypothesis was used t0 validate the scope and
relevance of the research. Following Davidson’s natural cycle 0f research (notes
de cours, 2001), this validation was made at different levels, at different
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moments and for different lapses of time. The whole cycle of research, which
includes revising the theory, stating the hypothesis, designïng the research,
choosing the methods, doing the research, analysing the resuits and drawing
conclusions, was conducted in one hour, in one day, in a week, etc. before doing
the final study. This exercise (represented in figure 2.1 by the arrow that creates
the first loop) permifted, at several stages, to refine the hypothesis and the
methods.
Once both the hypothesis and the methods were refined, the research was
conducted on the selected case studies. Both the performance and the
organisational system of each of the projects were studied to draw individual
conclusions for each case. Finally, as proposed by Yin, these conclusions were
compared with the cases studied in the literature and visited in the preliminary
part of the research in order to be able to draw “analytical generalisations”, as
suggested byYin (1984).
Being at the core of the case study methodology, the analytical generalisations
permit to put in context the resuits of experimental research and to give
continuity to existing knowledge. Analytical generalisations compare the tesults
found in the case studïes with previous resuits found in the literature. Through
this comparison, the results of the study can be proved ‘standard’ (if the results
correspond to the findings of similar studies) or ‘exceptional’ (if the results are
innovative). This comparison permits either to reaffirm and consolidate an
ongoing body of knowledge or to define an alternative position that contradicts
general assumptions.
As previously explained, determining the performance of a project implies a
process for its evaluation. The following section dwells on the subject of defining
the appropriate method to determine the performance of the selected case
studies.
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2.2. Project evaluation
A large number of approaches exist in the field of evaluation research and some
consensus has been agreed in both methodology and objectives. However,
project evaluation methods are stiil controversial in the fields of urban projects,
in the building industry and in international development. According to
Appasamy (1983), thïs controversy has leU to different approaches for the
evaluation of urban projects: 1. The evaluation of the system vs. the evaluation
of results, and 2. The evaluation based on qualitative methods vs. the evaluation
based on quantitative methods. Belkacem Zaouali (1994) also shows that in the
field of international development projects, different methodological tendencies
and rationales of evaluation have followed, in the last for[y years, the ever
changing approaches to development and international aid.
Making a synthesis of the extensive list 0f evaluation methods (ranging from
those which are used for the regular building industry to those which are used in
the international development fields) represents a particular challenge for this
study. lnstead of presenting the different approaches commonly used and
justifying the selection of one of those, we suggest here to take the readers
through the process of building up the methodology of evaluation as it was
developed during the study. Readers will note that in building up this method,
some components from existing approaches were used and many other were
adapted rather than adopted. At the same time, the review of the pertinent
knowledge and background found in the literature will be made explicit.
However, it is important to clarify first the type of evaluation that this study is
concetned with. This method needs to match the following criteria:
a. It is conducted when the project is finished and it is flot conducted by the
institution(s) that created it. For future reference, and following the term used
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by some authors this type of evaluation wilI be referred as “ex-post
evaluation” (Zaouali, 1994; OECD, 1986).
b. The research method required here is flot necessarily a management tool.
This approach might therefore be different from the one used in self-
performance evaluation methods which, in the case of development
agencies, seeks to improve in-house management practices through a
participatory and empowerment approach (as suggested by OECD, 1986;
ILO, 1996; Gagnon, 1995)
c. It concerns the evaluation of reconstruction projects, flot the evaluation of
reconstruction programs. According to Davidson (1988), a project is “a
unique operation that has a start, a finish and a limited duration and a
defined objective”. In comparison to projects, programs are defined here as
Iong-term initiatives with broader objectives and Iess clear boundaries over
time. As defined by the International Labour Office, a program s composed
by several projects that are Iinked to the achievement of higher common
objectives (ILO, 1996).
d. It is not an evaluation of an institution. Even though this method of
evaluation examines the role of the organisations, management evaluation
or auditing (as defined by OECD, 1986) is outside the scope of this study.
Keeping this in mi, two fundamental decisions need to be clarified: 1. what to
evaluate?, and 2. how to evaluate?
2.2.1. What to evaluate?
Due to the complexity of the projects involved with international development
(reconstruction after disasters usually falls into, or forms part of one of those),
and the constraints in time and resources, evaluators “cannot evaluate
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everything” (Zaouali, 1994). Accordingly, The Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) advocates that “the evaluation process
requires defining the questions that are to be answered” (OECD, 1992). This
implies defining what the evaluation is for and what kind of information the
evaluator is looking for.
It could be thought that evaluating a project corresponds to evaluatïng the
product or service that the project developed (or affempted to develop). Then,
the question to be asked would be: Was the product or serviced offered ‘good’?
However, we will demonstrate here that evaluating the product or service says
very lift le about the performance of the project at large. We wilI clarify thîs with a
simple example of the evaluation of an imaginary project that aftempted to
improve the quality of the water that people drink. Responding to the
hypothetical fact that people use containers that pollute the water put in them,
the project aftempted to produce and donate ceramic cups to improve the quality
of water consumed by the users. Even if a large quantity of cups was produced
(let’s say 1,000), and the product was considered of “high performance”
(according to certain indicators of cups performance, tested in the donor’s
industry), the performance of the project was affected by aspects related to the
process, not to the product itself. Here are some possible scenarios:
1. To produce the 1,000 cups, materials and human resources (the inputs)
for the production of 1,200 cups were used. In this case the resources
were not optimised.
2. Even though 1,000 cups were produced, the targeted production was
2,000 cups. In this case, only half of the targeted production was
achieved.
3. Users did need a cup but the cups were offered too late when they had
already produced their own improvised cups that pollute the water. Timing
failed.
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4. When considered of “high performance”, the cups were tested in a
different environment. In the new environment, the particular use people
make of CUS make them extremely fragile. In this case the quality of the
product was flot weII adapted to the “new environment”.
5. The cups were offered to a certain group of usets who do not drink in
cups but prefer f0 use glasses; while the users that really needed the
cups did not receive the cups offered.
6. Nobody really used the 1,000 cups. The users acquired the cups but in
reality, due to certain cultural reasons, users did not use the new cups but
continued using their old cups. In this case users did flot accept the
project.
7. Users already had ceramic cups at home, and therefore the new cups
were not necessary. It was flot a good idea to produce cups in the first
place. If would have been beffer to produce, for example, water tanks to
replace the non-appropriate tanks that people use and that also pollute
the water.
8. The project aftempted to produce 1,000 cups and in fact, 1,000 cups were
produced. However, 100,000 people drink from containers that pollute the
water. In this case only one percent of the users improve the quality of
water consumed. In another example of the same difficulty, 1,000 cups
were produced but only 400 wete needed.
9. Using a proper cup does flot improve the quality of water anyhow
because the water cornes already polluted.
10. The media, in order to affack the project for political reasons, gave
negative advertising f0 the use of the new cups arguing that they rnodify
the nutrients water normally provides. This caused the users that needed
and acquired the cups to end up breaking them f0 be sure they were flot
used.
These hypothetical examples show that not only aspects related to the product
need to be examined. Also aspects related with the process prove to be crucial.
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The ten cases can then be translated into ten main aspects that need f0 be
examined and, by analogy, ten corresponding questions that need to be
answered in the evaluation of reconstruction projects:
1. Efficiency: were the local and external resources optimised?
2. Results: were the targeted outputs attained?
3. Timing: were the outputs available at the right time?
4. The quality of the product: is the product good in the environment in which it is
going to be used?
5. Pertinence: were the outputs available to the right people?
6. Acceptability: did the local community use the outputs/ services offered?
7. Strategy: did the outp uts that were offered correspond f0 the needs of the
population?
8. Scope: how much ofthe real needs was covered? Is that percentage
satisfactory?
9. lmpacts/objectives: did the project reduce the vuinerabilities of the
population?
10. External aspects: how did the environment affect the results of the project?
Note that similar lists of variables have been suggested by the organisations that
have emphasised process evaluation over product evaluation. OECD suggests
the following list of variables: rationale, objectives accomplishment,
impacts/effects, general results, viability, alternative solutions, and lessons
(OECD, 1992). In the same way, Zaouali suggests the following ‘levels’ of
evaluation: pertinence, efficiency, results, impacts and durability (Zaouali, 1994).
The International Labour Office (ILO, 1996) suggests the following aspects and
questions f0 be considered:
Effectiveness: To what extent has the project achieved ifs objectives and
reached its target groups?
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Efficiency: Do the expected project resuits continue to justify the costs incurred?
Relevance: Does the project continue to make sense?
Validity of design: is the design Iogical and coherent?
Causality: what specific factors or events have affected the project resu Its?
Unanticipated effects: is the project having any significant (positive and/or
negative) effects which were flot foreseen?
Alternative strategies: is there, or should there have been, a more effective way
to address the problem(s) and achieve the objectivefs)?
Sustainability: What is the likelihood that project benefits will be sustained after
the withdrawal of external support?
Readers will note that the questions are similar yet phrased in a different
manner. However, the example of the cups has been specially adapted for our
interest in reconstruction to show the aspects with which we are particularly
concerned. This is achieved by highlighting three aspects commonly challenged
in reconstruction projects: time-efficiency, pertinence and acceptability.
Even though the previous examples make it seem obvious that several aspects
of the process are fundamental to the performance of the project, the evaluation
methods commonly used in the building industry pay little attention to their
assessment. Let us consider, for example, some of the evaluation practices
most commonly used in the building industry: (i) administrative audit, (ii) post
occupancy evaluation, (iii) users’ satisfaction, (iv) environmental impact studies,
and (y) human ecology evaluations.
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In a systems analysis, every construction project can be illustrated as shown in
Fig. 2.2. Ihe diagram shows that construction projects are developed by
organisations that conduct a process to produce a product, which is, at the end,
offered to a group of targeted users. The organisations, the processes, the
product and the users affect - and are ail affected - by the environment.
environment
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Fig. 2.2 Construction projects diagram. In a systems analysis, projects are represented
as linked elements that affect and are affected by the environment.
Fig. 2.3 shows that the five evaluation practices commonly used in the building
industry concentrate on the performance of individual aspects of the construction
project diagram. Similarly, some aspects are not fully considered in those
methods:
environment
Fig. 23 Evaluation methods positioned in the construction projects diagram.
1. Administrative audit: As explained by Appasamy (1983) it is useful as a
management exercise to study procedures, organisationai structures, methods
of implementation, etc. Even though it permits improving management
procedures, it represents other limitations when evaluating the process. As
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explained by Appasamy “one can be extremely proficient in rearranging the deck
chairs of the Titanic without realising that the ship is about to sink”. With this
approach it is difficuit to know if ultimate objectives have been met, as this kind
of audit does not question the validity of the strategy. Audits concentrate in the
performance of the organisation and the processes from any of the involved
corporations’ point of view.
2. Post-occupancy evaluation: A constant development has been obtained in
this field when Iooked at from the performance requirements and performance
based specifications point of view to evaluate buildings and facilities as finished
products. lt concentrates in the performance of physical components; the
performance is measured according to the indicators chosen for each of the
subsystems of the building and the relationships between them (Ehrenkrantz,
1988). It does not question the validity of the strategy or the objectives.
3. Users’ satisfaction: this evaluation concentrates in the users’ perception of the
project. Usually the evaluation is conducted through questionnaires and surveys
among the targeted population. The performance is considered as a variable of
the level of satisfaction of users. Nevertheless, it does flot question the strategy
used, the optimisation of resources, the management approach, or the
organisations’ approach to the project. In other words, people can be extremely
‘happy’ with 500 houses built without knowing that the unïts were built with the
resources that are usually used for building 1000 houses.
4. Impact studies: They usually measure the impact of the project in the
environment. It might correspond to impacts on the natural environment, in the
market or in social groups (Social Impact Assessment — SIA). Impact studies are
usually Iess concerned with the sequence of activities that were conducted than
with the permanent effects of the project.
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5. Human ecology-based evaluations: this approach concentrates in the
relations between the humans, the natural environment and the built
environment. According to Machado (1989) the evaluator is concerned with two
questions: (i) how does the built environment relate to the natural one? and (ii)
how humans relate with the built environment?. However, none of these
questions challenge the strategy used or validate the approach followed in the
project.
Fig. 2.3 shows the relative position in the general diagram (shown in Fig. 2.2) of
each of the evaluation methods described earlier considering the aspect that is
emphasised in each one of them. The diagram shows that the analysis of the
process (the darker box) is flot fully emphasised in the methods currently used
(a question mark indicates this gap). Even though a different method is thus
required, the tools to develop it are not found in the evaluation of construction or
urban projects. As we will see, the basis for process evaluation can beffer be
found in the field of international development projects. Keeping this in mmd, let
us now consider the second question proposed earlier: F-Iow to evaluate?
2.2.2. How to evaluate?
Edward Suchman, who established several of the principles 0f evaluation that
have been used since the publication in 1969 0f his book on evaluative
research, argues that “inherent in evaluation is the process of assigning value to
some objective and then determining the degree of success in attaining this
valued objective.” Suchman adds, quotîng Riecken: “evaluation [is] the
measurement 0f desirable and undesirable consequences of an action that has
been taken in order to forward some goal that we value”. These two statements
imply that evaluation requÏres (i) questioning the objective and (ii) determining
the consequences of its implementation. Zaouali (1994) demonstrates that these
two particular aspects have been reconsidered in the evaluation 0f international
development projects over the last 10 years. In fact, a refined tool of evaluation
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has been developed by international agencies to deal with this aspect. This tool
is called the Logical Framework Analysis or “Cadre Logique” and it is today the
most commonly used evaluation method in international development projects in
Europe, Canada and the United States.
Taking advantage of the developments obtained in results-based management,
the Logical Framework Analysis (Log. Frame.) appeared in the seventies as a
tool to overcome the difficulties found in project evaluation. With the importance
given to a particïpatory approach to development, where users played a
fundamental role in the process, the traditional evaluation of projects became
obsolete. If the ‘triangle’ of evaluation that considered the performance of a
project in terms of costs, schedule and quality was sufficient to evaluate regular
building projects, it proved insufficient to assess the effects of the project in the
targeted population of international development projects. Therefore, a fourth
dimension for measuring the role 0f participants and the involvement of users in
attaining the objectives became necessary.
However, this also meant reconsidering the sequence and life cycle of the
process, which resulted in tracking down the cause-effect relationships between
different stages of the project. The Logical Framework Analysis was first
developed in 1969 by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). Since then, it has been largely used by different organisations
including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and
International OECD. The stages into which a project is subdivided have received
different names and interpretations. However, as a constant, the Logical
Framework considers at Ieast four or five stages placed in a time-sequence of
cause-effect:
The first one, usually called inputs, in which the resources and/or the activities
that exploit the resources, are considered.
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The second one includes the resuits of those activities. It involves describing the
products and services delivered taking into account the consumption of
resources. This stage is usually calied outputs or process.
in the third one intermediate resuits are expiained. Those resuits correspond to
the immediate effects of the products and services offered; these effects can be
measured as the transfer of technoiogy. This stage is usually called resuits or
outcomes.
The fourth one is the one in which the iong-term effects are explained. This one
usuaily corresponds to the final goal of the project. In some cases, an
intermediate stage can be considered to distinguish between the medium-term
objectives and the Iong-term effects or impacts.
external factors indicators 0f performance
foutside the project)
___________
À
indicators of
development
indicators cf
technology transfer
operational indicators
H
operationat indicators
Fig. 2.4 Aubry and Hivon’s Logical Framework with only one space for medium-term
and long-term impacts.
Howevet, this approach represented some limitations. As can be expected, the
reiationship between causes and effects within the project scope might be
altered by elements of the context. To soive this limitation, recent revisions of
the Logical Framework have included other aspects such as (I) risks and
enabiers (CIDA, 1997) and (ii) internai and externat factors (Aubry and Hivon,
1994, see Fig. 2.4). in both cases, these aspects permit highiighting eiements of
internai factors
(within the project)
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the context that might influence the performance of the project. Similarly, later
versions of the Log. Frame. have also included “important assumptions” which
are defined as “conditions which could affect the progress or success of the
project but over which the project manager has no control” (Wiggins and
Shields, 1995).
The assumptions are usually determined by the expectations 0f the project
manager or the evaluator. In the case, for example, 0f an agriculture
development project, the project manager might assume that if there is an
increase in the distribution of fertilisers (an output of the project), peasants will
use the fertilisers as required (the assumption) and thus there wiII be an
increase in yield per hectare (the effect). If that effect happens, and the market
demand is stable (another assumption), it wilI Iead to an increase in agriculture
productivity (goal or impact). If the influence of religious values affects the use of
fertilisers and peasants do not use them as required, the effect might not
happen. In this case, an external influence (over which the system has lift le
control) affects the performance of the project. Likewise, if the effect happens,
but the demand for agricultural products decreases, the final goal (impact) might
not be aftained.
In sophisticated versions ofthe Log. Frame., a rather useless distinction
between the so-called horizontal and vertical Logical Framework Analysis has
also been proposed (Wiggins and Shields, 1995). The so-called vertical Log.
Frame. is usually associated to the definition of cause-effect relations,
assumptions and uncertainties (within or outside the project). The so-called
horizontal Log. Frame. (the difference between horizontal and vertical do flot
correspond to the position of the boxes in the diagram) corresponds to an
evaluation tool to measure the performance of inputs, outputs, effects and
impacts. Adding this second dimension (the horizontal Log. Frame.) leaves open
the question of the indicators of performance that need to be explored and
defined. As suggested byAubry and Hivon’s model (1994) this distinction is not
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necessary as his model compiles both the sequence of cause-effect
relationships and the indicators of evaluation (see Fig. 2.4).
2.2.2.1. The problem of unexpected outcomes
The Logical Framework model, as suggested byAubry and Hivon (1994) and
CIDA (1997) illustrates easiiy the cause-effect reiationships that can be
expected and therefore tracked down through indicators of performance (the
meaning and scope of the indicators of performance is explained in the next
section). However, unexpected effects and unforeseen resuits - that obviously
are flot previously described as indicators - are flot easily represented in the
model. This limitation of the Log. Frame. has been studied by researchers such
as Des Gasper (2000) who proposes the need to incorporate unexpected
variables of the sequence of the process into the system of evaluation. Due to
the lack of coordination for unexpected variables, the Logical Framework is
known as a convergent model, that is to say, a model that emphasises planned
and desired objectives.
Obviously, this approach is not good enough if the evaluation requires
considering unexpected effects of both internai decision-making and the
influence of the environment (which is certainly the case when evaluating
reconstruction projects). A different model is used to cope with this kind of
situation: the divergent model. According to Brinkerhoff and Tuthill (1987), in the
divergent model — also known as “evaluation without objectives” — the causes (or
outputs) are tracked down to relate them with non-preconceived effects. Very
often the evaluator using the convergent model starts by identifying causes that
he/she can relate to expected effects, whereas in the divergent model, the
evaluator sometimes requires to identify the effects (unexpected ones) and then
relate them to a series of causes he/she will need to identify.
Fig. 2.5 represents the convergent and divergent models, the first one about the
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evaluation of expected effects and the second one about the evaluation of
unexpected effects. Brinkerhoff and Tuthill (1987), argue that evaluation
methods should ideally consider both a convergent and a divergent model
simultaneously.
Cause
Cause Effect Cause
t
Cause
Effect
Effect Effect
Cause
Effect Effect
Fig. 2.5 According to Brinkerhoff and Tuthill (1987) the convergent and divergent
models (the convergent model on top and the divergent on the bottom of the figure)
The divergent approach is commonly neglected or omifted in the Logical
Framework Analysis. However, due to the importance of unexpected outputs in
the performance of the project (cer[ainly representing a crucial variable for the
hypothesis of this study) a different layer will be added to the Logical Framework
to give space to them. Finally, it is important to remember that those unexpected
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effects (resuits) can be both positive and negative.
2.2.3. The model of evaluation
The model of evaluation proposed here (Fig. 2.6) is based on the Logical
Framework proposed by Aubry and Hivon (1994). However, some changes have
been proposed. As suggested here, the process of the project (rang ing from
inputs to impacts) is subdivided ïn two main areas: the area of direct influence of
the system, and the area in which the project is exposed to the general
environment. The inputs and outputs are considered in the first area whereas
the resuits and impacts are considered out of the scope of direct control of the
system. This approach responds to the belief that once the outputs are offered
to beneficiaries, the multi-organisation has liffle or no control over them. If
changes are required (and this might be because the anticipated assumptions
do not correspond to reality), the organisations can control and keep monitoring
the performance of outp uts and (i) produce changes in the outputs being offered,
(ii) deliver new outputs or (iii) stop the delivery of certain of them. However, the
multi-organisation cannot change the way people react to products and services
in the second area and has very liffle scope for changing the environment
favorably other than through the outputs offered (which, in principle, have an
impact in the environment).
In order to incorporate the divergent approach, and reg ister, in a clear manner,
the effects of the project that cannot be forecast, two spaces have been
ïncorporated: one for unexpected resuits and one for unexpected impacts.
In conclusion, the changes applied to the Log. Frame. (as proposed by Aubry
and Hivon, 1994) have a powerful influence in the way projects are analysed,
because they highlight fundamental facts for the analysis of reconstruction
projects:
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- That the system is exposed to external factors (proper of the environment).
Those influencing factors might have positive or negative impacts (they can be
risks or opportunities) and the only thing the multi-organisation can do towards
them is to acknowledge the risks and be prepared for them, and take advantage
of the opportunities.
- That the resuits and impacts are greatly affected by external factors over which
the mufti-organisation has liffle or no control.
- That the evaluator needs to be ready to register flot only the expected resuits
and impacts (as proposed by the assumptions made before the disaster) but
also unexpected effects.
I
expected fl unexpectedt
time
Fig. 2.6 Model of evaluation proposed here
Alternative versions of the Log. Frame. give a different meaning to inputs. Some
of them relate the inputs to the raw resources used in the project while others
relate the inputs to the activities developed in the use of those resources. To
solve this, some organisations have used inputs in two different ceils, identifying
both resources and activities. As we wilI see in the definition of the indicators of
performance, the model of evaluation proposed here does not include
the environment of any one project
expected Fi unexpected
I «II» I
resuIts (+) u resuits (+, -):
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resources, but emphasises activities instead; indeed in some cases, only the
major characteristics of those activities.
This decision is based on the fact that in the evaluation of a project (seen as a
process) we are deeply concerned with evaluating the performance in the
development of processes and flot evaluating the resources as such. In this type
of evaluation, we are not interested in assessing the performance of —for
example
- bricks, but in the performance of the process of finding, selecting,
transporting and assembling the bricks. In other words, in thïs model we do not
evaluate the budget allocated to the project ta resource), but the capacity of the
multi-organisation to obtain the required sources for the prolect (a characteristic
of the activity of finding money). Obviously, this delicate distinction has a
fundamental effect on the evaluation of projects if they are to be evaluated in
terms of a logical sequence of activities and decision-making.
2.2.3.1. The indîcators of performance
The stages of the Logical Framework that can be anticipated and that
correspond to pre-estabiished assumptions (inputs, outputs, expected resuits
and expected impacts) need to be assessed in a way that reflects the fact that
they represent the reality of the project at a certain level of completion. This
assessment needs to be made in a consistent and replicable way. To
accomplish this, the so-called indicators of performance are used. As defined by
CIDA, “the indicator is a pointer. It can be a measurement, a number, a fact, an
opinion, or a perception that points to a specïfic condition or situation over tïme”
(CIDA, 1997). By selecting the indicators, the evaluator defines the type of
information that has to be Iooked for and defines a position regarding the object
or process under study. This bias should not make the evaluator feel ashamed.
In fact, CIDA suggests that: “it is important to recognîse before using indicators
that ail indicators have their own political heritage and bias” (p. 5). In fact, this
bias has historically corresponded to the predominant approach towards
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development and is beffer recognised than denied. For example, from the mid
1980s and during the nineties, the bias is reflected in the tact that there was a
stronger focus on indicators 0f empowerment and participation (CIDA, 1997;
Zaouali, 1994).
2.2.3.1.1. The problem of fine-tuning the îndïcators
According to CIDA (1997), indicators of performance need to meettwo
conditions: “reliability” and “validity”. Validity means that the information that
indicators provide must be close to the reality they are measuring. Reliability
means that the indicators used must be accurate and consistent. These two
conditions imply that (i) the indicator must reflect similar findings in different
situations; (ii) that different instruments of measure must yield a similar
assessment and (iii) that multiple uses of the same instrument yield similar
resuits.
To meet the aforementioned criteria, the evaluation method requires breaking
down the project into entities that can be measured in a consistent way.
However, f00 broad indicators representing large subsystems of the project are
difficult to measure. Let us illustrate this with a simple example. If a building is fo
be evaluated (the building as a product is a system) it can be subdivided in
subsystems such as the system of vertical and horizontal circulations, the
system of walls and partitions, the system of structure, etc. However, assessing
each one of these sub-systems in a single indicator is not possible for that
indicator cannot be measured in a replicable way (the “appropriateness” of
vertical circulations can be assessed in different ways by different evaluators).
Thïs very fact implies that each of the subsystems needs to be broken down info
entities for which there are indicators that meet the three criteria mentioned
earlier. The subsystem of vertical circulations can be assessed by identitying, for
example, the time that users need to wait for elevators (measured in seconds),
the time if takes users f0 move form point A f0 point B (measured in minutes),
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the capacity of elevators (measured in Kg), etc. The three examples that we
present here can be assessed by different evaluators with different instruments
obtaining similar or identical results.
However, the evaluator has to be careful of flot fragmenting the subsystems too
much, for it can lead to a false appreciation of the overali performance of the
system. it is important to remember that the good performance of a system is
not necessarily the accumulation of the good performances of its components
(an inefficient wall can be made of wood panels, paint, nails and glue of very
high quality). In the building performance field, this aspect has been seriously
considered by Ezra Ehrenkrantz (1998) while studying the Schools Construction
Systems Development in California, where “aIl of the sets of different building
components [...J had to work together to provide total building acoustical
performance”.
It is therefore crucial to fine-tune the subdivision of indicators without incurring
over fragmentation of the system. Aiso, the relations between components have
to be enunciated and measured to assess a certain level of compatibility
between them.
2.2.3.1.2. The problem of assigning a value to the indicators
Once the indicators are selected, one of the typical difficulties of evaluation is to
give a certain value to a given level of performance. Let us exemplify this with
the case of building performance. Let us consider the example of measuring the
performance of a meeting room in a certain building. If one of the indicators is
the capacity of the room and it corresponds to 25 people what does it mean? Is
that appropriate? Is that too much or insufficient? in order to solve this, the
American Society for Testing and Materials has developed an evaluation system
consisting in a two-step process for assessing both building functionality and
serviceability (ASTM, 2000). These two steps are assessed through the
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judicious completion of questionnaires among officers responsible for the
facilities and users.
In a first step, the ASTM’s evaluation method assesses the functionality, i.e. the
requirement scale (what is demanded, required or desirable). This demand is
identified through a series of five statements numbered in odd numbers from
fine to one (9,7,5,3, 1), determining in this way a scale in whïch nine
corresponds to the highest performance. If the degree of performance required
corresponds to an intermediate level in between the statements Iisted, it is
marked with even numbers (8, 6, 4 or 2). In this step, the level of importance of
that aspect is also assessed (it can be marked as being exceptionally important,
important or of minor importance) and the minimum threshold level is indicated
to identify the Iowest level that is tolerated.
In a second step, the evaluation ranks the facility level, i.e. the serviceability
(what exists or what is provided). At thïs stage, also five statements are
suggested and the one that most closely relates to the reality is flagged. The five
statements are also numbered in odd numbers from nine to one leaving the
even numbers as intermediate ranks.
Consequently, both scales marked from nine to one are illustrated in a graphic
(see Fig. 2.7). A parallel comparison ofthe two scales permits comparing their
values in order to flag possible shortfalls or surpiuses. That ïs to say, if the level
0f performance that is provided is higher in comparison to what is needed (or
wanted) or if, on the contrary, the level of performance provided is Iower than
what is demanded. Both a shortfall and a surplus might be considered negative
and are indicated ïn a third graphic with a color code (i.e. red for shortfall and
blue for surplus).
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code indicator
Ail IMAGE TO PUBLIC AND OCCUPANTS
A.1 1.1 exterior appearance
Ail 2 public lobby 0f buldmg
Ail 4 appearance and spaciousness 0f spaces
A11.6 identity outside building
B.2 MANAGEABILIW
B2.1 reliability 0f extemal supply
B2.3 ease 0f operation
624 ease cf maintenance
B.2 7 energy consumption
ec art reflu qtc - faItinqsca -
123456 789 123456789
comparison 0f two scales
123456789
iii
I
Fig. 2.7 Representation of the ASTM’s method of evaluation (Adapted from ASTM.
2000).
Coming back to the simple example of the meeting room, a type of evaluation
such as the one used by the ASTM solves the problem of knowing if a capacity
of 25 people is ‘good’ or flot. Ihis type of evaluation would simply let us know
whether that capacity corresponds to what is required and expected or flot.
The ASTM two-step process is a smart solution that can be applied to the case
of process evaluation, in which a similar difficulty s found. Which level, in an
indicator of performance of an output, can be considered insufficient? enough?
or acceptable? If a Logical Framework Analysis is used, how much of an output
is ‘good’? Let us consider for example the case of 500 houses delivered. Can we
consider 500 houses built and provided as positive and adequate? As an
analogy to the ASTM process it can be said that an indicator of performance of
outputs (houses built) needs to be accompanied by an indicator of demand
(were houses required?). This second scale corresponds precisely to what is
going to be called here “the pre-project level of need (vulnerability and
damage)”.
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2.2.3.1.3. Selecting the ïndïcators of performance
A careful selection 0f indicators was necessary in the development of the
evaluation method. This selection was based on the review of case studies in
the literature, the review of similar studies 0f evaluation and the preliminary
review 0f our own case studies. Even though a great number 0f indicators 0f
performance were considered, only those matching the following nïne
characteristics were retained:
1. Each indicator must be a representation 0f: one aspect of the housing
reconstruction project; or one aspect closely related with the performance of the
housing reconstruction project. This seeks to reduce the number of indicators of
the performance of:
• The reconstruction program at large;
• Aspects of the project not related with housing reconstruction (i.e. the
indicators of the projects of emergency or medical assistance);
• Individual participants
• Thefinalproduct
2. The indicators must appear frequently in the study of reconstruction projects
or they must be frequently considered as variables of performance in the study
of similar projects.
3. The indicator must be measurable by the researcher preferably using
available methods for collecting first-hand data within the scope and limitations
of the study. If a proper quantification to measure the indicator cannot be
assessed by the researcher, the indicator must be able to be assessed by the
observation, in place, of ïts most evident characteristics. In this case, a
qualitative value based on observation must be used.
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4. Preference is given to indicators which reflect major effects in the
performance 0f the project by the fact of being included in the project or not. This
characteristic makes it easier f0 measure the indicator (considering the scope of
the study) and lïmits the amount of subjective value affributed to non-quantifiable
indicators. The indicators of outputs must be products and services with major
influences on the project, as shown by the simple fact of being or not included in
the project.
For example, roads (the indicator of including or flot including the construction of
roads for transportation) or health centres (the indicator of building or not
building health centres) are preferred over broader indicators such as
transportation systems avallable or health coverage. Even though transportation
systems avallable and health coverage are doser representations of the reality
of transportation possibilities and health assistance, they are difficuit to measure
and they include aspects not related with housing reconstruction activities.
Whereas the most important effects of the indicator roads are easily assessed
by knowing if roads were or were not included in the project, measuring the
availability of transportation systems requires one to analyse variables of
commuting by bus, train, airplane, boats, etc (not necessarily directly related
with reconstruction). Similarly, measuring the indicator of health centres built
provides an idea of how the health condition of the community was addressed
from the reconstruction point of view without entering info specialised
evaluations of health management that, in any case, are impossible to measure
within the scope of the present study.
This characteristic of the indicators 0f performance means that a certain level of
simplification and generalisation is accepted. One could argue, for examp!e, that
not having included health centres in the project might flot necessarily be related
with 10w performance if an efficient system of visiting doctors exists in place.
Even if this might be true, simplified and quantifiable indicators are preferred
and, if necessary, a brief explanation to put them ‘in context” is included.
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5. Indicators that are useful to support the hypothesis are preferred, in particular
those that permit one to relate the relationship between the organisational
design, the environment and the performance cf the project.
6. Only indicators measuring an average level of development are included.
This level corresponds to the level of development that is expected in the
context of the projects that are evaluated. For example, even though including
connection to Internet and television might be considered as an indicator of
performance of housing reconstruction in developed countries, it is not included
as a relevant variable in low cost housing in developing countries. This selection
has been made after assessing the traditional level of development of low
income affected communities in the selected case studies.
Note that — even if it seems in contradiction with the previous argument - some
level of performance is expected even if it is not common in the average level of
development of countries in South and Central America. For example, this study
measures the level 0f performance of transferring insurance policies to the
private sector. Even though geffing private insurance for housing is anything but
common in low-income housing in developing countries, including it as a
variable 0f performance denotes the position and opinion of the evaluator
regarding the way in which developing countries could deal with risks of
damages and destruction.
7. Only Critical Success Factors (CSF5) are retained. Adapting Leidecker and
Bruno’s (1986) approach to evaluation of business performance, a selection of
indicators is made here according to the specific industry that is being evatuated.
According to that approach, CSF5 correspond to “things that must go right” in
reconstruction projects in developing countries, leaving behind other aspects
that, though they might be beneficial (pluses) are flot critical for the project
(musts)
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8. The indicatots of performance do flot represent what is individually best for
the community or what is best for the government or for the organisation
responsible. According to Roberts (1972), performance is the level of utilisation
of resources which results in the maximum benefits to ail participants, not
considered separately, without resorting to exploitation. Foilowing that definition,
the indicators show the level of performance for the multi-organisation involved
in the project (inciuding the beneficiaries) thus representing what is ‘best’ for the
reconstruction project.
9. Following Aubert’s approach to the Logical Framework (1994), the indicators
of performance for inputs and outputs are selected as operational indicators. For
the case of inputs they represent the completion of an operation or its main
characteristics. In the case of outputs they represent the delivering of a product
or service. For the resuits, oniy indicators of transfer are selected, including:
transfer of knowledge, transfer of technology, acquiring a product, participating
in the deveiopment of a product or service or using a service. For impacts, only
indicators of development are used, accord ing to the exclusive objectives of a
reconstruction project. Even though the level of deveiopment must be increased,
according to the definition of reconstruction, indicators of impacts exclude
objectives of development not related with reconstruction activities.
2.2.3.1.4. Assessïng the indicators of performance
The indicators of performance include considering both quantitative and
qualitative information. In fact, a general consensus now exists in evaluation
research about the advantages of combining both quantitative and qualitative
methods (Cook and Reichardt, 1983; CIDA, 1997). Qualitative analysis s
particularly useful to put the indicators in context. As it was exemplified earlier, a
single indicator of, for example, 500 houses built does not mean anything from
the process point of view if it is not put in context. In other words, is 500 houses
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built good or flot? It might be good if, for example, 500 houses were expected to
be built, it might be bad if the average amount of houses built with the same
resources is 2000 units. A qualitative assessment of the facts based on an
expert’s appreciation of the relations between the indicator and the context is
fundamentai
If is well known that qualitative data provides depth and detail (Pallon, 1980).
Accord ing to Patton it consists of detailed descriptions of situations, events,
people, interactions and observed behavïours (p. 22). In the type of evaluation
proposed here, qualitative analysis is not being used to perceive levels of
satisfaction of the participants of the project. Contrary to the gender-sensitive
analysis made by CIDA (1997), in this studythe interviews, meetings and
informai conversations with the participants (inciuding the beneficiaries) are flot
used to assess the level of satisfaction but to collect information about facts and
situations that permit puffing the raw data in context.
Let us emphasise this aspect. With the popularity gained for the participatory
approach to deveIopment, users’ satisfaction has been considered as a primary
yardstick for the evaluation of international development projects. We do not
pretend to underestimate the importance of it in the evaluation of performance.
However, the method developed here assesses the performance of the process
in terms of a consistent sequence of activities and decisions. Ifs primary
objective is not to measure the opinion of participants but the capacity of those
participants to conduct a consistent sequence of decision-making activïties
within the constraints of the context and to examine the effects of those
decisions in the chain of activities. In other words, a project is not considered
here as having adequate performance if users are “happy” but if the sequence
and pertinence of decision-making responded to the risks and constraints of the
hostile environment to consistently respond to the objectives targeted in the
project.
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The qualitative assessment of the indicators needs, therefore, to consider the
aspects that, as discussed earlïer, represent the development of the process.
The questions related with the water-cups example (section 2.2.1) are used here
in combïnation with the Logical Framework Analysis. In thïs way, the evaluator
assesses the corresponding indicatot by answering some of the questions (in
the form of statements) formulated earlier as part of the example of the cups.
Therefore, the evaluator might assess, for example:
Were the local and external resources optimised?
Was the targeted output aftained?
Were the outputs available at the “right time”?
Is the product adequate for the environment in which it is going to be used?
Were the outputs available to the right people?
Did the local community use the outputs/ services offered?
Do the outputs offered correspond to the needs of the population?
Was a significant part or ail of the real needs covered? Is that percentage
satisfactory?
Did the project reduce the vulnerabilities 0f the population?
How did the environment affect the resuits of the project?
2.2.3.2. The Forms of Indicators of Performance (FIPs)
b assess the questions presented earlier, and some others that are specific for
certain indicators, a series of forms have been prepared. The Forms of
Indicators of Performance (FIP5) are completed by the evaluator through a
series 0f statements that the evaluator assesses (ail the FIPs are included in the
attached CD). A FIP exists for each of the indicators and it consists of a series of
statements that define the level of performance of the specific indicator. Fig. 2.8
shows the main components of the FIPs. As it will be explained later, the FIPs
give a value to each of the indicators of performance. These indicators are
summarised in a Table 0f lndicators of Performance and vulnerability fliP).
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Type of indicator in the model (in the computer, click here to obtain more information)
Group of indicators (click for more info)
Code of the indicator
Name of the indicator
___
___
_
Levelofdemand
4
Explanation ofthe
-
-
level of demand
-
4
Statements
--
-
Level ot performance
-- -
-
-
of the project
.- —---
___
_
—-
----
H—-— Explanation ofthe
-
-•
level of performance
-
‘
Statements
Three-choice
assessment cf the
statement
—
ok neI
In the computer, click to go to the next FIP
Indicates “error” if an extra “x’ has been typed by mistake
Indicates “complete” when aIl the ‘x’ have been typed
Fig. 2.8 Typical FIP
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The statements are presented in a three-choice scale that indicates the level of
conformity of that specific item to a certain degree of performance that is
considered ‘optimum’ or ‘desirabie’ by the evaluator. For instance, whiie
measuring the performance of the capacity of residents to work in construction
(an input measured in terms of the characteristics of the activity as a resource
for the project) the compliance with the foilowing statement is assessed:
Beneficiaries of the project had [sufficient] [relative] [insufficient] knowiedge
about construction practices.
This statement means that the fact that beneficiaries of the project had sufficient
knowiedge about construction practices is an ‘optimum’ or ‘desirable’ condition
for the capacity of residents to wotk in construction. The toPe of the evaluator is
to seiect among the three options the one that closeiy describes the reality of the
project by typing an “x” in the corresponding space.
in ail cases, the evaluator chooses among three leveis. The first one being an
absolute compliance with the desired level and the third one being a total
discordance with that statement. For intermediate degrees of compliance oniy
one (the second) statement is presented. The first level is defined by adjectives
such as [absoluteiy], [sufficient], [very much] etc. The second level is defined by
adjectives such as: [almost], [relative], etc. Finally, the third level is defined by
adjectives such as: [flot at ail], [insufficientJ, etc.
This three-choice evaluation is based in a very pragmatic requirement that tries
to reduce the level of subjective value of the evaluator to its minimum. With
objective data the evaluator easily knows if the statement is absolutely or flot at
ail compliant with the statement proposed. However, a more than three-option
evaluation aiiows the evaluator to hesitate among 2 intermediate levels. This
hesitation might be influenced by the character of the evaiuator, which means
that two evaluators might classify the statement in two different ways (one in the
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doser levet to complete complïance and another one in the subsequent level).
This depends on the level or strictness with which the evaluator expects a
certain level of performance of the project. Similarly, a more than three-option
assessment may ïnduce evaluators to consider the level of compliance
differently accord ing to their mood, e.g. being stricter at one moment or Iess
strict at another.
The number of statements to be assessed varies for each indicator; however, in
general, an average of five statements are enough to fully describe the indicator.
Consïdering that similar methods of evaluation have flot been developed for
reconstruction projects, the statements have been selected by using: fi) the
information that is commonly used in the analysis of post-disaster projects and
(ii) the ten questions of evaluation drawn from the coffee-cups example
presented earlier.
The FIPs of indicators of outputs include a special feature, responding to the fact
that, as was previously explained, the performance of an output depends of the
level of need of that particular aspect. This means that providing a product or a
service is only desirable if that proU uct or service is, in fact, needed. In other
words, the provision of an output that is flot required is undesirable if the
resources spent in that output could have been used for developing products
and services that are indeed required. Similarly, flot providing an output that is
flot required is considered a wise decision while not providing an output that is
required reduces the performance of the project. It is for this reason that the
indicators of performance of outputs are compared against a determined level of
demand of that particular product or service.
Similarly to the way the ASTM’s evaluation compares the level of requiced
functionality with the accomplished level of serviceability, the FIPs for outputs
balance the performance of the product or service delivered with the demand or
flot for that particular output.
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b do this, the evaluation is conducted at two levels: the first one in which the
pre-project level of requirement is assessed and the second one in which the
level 0f performance of the delivered output is assessed. it is important to note
here that the pre-project level of requirement might correspond to fi) a pre
disaster level of demand (which corresponds to the pre-disaster vulnerability of
the community towards that aspect) and/or (ii) a post-disaster (stili pre-project)
level of demand, in which case it inciudes the level of destruction and damages
caused by the disaster.
The first part determines if the output was accessible to residents, if it was
enough to respond to residents’ needs, if it was safe enough, functional enough,
appropriate enough for residents’ needs, etc. Contrary to the statements of
performance fassessed in a three-option scale), these pre-project statements
are assessed in a two-option evaiuation. Ihe consequence of this is that the
evaluator is confronted with determining whether the output was or was not
required, ciearly this is a binary choice where intermediate ieveis carry hue
importance. For example, if bans are needed because peopie do flot have
access to them, it does not make sense to ask whether they are ‘very’ needed of
‘not that much’ needed; as long as they are needed, a response from the project
is required.
The statements used to assess the pre-project level of need describe the level of
access to that resource that is normaily expected in the context of the projects
being studied. Similarly to the statements of performance, the statements of pre
project level of need have been selected through the review in the iiterature of
the main aspects of vulnerabihity that are commoniy considered. Following the
definition of vuinerability used in this study, the level of access to each resource
is particuiarly assessed in the statements.
(J Choosing the first option 0f the binary system means that the statement totahly
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describes the reality of the project under evaluation. Adjectives such as
[absolutely] and [totally] are used. On the contrary, choosing the second option
(through adjectives such as [flot at ail] and [flot completely]) means that the
statement does not represent the reality of the project.
Whatever the combination of statements that the evaluator chooses, the final
resuit would be to determine if the output is or is not required. This means that
determining a vulnerability in only one of the statements implies that the output
IS required. If ail of the statements of the first section are classifïed as totally
compliant with the statement (the first option) the output is considered not to be
required (see Fig. 2.8).
2.2.3.2.1. Quantifying the resuits ofthe FIP
Assigning a quantitative value to each of the indicators of performance does not
permit a beffer understanding of the performance of the project. A number does
not per se give more information about the reality that is being described by the
statements of the FIP. However, it does permit an easy identification of the
weaknesses and strengths of the project and - more importantly - it permits one
to easily compare the level of performance of the same indicator in two or more
projects. This is the reason for which a system of quantification has been
developed for the indicators of performance.
The system consists in giving a quantitative value to the level of performance of
the indicator, and — in the case of outputs — to the level of pre-project need. It
assigns a value to each of the statements of the FIP and presents a global value
for the indicator. The performance of the indicator of the project is quantified
from O to 18 points (a number that was selected and was accepted after provÏng
comfortable for calculations), 18 for the maximum level of performance and O for
the minimum one.
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The maximum 18 points are thus distributed among the statements that are
being considered in each form. The maximum value of 18 points could be
distributed with differential percentages for each of the statements, giving some
of them more value or “weight” than to others. However, during the development
of the method, different weighting possibilities were considered without obtaining
systematic criteria for ail of the FIPs. Because of the different perceptions about
the priorities of the aspects of a project, it would not be possible to agree, with a
group of evaluators, on a homogeneous distribution of weights applicable to ail
the F1Ps. The extensive discussions around this subject concluded that the ‘best’
option - considering the scope of this study - was to give identical weights to ail
the statements of a FIP. Nevertheless, it was also agreed that more work is stiil
required on this aspect to identify a scale of priorities that might heip develop a
systematic distribution of weights among the statements being considered.
However, this aspect has been left for future research.
It is for this reason that the maximum 0f 18 points was equally distributed to
value the first scale of the statements used. That means that if an indicator of
performance of the project is assessed through six statements, the best mark
obtained for each statement (in the first option) is three points. Conversely, if the
indicator is assessed by only three statements, the first option of each statement
will be marked wïth 6 points, In the case 0f the three-option statements, the
intermediate option of the scale obtains 40% of the points affributed to the first
option and O points for the third option (i.e. 6 points for the first option, 2,4 points
for the second option and O points for the third option). The reason for 40%
being assigned to the intermediate option is explained below. In the case of
assessing the level of demand, where the binary choice is applied to the “pre
project” statements, the 18 points are distributed among the number of
statements for the first option and zero is assigned to the second option.
Let us see an example:
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The FtP for “new houses” that was presented in Fig. 2.8 consists of two
statements for the level of demand (before the project) and seven statements for
the level cf performance (within the project). Additional information is also given
to define if the output was -or was not- offered wïthin the project. However, this
additionai information (aiso a three-option choice) does not carry any
quantitative value. The 18 points aftributed to the pre-project level of need are
therefore distributed in 9 points for the statement “houses were [absolutely]
accessible to residents before the disaster”, and 9 points for “houses were
[absolutelyJ unnecessary after the disaster”. For the second option in the binary
system (represented by [not completelyJ) O points are assigned.
The 18 points affributed to the level of “performance within the project” are
distributed among the seven statements. The flrst option of each statement
[absolutely] receives 2,6 points; the second option of each statement [almost]
receives approx. 1,0 points, equivalent to 40% of 2,6; and the third option of
each statement [not at ail] receives O points.
For ail of the three-choice scales of the FIPs, the second option has been
deliberately assigned with forty percent of the maximum value assigned to the
statement. Instead of fifty percent, which some could say: “represents the
middle-in-the-way value between maximum and minimum performances.” This
decision responds to two requirements of the evaluation method:
1. The need to increase the gap between highly ptoficient projects and projects
with mediocre performances. This reduces the possibility that the final resuits
are ail too similar to determine signifïcant differences in between the projects.
Metaphorically, it prevents the comparison of the projects from having
“insignificant differences in a scale of gray tones” which would make it very
difficult for the reader to distinguish. Before evaluating the projects, the value of
forty percent was tested and proved valuable to reduce that risk.
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2. To “punish” more severely projects that did flot follow the expected results.
The definition of forty instead of fifty percent is a statement of severïty that
implies that “almost” doing something is doser to an undesirable performance
than to a desirable performance.
Once the level of demand and the level of performance within the project are
quantified, the final mark for the indicator consists of the addition of the two
values. This addition represents two possibilities:
1. If the output is required, the level of demand receives O points and therefore
the level of performance wiII be established in between O and 18 points resulting
from the statements of the second section (within the project).
2. If the output is not required, the level ofdemand receives 18 points and
therefore the level of performance of the indicator can have two values:
- 18 points if the output was not provided as part 0f the project, in which
case the level of “performance within the project” is zero.
- A value between 18 and 36 points if the output was provided as part cf
the project, in which case the level of “performance within the project”
ranges from zero to 18 points.
Let us see, as a maller of example, three possibilities: (1) if “new houses” were
required and the performance of the output (within the project) receives a value
of 16 points, the final value would be 16 points; (2) if “new houses” were not
requited and “new houses” as an output were not provided the final value of the
indicator will be 18 points; (3) if “new houses” were not required and “new
houses” were provided as part of the project then the final value will exceedl 8
points.
In conclusion, the system of adding up the values obtained from the level of
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demand and the level of performance within the project means that the ideal
performance for any of the indicators is 18 points. More than 18 points is
considered “undesirable” as it means puffing an effort in an output that was not
required. In other words, this evaluation system allows one to:
a. prevent projects from being “punished” for not developing an output that was
not needed anyhow (in which case the final value is 18 points);
b. “punish” projects that did flot do anything or did not do enough for an output
that was required (in which case the final value is zero or close to zero);
c. “punish” projects that developed an output that was flot required, assuming
that other aspects surely requïred the attention of the project fin which case the
final value ïs between 18 and 36 points).
2.2.3.3. The Table of Indicators of Performance TIP
As was explained in the previous sections, the selection of the indicators of
performance is one of the most important aspects of the evaluation process. As
previously discussed, the evaluator decides what are the indicators that reflect a
vision of the project that is adapted to the kind of information that is required.
However, selecting different indicators to evaluate different projects disturbs the
results of the evaluation if the evaluation system (and its conclusions) refers to
various projects in parallel. It is for this reason that a unique system of
evaluation needs to be applied to the projects that are to be simultaneously
studied (in this case, the selected case studies).
The method chosen here leads to a graphic representation and summary of the
evaluation method described earlier, accompanied by a series of diagrams that
highlight the relations between the organisatïonal design of the project and its
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performance (as suggested by the hypothesis of the study). This is a two-step
process including: fi) developing the Table of Indicators of Performance (TIP)
and (ii) representing the organisational design, where both refer to the
reconstruction process being evaluated.
The TIP has been prepared as a tool to visualise a summary of the evaluation of
the project quickly and effectively. The table was originally inspired by the
“diagramme de congruence” employed by Brinckerhoff and Tuthill (1987) to
illustrate the resuits of their evaluation based on the Logical Framework. Ihe
“diagramme de congruence” presents in a scale from 0% to 100% the level of
completion of inputs, outputs, effects and inputs according to the original
estimations. Thus, if education was to be provided to 1000 beneficiaries
(estimation of output) and it was finally provided to 700 beneficiaries, the
diagram would represent a 70% of performance in outputs. This diagram
appeared initially suggestive as a tool to quickly visualise the results of the
evaluation. However, the complexity of reconstruction projects demanded a
more complete set of variables where, contrary to the diagrams presented by
Brinckerhoff and Tuthill, many inputs, outputs, resuits and impacts needed to be
considered together.
The tables of indicators used by the ASTM (2000) (see Fig. 2.7) to measure
building functionality and serviceability were also inspiring for the design of the
final hP. In the ASTM’s table, a series of indicators are considered without
incurring the risk of adding up items of different natures. In other words, taking
care flot to be adding “apples and oranges” while giving an overali picture of the
performance of the project.
The TIP presents, in a simplified and graphic manner, the most important
aspects that have been evaluated in each project, allowing the reader to observe
and compare - in a standard ised form — the level of performance of the
indicators that have been selected. The construction of a unique table of
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evaluation permits a fait and unbiased parallel observation of two or more
reconstruction projects at the same time.
The table was flot prepared for a direct comparison of the final performance of
different projects taken in isolation from their contexts. The reader must aiways
remember that the overail performance of a reconstruction project is the resuit of
the performance of its individual subsystems as a variable of the vuinerabilities
of the affected community. However, the TIP easily shows the aspects where
each of the projects had Iow or high levels of performance and the aspects that
were delivered by an organisation that does not belong to the multi-organisation
responsible of the project. Figure 2.9 explains the type of information that is
provided by the hP.
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Name of the project
Section of the logical framework (inputs, outputs, results, impacts)
inputs multi-organisation
management tools
Column of indicators
1 the capacity ta atract funds for the project
6 organisations capacity ta adapt ta environm.
7 a census of local residents
Ï
18,0
16,2
15,3
Macking obtained from the equivalent evaluation torm (from O to 36)
Column to indicate outputs provided by a different organisation
(an organisation that does not belong to the multi-organisation)
Group of indicators
Number of the indicator
pr ject 199t CGO’s rural r construction project in Colombia
s ction group No. indicator dif. org
1
— evaluation scale
0.0 37 7 I0 14,5 1.1.1
36 7,2 108 144 18,0 8CC
2 level of integration with the community 13,2
3 level 0f integration between organisations 18,0
4 level of differentiation between organisations 18,0
5 project’s administrative costs 18,0
8 previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc) 18,0
Graphic representation of the evaluation scale, where a mark of less than 7,3
or more of 18,0 s indicated in red to flag a 10w level of performance
Fig. 2.9 The information provided by the TIP
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2.2.3.4. Identifying and analysing unexpected resuits and impacts
Developing a systematic way of identifying the unexpected outcomes of a
project is particularly difficult since, by nature, unexpected resuits and impacts
are difficult to predict and - most likely - are different for every project.
However, the review of Iiterature and other case studies in the field of
reconstruction reveal that, even though an infinite number of unexpected
outcomes might exist, there are a Iimited number of variables that cause the
majority of them.
Unexpected outcomes appear when the outputs provided or developed by the
project get in contact with the external environment of the system that produced
them. In Fig. 2.6 this environment is represented by the larger box and the
system and its immediate environment is represented by the grey box. Outputs
are exposed to the external environment when they are transferred to end users,
for example when housing units are provïded to users, or when users acquire a
product or a service (an output) provided by the project. When external factors
(represented in Fig. 2.6 by the atrows in fout directions) upset the expected
sequence of outputs-results-impacts, unexpected outcomes become likely to
appear.
What makes this new sequence particularly interesting, that is to say, the
importance of including the unexpected outcomes, is that the muli-organisation
in charge of the project has, very often, very lift le influence over the external
factors. The area of direct influence of the organisations that develop the project
is the ‘system’ (in other words, the project — including the inputs and the outputs)
and the immediate environment of that system. Even though a fuzzy limit
probably exists between the immediate and the larger environment, this
argument about the impact of the larger environment on the outcomes of a
project is easy to illustrate with the following example: A temporary multi
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organisation develops a project to provide a product that users have to pay for in
monthly payments, using a foreign currency (for example US dollars). This mode
of payment in foreign currency responds to the fact, for example, that the project
was conducted with bans and financïng responsibilities acquired in that foreign
curtency (US dollars). If end-users earn their income in a local currency (for
example in Honduran Lempiras) and a sudden devaluation of the Lempiras in
relation with the US dollars occurs when the product is transferred to the end
users, it might be possible that the economic feasibilïty of the project wibl be
challenged. If the devaluation of the local currency affects the capacity of end
users to respond to their payment obligations, unexpected outcomes might
occur (for example that users return the products or leave their homes or even
refuse to pay the monthly instalments). In this example, it is clear that the
organisations deveboping the project have liffle or no capacity to influence the
external factor that affected the project (the exchange rates between Lempiras
and US dollars). These organisations can — in the best of cases — influence an
immediate environment of the system; for example to persuade the financial
institutions to give them 10w penalty interest rates for delayed payments.
Nonetheless, the major influence of these organisations is on the inputs and
outputs of the project; for example, if they could anticipate a change in the
exchange rates, they can modify the product to make it more affordable in the
new economic conditions.
In the case explained earlier, an external factor dïsrupted the expected
assumptions of the organisations - for example that users were going to acquire
and use the products; as a resuit the performance of the project is affected.
Even though an infinite number of external factors potentially exists, they can be
categorïsed in five groups as suggested previously. They are:
Social factors
Economic factors
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Cultural factors
Political factors
Physical factors
These five categories of factors might disrupt the expected assumptions that
relate:
1. Outputs to resu Its and
2. Results ta impacts
These impacts are now explained. First, let us recapitulate the assumptions
concerning the project; then we can identify where the external factors can upset
the best planned project.
1. Impact on the relationship of outputs to results:
By definition, the indicators 0f results are those that explain the relations
between the outputs and the end-users (Aubry and Hivon, 1994). Two types of
relations between end-users and outputs are often identified:
1. Results 0f transfer (Aubry and Hivon, 1994): end-users acquiring and
using the outputs
2. Results of participation (Da Silva, 1984): end-users participating in the
development of the outputs
Even though the assumptions might be different for every project, case studies
prove that the most common assumptions in product oriented projects are:
For the results of transfer:
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Assumption No. 1: if:
1. Users have access to the product (if the product is affordable, accessible, etc)
and,
2. The users “like” it (if the ptoduct corresponds to the needs, desires and
expectations of the users)
Then:
The output is acquired.
Assumption No. 2: if:
-The product is acquired and its use corresponds to the needs, desires and
expectations of the users
Then:
The product is used.
For the participation of end-users, the following assumptions seem to be
proposed very often in the field of housing provision:
Assumption No. 3: ïf:
1. End-users are shown that resources do not allow for paying the labour force,
2. End-users are taught how to participate in the activities of the project,
3. End-users have the time (or can manage to get the time) to participate in the
project,
4. End-users are given the resources (tools and materials) to participate and
5. End-users are explained that the product is not given ‘for free’ but instead it
can be ‘paid for’ by helping in its production
Then:
They will participate in producing the product
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2. Impact on the reiationship between results and impacts
Impacts usually correspond to the goals of the project. Therefore assumptions
about the logical transfer between results and impacts are those that relate to:
The results of transfer to allaining the goal (s)
The results 0f end-user participation to affaining the goal (s)
That means that the following assumptions are commonly found:
Assumption No. 4: if:
Peopie use the products (usualiy just acquiring the product is not enough)
Then
The goal is affained
Assumption No. 5: if:
People participate in producing the product
Then
The goal is allained
In realïty the goals are often very similar. In recent cases of reconstruction
projects they commonly include aspects related with long term development and
reduction of vuinerabilities.
Assumptions 1 to 5 can be called “internaI assumptions” since they correspond
to the expected sequence of the internai process of the project. Sometimes
these internaI assumptions are complemented by ‘external’ ones that
correspond to the type of environment that is expected for the proper
development of the project.
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Two types of external assumptions might exist:
Assumption No. 6: If:
No sudden and/or unexpected changes occur in the environment
Then
The expected results and expected impacts occur
Assumption No. 7: if:
A certain expected change occurs in the environment
Then
The expected results and expected impacts occur
An example of assumptïon 7 could be that the organÏsers of the project expect
that interest rates will decrease over a certain period of time. If that external
factor occurs (interest rates decrease) then the users are able to take bans to
acquire the outputs.
This analysis shows that, in reality, projects are disturbed at the levels of results
and impacts when external factors (grouped in the five categories mentioned
above) influence the seven possible assumptions. Table 2.1 illustrates the
possible combinations that may exist between the factors and the assumptions
to help the evaluator identify the most frequent (and Iikely to be found)
unexpected resuits and impacts.
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Table 2.1 This matrix can help the evaluator identify the most frequent unexpected
resuits and impacts
external factors! social economic cultural political physical
assumptions
Assumption 1
Assumption 2
Assumption 3
Assumption 4
Assumption 5
Assumption 6
Assumption 7
Let us explain this with an example. Following the matrix, the evaluator can
recognise that a cultural factor (for example the way in which the message used
for advertising the outputs was received by the local community) can disturb the
second assumption (people acquired the product, which corresponded to their
needs, desires and expectations). A hypothetical resuit of this influence
(corresponding to the node of the third column - cultural, and the second line —
assumption) could be that people refused to use the product once it was
acquired because they misunderstood the way it had to be used.
lt is important to clarify that the purpose of the evaluation conducted here is not
to identify cause-effect relationships of the unexpected outcomes. Even though
some principles in that regard might be established with the information
available, a complete scientific analysis of the cultural, economic, social, political
and physical external factors is outside of the scope of the present work. The
only cause-effect relationships that this study attempts to prove in a systematic
way are those related with the four elements of the research hypothesis and the
methods to analyse them are described in section 2.5.
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2.3. Representing the organïsational system of the project
A standard method of representation is suggested here to see in parallel the
case studies. Analysing the structure of the project requires representing both
the structure of the organisation responsible of the project and the structure of
the multi-organisation. Even though the analysis of the internai structure ofthe
organisation responsible of the project is not particularly useful for building up
relations required for validating the hypothesis, it is used here to analyse the
way the organisation responded to the challenge of the project. For this analysis,
the method used by the Project Management Institute in the PMI Body of
Knowledge (PMBOK) is particularly useful. In this approach, a series of models
permit identifying the role of each of the subsystems of the organisation. Iwo
main types of structures can be identified: the functional-based and the project
based organisation (PM1, 1996).
The functional organisation (Fig. 2.10) has a classical hierarchïcal structure
where each employee has a ciearly identified superior and the teams are
grouped according to their specialisation. Each of the teams (subsystems) of the
organisation is a functional independent unit that cooperates to the development
of the project exclusively within the boundaries of their own functional
specialisation. The transfer of information in this structure follows a hierarchicai
dimension in which the employee transmits the information (or the question) to
his superior who communicates with the person responsible in the other unit.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the projectized organisation (Fig. 2.1 1), in
which team members are often located. Most of the organisation’s resources are
devoted to project development and project managers have a great deal of
independence and authority. If sub-departments (or units) exist, they usually
report to the project manager or provide service and support to the ongoing
projects.
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In between those two approaches, three intermediate structures exist: the weak
matrix organisation (Fig. 2.12), the balanced matrix organisation (Fig. 2.13) and
the strong matrix organisation (Fig. 2.14). They correspond to a blend 0f the
functional and the projectized characteristics. Weak matrices maintain most of
the characteristics of the functional organisations and the project manager acts
more like a coordinator than like a manager. In a strong matrix organisation most
0f the characteristics of the projectized organisation are maintained.
As represented in figure 2.15, a combination 0f the previous structures might
appear. In fact, modem organisations usually combine different structures. For
example, a fundamentally functional organisation might prepare a project team
for developing a critical project.
Fig. 2.10 Functional organisation according to the PMBOK (in ail ofthe PMBOK
diagrams black boxes represent staff engaged in project activities)
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(Black boxes represent staff engeged in projoctaibes.) I
Fig. 2.12 Weak matrix organisation according to the PMBOK
Chief
Executive
Fig. 2.11 Projectized organisation according to the PMBOK
Project Manager
Fig. 2.13 Balanced matrix organisation according to the PMBOK
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The structure of the multi-organisation is represented in a diagram inspired by
the model of construction projects as ptoposed in section 2.2.1. it is important to
remember that in this diagram, the project is considered as a system including
multiple subsystems, aIl of them embedded in a larger environment. A project is
then, the consequence of an organisation (or multi-organisation) that develops
some processes to produce a product or service that is finally offered to, and
acquired by, users (see fig 2.16)
Project Manager
Fig. 2.14 Strong matrix organisation according to the PMBQK
Fig. 2.15 Composite organisation accotding to the PMBOK
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Fig. 2.16 Diagram of a construction project (same as in Fig. 2.2)
Accordingly, the dïagram to represent the organisational system of the project
(Fig. 2.17) illustrates the elements of the system and their relations. The
organisations are Iinked by the main processes that relate them in the project,
which correspond to the activities that are conducted to Iead to the development
of the outputs of the project (which are also subsystems). These outputs are
directly linked to a targeted population that become the users or beneficiaries of
this process.
The diagram distinguishes, among the most important participant organisations,
those that are considered local and those which are external. Local
organisations are closely related to the environment of the project (regional or
national-based organisations) whereas the external organisations usually
correspond to internationally based institutions or NGOs. Also the organisations
that are not part of the multi-organisation responsible for the project, but that had
an influence in the development of the processes are indicated (in clear white
boxes). The relations between the organisations (links indicated by connectors)
are as important in terms of the information they provide to understand the
project as the non-existence of relations (which are obviously absent in the
diagram). In other words, these diagrams ace important both for what they show
and also for what they do flot show.
Q_______________
_____________
for outout
____ ___________
red: flot roi dort in thx nrrdxoi
whfte box
_______________________________________
__ __
grey box.
___ ____ ___
Fig. 2.17 Example of the diagram of the multi-organisation (in this example applied to
FUNDASAL’s reconstruction project)
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The main processes (activities) conducted by these organisations are also
represented. 0f course, not ail the activities involved in the project are shown,
only the most important elements of a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) for
reconstruction projects are illustrated. According to the WBS of average
reconstruction projects those activities are:
Cooperation agreements: The planning, definition and accomplishment of
cooperation agreements in between two or more organisations to provide
funding and/or technology transfer.
Funding: The activities conducted to partially or totally fund (through subsidies,
bans, or donations) a project or an output that is being developed within a
project.
Procurement: the activities conducted to assign responsibilities among a group
of participants within a project. It usually corresponds to the activities developed
by the client to hire employees and/or define contracts. Contracts and
subcontracts assign the responsibilities for the tasks required for the
development of the project.
Research & studies: the development of the activities targeted to gather
information and knowledge about the affected community or its environment. It
might include studies of sou, architectural typologies, weather, or sociological or
anthropological studies.
Distribution of money: Activities leading to the transfer of funds from funding
organisations to beneficiaries.
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Selection of beneficiaries : the activities conducted to determine the
beneficiaries (passive recipients or active participants) of the products and
services offered by the project.
Project management: the activities of leadership in the muiti-organisation
targeted to plan and design the process, distribute responsibilities, assign tasks,
control the operations, evaluate the process and, in general, ail the activities of
management of human resources, costs, quality, time and informatïon and
knowledge.
Control: activities targeted to follow up and modify the process according to
certain objectives of performance.
Cooperation: coordination of two or more organisations to develop an output
within the same objectives.
Provision of: land / housing solutions / temporarv housing: the activities targeted
to transfer an output ta lot, a house, etc) to the beneficiaries. It may include
legalisation of property tities and ail the activities required for the legal
acquisition of it. Three main groups of outputs are indicated here: land, housing
solutions and temporary housing.
Decision making: activity of selecting a product or service among a series of
options offered.
Educating and training: activities targeted to the transfer of knowledge, skills
and/or information.
Construction: construction activities conducted by hired personnel or
contractors.
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Self-help: activities of participation of the users in the process. As suggested by
Roberts (1972), it might include one, some or ail of the following activities:
design, management, financing 0f the project, production of components,
construction.
Construction: Leading the physicai construction of a building or of some type of
infrastructure. Actïvïties related with hiring construction work (i.e. hired labor
force).
The sequence of organisations and processes is foilowed by a summary of the
main outputs (products and services) developed in the project. Those outputs
correspond to the indicators of performance that were previously selected. The
iist of outputs has the same ordering and wording as the indicators of
performance of the hP; however, only some of the outputs are developed in
each of the projects. As a warning signal, the outputs that are flot included in the
project, or those included but presenting a low level of performance are
highlighted in red.
2.4. Collecting the information for the case studies
Table 2.2 iliustrates the type of information that was gathered for each of the
projects. By completîng this table as a checklist the same type of information
was obtained for the four case studies.
The interviews with the officers of the organisation responsible of the project
were initially prepared in the form ofa guided questionnaire (see annex 1).
However, in ail cases, the officers (project managers, directors and executives of
the organisations) demonstrated a pre-established structure to present their
projects (probably the same structure they use to present the project to their
superiors). The structure used by them demonstrated that they were prepared
and well organised and appeared to be useful to compile as much information as
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possible. Therefore, the guide that was prepared for the interview was only used
as a checklist to ensure that ail the information that was required was obtained.
Leffing the officers taik freely permiffed collecting information that was not
originaiiy expected while filiing in the data that were expected. In the same way,
the open interviews with residents (see annex 1) permitted obtaining unexpected
insights about their view of the project. The information given by the officers and
by local residents was triangulated with the officiai reports wriften by the
organisations responsibie and with other reports and information from the media.
In one of the projects selected as a case study (the ptoject of the municipality of
San Salvador - the criteria for selecting the case studies is presented in section
2.6), internai information in the form of ietters, faxes, emaiis and partial reports
proved vaiuable to overcome the lack of a final report. in the other projects, the
final reports provided most of the data requited for the evaiuation. Considering
the way in which the statements of the FIP are conceived, objectîve data from
officiai reports was more vaiuabie than subjective information coming from the
interviews. In thïs way, once the objective information was coliected, completing
the FIPs proved to be a rather mechanistic process where subjective value was
negiigibie. Due to the way in which the statements were deiiberately conceived,
the personal opinions obtained from stakehoiders provided iess information for
evaiuating the projects than verifiable data. As a maffer of example, the foilowing
statements used in the FIPs iliustrate that the type of information that was
required corresponded more to verifiabie objective information than to subjective
opinions:
- Whether an output was deiivered on time or not;
- Whether an output was or was not used by beneficiaries;
- Whether the money that was expected to be collected was collected or
not;
- Whether users determined the layout of the spaces wïthin their houses or
not; etc.
Table 2.2 Information required for the case studies
case case case case
study study study study
No. Type of information Source In the form 0f: 1 2 3 4
1 Thecontext
1,1 Generaicontext
Economic context previous studies documents and statistics X x X X
Social context previous studies documents and statistics X X X X
Political previous studies documents and papers x x x x
Geographical previous studies maps and gcaphics x x x x
1,2 Preparedness measures ( mitigation previous studies documents x x x X
policies, protocols, implemented strategies)
1.3 The history 0f disasters previous studies articles and papers x x x x
1,4 Previous case studies previous studies articles and papers x x X X
2 The disaster
2,1 Reports of the natural disaster lst hand info officiai reports, news papets x x x x
2,2 Analysis 0f the vuinerabilities lst hand info graphic model analysis x x x x
2,3 Report of the initial responses for rehab. 1 st hand info articles, officiai reports x x x x
2,4 Measures taken by the govemment (taxes, lst hand info articles, officiai reports x x x x
employment, legislation, etc.)
3 The case study
3,1 Genemi approach mortel analysis interviews x X X X
3,2 Technological approach lst hand info plans and pictures X X X X
3,3 Reported resuits previous studies officiai reports and papers X x x X
3,4 Evaluation of resuits 1 st hand info statistics and interviews x x X X
3,5 Short term evaluation model analysis mortel analysis x x x x
3,5 Mid-term evaluation mortel analysis - graphic analysis and discussion x x
Questionnaires
Questionnaire to residents lst hand info visits to some residents X x X x
Interviews with officers lst hand info guided queStionnaires x x x x
Specific lst hand info. reguired
Picturesofthedisaster x x x x
Pictures 0f the reconstruction project x x x x
Plans 0f pre-disaster housing typologies x X X X
Plans 0f the reconstruction project X X X X
Construction documents (budgets, schedules) x x x x
Information from the organis. responsible: x x x x
Organigram X X X X
Mandate x x x x
Procurement strategy x x x x
Technological aspects x x x x
Information and opinion from the media X x X x
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2.5. Fïnding relations between the performance of the project and its
organisational design
Once the projects are evaluated, and the organisational systems are clarified
and represented, the relations in between them need to be established. b do
so, it is important to remember that the hypothesis of the study proposes that the
performance of the project is a dependent variable of four main variables:
First variable The level of integration and differentiation within the multi
organisation, including inserting the project in a larger program 0f
reconstruction
Second variable: The multi-organisation’s strategic capacity to attract funding
Third variable: The multi-organisation’s capacity to share and react to the risks 0f the
environment
Fourth variable: The level cf user’s responsibility for individual decision-making among
a series of choices offered
The following cause-effect relationships need to be examined to validate each of
the fout aspects included in the hypothesis. For each relation a few micro
hypotheses are proposed. These micro-hypotheses are validated (true or false)
based on the evaluation of the set of projects stud jeU in this research.
2.5.1. First variable of the hypothesis
First variable The level of integration and differentiation within the multi
organisation, including inserting the project in a larger program
of reconstruction
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A. Possible relationships between the level of differentiation and integration
(indicators 0f inputs No. 2, 3 and 4) and the overall performance of the project
(including expected and unexpected results and impacts): The micro
hypothesis is: higher levels of integration and differentiation Iead to higher
levels of performance.
B. Possible relationships between the fact that the project was either
independent or else coordinated with a larger program of reconstruction and the
overali performance of the project (ïncluding expected and unexpected results
and impacts): The micro-hypothesis is: if the project is well integrated into
a larger program of reconstruction the level of performance is higher.
C. The relationship between the different organisations in the diagram of
organisational design and the delivery of outputs. Particularly if an output is not
delivered in the project and none of the organisations took care of it: The micro
hypothesis is: the outputs that were not developed correspond to missing
or insufficïent links within the multi-organisation.
D. The possible relationship between the amount of relations and organisatïons
participating in the multi-organisation and the variety and quantity of outputs
offered: The micro-hypothesis is: more organisations participating and
more relations in between them lead to higher levels of performance.
E. The possible relationship between the amount of processes included in the
project (processes listed in the WBS) and the overali performance of the project
(including expected and unexpected results and impacts): The micro
hypothesis is: the more processes ïncluded in the project the befter the
performance of the project.
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F. The possible relationship between the amount of organisations participating in
the project and the amount of processes conducted: The micro-hypothesis is:
more organisations participating in the project Iead to more processes
beïng conducted.
2.5.2. Second variable of the hypothesis
Second variable: The multi-organisatïon’s strategic capacity to attract funding
A. Possible relationships between the multi-organisation’s capacity to affract
funding (indicator of inputs No. 1) and the overall performance of the project
(including expected and unexpected resuits and impacts): The micro
hypothesis is: befter capacity to attract fundîng Ieads to beffer
performance of the project.
B. The relationships between the external factors influencing the project and the
multi-organisation’s capacity to aftract funding: The micro-hypothesis is: if the
multi-organisation’s capacity to aftract funding is low it is due to
influences of the environment (external factors).
C. The relationships between the strategic planning ofthe organisation
responsible for the project and the multi-organisation’s capacity to affract
funding: The micro-hypothesis is: a weII-established strategic plan that
includes positioning the organisation in the market of international
funding leads to a befter capacity to aftract funding.
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2.5.3. Third variable of the hypothesis
Third variable: The multi-organïsation’s capacity to share and react to the risks
of the environment
A. Possible relationships between the organisation’s capacity to adapt to the
environment (indicator of inputs No. 6) and the overali performance of the
project (including expected and unexpected results and impacts): The micro
hypothesis is: the beffer the capacity of the organisation responsible for
the project to adapt to the environment the befter the performance of the
project.
B. Possible relationships between sudden changes of the environment (so
called “external factors” in the model of evaluation) and the overall performance
of the project (including expected and unexpected results and impacts): The
micro-hypothesis is: external negative factors affect the performance of
the project, particularly the capacity to deliver the outputs.
C. Possible relationships between management tools used to reduce uncertainty
(indicators of outputs No. 7, 8, 9 and 10) - uncertainty, it ïs well known, is one of
the major causes of risks - and the overall performance of the project (including
expected and unexpected results and impacts): The mïcro-hypothesis is: the
befter the performance in the development of the management tools the
better the performance of the project.
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2.5.4. Fourth variable of the hypothesis
Fourth variable: The level of user’s responsibility for individual decision-making
among a series of choices offered
A. Possible relationships between the indicators of community participation
(indicators of resuits No. 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54) and the overali oerformance
of the project (including expected and unexpected resuits and impacts): The
micro-hypothesis is: higher levels of performance in the indicators of
community participation Iead to higher overall performance of the project.
B. The relationship between the level of community participation in decision
making (indicatot of resuits No. 54) and the organisatïon’s capacity to adapt to
the environment (ïndicator of inputs No. 6) and the overail performance of the
project: The micro-hypothesis is: High levels of community participation in
decisïon-making fwhich transfers the risk associated with acceptability to
the users) increases the capacity to adapt ta the environment leading to
higher levels of performance.
By proving the micro-hypothesis rïght or wrong in the fout case studies, the
correspond ing hypotheses are also proved right or wrong. Finally, as proposed
in the diagram of the research (Fig. 1.1), the relations found in each of the
projects are then compared between the projects and later on between the
resuits of the study and other resufts found in the literature in order to be able to
propose some analytical generalisations.
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2.6. Criteria for selecting the case studies
Before presenting the case studies, let us examine the criteria used to seiect
them. The selected case studies are similar regard ing the variables that wiII not
be considered in the study but are different regarding the research variables.
In other words, the selected projects:
- have a similar goal (Iow-cost housing reconstruction);
- have a similar environment (Latin American developing countries);
- have similar rationale (post-disaster recovery);
- were ail developed in the last five years;
- have different organisational designs
- have a different strategy and structure
Chapter III, Resuits
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Chapter III, Resuits, part J
With similar goals at the tactical level and comparable mid-term objectives,
four organisations working both as ‘promoters’ and ‘builders’ but with
different strategic plans adopted four approaches to the logïstics and planning
of reconstruction projects with which they chose to become involved. Their
initiatives resuited in four different organisationai structures, with different
strengths and weaknesses and exposure to opportunities and threats. This
chapter shows the contextuai constraints, the internai reasons and the vision
of each of these organisations, illustrating how these three aspects iead them
to adopt a particuiar approach to their projects. Omissions, inappropriate
decisions and unfortunate mistakes iead to the provision of a certain quantity
of outputs with different standards of quality and in different time frames.
This chapter is subdivided in three parts. Part one presents, in a parallel and
standardised form, a summary of relevant data and facts about the four selected
case studies to facilitate their comparison. Part two presents fi) an introduction about
the environmental aspects of the case studies and (ii) a chronological analysis of the
four projects. Part three presents the resuits obtained by applying the methods
(developed in Chapter Il) to the case studïes.
Even though there is no point in drawing conclusions by comparing individual
elements of the projects, seeing their most important aspects in parallel is crucial for
the benchmarking purposes presented in Chapter IV. The first two sections follow the
structure proposed in Chapter I for the analysis of reconstruction. This includes an
analysis of the disaster studying bath the vulnerabilities and strengths of the
community to face environmental hazards. The analysis of vulnerabilities includes (as
proposed by Hewiif, 1997) the review of contextual (historic and geographic) causes
• ‘promoter’: used here to describe the organisation that plans and initiates (‘promotes’) the
project, besides financing it and/or looking for its funding. ‘Builder’: used here to describe the
organisation that organises construction activities and Ieads the execution of the project.
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of vulnerability. Root causes of vulnerability related with political and social aspects
(as proposed in section two) are based on previous studies conducted by specialists
in sociological and anthropological issues, but adapted for the present analysis.
The analysis of vuinerabilities and strengths is followed by the introduction to the
disaster and the consequences of it. Then, the organisation in charge of the project is
presented and finally the project and ïts major resuits are described.
3.1. Summary of relevant data and facts about the four selected case studies
This part includes the following tables used to see in parallel data and tacts about the
case studies:
1. Location: location and main facts about the country (source: Atlamedia.com)
2. Geography: main characteristics (source: Atlamedia.com)
3. Major recent disasters and dïsaster exposure indicators (1970-1 999):
according to Charveriat, Celine, Inter American Bank (2000)
4. Vulnerabilities of the built environment: main vulnerabilities related to
housing construction and the built environment
5. Socio-cultural vulnerabilities: Social and cultural tactors that limited or
reduced the capacity of residents to have access to resources
6. Political and economic vulnerabilitïes: Political and economic tactors that
Iimited or reduced the capacity ot residents to have access to resources
7. Strengths and opportunities 0f the community: according to the definition
of vulnerabilities and disasters, strengths correspond to the factors that
permiffed the residents to increase their access to resources
8. The hazard, main event and secondary events: the events that triggered
the disaster
9. Effects of the disaster: damage and losses
10.Implementation ofthe project: the process that resulted in the creation of or
mobilisation of an organisation assuming the project
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11.The organisation in charge ofthe project, strategic plan: mission: as
stated by the organisation.
12.The organisation in charge of the project, strategic objectives: the
organisations’ objectives to achieve the strategy proposed
l3The organisation’s strengths to assume the project: main strengths to
conduct the project in the case study
14.The organisation’s weaknesses to assume the project: main weaknesses
to conduct the ptoject in the case study
15. The organisation in charge of the project, objectives of the project: the
main objectives targeted in the project
16.The organisation in charge ofthe project, tactical approach: the decisions
and approach used for the project
17.The organisation in charge ofthe project, management tools: the main
management tools used at the tactical level
18. Resu Its of the project: some figures about the outputs delivered by the
p roject
19.Time-table of the main resuits 0f the project: a time-table in standardised
format to see the development of the main groups of outputs (in ted the time
people stayed homeless or in bad conditions of habitat, in white the activities
that were not included in the project).
The four case studies selected are:
Case study 1: 2001 earthquake, El Salvador, rural reconstruction project.
Organisation responsible: FUNDASAL.
Case study 2: 2001 earthquake, San Salvador, urban reconstruction ptoject.
Organisation responsible: The Municipality of San Salvador.
Case study 3: 1999 earthquake, Colombia, rural reconstruction project.
Organisation responsible: The Colombian Coffee Growers’ Organisations (CGO5)
Case study 4: 1998 after Mitch, Choluteca, Honduras, semi-rural reconstruction
project. Organisation responsible: Canadian Centre for International Studies and
Cooperation (CECI)
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Repu bhc of El Salvador
• Capital: San Salvadot
• System of government:
Multiparty Republic, Democratic
• Area: 21,476 Sq Km (8,292 Sq
Mi)
• Estimated population in 2000:
6,435,600
Municipality of San Salvador
• Capital of the department of
San Salvador
• System of government:
Democratic election of the
Mayor and the Council.
• Area: 72 Sq. Km
• Estimated population of the
department in 2002: 1,831,532
Republic of Colombïa
• Capital: Bogota
• System of govern ment: Unitary
Multiparty Republic, Democratic
• Area: 1,138,914Sq Km
(439,735 Sq Mi)
• Estimated population in 2000:
38,324,400
Republic of Honduras
• Capital: Tegucigalpa
• System of government:
Multiparty Republic, Democratic
• Area: 112,088 Sq Km (43,277
Sq Mi)
• Estimated population in 2000:
6,163,300
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2. Geoqraphy
A T E A L A H N D R
El Salvador is a small country located
in a very unstabie geologicai zone
--
with approximately 25 volcanoes and
subjecttofrequentearthquakes.
Nearly 150 rivers flow across the
country to the Pacific Ocean. Land
Use: forested 5%, pastures 30%,
agricuitural-cuftivated 35%, other
30% (1993)North Pacific Ocean
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North Pacific Ocean
HONDU Located in the centre of El Saivador
and at 658 m above sea level, the
capital city is located in the
department of San Salvador. The
municipality is located at 20 mïns.
from the Volcano Quezaltepec
(known as the Volcan o of San
Salvador). Average temperature
yearlong is 25- 29 degrees Celsius.
t..
I—
5 oo’Ti,
-. areaaffected
Colomb jan central highlands are
divided into cordillera central, oriental
and occidental, ail considered
earthquake prone areas. Flood-prone
areas are found almost ail over the
country, particuiarly the valleys in
between highlands and the east
- prairies. Land use: forested 48%,
pastures 39%, agricultural-cultivated
5%, other8% (1993).ECU:
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The location of Honduras in between
the Pacific and Atiantic oceans
makes it extremely vulnerable to
tornadoes, tropical storms and
hurricanes. (t is located in a volcanic
and seismic prone area, the iowiands
consist of a southern coastal plain.
Land use: forested 53%, pastures
14%, agricultural-cultivated 18%,
other 15% (1993)
3. Major recent disasters:
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Dïsaster exposure indïcators (1970-1999):
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1982: Floods
1986: Earthquake
1998: Hurricane Mitch
January 2001: Earthquake
February 2001: Earthquake
1982: Floods
1986: Earthquake
1998: Hurricane Mitch
January 2001: Earthquake
February 2001: Earthquake
• Number of disasters during that period: 16
• Disaster occurrence rate per year (during
that period): 0.5
• Total fatalities during that period: 2,880
• Fatalities per 1000 hab. during that period
according to the population in 1995: 0.5
• Loss as % cf GDP from 1995: 22.9 %
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Data flot available for the municipality of
San Salvador.
1982: Climate changes: Et Nitio
1983: Earthquake
1985: Volcano Nevado del Ruiz
1987: Earthquake
1994: Floods Rio Paez
1999: Earthquake
• Number of disasters during that period: 89
• Disaster occurrence rate per year (during
that period): 2.97
• Total fatalities during that period: 29,857
• Fatalities per 1000 hab. during that period
according to the population in 1995: 0.8
• Lossas%ofGDPfrom 1995:11.5%
1973: Landslide
1974: Hurricane Fifi
1982: Tropical Storm
1989: Hurricane Hugo
1990: Flood
1993: Hurricane Gert
1998: Hurricane Mitch
January 2001: Earthquake
February 2001: Earthquake
• Number of disasters during that period: 28
• Disaster occurrence rate per year (during
that period): 0.9
• Total fatalities during that period: 17,374
• Fatalities per 1000 hab. during that period
according to the population in 1995: 2.9
• Loss as % cf GDP from 1995: 82 %
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4. Vulnerabilities of the built environment
The most important physicai vulnerabiiity was related to the impressive
< qualitative and quantitative deficit of housing, originated in part by the lack of a
coherent housing policy. Before the disaster, El Salvador already had a deficit
of 554,324 housing units (in a country with aprox. 6.5 million inhabitants), with
38% of the familles living in overcrowded situations (Ceprode, 1994). Despite
U. this endemic housing crisis, no more than 20 thousand units were built per year
(that according to officiai data). Many of the houses built were not sold or
occupied due to the lack of access of the population to mortgages and credit
. (Lungo, 2001). Even though information and knowledge was available (multiple
U) studies were conducted by Universities and research centres) no changes
were ever proposed by the national government to overcome this situation.
The lack of comprehensive policies for housing had a major effect in the capital
.. city, where rapid migration and lack of urban planning made the situation even
. • worse. By 1999, 27% of housing in Metropolitan San Salvador was inadequate,
z almost 40% of squatter sefflements were built in illegally occupied land while
Z 13% of the population of the city lived at risk of landsiides or flooding
(Chinchilla, 1999). In terms of infrastructure, the situation was not any beffer; in
1994, 25% of urban residents in El Salvador did not have regular potable water
service and 43% of urban housing presented risks associated with weak
structures and inappropriate construction (Source: Ceprode, 1994)
The main causes of physical vulnerability to hazards in rural housing in
Colombia were: (1) the Iack of proper maintenance of the units and (2)
. O construction on huis and unstable land (Robledo et al., 1999; EERI, 1999).
Lack of maintenance of roofs resu lted in the collapse of heavy materials such
as clay tiles (widely used in traditional typologies). Most of the affected
structures wete built before 1984 (when the building codes included seismic—
W E resistant standards). Even though the conditions of rural housing are better
. than in many other Latin American countries, rural housing has less access to
o infrastructure than urban housing. In 1999, approximately only 40 % of rural
residents had connection to a regular sewage system, and 65 % to water
infrastructure.
The housing deficit and extreme poverty (approximately one third of the
.5 9 residents 0f Choluteca do flot have legal property) during may years forced the
poorest residents to occupy flood prone areas close to rivers and sources of
o water. 91% of houses were built with roofs made of heavy materials (mostiy
5. tues), coupled with lack of maintenance that represented an increased risk of
collapse (Ranganath, 2000). Considering that most of the units were damaged
by floods, construction materials had a great impact in the vulnerability, in fact
42% of the houses damaged by floods were built in adobe.
-
o
121
5. Socio-cultural vuinerabîlities
W Rural residents in El Salvador have very 10w access to education, health care,
insurance, banking, bans, and public services. This situation of historical
z segregation is both a cause and an effect of the poverty of rural areas. As is
Z the case in many other Latin American countries, agriculture and caffle (the
L basis of rural production) are flot profitable economic activities for peasants in
-g Et Salvador. Unequal distribution of the land makes this situation even worse
for the less wealthy. Lack of political will from the State has not permitted a
necessary change in land distribution.
.. Lack of infrastructure and planning coupled with rapid and uncontrolled
. .
migration to San Salvador from rural areas resulted in the creation of ghettos
and informai sefflements. New residents in the city have liffle access to
Z employment opportunities in formai jobs, most of them deciding to work in the
informai sector and to bive in iiiegally occupied land. These two aspects keep
- most of these residents in illegal status and out of the main systems of the city,
. inciuding education, heaith care, taxing, voting, banking, etc.
Historicai segregation of social classes in Coiombia has resufted in extremeiy
unequal distribution ofwealth. Social and politicai indifference towards poverty
and rural violence, existing since independence, have mostiy affected
Coiombian peasants, segregating them from the urban citizens. These factors
have the consequence that rural residents rareiy have access to banking
services and health care. The lack of presence of the State in rural areas has
a contributed to the difficulties of the peasants’ rural economy that is mostly
_
based on small-scale agriculture, fishing and caffle. Guild associations such as
the CGOs have fulfilled in multiple cases the lack of presence of the State
providing support and help to the rural community.
o
w
- Q Poverty and lack of education merge as fundamentai vuinerabilities of the
residents of Choluteca. 73% of Honduran households are classified as poor
and 30% of these homes as extremely poor. 60% of that 30% live in the
Department of Choluteca. From the residents of Choluteca affected by the
disaster, it is estimated that 35% cannot read or write and only 19.3% have had
g ‘ schooling (FUNDEMUN-USAID, 2001).
.
o
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6. Political and economic vuinerabilities
-J
iii
Corruption, exaggerated bureaucracy and a high external debt ($1 ,897,000,000
z USD in 1993) characterise the government of El Salvador. Lack of education
and segregation of rural residents permit them very liille access to political
‘ L decision-making. Insufficient schooling and high levels of illiteracy among the
. rural population do flot permit peasants to know about and act for their civil
rights.
u)
. The illegal status and insufficient education of the poorest citizens of San
z Salvador do flot permit them proper political representation. Liberal and leftists
groups daim that national policies lead by the right-wing party have liffle
concern with social issues and affaining social equality (personal
G) communication, Roberto Chinchilla and other municipal officers).
‘- c
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Political and social acceptance of poverty and misery have not permiffed
. O affaining social equality in Colombia. The lack of political will towards land
reform (demanded by civil groups since the J940s) to redistribute the land that
is concentrated in the hands of a few rich has resulted in insurgence groups
called guerillas. Affecting mostly rural areas, ongoing violence has increased
E the segregation and poverty of peasants. The 10w price of coffee in the
international market (due to extreme competition and over supply) and the
o general economic recession ofthe economy in Colombia during the nineties
had a major impact in the regional economy of the coffee growers.
o
w The main vulnerability of the residents of Choluteca was, no doubt, the result of
. 9 lack of employment opportunities in the reg ion. It is estimated that before the
disaster, only 40,8% of the potentially working population was actually
employed; this figure decreased after the disaster to 32%. 16% of the houses
. damaged or destroyed by the disaster also had severe damages or collapse of
spaces that were devoted to income generating activities fa shop, a small
g . business, etc) increasing unemployment and the lack 0f sources of income
afterthedisaster(Oseguera, 1999)
.
o
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7. Strengths and opportunities of the community
— _i Their capacity to work in construction coupled with easy access to materiais
(earth, stone, wood, clay, etc) permits rural residents in El Salvador to find
solutions for sheltering (basically made by themselves). This practice, common
z in many developing countries, is usually made without proper building
Z knowledge, without hazard resistance standards and in unsafe locations.
‘ L However, it constitutes a vital ‘capital’ for residents to survive in a system
G)
. where they are usually excluded from access to bans, mortgage systems and
the banking services. Peasants’ work of the land and long-term residence in
the same location (even generation after generation) helps them guarantee
land tenure even if this tenure is not legably recognised in officiai documents.
Lack of ptoper housing has forced the poorest sectots of the society to buiid
shelter for themselves. As is in fact the case in many Latin American cities, the
•- capacity of cohesion 0f these residents is fundamental for assuring illegal
.
. occupation of public or private open urban land. Their capacity to work in
teams in construction activitîes and to help each other in meeting their day-to
Z day basic needs (water, food, health, security, etc.) perm its them to
consolidate squaffer seffiements very quickly, even though they live outside of
the regular systems of the city and often in illegai conditions. Residents’
capacity 0f cohesion permits them to survive at the same time that makes
c.i evictions very difficult and costly in terms of the political image of municipal
governments.
Three main strengths helped to the recovery of rural residents: (i) high bevels of
land tenure; (ii) capacity of organisation for the deveiopment of the major
. O economic activity: the coffee industry; and (iii) residents’ capacity to work in
construction. The capacity of organisation was consolidated 75 years ago with
Z ‘ the creation of their own guild: The Coffee Growers’ Federation, the
organisation that promoted the reconstruction project of the rural area. in the
E area affected by the disaster, more than 400,000 hectares of coffee production
. (the most important export product in Colombia) represent 47% of the national
o production of the coffee industry. The residents’ traditional capacity to work in
the construction of their own house was to prove extremeiy useful in the
development of the project itself.
In recent years, Centrai American countries have been targeted as areas of
w evangelisation by Protestant and Christian churches. As non-catholic beliefs
. Q have oniy a limited influence in Mexico, multiple North American church-related
organisations have set up in Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador with a
o great impact in the bow-income population. Catholic-based institutions make a
constant effort to compensate the influence of foreign organisations. After the
disaster, this fact contributed to the devebopment of numerous housing projects
lead by religious-based organisations. It is expected howevet, that many of
these projects targeted members of theit own communities and beliefs. Some
religious-oriented organisations working in Nueva Choiuteca included among
others: Boisa Samaritana, Iglesia Santidad, Caritas and Iglesia de Cristo.
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8. The hazard, main event and secondary events
_j
< On January 13, 2001, at approximately 11:35 am local time, an earthquake with a
magnitude of 7.6 on the Richter scale and a depth of 60Km occurred off the El
Salvador coastiine. On February 13, 2001 at 8:22 am local time a second
earthquake with epicenter in the department of La Paz and with a magnitude of
U 6.6 Richter scale and a depth of about 13 km struck El Salvador. Aftershocks
continued to occur for the following weeks. The two earthquakes affected several
of the 14 departments, particularly “La Paz”, “San Salvador” (where the capital
.
city is Iocated), San Vicente and Usutlan. Landslides caused by the movement of
unstable land and floods caused by the damming of rivers and channels by debris
followed as secondary effects.
coa
Caused by these two earthquakes, a serïes of landslides (including the well
Z reported one in Santa Tecla) and floods occurred in the capital city. Regular
oufflow of rivers and channels was interrupted by debris causing floods in
W squatter settiements.
o>
o—
o)WÏ 3 On January 25, 1999, an earthquake with a magnitude of 6,0 on the Richter scale
• Iocated in the Volcano “del Huila” struck at 1:19 pm local time the east region of
central Colombia, an agricultural region Iocated in the mountains and where the
G) E coffee industry 15 cultivated. Six departments of the so-called “eje cafetero”
. (coffee axis) were affected: El Valle, Cauca, Risaralda, Qundio, Caldas and
o Antioquia. The main affected cities were Armenia and Pereira.
o Hurricane Mitch struck the Central American countries of Guatemala, Honduras,
,
‘. El Salvador and Nicaragua on October 28, 1998, and continued for eight days.
The torrential rains flooded villages, destroyed bridges, dams, roads,
infrastructure and destroyed extensive areas of agricultural land and crops
j (October is the harvest season). Even though several countries were affected, the
most severe damage was suffered in Honduras (Ranganath, 2000). Lack of
‘ potable water, and effects in the environment were the source of secondary
effects in Choluteca. Malaria and other diseases were reported weeks later after
O the disaster.
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9. Effects of the disaster
• Effects in the population: 1,159 deaths, 8,122 injured, 1,582,428 people
affected
• Effects in housing: 186,444 houses destroyed, 153,011 houses partially
damaged, 28,678 houses destroyed in the department of La Paz alone
>1
.
• Effects in the population: 28,678 people affected by the disaster in the
city, 20,000 families needing to be relocated
• Effects in housing: 929 houses destroyed in San Salvador, 4,945 housing
I units partially damaged
.
e Other effects: 59 retaining walls in conditions of high risk
• Effects in the population: ovet 800 deaths
• Effects in housing: 1,856 rural houses destroyed, 4,552 rural houses
partially damaged
• Other effects: Losses in the productive sector equivalent to 4.2% of
regional GDP, 1,199 buildings for coffee-related micro-industries destroyed
o and 2,190 partially damaged, 48 schools collapsed, 86 schools partially
O affected
Q
-j ? e Effects in the population: 7,000 deaths in Honduras alone
• Effects in housïng: 24,2% of the population was Ieft homeless
• Other effects: Losses equivalent to 80% of GDP, US$ 800 million in Iost
agricultural production, 25% of the schools in Choluteca were damaged,
one Hospital totally destroyed, 94 bridges completely destroyed and 75
severely damaged, 52 highways destroyed, approximately 22 water mains
between Tegucigalpa and Choluteca damaged
Q
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10. lmplementatïon ofthe project
Even though a commillee that included governmental officers and non-profit
—
organisations presented various projects in a meeting called for the purposes of
ø planning and collecting economic support in Madrid, very liffle was actually
organised after the meeting by the National Government. The governmental
Z strategy was limited to promote the financing of individual projects through direct
donations to the organisations in charge of executing the projects. The
L indifference and lack of leadership of governmental institutions, lead FUNDASAL
°
. to start very early to participate in rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. First
actions included participating in ongoing projects of providing temporary shelter.
For reconstruction, FUNDASAL received support from the German government,
through pre-established cooperation agreements between the donot and the
Salvadorian Government.
As had previously been the case regarding the regular provision of Iow-cost
housing, national policies transferred the responsibility of reconstruction to
municipalities. Political differences and weak political links between the national
government and the municipality resulted in very liffle cooperation in between the
two parties. In fact, there was no transfer of funds or initiatives of financing from
I the National Government to the municipality. Left alone, the Municipality of San
Salvador formed a Working Team that included public officers and experts in the
field of 10w cost housing, while using its regular units to coordinate the
. reconstruction project. The Working Team was mandated to both plan (promote)
C the project and execute it.
Just after the disaster, the presidency of M. Andres Pastrana developed a
reconstruction program that included the creation of a new body called FOREC
. O with the exclusive mandate of managing the resources available for
reconstruction and for outsourcing individual projects. FOREC was formed with a
• ban of the World Bank and resources from the National Budget. For executing
the projects, FOREC conducted a calI for proposais that resulted in the selection
° E of thirty-two NGOs, each one of them responsible of reconstructing a village, or a
. sector of a major city. For the whole of the rural areas and rural villages the
o CGO5 were selected. The CGOs proposed the creation of a new fund including
their own resources. A couple of weeks after the disaster, permanent
reconstruction in rural areas had begun.
o
Despite the millions of dollars received by donations and international help, the
• indifference of the National Government towards reconstruction in Honduras led
to the involvement of more than one hundred NGOs in reconstruction activities.
By 1998, CECI already had previous experiences working in Honduras and
Guatemala. CECI contacted other NGOs in place (including Atlas Logistics) and
used the officer that was in Central America to develop the project. Various
. municipalities were targeted in Honduras and Guatemala. In December 1998
CECI decided to join other NGOs in an ambitious rebocation project in Nueva
Choluteca.
127
11. The organisation in charge ofthe project, strategic plan: mission
-J
“To promote social development and equality of genders through
the improvement of the habitat and the support of productive
activities of the rural and urban communities. To become the
D most important housing-oriented NGO in the region dealing with
the most vulnerable sectors of the society. b guarantee the
participation of the community in the process of change by
generating the possibility of analysis, criticism, self-management
. and organisation in order to create sustainable solutions for H
c Salvador.” (FUNDASAL, 2001)
c Within the established democratic system 0f El Salvador, the
c municipality of Metropolitan San Salvador (the capital city with
:
_______
1,8 million inhabitants) is composed of the Mayor and the Council
(both democratically elected) and includes the administration of
seven districts. The administration is mandated to promote the
following activities: defend the interests 0f the citizens, the
o delivery of public services, planning activities, public
representation and control. It is the most important authority in
the city. (Adapted from the web site “Alcaldia de San Salvador,
U) Nov. 2003)
“b represent the interests of the coffee growers through the
democratic and participative organisation of the members of the
guild. The Coffee Growers’ Organisations aim to favour the
development 0f the local coffee industry through the improvement
.0 of efficiency and international competitiveness, procuring at the
same tïme the integral development of the coffee grower, his/her
family and the region.” (Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros de
Colombia, 2002)
“To fight poverty and exclusion. More specifically, [CECI]
2 ‘. strengthens the development capacity 0f disadvantaged
communities; if supports initiatives for peace, human rights and
— equity; it mobilises resources and promotes the exchange of
know-how.” If aims to consolidate ifs position as “one of the
CECI largest and most solidly established Canadian non-governmental
organisations supporting international development” (adapted
from CECI’s web site, Nov. 2003)
o
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12. The organïsatïon in charge of the project, strategïc objectives*
- Consolidate the public image of the organisation
• - Disseminate the concept of development and promote general
Z concern for development-related issues
- Conduct a permanent fund raising campaign
L - Promote project-specific fund raising campaigns
W
- Promote tesearch in the fields of development and housing
- Disseminate information through training, education,
publications documentation etc.
U)
Ø. ..
- Reduce informai markets of the city
. •
_______
-
Develop projects of infrastructure
I - lncrease control in the occupation of public spacesZ r A - Rehabilitate public spaces, particularly in the Historic DistrictA:
- Develop studies on land use and risk mapping
W
- Develop urban plan studies
- Control and regulate the Districts
- Position the brand “Café de Colombia” in the international
U) market
. O - Control the sale price of coffee proU ucts
- Develop social and health programs
Z ‘ - - Work in research and technology transfer
- Provide technical assistance to coffee growers
W E - Consolidate a Mutual Fund of savings and investment
2 Café de Colombia
- Regulate the policies of the commercialisation of coffee
o - Compile / document information about coffee growers
- Save money and invest to increase the CGOs’ Fund
- Reinforce local and regional committees
o - Promote development in specific regions and countries
I. - Disseminate the concept of development and promote generai
concern for development-related issues
—
- Conduct a permanent fund raising campaignj j - Promote project-specific fund caising campaigns
- Promote research in the fields of development and housing
- Disseminate information through training, education,
publications, documentation, etc.
o
* adapted from officiai reports and personai communications
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13. The organisation, strengths* to assume theproject:
t1M4:
u w
c -U)z w0
.o-—’ ‘r’
LL
t’
_
4I
L.. .tQ)
,, o t.!
c%lm O 0)0
Cl) C4
Local commitment (commitment with the region) X X X
Local know-how X X X
Availability of local information X X
Experience in project implement./management X X X
Experience in housing issues X X
Expecience in social development issues X X
Experience in fund raising (through donations) X X
Experience in public works X
Previous experience in the region X X X X
Positive public image X X X
Political independence X X X
Institutional image (as a public institution) X
Management and financing capacity X X X
Capacity to regulate norms and codes X
Capacity to influence local authorities X X X
Capacity to influence national authorities X
Own economic resources X
Local relations X
Good relations with local authorities X X X
International relations X X X
.
* This Iist was prepared by putting together the different strengths that were found in the four
organisations. From the interviews that were conducted with the officers of the organisations,
it appeared that these characteristics were considered by them as being “advantageous” for
the development of the projects.
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14. The organisation, weaknesses* to assume the project:
-4’
___
CECI
-J 5
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c..1cU ©. 0)00)—U) CI) O
‘-Q
Lack of support from national funds X X
Limited own funds X X X
Weak relations with governmental institutions X X
Lack of capacity to coordinate housing projects X X X
with other projects of construction of facilities for
health, education, security, etc.
No capacity to regulate codes and norms X X X
Liille capacity of management X
Politically driven rather than technical or X
management oriented
Little experience in collect of funding from X X
donations and aid
Little financing capacity X
Liille experience in housing X X
Producing housing has indirect benefits but is X X X
not the real LbusinessJ of the organisation
Lackoflocalknowhow X
Little capacity to have fïrst hand information X
Liftle capacity to influence local authorities X
Little experience in public works and X X
infrastructure
High administrative costs X
* This list was prepared by putting together the different weaknesses that were found in the
four organisations. From the interviews that were conducted with the officers of the
organisations, it appeared that these characteristics were considered by them as being
“disadvantageous” for the development of the projects.
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15. The organisation in charge of the project, objectives of the project*
— -J 10 promote the development and increase the quality of life of
w “the rural residents 0f La Paz through a housing project
z To minimise the effects of the disaster in the region of La Paz
L To reinforce the presence and concern of FUNDASAL in the
. development of solutions for the most vulnerable Salvadorians
CN œ To increase awareness of the importance of prevention and risk
mitigation
b show the concern 0f the municipality with the disaster and the
victims
Id
I b reduce the housing deficit Ieft by the disaster
‘t:’ IA
L_ b overcome the lack of economic resources through the
development of a project-based collect of funds
o >
o—
To facilitate the recovery of the population to minimise the effects
O of the disaster on the production of the coffee industry
Â
•
b take advantage of the reconstruction to improve the quality of
‘€ life of the members of the guild and to improve the infrastructure
G E (ff*,. required for the production of the industry
O Café de CoIomba
To send the message to the coffee growers that “the guild is there
to help you and support you in difficult moments”
Q
b promote the development of Choluteca residents through a
housing project
To facilitate the integral recovery of residents
cc
cEci0 b increase awareness about risks and the importance of
prevention
.Q
* adapted from officiaI reports and personal communications
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16. The organisation in charge of the project, tactical approach*
-J
ii:i < The tactical approach consisted in using the experience and name
of the organisation to develop an international campaign of
collection of funds. Targeting a vulnerable rural region (following
D the strategic mission) an office in the region 0f La Paz was
developed to implement, manage and conduct ail the operations
of the project with support from the units located in the
headquarters in San Salvador. The tactical decisions aimed at the
.
active participation of the municipalities (and transfer of know-how
0 to them) and of the residents (based on a self-help program)
The tactical approach consisted in the post-disaster reinforcing of
the in-house resources with the volunteer participation 0f
.
.__._. specialists to develop a Working Team in charge of project
pir ‘promotion’ and execution. The plan included developing a
r
A comprehensive project to be presented to funding institutions. The
A; h original project inciuded several outputs including housing,
W financial aid, prevention of risk and infrastructure. The housing
component targeted active participation of users through a self
help program.
The tactical approach consisted in taking advantage of the
available structure of the organisation. First, in terms 0f funding,
. O the existing international relations of the organisation (including its
office in New York) were crucial in the search for resources.
• Second, the relations of the organisation with the National
• Government permiffed introducing the CGOs in the National
W E program of reconstruction. Finally, the network of regional
2 Café de Colomb4a commiffees was exploited for the direct implementation and
o development of operations (in-situ). The approach transferred the
responsibility of reconstruction to residents and the CGOs
constituted a supporting institution.
Q
w
O The tactical approach consisted in using the resources and
I. experience of the organisation in Central America, basically using
the project manager and some resources available in Guatemala.
• A region was targeted and CECI tried to establish links with other
NGOs in place (including Atlas Logistics) while trying to involve
ctci local residents as much as possible. The tactical approach
g! concentrated in a self-help program affached to long-term
development objectives.
o
* adapted from officiai reports and personal communications
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17. The organisation in charge of the project, management tools4
. Type of audit: internai • Type of structure: project
W
• Method used: aided self- manager in place
help • Strategy to reduce risks
Z • Main innovation: pre-fab caused by uncertainty:
Z units and close work with par(nership with the
‘ L municipalities municipalities and close work
‘ .
• Administ. costs: 7 to 8% with the residents
• Roles: promoter and • Staff: in-house trained officers
C%1 builder
,.
• Type of audit: no audit • Type of structure: in house
• Method used: aided self- operative units plus special
.
. help Working Team
.
. Main innovation: the • Strategy to reduce risks
I 9T I search for external caused by uncertainty:
i I r - I resources include external consultants
L..LI . Administ. costs: not specialised in housing issues
,
estimated • Staff: in-house regular officers
.
• Roies: promoter and plus consultants
buiider
• Type of audit: internai for • Type of structure: Network of
E technical aspects and institutions in place
external for the use of • Strategy to reduce risks
resources caused by uncertainty:
.
• Method used: giving transfer to residents the
. O options to individual choice responsibility of the project
3 • Main innovation: transfer • Staff: in house regular officersZ the responsibility to users plus specialised auditors
‘ and pre-fab units
• Administ. costs: 5,5%
• Roles: promoter and
. builder
c • Type of audit: internai for • Type of structure: project
technicai aspects and manager in place
2 externai for the use of • Strategy to reduce risks
. 5 resources (by the the main caused by uncertainty:Q funding body: CIDA) partnership with other NGOs,
i • Method used: aided self- close work with residents, use
heip of experienced staff
CECI • Main innovation: no . Staff: specialised officer in
4 innovation proposed place
• Administ. costs: 18%
• Roles: promoter and
S builder
-J
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• Total budget: USD$
13,400,000
• 200 temporary units in
Zacatecoluca
• 4400 permanent houses in
La Paz (approx. 500 pre
fab)
• 353 jobs created in
construction
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18. Results of the project
• 63,000 USD$ for local initiatives
of development and creation of
employment
• Education and training for
municipalities
• Training in construction for
residents
• Education in leadership for
residents
• Studies of sou and potable
water
Li
• Risk mapping and a study on
vulnerability
• Total budget: USD$
223,000
• 15 temporary communal
u n its
• Reconstruction and repairs
for retaining walls
• Cleaning and maintenance
cf canais and drains
• Loans for 110 municipal
employees
• 70 health centres repaired or
rebu j It
.2,131 projectsofinfrastructure
for coffee production, sewage,
water, electricity
• 10,000 jobs created
• Information and education for
residents (2 guides printed)
• Housing exhibition
• 17 private construction
companies participating
• Total budget: USD$
66,000,000
• 25,000 food rations
• 700 tents provided
• plastics for tempor. shelter
• 9,800 houses rebuilt
• 4,700 production related
structures for coffee
(beneficiaderos)
• 490 schools repaired or
reb ui It
• 80 water supply systems
• Total budget: USD$
125,000
• 52 houses built in
cooperation with Atlas
Logistics
.118 kitchens
• 172 latrinesctci
• Program of leadership and
education for the community
• Management cooperation with
Atlas Logistics for various
projects
18. Time-table of main resuits of the project
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date 0f the disaster date of the evaluation
Feb 01 02 L03 04
Time: years weeks — — — months
5+1-51 0123423 61012182436>
R&D
mergency aid and rehabilitation
I transitory housing
Dreliminary studies
designs
selection of projects I beneficianes
executionothousing — — —
— I • • • • • • • — — — — —
execution et inftast. (public serv.)
execution 0f community services
execution of “soft” outputs
date cf the disaster date cf the evaluat on
Fi 0304
Time: years — * — weeks — months
5+j1-5 i T 2 3 4 2 3 18 36 >
R&D
emergency aid and rehabilitation
transitory housing
oreliminary studies
designs
selection 0f projects I beneficianes
executionofhousing
— I ••• •••• •
execution 0f inftast (public serv.)
execution 0f community services
xecution 0f “soft’ outputs
date 0f the disaster dateoftheevaluation
Jan 99 00 ,01__02
Time: ears * weeks months
LE
R&D
emergencyaidandrehabilitation — — — — — —
transitory housing
preliminary studies
-J
ii
cz
L
g.?
>‘C
=
i1
o
w
o
t c
CECI
o
o
designs
selection of projects I beneflciarie
executionofhousing
execution of inftast. (public serv.)
xecution 0f community services
execution 0f ‘soft outputs
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
date 0f the disaster date 0f the evaluation
Oct98 9900T
Time: year weeks months
5+[1-5 1 0 1 2 3 4 2 3 6 10 12 18 24 36 >
R&D
emergency aid and rehabilitation
G
ransitory housing — — — — — — — — —
oreliminary studies — — — — — — — — —
lesigns
election cf projects I beneficiaries — — — — — — — —
xecution of housing — — —
— • — — — —
execution of inftast. (public serv.)
xecutionofcommunityservices
xecution of “Soft’ outputs — — — — = = = = = = = = = =
* in red the peciod 0f time people did not have permanent housing, in light gray: expected periods cf time
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Chapter III, Resuits, part 2
3.2. Analysîs of the four case studïes
This section includes (i) an overview of contextual aspects of Latin American
cou ntries that had an influence on the development of the projects and that are
applicable to the four case studies, and (ii) a chronological history of the projects
that £knits together the facts and data presented in part one of this chapter.
3.2.1. Overview of contextual aspects related to the politïcal, social,
cultural and economic environments in Latin American countries.
In many Latin American countries, political corruption, economic uncertainty,
high externai debt, social segregation (towards the uneducated poorest) and
unequal distribution of land converge both as causes and effects of an
unfortunate vicious cycle of underdevelopment. In countries such as Colombia,
El Salvador and Honduras, unequal distribution of land has reinforced the
unbalanced distribution of wealth, particularly affecting the rural population
(CEPRODE, 1994). Besides, the fluctuations of international prices of
agricultural and mineraI products of export (such as the selling price of coffee
and sugar) have resulted in recurrent economic crisis for the rural Latin
American population (Pan American Health Organisation, 1994; CEPRODE,
1994). In many of these countries, ail these factors have pushed rural peasants
to dramatic poverty that, too often, has been accompanied by lack of education
and lack of access to public services.
During the twentieth century, insufficient presence of the State in remote rural
areas plus economic crises and other social pressures facilitated the creation of
rural rebellions in countries such as Colombia, Peru, Mexico, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Guatemala and others (Weisner, 2001). In some cases, these
rebellions transformed, during the fifties and sixties info subversive ‘guerrillas’.
Communist-oriented, these rural insurgent groups were ideologically driven f0
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combat social and economic inequalities and to eliminate the permissive attitude
of the State regarding the persistence of rural poverty (Hays and Matuk, 1995).
The guerrillas found an important support for their insurgent activities in the
communist and socialist ideologies. This support (that included aid from soviet
countries) became a general concern to American administrations that saw
democracy and stability in Latin America challenged by growing adherence to
leftist movements. Deciding to flght these groups, many Latin American
governments declared open wars against reinforced guerrillas. Wars and
violence in rural areas added to the vicious cycle of poverty and lack of access
to resources to worsen and also become a cause and an effect of ever
increasing vulnerabilities.
Very often, rural residents (as is the case in Colombia, Salvador and Honduras)
do not have property titles of the land they own. Their ownership is the result of
the use of the land during long periods of time that - in many cases - goes back
to many generations. Lack of affordable land leads many others to live in ateas
at risk close to rivers or in siopes or simply in undesirable pieces of land. In
many cases, the unsafe conditions of the land also increase the physical
vulnerabilities of rural residents.
The low level of profitability of agricultural production accompanied by lack of
presence of the State and violence in rural areas, have contributed, in the last
twenty years, to the rapid and uncontrolled migration to major Latin American
cities (Hays et Matuk, 1995; Pan American Health Organisation, 1994). In fact,
this region has already surpassed the rest of the developing world in levels of
urbanisation (Charveriat, 2000). At the same time, one-fourth of the work force in
Latin America is employed in the agriculture sector, but many of these people
barely produce enough to earn at a subsistence level (Pan American Health
Organisation, 1994). However, peasants migrating to major cities such as San
Salvador, Bogota, Mexico, Sao Paolo, Caracas, etc. do flot necessarily find
beffer living conditions (DIRDN, 1996). Unable to easily enter into the regular
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systems of the urban community (i.e. the systems of education, health care,
insurance, etc.), new emigrants coming from the countryside find occupation in
the informai sectors of the economy and are forced to build their own sheiter in
the illegally occupied squatter sefflements.
The tather permissive officiai policies regarding the occupation of public spaces
in many Latin American cities have done very 11111e to reduce the huge impact of
informai vendors. Sporadic and more radical programs of ‘cieaning’ the public
space of informai vendors have, on the other hand, resuited in violent riots and a
deterioration of the public image of the municipalities (with its consequent
politicai cost in public elections). The solutions to reduce squatter seillements
have not been more successful. Smail rivers, sloping sites, public spaces, and
even private open areas of Latin American cities are iilegally occupied by
millions of families that live in extremely dangerous situations (Pan American
Heaith Organisation, 1994; DIRDN, 1996; Charveriat, 2000). Lacking basic
public services, these squatter sefflements are usually iocated close to sources
of water, therefore near rivers or siopes that are either flood-prone or present
elevated risks of Iandslides.
In most Third World cities, aimost half the population lïves in slums or squatter
sefflements built informally by end-users and without the participation of
architects and professionais of the building industry (Bhaft, 1998). Poor urban
and rural residents do not have access to the financiai systems available to
medium and high economic classes; in tact, it is well known that very few
peasants have a bank account. Unable to access the mortgage system (many
citizens are not Iegaliy recognised as land owners), both rural and urban poor
residents do flot have another option that building housing for themseives.
Common consequences of informai construction of housing in Latin America
are, therefore, the Iack of proper disaster resistant standards of construction and
lack of insurances. While in developed countries the housing insurance system(J is coordinated (and in a way reguiated) by the mortgage banking system, in
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developing countries very few families have insurances to cover damages
caused by disasters (Lizarralde and Johnson, 2003).
Urban squatter sefflements and siums accentuate the differences in between the
few wealthy and the poorest, increasing the segregation in between economic
classes and facilitating the creation of ghettos.
The existing physical risks associated with poor standards of construction and
unsafe locations have only but increased the vuinerabilities of the poor towards
natural hazards. Most of central and Latin American countries are Iocated in
areas of seismic and volcanic activity and are continuously exposed to tornados,
hurricanes and other atmospheric hazards. The so-called phenomena of “el
Niiio” and “la Niia” produce regularly dramatic changes in weather conditions
resulting in floods or draughts. In general, the combination of multiple ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ vulnerabilities and the constant natural threats in the region result very
often in major urban and rural disasters.
Low-income residents in rural or urban areas not only have vuinerabilities and
weaknesses towards natural disasters, they also count with strengths
(developed to adapt to the hostile environment they live in) that are crucial in the
case of disasters or crises. For example, in the case of rural residents, they
usually have the skills and availability of resources to build their own dwellings,
giving them the possibility to get easily integrated in aided self-help programs.
Urban residents, living in illegal conditions in siums and squatter sefflements,
usually have strong social relations between the members of the community.
This social cohesion facilitates them to cope with their needs (even with few
resources) in tacit arrangements in which they help each other. As we will see
later, these and other strengths play a fundamental role in the reconstruction
projects.
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3.2.2. Analysis of Case study 1. 2001 earthquake, El Salvador,
organisation: FUNDASAL
Even before the disaster, approximately one third of the six and a haif million
people living in El Salvador were already homeless or lived in extremely
inadequate housing conditions. The lack of a national program of reconstruction
lead by the Salvadorian government to deal with the dïsaster triggered by the
destructive earthquakes of January and February 2001, resulted in dispersed,
sporadic and ill-funded interventions lead by indïvidual NGOs that were unable
to produce holistic conditions of habitat. Despite the experience and positive
public image of the organisation and its development-oriented intentions, the
project lead by FUNDASAL - as we will see - could not overcome these
constraints, providing insufficient conditions of housing without infrastructure or
public and community services.
Before the disaster (antecedents of the project)
According to Edin Martinez, general director of FUNDASAL, the main problem
with the political approach to housing in San Salvador is not so much the Iack ot
appropriate specialised units, ministries or controls, it is mostly that a coherent
national housing policy has flot been yet implemented. After more than thirty
years of experience in the field, the NGO FUNDASAL (Fundacion Salvadorena
de desarrollo y vivienda minima) has consolidated its position almost as a para-
min istry of housing. Its activities are developed Nation-wide and they have
recently been expanded to Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In response to
the governmental lack of response to the large qualitative and quantitative deficit
of housing in El Salvador, FUNDASAL conducts research, promotion, education
and physical construction targeted to the economically Iowest sectors of the
society and particularly the rural population.
FUNDASAL builds an average of one thousand housing units per year under the
C umbrella of development, education and holistic improvement of the quality of
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life. Most of the programs are based on self-help, using local materials and
technologies and promoting active participation from end-users. More than thirty
years of existence have given to FUNDASAL a respectable image in El
Salvador, “Politicians and political parties have changed, but people know that
FUNDASAL remains” says Mr. Martinez. Its headquarters in San Salvador,
includes a specialised library, centers of research and planning, and
administrative and control units, thus demonstrating the organisation’s
commitment to its strategic plan: consolidate its position as the most important
housing-otiented NGO in the region (Martinez, personal communication).
The dïsaster and first response
After the two earthquakes of 2001, the national government’s approach to
reconstruction was not coherent with the plans and intentions that were
exposed, a few days after the disaster, at an international meeting conducted in
Madrid. The planning and funds that were consolidated in Madrid among officers
of the government, international representatives and NGOs were neyer
coordinated by the government into a coherent national reconstruction program;
on the contrary, the approach released responsibility to individual NGOs to work
on their own with direct funds from donor bodies. FUNDASAL took up the
challenge and concentrated its efforts on a reconstruction project for the
southern reg ion of “La Paz”.
Even though the beginning of the project of rural reconstruction in “La Paz” was
delayed for almost one year after the disaster, the activities of FUNDASAL to
reduce the effects of the disaster started immediately after the earthquakes.
After most 0f the foreign organisations had corne in, worked and left (many in
the landslides of “Las Colinas” or “Santa Tecla”), FUNDASAL identified the
areas that benefited less from external aid — probably for being less attractive to
the media and funding campaigns (Martinez, personal communication) - but
which also represented major vulnerabilities. Finally the rural region of La Paz (a
department in the southern valleys 0f El Salvador) was targeted for an ambitious
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plan of rural reconstruction that invited local authorities to actively participate in a
learning-by-doing process.
An unfortunate outcome of the first steps 0f the project was the dramatic
conditions lived in temporary housing provided for both land owners and renters
by the national government (and other donors) with the cooperation of the Army
and FUNDASAL. The delay in the construction of the permanent housing project
leU by FUNDASAL (that included in a later stage the construction of permanent
masonry units for land owners and permanent pre-fab units for renters), meant
that hundreds of families of La Paz lived from twelve to eighteen months in the
24 m2 corrugated sheet shacks of the governmental initiative for temporary
housing. These shacks, built by the residents and soldiers of the Army with the
help of FUNDASAL and materials given by various donors (BCIE Bank,
MISEREOR, etc), constituted inhuman conditions to residents. In fact, referring
to the performance of the metallic units when exposed to the extreme heat of the
region, the residents called them “microwave ovens”. The units were
inappropriate for the climate, unsafe for children and the elderly (due to the risk
of accidentaI cuts and injuries with the rough materials) and insufficient space for
18 months of occupation by a complete family (see Fig. 3.1)
Fig. 3.1 Prefabricated units (called by residents microwave avens) as originally built.
Permanent reconstruction project
Various small projects were developed simultaneously by FUNDASAL.
However, the most extensive project (which is the basis of this case study)
—
I
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resufted from a funding initiative derived from the cooperation agreements
arranged between the German and the Salvadorian governments. The project,
subdivided into two phases, required a budget of 20 million US dollars, from
which the German Government (through the German Bank KFW) gave about
78,5%, the beneficiaries (working in self-help) were expected to contribute with
about 19% of the costs, the municipalities with 2% and FUNDASAL (from its
own resources) about 0,5%.
Special attention seems to have been made in FUNDASAL to achieve the high
level of public image that is required to achieve funding in the competitive
market of international aid. Nationally and internationally, FUNDASAL is seen as
a non-political organisation. In this regard, Mr. Martinez explains that “though the
organisation does not have a political bias it is not apolitically driven; on the
contrary, it has a clear orientation towards the achievement of social equality
and defence of the segregated poor sectors of the society”. Even though this
might be seen as a leftist approach in a politically polarised country, it seems to
have gained respectability from international donors that see FUNDASAL as a
serious and engaged organisation with financial capacity and enough local
know-how (Martinez, personal communication; Cardozo, personal
communication).
Considering the organisational structure of FUNDASAL, the project demanded
the creation of a project unit with an “in-situ” project manager receiving both
indirect control and support from FUNDASAL’s headquarters in San Salvador.
Accordingly, the local office located in the village of Zacatecoluca was equipped
with computers, telephone, fax and office material as weIl as with two trucks and
two motorcycles to facilitate the mobility of officers to the dispersed rural areas.
Administrative audit by the donor body was conducted through a German officer
located in the same office in Zacalecotuca. Even though ail the activities were
directed and controlled from the local office, the influence of the project reached(J out over several kilometres, with interventions in eight municipalities.
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Specific interventions began with FUNDASAL contacting the affected
municipalities and offering its services. Acceptance by the municipality meant
that it was committed to become an active partner in the project and not only a
passive receiver of help. The new partnership then started a preliminary
selection of potential groups of beneficiaties, giving special affention to women,
particularly women who were the ‘head’ of a family. This phase was supported
by a survey of the affected population in which FUNDASAL determined which
peopie were affected by the disaster at different leveis. After identifying the
priorities, local residents were informed who were the pre-selected candidates to
be beneficiaries. However, if not included in the list, affected families could stiil
register as potential candidates. With a final and corrected list, the process of
final selection started. Priorities were established to concentrate the efforts on
the most needy; these included giving priority to single-patent familles, familles
that could participate in the labour force, people with the lowest revenues, etc.
Despite the good intentions in establishing the priotities, a negative side-effect
resulted from this selection, since families living in high risk sites were
deliberately excluded. This criterion aftempted to reduce the probabilities of
reconstructing in lots that, even with proper quality of housing, represented risks
of landslides or flooding. For such a criterion to be valid, a plan of officiai
relocation of people living in risk-prone land should have been included, as it is
very uniikeiy that the subsequent pressure to relocate has had any major
influence on residents that had, ofthemselves, very few alternatives or means to
acquire land in safer locations.
Once the final list of beneficiaries was finished, a two-fold phase followed. On
the one hand, FUNDASAL worked closely with the municipalities, in order to
transfer beffer administrative practices, increase prevention and promote
awareness of risk reduction (including education and training). On the other
hand, direct work with the affected families included transfer of beffer building
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practices, increased knowledge in risk prevention and the execution of the
construction activities.
Iwo types of beneficiaries were identified: (j) land owners and (ii) land or house
renters. For each of these two groups, a single model of house was designed.
For land owners, a 30 m2 unit in cernent blocks. For renters, a metaliic structure
with panels rnade of an aluminium and zinc conglornerate. These pre-fab units
aftempted to permit dismantling and relocation once the lease is over.
Proof of ownership was required for land owners. If their property was not
officially recognised by a property title, a process of legaiisation to demonstrate
previous long-time tenure was required. Legalisation was approved after
dernonstration of more than five years of possession. This legalisation process,
that gave officiai ownership titie to peasants, is expected to have positive long
term effects as it is also a step forward towards allowing rural residents to gain
access to the regular systems available to urban citizens (access to bans,
banking, health, education, etc.). For renters, a minimum offive years of lease
was required in order to be accepted as recipients of the mobile units.
Fig. 3.2 Houses built by the FUNDASAL project. Ail the units were identical. The façade
and the layout demonstrate very littie care in the design of the unit.
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The units were ail built using the same model, a 6x6 m minimum shelter with a
social area, two smaii bedrooms and no inside washroom (see Fig. 3.2 and
plans in Appendix 2). The separation of the family in different bedrooms is flot
common in rural vernacular architecture in El Salvador; however, it has been
included as a feature of the units to promote different levels of privacy for the
parents. This is expected to reduce cases of sexual abuse between members of
the family; Rene Cardozo, manager of the project in Zacatecoluca, daims that
residents have accepted this ‘new’ distribution of spaces very well.
Despite the fact that FUNDASAL daims that it conducts sufficïent research in
the area of housing, an inappropriate, or at least contradictory decision was
made by FUNDASAL in the design of the unit. As explained by Mc. Cardozo, the
design took advantage of the fact that rural residents are not used to build inside
washrooms in their dwellings; this permiffed to reduce the cost per unit
considerably. However, consequent problems of water pollution and its effects
on public health were reported recently. Hydrological studies have already been
conducted by FUNDASAL to determine the depth at which potable underground
water can stiil be found; a much required new project 0f latrines is now under
study.
Construction 0f permanent housing started one yeac after the disaster; by June
2002, 1098 houses were finished, stiil leaving 3,000 units to build. Two types 0f
permanent housing were built: (i) for land owners: cement block houses that
were built using local technologies and resources (blocks were bought in the
region); and (ii) for renters: metal pre-fabricated houses which are considered
here as permanent units (they were given to renters) but yet using a technology
that permits to dismantie them when the lease is over. The technology of pre-fab
units was selected after reviewing several proposais from the pre-fab market.
Each of the masonry houses was built in approximately one month and a half,
whereas the pre-fab units were built in approximately fifteen days. Principally
due to the savings in time of construction, pre-fab units resulted in an overall
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savings of ten percent compared to the masonry houses that cost about $ 3,200
USD. In both cases, participation of at least one member of the family was
required to buiid the house.
Fig. 3.3 User’s labour force was used in construction. Left: the technology chosen for
most of the units was labour intensive. Right: detail of the interior of a house. Even
though training in construction was provided, many construction defects resulted from
the use of unskilled labour.
At least one member of the family had to work a minimum of 45 days from 5 am
to I pm.; according to Mr. Cardozo, these residents were expected to perform
other income generation activities in the afternoon! Even though unskilied labour
received assistance from construction workers once a week, construction
mistakes are found in several units (see Fig. 3.3).
Ail the houses wete occupied by their end-users; however, the masonry houses
lack a veranda or covered area protecting the house from the sunlight (average
temperatures in the regïon range from 25 to 35 degrees Celsius). The fact that
ail the houses are identical and minimal has resuited in modifications and
expansions that are starting to be built (June 2002). The quaiity ofthese
extensions and the safety of the modifications has still to be seen, but
considering the 10w quality of construction found in the basic units, very hile can
be expected at this regard.
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One of the main weaknesses of FUNDASAL is its lack of capability to integrate
housing projects with the other types of projects required for adequate
conditions of habitat, such as facilities for education, health, infrastructure, etc.
In fact, the Iack of integration of housing and infrastructure has had a negative
effect on the project. Neither aqueduct nor sewage system nor telephone had
been included. Even though most of the houses are located in areas that do flot
have electricity supply, some pieces of the roof had to be welded, and a drill was
required for assembly. As no permanent infrastructure was included in the
project, temporary electrical supply for construction had to be provided by the
municipalities through the temporary installation of generators. The capacity to
properly dismantle and rebuild the mobile units poses many questions, including:
(i) the lack of availability of equipment in the future; (ii) the sufficient strength of
the components to be dismantled and assembled again; (iii) the inflexibility of the
system to make changes using the same components; and (iv) the weakness of
the system regarding the use of other materials or technologies for later
additions or changes.
Even after construction of permanent housing, the temporary “microwave
ovens”, have flot been dismantled; on the contrary, in most cases they have
been adapted for storage of equipment and goods (see Fig. 3.5).
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Fig. 3.4 Prefabricated units proposed as permanent housing for renters. Top-Ieft: a
orototype of the pre-fab company that was selected. Top-right: a unit occupied by its
residents. Bottom: structure of the pre-fab units built.
:
Fig. 3.5 When permanent houses were finished, the temporary units became
oermanent. being use for storage or as another room.
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‘Soft’ outputs provided during the project included geological studies and
mapping of regions at high risk. Also, wïth a reduced budget of $ 63,000 USD, a
program of support of local productive initiatives was conducted to promote the
creation of small industries, cooperatives and businesses. These ‘soft’ outputs
were supported by social workers and sociologists who, when needed, also
conducted community meetings, and formed and guided special commiftees.
Two courses of construction best practice were given in two different
municipalities. Besides, the direct work with municipalities is expected to have
been a seed for creating awareness of danger and risk at the political level.
In a turbulent political environment, with minimum resources of its own, and
working both as a ‘promoter’ and ‘developer’ of the project, FUNDASAL
managed to collect an attractive budget to conduct its housing contribution to the
disaster relief. 1,098 houses were built in six months, representing more than
two times the normal production of units of FUNDASAL (1,000 units per year).
Doubtless, the experience and image gained by the organisation before the
disaster was fundamental in obtaining these resources. Even though congruent
with FUNDASAL’s mission and values, the project was deficient in the time scale
and the houses insufficient in quality to cover the needs of the population.
However, very hile seems to have been learnt in FUNDADSAL and therefore
probably hile will change for future projects. Officers of FUNDASAL praise the
resuits of the project and compliment themselves, analysing with very scarce
constructive criticism their own project in La Paz.
3.2.3. Case study 2. 2001 earthquake, San Salvador, organisation:
Municipahity of San Salvador (MSS)
lnappropriate political decisions led San Salvador to an unbearable situation of
vulnerabihity where previous experiences and historic disasters did very hile to
create a political and social culture of prevention and risk reduction. Particularly
for the poorest sectors of the society, the long history of disasters that had
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affected San Salvador in the last fifty years has only wotsened their economic
situation and increased their physical and social vuinerabilities. Even though the
recovery of the economy after twelve years of civil war (1980-92) keeps a slow
but continuous pace, the disaster hit an ill-prepared country that is stiil
considered to be in the midst of its democratic consolidation. The scars of one of
the most violent Latin American civil wars of the twentieth century, that took over
75,000 lives in a country with a population of 6,5 million, are stili present in the
economy, in the society and more dramatically: in the political environment.
Before the dîsaster (antecedents of the project)
As demonstrated by Ben Weisner (2001), Lidia Salmanca (2001), Ricardo
Castellanos (2001) and Mario Lungo (2001), historical causes and political
decisions have had a dramatic influence in the situation of housing in El
Salvador. These causes can be traced back to external social and political
factors which explain the decisions that have been made (or flot made) in terms
of housing policies. As explained before, El Salvador along with other Latin
American countries such as Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia,
encountered, in previous decades, the problem of so-called rural ‘guerrillas’; in
the case of El Salvador, this internai conflict became, at its worst, a violent 12
year civil war. The war had devastating outcomes in the economy. One of its
most evident effects was the emigration of Salvadorians to the United States
and other countries (many with the status of refugees). It is said that the informai
transfer of money from the United States to El Salvador - in the form of
economic help from members of the family that have already migrated, towards
members of the family stiil living in Ei Salvador is today one of the most
important sources of revenue for the national economy (Chinchilla, personal
communication).
When rural insurgent groups gained enough public support and military power to
challenge the stability of local institutions, the North American concern(J materialised in an ambitious economic and military support to the Salvadorian
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right-wing government. The effect of this help (a total of US $6 billion) was that
the two armed parties (the government and the guerrilla movement “Frente
Foribundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional -FMLN”) found that their forces
were balanced and sufficiently weakened to decide, in 1992, to sign a peace
agreement. Agreements between the United States and subsequent Salvadorian
Governments resulted in political pressure to modernise and adapt Salvadorian
public institutions following principles recommended by Washington (source:
Weisner, 2001).
It is for this reason that national policies established in El Salvador during the
eighties favoured the development of a Neo Liberal State. To compensate for
the danger perceived from communist and socialist economies, and the
vulnerability of unstable governments in Latin America to drift towards Ieftist
extremes, a strict political plan based in the advantages of the private sector was
proposed for Latin America (Weisner, 2001). These Neo Liberal policies were
promoted by the World Bank, the Inter American Development Bank, and
through political persuasion. For many Central and South American nations, this
pressure also included conditioning the delivery of international help and
international bans, as well as conditioning commercial agreements, to the
application of the new Washington-oriented policïes.
These policies affempfed to overcome the traditional limitations to devebopment
(as they were seen from the “deveboped world”) by reducing the responsibilities
and influence of the State, sinGe the State, during the eighties, was associated
with inefficiency due f0 high levels of corruption and extreme bureaucracy. It was
expecfed that, by reducing the influence of the State, transferring responsibilities
to the private sector (and its organic market forces) and decentralising the
government, corruption and bureaucracy could be minimised, resulting in a more
efficient system overall. Besides, government down-sizing and privatisation of
public functions were also expected to reduce the financial deficit of most Latin
American economies and therefore a process of eliminating public jobs
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frequently followed the Neo Liberal policies. However, these cuts eliminated
several governmental units and had (and indeed they stiil have), dramatic
negative effects on unemployment rates and therefore on the already
deteriorated public image of public institutions.
In many Latin American countries, including El Salvador and Colombia, this new
model for the State challenged the need for public departments or units to be in
charge of housing and infrastructure issues (Weisner, 2001). It was believed
that traditional duties of the government during the sixties and seventies, such
as building housing for the poor, were no longer needed if transferred to the
“more efficient” private sector. Finally this sector was expected to respond
appropriately to the forces of supply and demand with products of beffer quality.
Fuelled by new approaches towards the capacity and importance of people
building for themselves (Pugh, 1997), it was believed that if proper infrastructure
was given, residents could find a way of fïnding or building by themselves
appropriate quality housing. Public units in charge of building housing were
reduced or eliminated, ministries of housing were replaced or transformed into
ministries of “public works” and many other national and regional units
responsible of housing issues were abolished.
However, the panacea did not materialise as expected. In El Salvador, many of
the responsibilities for housing issues were transferred to municipalities, which,
ail of a sudden, were in charge of developing several new missions (including
those related with guaranteeing shelter) and of finding economic resources to
meet the new challenges. In terms of housing, the challenges were enormous
and the causes of the problems extremely complex.
The dîsaster and first response
The effects of the 2001 earthquakes in siums in San Salvador seem like an
identical “replay” of the catastrophic effects of the previous earthquake which
occurred in 1986. Major Iandsiides, the collapse of weak houses, thousands of
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houses reduced to uninhabitable conditions and a huge toli of deaths and
wounded was, once again, the price that these communities had paid after the
accumulation of multiple vulnerability factors. The landslides of “Las Colinas” (or
Santa Tecla), that buried hundreds of people in San Salvador were, once again,
captured by the media as the most dramatic demonstration of the effects of the
earthquake (see Fig. 3.6). As is normal in these situations, there was a
momentary sense of anger towards the authorities and a search for responsible
parties among the government officers just after the disaster. This has now
dissipated with time and a return to ‘normality’ is felt two years aftet the disaster.
-o
Fig. 3.6 Ihe 2001 earthquake in San Salvador caused landslides in the sector known
as “Santa Tecla” or “Las Colinas” (Source: AP’i
lmmediately after the disaster, considerable resources were affracted by NGOs
and National authorities, after aggressive campaigns offund raising that
impressed philanthropists and potential donors by showing the worst examples
of destruction and suffering of the residents of “Las Colinas”. An ‘invasion’ of
NGOs and international humanitarian agencies followed the disaster during a
period of few months. Initiatives of USAID, the Red Cross, and many
Salvadorian volunteer groups in the United States, among other organisations
are widely reported.
Even though the Salvadorian government of President Francisco Flores
expressed its concern immediately after the disaster, a general plan of
reconstruction was neyer developed by the national administration. lnstead,
fragmented and dispersed initiatives were supported by donations and
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humanitarian aid. Since the government did flot apply for bans or credits for
reconstruction (the external debt in 1993 was already $1,897 million USD), it
was flot able to manage a centrai fund for supporting reconstruction projects.
Different units of the government (from the Army to various ministries)
concentrated on individual initiatives, without proper coordination of resources,
logistics, policies, etc. lnstead of creating a new unit to take responsibility of the
reconstruction, ail the units of the government, at ail levels and scales, were
called on to participate. However, the policies of funding of these initiatives were
neyer clearly determined and public initiatives merged in a disorganised way
with projects Ied by NGOs and private projects. Foliowing the policies of
decentralisation and Iimited national governmental intervention, municipalities
were mandated to take responsibiiity for their own projects.
The limited economic resources and iack of expertise in the municipality of San
Salvador was no beller to deal with the disaster than it had been to deal with
‘regular’ homelessness and the ‘normal’ poot quality of housing. However, a
singular political circumstance made the situation even worse. The national
government of President Flores was formed by the right-wing party ARENA
(Alianza Republicana Nacionalista), while the ruling party at the municipal
government of San Salvador was formed by the opposition FNLM (the leftist
political representation of the disarmed guerrilla movement) in coalition with the
USC fa centre-left party). The historical and ideological opposition of these two
groups resulted in a total lack of cooperation in between them and the effects of
this on the reconstruction initiatives were catastrophic. The municipality, led by
Hector Silva, was left to its own to respond to the effects of the disaster.
Left without any other alternative, the municipality of Metropolitan San Salvador
(which comprises seven districts) assumed the responsibility for acting on
disaster relief immediately after the earthquake. First, an evaluation of damage
was conducted by a special commission; the collection and processing of data(J obtained from this activity took over four months. Then, the major initiative
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conducted by the Municipality was the creation of a Working Team (Comite para
la reconstruccion) to develop the project of reconstruction. The first problem
appeared when the Municipal Council decided not to participate in the Working
Team, seemingly because representatives of the Council proved more
interested in their political activities than in administrative or technical initiatives
(Daisy Galindo, personal communication). The Working Team was finally
composed by officers of the “Department 0f Planning and Projects” and
practitioners in the field of housing, reputed researchers (with credit in the field
of low-cost sheltering), and other multi-discïplinary volunteers. Considering the
profile of its participants, the team seemed to be well equipped for the challenge.
In a special general assembly of the Council and acting very rapidly, the team
was officially created (without delegates from the Council), one week after the
second earthquake (February, 2001) with the mandate 0f assuming the
responsibility of both organising (promoting) and executing the project.
Permanent reconstruction project
The first task of the Working Team, that met once a week in a general assembly,
was to define the scope of the project. An ambitious agenda, that included the
construction 0f more than 6,000 housing units, reconstruction of infrastructure,
social programs, etc. was defined. The project was well designed in terms of the
outputs required, covering both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ aspects of reconstruction
(eU ucation, infrastructure, housing, cred its, environmental projects, etc) and
including a comprehensive plan of mitigation, risk reduction and risk mapping.
Plans and construction documents for the projected prototype house were
prepared and ready to begin construction (see in appendix 2 the plans 0f the
project in San Salvador). However, the main obstacles appeared in the search
for funding. Neither at the local, nor at the international level was it possible to
materialise enough economic help for the initiatives. Unable to obtain bans or
credits (the initial target was $2 million USD), the municipality’s only chances of
funding came from donations and humanitarian aid, mostly from supporters 0f
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the political party of the mayor. “Private bans are extremely expensive (13%
interest rates) and even though the interest rates of international institutions are
Iower (5,5%), the requirements of international Banks are very strict. Not even
the World Bank would have given us money because we do not have any more
capacity of financing” explained the director of the program. A national ban on
the transfer of large funds coming from international aid to municipalities without
passing through Congress left the MSS in a “cul de sac”. Not only it did not have
the funds to reconstruct nor did it have the flexibility to collect its own resources
without taking the risk of facing corruption and deviation 0f funds at the level of
the National Congress.
The limited resources that finally could be, and were, allocated from the
municipal budget, plus a very liille money collected from donations, were only
enough to accomplish the maintenance of water channels, to adapt a few tents
for temporary housing and to provide a few minimum subsidies for housing to
employees of the municipality. The housing project was abandoned without any
single unit built, the Working Team was removed from the duties of execution
and transformed into a consultant role. Finally, with little chances of providing
any additional help, the Working Team was dissolved by April 2002. One year
and a half after the disaster, the national govern ment was trying to promote a
relocation project for 928 families, these families were given materials (wood
and corrugated sheets) for building a temporary shack in a village called
Tonocatepeque, situated a one hour drive from downtown San Salvador
(obviously relocated residents do not have cars). Even though Tonocatepeque
was stili in its early phases of devebopment, by June 2002 it was already
recognised as one of the most dangerous areas of the reg ion, it did flot have any
infrastructure and the access to it was extremely risky even for the police.
Today, the MSS is working on other “important issues”, reconstruction is no
longer a priority and even though a spirit of prevention and risk reduction is
perceived by municipal officers, very lift le has changed in the city. As is the case
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for many othet Salvadorian municipalities, the plan of urban development (POT)
proposed by the city was flot approved by the National Congress. Squatter
sefflements keep growing accompanied by increasing urban risks. Major risk
prone areas have been mapped and documented but thousands of families stili
live on riversides and risk-prone slopes. San Salvador is once again waiting for
the next disaster to happen.
3.2.4. Case study 3. 1999 earthquake, Colombia, organisation: Coffee
Growers’ Organisations
A seven-year recession in the economy and increasing violence caused by the
40 year-plus armed conflict in Colombia were already enough worries for the
National government before the disaster. However, in the midst of the economic
crisis and the ongoing armed conflict, a Colombian organisation not specialised
in housing, with no expertise in traditional projects of development (as
understood by development-oriented NGO5), and with hile experience in post
disaster reconstruction, developed an ambitious project of housing and
infrastructure reconstruction that included more than 14,000 individually
customised projects of housing, infrastructure, income generation, commu nity
services and others in Iess than eighteen months. In order to understand how
this was possible it is necessary to understand first the type of organisation that
conducted the project.
Before the disaster (antecedents of the project)
In 1927 a group of Colombian coffee growers created a guild or federation called
“Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia”. Today, the Federation along
with its local committees constitutes the Coffee Growers’ Organisations (CGO5),
a non-profit non-pohitical guild that aims to control and support the coffee market.
The CGOs are, in reality, a pyramidal network of institutions at different levels
(national, regional and local). For the purpose of the present study we wihl
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consider ail these organisations (the National Federation and its local
commiftees) as one single organisation (chapter IV develops a complete
analysis about the organisational structure of the CGO5).
Under the supervision of the Colombian Government, and financed through a
tax on coffee exports, the CGO5 protect coffee producers by buying and
reselling their produce on the international market. This mechanism guarantees
a regular income to the coffee growers throughout the year. The CGOs develop
programs of social assistance, research, promotion, infrastructure, bans and
market studies. They also control the quality of the product, defending the
interest of 300.000 small-scale independent workers (Federacion Nacional de
Cafeteros de Cobombia, website, 2002).
The disaster and first response
On January 1999, a 6.2 (Richter scale) earthquake struck the west high
mountain region of the country. Affecting five Departments and destroying a
great part of the region where the coffee industry is concentrated, the
earthquake constituted an additional threat for the already bad export situation.
Immediate response, leU Uirectly by the Presidency, included declaring a “state
0f emergency”, this permifted the President to make certain decisions without
the regular time-consuming consultations in National Congress. Some measures
included declaring an exceptional two-year increment on regular taxes and
applying for an international ban to the World Bank and to the Inter-American
Devebopment Bank (1DB). These measures resulted in the creation, two weeks
after the disaster, of a National Fund for reconstruction. The fund (called
FOREC), permifted an intervention of almost one million US dollars with the
exclusive mandate of managing, outsourcing and controlling individual projects
of reconstruction.
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Fig. 3.7. House collapsed. Inappropriate construction practices and construction in
unstable land increased the physical vuinerabilities of the region.
Colombian public institutions, as is the case in many other developing countries,
are associated with extreme bureaucracy, slow procedures, corruption, and
inefficiency. Therefore, the government opted for an institutional structure that
involved the participation of the private sector and multiple NGOs. In fact, in
order to conduct specific projects, FOREC conducted a cali for proposais to
select the most competent NGOs in the country. From this initiative, 32
organisations were selected and mandated as being responsible for a specific
village, or part of a major city. For the reconstruction of the rural areas and
towns of maximum 20,000 inhabitants, the CGOs were selected.
The CGOs (as a network including the Federation and its committees) had
several qualifications that ensured they could attend to the peasant
communities’ needs: (i) support and credibility from the community; (ii)
infrastructure spread throughout the rural areas; (iii) administrative and financial
capacity and organisational infrastructure; (iv) local know-how; (y) availability of
its own resources; (vi) independent decision-making and (vii) national and
international commercial and political contacts. Besides, the CGOs have a
hierarchy of organisations at different scales: national, departmental and local
(municipal) committees, which togethet, constitute a weII-arranged network of
institutions with different levels of influence.
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Before being mandated by the FOREC, and immediately after the disaster, the
CGOs took measures to mitigate the effects of the earthquake. However,
considering that the CGOs were not disaster-assistance organisations, they
were flot in a position to assume ail the required roles of rehabilitation and
reconstruction. Their inïtïal activities were otiented to help distrïbute externai aid,
reactivate the industry, re-establish conditions for the collection of the season’s
harvest, and prevent migration to main urban ateas. The CGOs co-ordinated
national and international organisations and resources to guarantee assistance
for the peasant coffee workers.
The more relevant activities targeted for the rehabilitation phase were the
provision of tents, materiais for temporary shelters, food distribution, temporary
infrastructure and a census of residents. For permanent reconstruction, the
foilowing activities were targeted: fu nd ing, housing reconstruction, reconstruction
of infrastructures related with the coffee industry, general infrastructure,
community services, information, education and techn icai assistance.
The measures taken by the CGOs not only were targeted to an important
productive sector of the economy, but also to one of the most potentiaiiy
vuinerabie communities. Poverty, lack of education, iack of support from the
government, and iack of adequate transportation systems, characterise rural
areas in Colombia and are factors that could have amplified the negative
consequences of the disaster.
The pre-established international relations of the CGOs (including their offices in
New York and some cities in Europe) were crucial for the development of the
initiatives after the disastet. The CGOs acquired, through negotiation with the
German Government, 800 tents to lend to coffee growers’ families, the provision
of tents was complemented with technical assistance to put them up and
construction workers were hired to assist residents in the process of installation.
C Through community participation initiatives, the CGOs established links between
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external institutions and residents. Such is the case of the distribution and
installation of the special emergency plastics donated by OFDA (Ametican
Government’s Office for Disaster Assistance) for the construction of temporary
shelters. In this program, where 150 small farms benefited, residents contributed
with their labour and supplementary materials while contractors were hired f0
bring technical support to victims in the installation of the plastics. Shelter was
not the only concern of the rehabilitation phase, in fact, during the first month,
local commiftees of the CGOs contributed together with “UMATA” and “ICBF”
(Colombian institutions commifted to social aid programs), to the distribution of
25,000 food rations donated by the UN World Food Program. Also for the repair
of rural infrastructure, the CGOs co-ordinated their own resources, labour force
and officiai entities (such as the “Empresa de Energia” - in charge of the
provision of electricity) to mitigate the damages caused in sewage, water,
electricity and communication systems.
Permanent reconstruction project
As was the case in rehabilitation activities, permanent reconstruction also
affempted f0 deal not only with the ‘physical’ needs of the victims (shelter,
money, food, etc.), but also with ‘soft’ factors such as community organisation
and participation, ed ucation, decision-making, information, employment
opportun ities, and economic reactivation. Soon after the disastet, and in order to
asses the magnitude of the damage, a census was conducted; this census
included the evaluation of each of the rural houses of the five departments; the
fask was conducted by eleven engineers in just one monfh. According to the
census, 6,648 houses needed to be reconstructed for coffee workers and 2,972
coffee industry infrastructures needed to be repaired.
For this challenge, the next and most important step was the creation of a
parallel fund to be managed by the CGOs. The new fund, called FORECAFE,
(Fondo para la reconstruccion del area rural cafetera) was created with savings
C of the CGOs, resources transferred from the FOREC and private donations
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(made by Statbucks coffee, Red Cross, ECHO and others). From the total
resources, equivalent to US $ 50 million, a first phase called FORECAFE 1 was
created. FORECAFE 1 was designated ta provide money ta affected coffee
growers and coffee workers.
Considering the efficiency and advantages of these first initiatives, the central
government asked the CGOs to manage a second phase: FORECAFE 2, to
provide subsidies and bans to non-coffee workers’ families or residents of small
rural towns (of less than 20,000 inhabitants). One year later and after the
evaluation of the positive resuits of these twa phases, the central government
asked once again the CGO5 to manage a third phase, FORECAFE 3. This last
phase was designated for community services.
FORECAFE 1 met the needs of: housing, productive infrastructures for the
coffee industry, public services, and programs of assistance and social
development. FORECAFE 2 was designated for housing reconstruction and
relocation. FORECAFE 3 was designated for the construction of schools, roads,
health care centres, police stations, churches and social activity centres.
lnstead of providing finished houses and infrastructures, the CGOs opted for a
strategy where individuals received financial aid and were responsible for
making their own decisions about the construction they wanted. This strategy
was implemented for the following reasons:
• As the community’s economy is based on individual agricultural activities,
most of the families owned land
• Farmers could develop self-help construction, for the following reasons:
- Farmers have skills and knowledge in construction
- Their extended families allow many people to work on each dwelling
- The regular season of harvesting was almost 5 months after the
disaster, leaving the peasants with free time for other activities
C
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- Farmers work individually and fun their own businesses, which allows
them independence to manage their time
• Construction materiais were available in rural areas
• If some families could not or did not want to adopt a self-help construction
approach, a labour force was still affordabie to hire
• Rural communities have a deep-rooted sense of mutual co-operation.
To get access to money, rural residents could apply to two different sources: the
bans from the Central Government, or the funding from FORECAFE, for their
house and/or infrastructure or production-related structures. For housing, two
possibïlities were offered by FORECAFE 1: a subsidy of $4,000 USD and an
extra ban of $1,000 USD. For infrastructure and production-rebated structures
two possibilities were also offered: a subsidy of $2,000 USD and an extra ban of
$3,000 USD.
In ail cases, and in order to guarantee that the use of the resources fiffed the
priorities of the program, subsidies and bans were given under promissory
notes with a time limit requirement. This meant that if the construction was flot
finished in the specified time, and folbowing hazard-resistant specifications, the
money had to be paid back immediately to the fund. As each NGO in charge of a
zone developed a different program of reconstruction, many housing products
and programs were simultaneously offered. The CGOs project ailowed people to
repair or build houses with any of the different choices available in the market.
Therefore, affected families could receive financial aid, infrastructure, technical
support for their industry, information, and technicai assistance promoted by the
project with any of the three possible housing options: fi) prefabricated houses
promoted by the CGOs, (ii) houses from others NGOs’ programs, or (iii)
individual option.
For the construction, people could choose between building themselves or hirïng(J labour. Whatever the option used, the house had to be hazard resistant to be
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Q eligible for the money of the funds. Twenty-three specialised engineers wereselected to conduct the following tasks: fi) approve the hazard-resistant quality
of the units, (ii) approve the conformance of the constructions with ecological
and environmental standards proposed by the CGO5; and (iii) approve the
monthly construction payments. The ecological and environmental requirements
included: considerations about the use of wood, pollution of water and a norm
that obliged the construction of a sewage system (mostly septic tanks). After
approving the quality of construction and the respect of norms, the engineers
(working in the capacity of construction auditors) authorised, at different stages,
the monthly payments of the subsidies and bans. This process guaranteed that
the money was used, and only used, in conformity with the priorities of the
project.
The prefabricated housing initiative was based on three different prototypes of
one-storey units designed by officers of the CGO5 and based on traditional
typologies used in vernacular housing in the region. The prototypes included
semi-open verandas, and pre-designed possibilities for expansion and
adaptations (see appendix 1). The units included two bedrooms, a kitchen, one
indoor bathroom and a social area. The general Iayouts and proportions of the
cD units corresponded to traditional dwellings, and typical cosmetic features of
vernacular architecture in the region were included in the design. The units were
Fig. 3.8 SeIf-help produced houses. Residents acquired bans and subsidies and built
the type of house they wanted according to their needs, capacity to work in construction
and availability of their own resources.
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designed over a grid 0f 1.20 by 1.20 m. to be produced with prefabricated
modular systems (see appendix 2). The bathroom and the kitchen were placed
back to back to optimise services installations. Openings in the facades were
distributed and proportioned to minimise waste of material in frames and panels.
In the bedrooms, the windows were placed at the opposite side of the entrance
door. This not only facilitates cross ventilation in the room but also brings a
beller visual impression when entering the space, making it look bigger. A
simple and efficient electrical installation was included.
By allowing cross ventilation and including covered semi-open areas and
extended roof cantilevers (called ‘aleros’ in Colombia), the design of the
prototypes tesponded to the hot temperatures and heavy tains of the region.
-V——-—
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Fig. 3.9 SeIf-help made constructions. Left: house built using pre-fabricated
components; the design corresponds to the prototypes proposed by the CGOs. The
layout, scale, distribution and multiple details correspond to traditional vernacular
housing in the region. Right: Customised structure for processing coffee beans (called
“beneficiadero”).
Pre-fab companies offered competitive prices as the government offered tax
benefits to construction companies wotking in the affected area. The economic
recession in the test of the country attracted the participation of pre-fab
companies to the affected region and motivated them to lower their regular
costs.
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Q The CGOs opened a cail for proposais to select the companies to participate inthis initiative and to set up a housing exhibition under the auspices of the CGOs.
From more than 50 proposais, 17 pre-fab companies were selected according to
the following crïteria: fi) the quaiity of the system, (ii) the price, (iii) the production
capacities, (iv) socio-cultural acceptability of the technology, and (y) the scope
for the use of local labour force fsee Fig. 3.8). Selected companies used
different finishes and some used traditional colours and elements to match their
proposais to the typical architecture of the region. This aspect gave multiple
choices to the clients, allowing them to seiect the most appropriate option.
:
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Fig. 3.10 Houses offered in the housing exhibition. Different materials and technologies
were proposed by the construction companies seiected.
in order to increase the possibilities of choice for the community and to help the
peasants visualise what they were choosing, the CGOs organised a housing
exhibition of prototype fuil-size modeis of the selected companies (see Fig. 3.10
and 3.1 1). Even though very few flnished units were actually sold, many housing
components were purchased by residents in order to construct their dwellings.
This is in part because rural residents are flot used to ‘buy’ a house since, in
their experience, building a house for them is a long self-help process (even
lasting many generations) where the house ‘grows’ according to the needs of the
family. According to Edgar Echeverri, Director of the department of production
Q and development in the CGOs headquarters, in many cases, the exhibition wasa source of inspiration for many residents who copied the models to build them
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by themselves; sometimes buying individual components such as windows,
doors, tues etc. from the pre-fab companies (Cafered, 2000). It also helped
counteract the speculation in the prices of construction materials, which were
increasing very fast since the disaster. For the residents, it was an educational
exercise, an opportunity to buy quality products and an opportunity to learn that
they had the responsibility for, and the Iiberty to complete their own
reconstruction. Finally, from the perspective of architectural design, the
exhibition is a note-worthy example of culturally appropriate housing designs
coexisting with appropriate technological solutions from which many lessons can
be gained for future housing projects.
Iransferring the responsibility of construction to residents had a positive effect in
the optimisation of resources. Residents built their houses using the most
efficient and economic components according to their own taste; besides, many
recycled materials from the ruined or damaged house, reducing the costs of
construction. Toilets, sinks, windows and doors from the ‘old’ houses were
usually recycled by the users in the construction of the ‘new’ homes. The
savings resulting from this were used in some cases to improve the quality of
other materials or to build a more spacious or comfortable house.
Concerning the development of individual options and self-help construction, the
CGOs supported the rural community with education and technical assistance.
Special bans and training programs provided by the CGOs also supported the
construction of infrastructure. Water tanks, septic infrastructures, water supply,
electricity and telephone connections were supported in this way to complete the
housing construction.
o
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Even though the project did flot target renters specifically, thirteen thousand
renters benefited from the various projects developed by the owners of the
houses or the owners of the farms. However, rural residents living in illegally
occupied lots were flot covered by the CGOs’ project. This population, that in
general lives in risk-prone areas (huis and close to rivers), did flot have access
to the outputs of the project. The efficïency of FOREC 1 and 2 contrasts with the
indifference showed towards this group that, in fact, did flot receive any solution
- neither from the CGOs nor from the government. Since the earthquake, ample
criticism has been made in the media to both FOREC and FORECAFE for flot
including this vuinerable community. The CGOs daim that the government
should have taken responsibility of it, adding that many peopie came to the
reg ion after the disaster hoping to take advantage of the generous services
offered by FORECAFE 2.
With FORECAFE 3 and in a period of two years, a total of 490 schools were
repaired (some rebuilt) using a modular system of pre-fab components. The
construction of schools was carefully followed and supported by a four-year
initiative launched by the Colombian First Lady to bring education to the poorest
sectors of the society. Besides, 80 water supply systems were repaired, 70
heaith centres were reconstructed, churches, police and community centres
L
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Fig. 3.11 Views of the housing exhibition. The exhibition was organised by the CGOs to
promote a parallel program of pre-fab housing targeted to give alternatives to the
beneficiaries of the project.
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were either repaired or reconstructed in the departments of Caldas, Quindio,
Antioquia, Risaralda and Cauca (FORECAFE, 2002). Private construction
companies were hired for some projects and a similar mechanism of
management to the one used in FORECAFE 1 was employed.
For the three phases (FORECAFE 1, 2 and 3) an external audit was engaged by
the CGOs, the weB known international firm Deloille and Touche was
responsible for accounting and controlling the use of resources and the
management procedures used by the CGOs. The total administrative costs
(including the management of the project) for the three phases are estimated to
be only 5,5 % of the total budget.
Rural communities in Colombia usually receive hile assistance from the central
authorities and there is a lack of education and organisational support. The
constant contact of the CGOs with the rural community gave support and
credibility for the programs, and mitigated the psychological effects of the
disaster. To reinforce the self-help initiatives, the CGO5 published two
educational guides for the construction of earthquake resistant houses (in wood
and in concrete). The guides, illustrated with drawings and sketches, provided
not only technical instructions but also general knowledge in a basic language
appropriate for communities with hile education.
As a complementary activity, the coffee worker’s organisations provided
information and advice to the community about the fohlowing aspects:
• Technical advice on how to build septic tanks or floor slabs
• Hazard-resistant principles
• How to select the appropriate house
• How to maintain the traditional identity of the houses after the disaster
• How to deal with psychologicahly affected survivors
• Evaluation of damage (including a housing census)
• Projects in progress
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• Requirements to access the available financial resources
• Promotion of the various products (housing, tents, food, etc.)
• Resuits and preliminary evaluations of the programs
Information was provided in newspapers and magazines published by the
CGOs. Some of these are: “Cafered”, “Quindio”, “Actuaiidad Cafetera”
(published by the Quindio commiffee), “Panorama Cafetero”, and “El Caficultor”.
Other sources of information were local newspapers such as “Café 7 dias” and
“La Tarde”.
A total of 26,222 hazard resistant and environmentaily friendly individual projects
were completed in three years (14,138 in the first year) according to the needs,
capacity and expectations of their own users. A total budget of $ 66 million USD
was managed by the CGO5 for this project. Transparency and efficiency of the
process have been observed by the United Nations, the World Bank, the
Presidency of Colombia and the external audit. As it will be exp lained in chapter
IV, an innovative scheme in terms of organisational design was used, useful
decisions were made at both levels: the national program of reconstruction and
the regionai ptoject; certainly, appropriate conditions merged together to
contribute to the positive results of this project.
After almost four years of existence, and when the proposed tasks were ail
accomplished, the national fund FOREC was dissolved. With its dissolution,
collective experience and knowiedge gained through the reconstruction
experience was probably Iost. By adopting this model, centered in a new
temporary unit with the exclusive mandate of reconstruction, little experience
and know-how is expected to have been transferred f0 municipalities and local
authorities that, in general, were kept out of the main decisions of the fund (and
this, as was previously explained, to avoid the risks of corruption).
C
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When FORECAFE 3 was finished and considering the positive results of rural
reconstruction, the National Presidency invited the CGOs to develop other
housing projects in other areas of the country. Edgar Echeverry (director at the
National Coffee Growers’ Federation and one of the directors of the project)
explains that the answer of the CGOs to this invitation was: “No thank you, our
business is to grow and sell coffee flot to build houses”. On January l7th, 2004,
an earthquake of magnitude 5.2 in the Richter scale hit the same region that was
devastated in the ear[hquake of 1999. This time no deaths, destruction or
physical damages occurred, demonstrating that the vulnerabilities of the region
were largely reduced (El Tiempo, January 18, 2004, www.eltiempo.com).
3.2.5. Case study 4. 1998 after hurricane Mitch, Choluteca, Honduras,
organisation: CECI
In a traditional scheme of international intervention for development, the
Canadian NGO CECI got involved in a large relocation initiative that included
creating a new village called “Nueva Choluteca” in one of the poorest regions of
Honduras. The weaknesses 0f the specific project carried out by CECI are over
shadowed by the monumental failure of the relocation program. “Nueva
Choluteca” is today a symbol of the negative consequences of badly planned
relocation. Poor quality of housing, non-existing infrastructure, increased
segregation, lack of employment opportunities, high rates of crime and public
health problems characterise this new hamlet. Even though the responsibility for
the relocation program at large is shared among various NGOs, the specific
project carried out by CECI can be studied and analysed on its own.
Before the disaster (antecedents 0f the project)
Commuting from Tegucigalpa to Choluteca by bus is a long journey; the trip is
made in an old overcrowded bus, without air conditioning and endless stops
starting in the highlands of South-Central Honduras and finishing in the
C extended valleys of the Pacific (close to the border with El Salvador). What really
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makes this journey special is not the extreme hot weather, the multiple rivers
crossing the southern valleys and making of them extensive flood-prone areas,
or the dilapidated houses standing along the toad in small hamlets, it is to
realise that Choluteca is an impoverished enclave of the country surrounded by
no apparent economic activity. As the bus approaches Choluteca, one has the
idea that sources of income and production have disappeared (or neyer existed)
in the city and its rural proximity. Extremely scarce agricultural production and
caffle, no industry or manufacturing activities, very liille new construction and an
incipient tourist industry are clear signs of the dramatic poverty of the region.
In fact, it is estimated that before the disaster, only 40,8% of the potentially
economic-active population was working. A figure that got reduced to 32% after
Mitch (Oseguera, 1999). Honduras’ public debt in 1993 was greater than its
Gross National Product (Atlapedia, 2003), the country was considered as highly
corrupt and despite the fact that almost 60% of the population was rural,
Choluteca was a dramatic example of unequal distribution of land. These
aspects merged together with poverty, and poverty translated into lack of
housing, which resulted in occupation of areas close to rivers and sources of
water (for personal consumption, fishing and agricultural activities).
The disaster and first response
When torrential winds and rains caused by Mitch washed out the country in
1998, one third of the population was badly affected, mostly the poor residents.
Large amounts of resources were injected in the country in the first weeks after
Mitch. However, these resources did not materialise in a housing reconstruction
program from the national government. Within this context, more than one
hundred NGOs had to assume the responsibility of housing construction
(Ranganath, 2000).
C
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When Mitch struck Central America in 1998, CECI already had experience of
work in Honduras and Guatemala and experience in disaster mitigation from a
project conducted in Rwanda (J 996-97). Consistent with the mission and
objectives of the organisation, a program of reconstruction was then established
for Honduras and Guatemala. This program included specific interventions in
seven municipalities of Guatemala and six in Honduras. Even though ail these
interventions were targeted to housing construction, they are considered here as
a program and flot as a single project due to the fact that the conditions and
participants on each of the interventions were different. The services and
products offered, the typologies and the technologies used varied from project to
project; besides, the partnerships established by CECI resulted in different
temporary multi-organisations for each of the interventions. The program built a
total of 2,087 houses in both countries from which about half of them were built
in Honduras.
Permanent reconstruction project
The extensive damage in Choluteca and the lack of affordable safe land in the
city led the organisations working there to believe that a relocation plan was
required for this area. A local bank (Banco Occidental) proposed the use of one
of its lots (117 hectares) in a ‘safe’ area 15 Km away from Choluteca. The land
was subdivided in 2,154 individual lots without any apparent urban design, urban
Fig. 3.12 Gas station in Choluteca just after Hurricane Mitch. Source:
http.www.agenvsafety.tamu.edu
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morphology, transportation or environmental considerations. The rough urban
distribution included two principal streets of 12 meters width (exaggerated for a
residential neighbourhood of one-story units) and lots of 10 by 20 meters. This
rather randomly chosen distribution resulted in a spread out suburb-Iike plan of
detached units that certainly challenged the sustainabïlity of the project. As built,
this urban configuration made construction and maintenance of infrastructure
(water, sewage, electricity, drains, telephone, etc.) more expensive at the same
time that it increased costs associated with the provision of other services
(security, post, cleaning, waste collection, etc.) (Schoenauer, 1994). This
suburb-Iike low-density ‘plan’ contrasts with the elegance and effectiveness of
the old Choluteca city, where vernacular housing, traditional streets and public
spaces still represent an appropriate human scale and urban charm.
In “Nueva Choluteca”, the units are setback three meters from the street and
separated between them by 4 meters; even though space is available for
expansion, certainly the size of plots do not allow for any agricultural or caffle
activity. It can be said that lots are flot large enough to allow the traditional
exploitation of the land but neither are they well arranged to contribute, with a
higher density, to the sustainability of the village (see Fig. 3.13).
lndividual lots were sold by the Banco Ocidental to ‘beneficiaries’ in the basis of
monthly payments of 1,701 Lempiras during 10 years ($1 USD = 17.19
I,
Fig. 3.13 View of the units built in Nueva Choluteca. AIl the houses built by the
residents using a labor-intensive technology were identical.
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o Lempiras, Dec, 2003). If we consider that only 33% of the residents of “NuevaCholuteca” was working in 2001 (FUNDENUM-USAID, 2001) and that 80% of
that 33% received Iess than 2,000 Lempiras pet month, it is easy to understand
that the project was unfeasible in economic terms.
However, a great number of local and international organisations got involved in
this project. These included Caritas, Atlas Logistique, Iglesia de Cristo,
Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Organisation de Immigration et Migration
(01M) and CECI. UNICEF also joined the NGOs in place to build school
buildings. With no single leader, each organisation assumed the construction of
a sector. The Spanish neighbourhood built by the “Cooperacion Espaiiola”, the
Samaritana neighbourhood by the NGO of the same name, and so on. Even
though more than 24 NGOs were working in place, none of them assumed the
responsibility of building roads, water systems, electricity systems, sewage,
drains, parks, sidewalks; flot even planting a tree, or building a market, urban
commodities or public facilities (see Fig. 3.14). The only infrastructure-related
service offered in Nueva Choluteca is a small health center, an improvised
police station and two uncompleted schools.
Fig. 3.14 View of a suburb-Iike neighbourhood in Nueva Choluteca. At the right side of
the street the houses built by CECI; no roads, sidewalks, or infrastructure were
completed in the village.
•:
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Despite the fact that CECI recognised that major needs in Nueva Choluteca
were related to the lack of infrastructure rather than to the construction of more
and more houses (CECI, 2001) the organisation got involved. In par[nership with
the French NGO “Atlas Logistique” (that built a total of 250 housing units in
Choluteca) and based on a self-help program, CECI started the construction of
52 new units. The CECI’s program of reconstruction at large (in Honduras and
Guatemala) was initially funded by the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), the Ministery of Foreign Relations of Quebec (MRI) and
religious and private donors. In a second phase, additional funds for $ 110,000
USD and for $ 50,000 USD were given by CIDA and MRI respectively. For the
southern region of Honduras, the initial target was to build 800 houses; finally,
990 were built, including the 52 units in Choluteca.
In Choluteca, the rough design of the 6 by 6 m units, without washroom and
kitchen and with two 1 by 1 m windows in the façade, demonstrates the lack of
cate in the details of the project(see Fig. 3.15). Walls are made of reinforced
cernent blocks and the roof in terra cota tiles (produced with local clay). Having
the interior floor level elevated 15 cms from the g round, the houses are
supposed to respond to seasonal floods. The costs of materials required to build
one house were about $ 2,000 USD (June 2002), the scheme to build them
included very little users’ decision rnaking. Self-help-induced activities were
made by users without knowing which house they were going to be allocated,
this in order to mass produce identical units and prevent people from
personalising or put more care in the construction of their own dwelling! The
result: a complete neighbourhood of identical units.
The later changes and additions made by users proved, three years later, that
the units provided were no more than cote structures and that, in reality,
residents required a space for bathing, a kitchen, a washroom, and in many
cases an extra room and a space for an economic activity (see Fig. 3.15). Not(J only did these additions represent extra costs for residents but also many of
.C
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them were made with poor quality materials and without proper construction and
hazard-resistant standards.
Trying to overcome the limitations in infrastructure, other outputs provided by
CECI in Nueva Choluteca included the construction of 118 kitchens and 172
latrines (see Fig. 3.16). A program of leadership and “reinforcement 0f
democratic and participative structures” was conducted with a Iimited budget to
which CECI added US$ 7,000. The 10M (International Organisation of
Migrations) promised a US$ 10,000 contribution to this initiative; however most
of these funds came too late and therefore could not be accepted by CECI.
According to a report prepared by CECI, the results ofthis initiative were mixed.
Five meetings and sessions of work were conducted with the residents,
Fig. 3.15 Houses built by the project. Top: House as originally constructed. The fence
is a later addition that many residents did on their own due to the high levels of
insecurity and theft in the village. Boffom: later changes and additions made to the
units.
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including women and local leaders” (40% of the population of Nueva Choluteca
lives in single-parent female-headed families).
By 2001, the figures provided by a socio-economic study conducted by
FUNDEMUN-USAID showed the results of this collective failure: 4,704 people
Iived in “Nueva Choluteca”, only 42% of the houses were occupied by their
owners, the rest were rented, ttansferred to non-owners (friends and family) or
simply flot used, 10% of the houses were already in irregular or bad conditions.
Dut of the population that wotks (as was said before it is a very low percentage)
only 27% produce their income in the sefflement (the majority work in agriculture
and caille), elderly and children are forced ta have non-paid jobs and a great
number of crime groups of young people are reported. Crimes are frequent and
the neighbourhood is considered by local residents as dangerous.
Dbviously, the negative results of the seillement of Nueva Choluteca as a whole
cannot be blamed to CECI alone. In fact, this can be considered as a case in
which Iack of leadership in between organisations led ta an accumulation of
collective mistakes. However, the initiative led by CECI can indeed be
considered as a project on its own and it is worth evaluating (in the next
‘I
Fig. 3.16 Infrastructure provided by CECI. Left: latrine module provided ta some units.
Right: view of the exterior kitchens built.
.
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chapter); doubtess, many lessons can be Iearned from this project, particularly
regarding the relations between organisations for allaining a common objective.
C
181
Chapter NI, Resuits, part 3
3.3. Results obtaïned by applying the methods to the case studies
This section ptesents the results obtained by applying the methods presented in
Chapter Il to the fout case studies. These results include (i) the evaluation ofthe
fout case studïes (using the methods proposed in section 2.2. page 50), and (ii)
the representation and description of the organisational system of the four
projects (using the methods proposed in section 2.3., page 96). The relations
between these two aspects (as proposed in section 2.5, page 107) are part of
the discussion and are therefore included in Chapter IV.
As proposed in Chapter Il (Methods), the evaiuation of the four case studies
includes the foilowing activities:
1. Coliecting, analysing, and synthesising the information required to complete
the Forms of Indicatots of Performance (FIP5), and:
2. Completing the FIPs for each project. Sixty two FIPs were completed for each
case study using the information gathered in the first activity. Ail these resuits,
presented in the FIPs, are included in Appendix 3 (volume Il).
3. Analysïng the Table of Indicators of Performance (TiP) of each project. The
TIP presents in a standard ised and systematic manner the aspects that need to
be assessed for each of the fout projects. As they were designed in a MSOffice
Excel file system, the TIP of each project is compieted automatically when
completing its corresponding FIP5. This section therefore includes the analysis
of the main aspects of the TIPs.
4. Analysing the unexpected results and impacts for each case study
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3.3.1. Results of Case study 1: 2001 earthquake, El Salvador, organisation:
FUNDASAL
3.3.1.1. Analysis of the TIP
Refer to Table 3.1 for the evidence upon which the following analysis is based.
Table 3.1 also summarises the headings used in the following section.
Inputs
Multi-organisation: Despite the fact that the mufti-organisation set up by
FUNDASAL was well equipped to collect funds (basically due to the positive
image of FUNDASAL), the funds collected for the project in La Paz were flot
enough to obtain high standards of housing construction and infrastructure.
Besides, an insufficient level of integration between FUNDASAL and other
organisations - that could have developed parallel or supplementary projects in
partnership with FUNDASAL — Iimited the scope of the project. These two
weaknesses contrast with an appropriate distribution of responsibilities (that is to
say: integration and differentiation) between FUNDASAL, the municipalities, the
construction companies, hired labor and the users, an aspect that facilitated the
development of construction activities.
The structural flexibility of the organisation permiffed creating a unit in the
affected area for direct management of the project, also resulting in Iow
administrative costs for the project. By integrating the active participation of the
municipalitïes, FUNDASAL adopted a strategy that permifted sharing various
risks of the environment (such as risks associated with the selection of
beneficiaries, the acceptability of the program, the responsibility for decision
making, and others). This strategy was appropriate to adapt the multi
organisation to the environment and particularly, to different micro-contexts (the
municipalities and their counties) in which Iocated interventions were conducted.
Table 3.1 project: FUNDASAL reconstruction project in El Salvador
section group No.
mufti-organisation
management tools
local resources
financial I funding:
others
impacts project goals
indicator
the capacity to atract fiinds for the_projec_
organisations canacitv to adant to environm.
a census of local residents
previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc) 15.
surveys of people’s needs 11.
10 consultation with Hie community 7.9
Ï bans for housing 0.0
15 subsidies for housing 0.0
16 bans for infrastructure or others 0.0
17 subsidies for infrastructure or ofriers
35 rescue 0.0
osychobogical aid
37 food 0.0
38 medical aid 0.0
39 temporary infrastructure 0.0
40 education and technical assistance 16.2
41 information 16.2
55 debt
environmental impact
57 recovery of normal activities
58 physical resistance to hazards
59 transfer beffer building practices
60 institutional capacity and devebopment
61 eguality of gender and minonfies
62 aIl settiements in safe areas
9.0
7.2
6.3
7.2
18.0
15.1
I inputs
I dif. or,I
14.4
level of integration with the community 13.2
level ot integration between organisations 5.8
level of differentiation between organisations 15.
orojects administrative costs 18.
14.4
5
B
13.7
18.0
0.0
11
12
13
residents caoacitv to work in construction
tax incentives for comnaniesl individuals
13.2
infrastructure iï dams, bamers, retaining walls 0.0
19 roads 0.0
20 water supply
21 electricity 0.0
22 sewage 0.0
23 telephone 0.0
community sewice 24 schools 0.0
25 healili centers 0.0
26 community centers I religious bldg. 0.0
27 police I fire station 0.0
housing 28 new lots 0.0
29 emergency shelters 0.0
30 temporary housing 5.7
31 newhouses 14.9
32 reconstructed houses 0.0
industiylempboym. 33 bldgsîinfras. for industry & income generation 0.0
34 unempboyment subsidies 0.0
results transfer bans given and subsidies albocated
43 direct and indirect jobs created 18.0
44 houses occupied 18.0
45 insurance policies taken 0.0
46 emergency protocols implemented 0.0
47 increment on land ownership 18.0
48 increment on home ownership 18.0
community parficip. 49 design 5.4
50 management
51 financing of Hie project 2.4
52 production components 18.0
53 constwction 16.0
54 individual responsibility of decision making 6.7
18.0
9.9
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Management tools: The management tools to reduce uncertainty and collect
information about the damage, the needs, the expectations and desires of the
community (including a census, a survey of people’s needs, various technical
studies and consultation with the community) permiffed FUNDASAL to design
and adapt the ptoject to several of the specific requirements of the situation.
Local resources: The availability of both the residents’ capacity to work in
construction and the required construction materials and equipment made it
possible to conduct the self-help component of the project, permiffing a
significant reduction of costs of construction.
Outputs
Financïal I funding: The strategy adopted by FUNDASAL for reconstruction in
the reg ion of La Paz was flot based on provision of financial aid for housing,
infrastructure or for the construction of infrastructure related with income
generation activities. Instead, the organisation opted for the direct provision of
housing units, along side which the provision of subsidies for local initiatives
(such as the creation of small and medium-size industries) was just a small
component of the project. Tax incentives were neither offered at the individual
nor at the private companies’ level.
Infrastructure: Even though retaining walls were required in land presenting a
risk of landslides, and even though rural residents have very liffle access to
regular systems of potable water, sewage, electricity and telephone, the project
lead by FUNDASAL did not include the provision or development of any
infrastructure. In the last few years, the National government has built main
roads to link several municipalities with the capital city San Salvador; however,
several secondary roads in rural areas are in bad condition making the access to
remote areas (particularly in the rainy season) extremely difficult. Despite this
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major need, the project did flot include construction of this - or any - type of
infrastructure.
Community services: The construction of facilities and infrastructure for the
functioning of schools, health centers, community centers, religious buildings,
police or fire stations was flot included in the project. This is an unfortunate
outcome keeping in mmd that the analysis of vuinerabilities demonstrates that
the level of access of Salvadorian rural residents to this kind of services is lower
than in urban centers and therefore the services were required.
Housing: Even though FUNDASAL recognised the existence of multiple rural
families living on unsafe land, the project did flot include relocation of these
families or provision of new lots. As explained in the first part of Chapter three,
families living in properties at high risk of landslides or flooding were flot
included as beneficiaries of the ptoject.
Emergency shelters were flot provided; instead, FUNDASAL participated in the
governmental initiative of temporary housing, with a sub-standard product that
was inappropriate for the needs of the population. Later on, the ptoject did flot
contemplate the reconstruction of damaged houses, a possibility that could have
perm ifted the recycling of useful components of the affected units. lnstead, the
backbone of the project was the construction of permanent new houses, an
initiative that delivered the final product very late and without sufficient functional
quality. As was previously explained, the new units lacked a veranda, interior
washrooms and a finished kitchen.
Industry and employment: Even though poverty is one ofthe main
components of vulnerability among the rural residents in FI Salvador, the
construction of facilities, structures or infrastructures for income-generation
activities was not included in the project. Nor were economic compensation or
unemployment subsidies accessible to affected residents.
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Others: FUNDASAL did flot get involved in rescue activities in La Paz; in fact,
its participation in La Paz started when the first phase of recovery was finished.
Other ‘soft’ outputs proper to the early stages of recovery such as psychological
aid, food, medical aid and, temporary infrastructure were flot included in the
project. However, education, technical assistance and information became a
fundamental output for the development of the seif-help component of the
project, at the same time that they were crucial for the transfer of knowledge and
better practices to local municipalities.
Resuits
Transfer: The few subsidies that were devoted to motivate the creation of small
and medium-size industries were transferred to residents according to the plan
designed by FUNDASAL. Regard ing employment opportunities, internai
evaluations conducted by FUNDASAL show that a great number of jobs were
created for local residents specifically to work in construction activities. Besides,
construction workers hired by FUNDASAL made a considerable contribution in
the process of teaching and supporting residents in self-help activities.
According to the officiai reports, and comparing this information with the
interviews conducted in place, it is possible to say that new housing reached
almost 100% occupation. The residents that were targeted by the project used
the new units according to the plan of activities designed by FUNDASAL.
Even though officiai statistics are flot available, recent articles and papers about
the reconstruction process suggest that the low level of access to insurance of
rural housing and the scatce implementation of emergency protocols did not
improve after the disaster (Lungo, 2001). Despite the fact that new lots or land
were flot included as an output in the project, it can be said that the legalisation
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of tenure of rural properties had positive results in incrementing the levels of
legal ownership 0f land and housïng in the region of La Paz.
Community participation: The beneficiaries of the project had very hile
participation in the design and management of the project. As was explained
before (page 147), aIl the units were built following the same model, preventing
the residents from adapting the proposed units to their particular needs during
the original construction of the houses. b benefit from the project, residents had
to work as sweat equity and did not have the option of replacing this work with
hired labor. Similarly, very hile participation was given to residents in the
financing of the project, leaving very liile space for the creation of alternative
ways of financing (such as the creation of cooperatives, application for
complementary bans or combination of aid and help from different sources). On
the other hand, not only did local residents participate in the assembly of
construction components but also in the production of them, including peasants
being hired to work in the local industries producing cement blocks. In general,
end users had very hile responsibihity for decision-making; they did flot
participate in deciding where or how the funds were going to be allocated, or
how the financing strategy was going to be conducted.
Impacts
Project goals: Considering that neither the national nor the municipal
governments obtained bans for reconstruction, there is no additional burden of
debt resulting from post-disaster reconstruction activities.
The most important negative impact of the project on the natural environment
was associated with the pollution of natural sources 0f water due to the Iack of
any sewage infrastructure. Furthermore, the recovery of normal activities in La
Paz was delayed due to the late provision of permanent housing solutions. Even
though the structural (anti-seismic) resistance ofthe housing structures was
188
guaranteed by the building process, the low quality of construction of the units
leads one to believe that, in the long-term, the resistance of future additions
might be compromised by the prevailing 10w quality of construction. At the same
time, the subsequent use of temporary shacks built with ‘rough’ materials and
very Iow standards of safety (and used even after the permanent units were
finished) constitutes additional physical vuinerabilities in the case of future
natural hazards. Later additions to the original units are flot commonly compliant
with construction codes and standards (which, by the way, are not properly
controlled by the authorities in the rural areas).
One of the most positive impacts of the project was the improvements gained in
institutional capacity and development at the level of the municipalities, obtained
from the close work between FUNDASAL and the officers of the local
governments. By including the participation of local authorities, FUNDASAL
made them take initiatives and make decisions about the project. This approach
permiffed that, even though the temporary multi-organisation responsible for the
project was dissolved when the project was finished, some of the individual
organisations that constituted the project team did not disappear, and therefore,
they can potentially give continuity to the lessons learned from the project.
Except for the exclusion of residents living in unsafe locations, the project had a
fair system for selecting the beneficiaries, giving the same opportunities to men
and women and people with different racial, economic, religious and ownership
conditions. This approach permiffed that both renters and peasants, who might
not have had officiaI documents to prove land tenure, were included as
beneficiaries of the project. However, the fact that residents living in land at high
risk of flooding or landslides were not included as beneficiaries means that
physical vulnerabilities related with unsafe locations were not totally reduced.
These vulnerabilities, coupled with the physical vulnerabilities resulting ftom later
additions and changes to the housing structures, suggest that a similar disaster
can still happen in the same region if a new natural hazard occurs.
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3.3.1.2. Analysïng unexpected resufts and impacts
In section 2.2.3.4 a list of seven assumptions were first presented as a guide to
the identification of the most frequent (or most likely to occur) cause-effect
relationships in projects offering a product in the context of development
oriented objectives. By applying these assumptions to the evaluation of the
project lead by FUNDASAL, the following unexpected resuits and unexpected
impacts were identified:
Assumptïon No. 1: if: (j) users have access to the product (if the product is
affordable, accessible, etc) and (ii) the users ‘like’ it (if the product corresponds
to the needs, desires and expectations of the users), then: the output is
acquired: The assumption was ttue.
Assumption No. 2: if the product is acquired and its use corresponds to the
needs, desires and expectations of the users, then: the product is used. The
assumption was truc.
Assumption No. 3: if: (i) end-users are shown that resources do flot allow for
paying labour force; (ii) end-users are taught how to participate in the activities
of the project; (iii) end-users have the time (or can manage to get the time) to
participate in the project; (iv) end-users are given the resources (tools and
materials) to participate; and (y) end-users are shown that the ptoduct is not
given ‘for free’ but instead it can be ‘paid’ for by helping in its production, then:
they will participate in producing the product. The assumption was truc.
Assumption No. 4: if: people use the products (using as opposed to just
acquiring the product which is not enough), then: the goal is attained. Two
unexpected outcomes prove that this assumption was falsc: first, the negative
impacts in the environment related to the pollution of sources of water and
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second, the permanence 0f the temporary sub-standard units after the
permanent houses were built. In both cases, the use of housing units was flot
enough to reduce the vulnerabilities of the population and to Iead to sustainable
development.
Assumption No. 5: if: people participate in producing the product, then: the goal
is affained: Contrary to the assumption established by FUNDASAL (as a
rationale for the implementation 0f a self-help-based project), the participation of
local residents in construction activities did not conduct, in the case of the
project in La Paz, to the implementation of better building practices in later
additions made to the original units. This aspect reduced the effects 0f the
project in terms 0f the potential for reduction of physical vulnerabilities. The
assumption was false.
Assumptîon No. 6: if: no sudden and/or unexpected changes occur in the
environment, then: the expected results and expected impacts occur. The
assumption was true.
Assumption No. 7: if: a certain expected change occurs in the environment,
then: the expected resuits and expected impacts occut. The assumption was
true.
3.3.1.3. Representation and description of the organisational system
As explained in Chapter li (Methods), two levels 0f organisational systems are
analysed. First, at the level of the organisation responsible of the project, and
then at the level of the mufti-organisation formed to conduct the project.
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3.3.1.3.1. Organisatïonal system of FUNDASAL
b conduct the reconstruction project in the rural region of La Paz, FUNDASAL
opted for a project-based organisation (as described in section 2.3, page 96).
This structure included a project manager, directly responsible for the project,
located on the site, and in charge of conducting the activities and organising the
community directors (see Fig. 3.17). Each community director was in charge of a
specific intervention (a Municipality or a specific community) and ditected the
activities of the different teams of aided self-help, which conducted the
construction activities.
Both the design and financing of the project (including the design of the units)
were supported by regular functional units located in San Salvador (at the
headquarters).
3.3.1.3.2. Organisational system of the multi-organisation
The organisation established for the reconstruction project in La Paz included
the National Government at two instances: fi) one just after the disaster, in which
FUNDASAL and the Government joined forces for the development of temporary
housing (as part of the National program of temporary housing); and (ii) one
before the disaster in which the National Government established cooperation
agreements with the German Government that led to the funding of the
permanent housing project. It is possible to say then, that the National
Government was part of the multi-organisation for the development of temporary
housing and was an external organisation (outside the multi-organisation) with
an important influence in the development of the permanent housing project. In
Fig. 3.18 (that summarises the organisational structure of the whole project), it is
represented as an influential organisation outside the multi-organisation
(therefore in a clear box).
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Other important participants wïthin the multi-organisation included the German
Government (and its audït body in El Salvador), the local municipalities, the local
residents, the construction workers hired by FUNDASAL for education and
training activities, and the companies selected by FUNDASAL for building the
mobile (permanent) pre-fab units.
The diagram also shows the activities that were conducted. From the activities
identified in the WBS of reconstruction projects (section 2.3.) the ones
implemented in FUNDASAL’s project are checked in the following list:
X Cooperation agreements
X Funding
X Procurement
X Research & studies
Distribution of money
X Selection of beneficiaries
X Project management
X Control
X Cooperation
X Provision of: land I housing solutions I temporarv housing*
Decision making
X Educating and training
X Self-help
Construction
* Within the activity called “provision of:...” the group of outputs that were
included in the project are underlined in this list
Figure 3.18 also shows that the following outputs were offered to rural residents
(owners and renters): fi) subsidies for infrastructure and others; (ii) temporary
housing; (iii) new houses; (iv) education and technical assistance; and (y)
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information. Finally, it is important to note that only ownets and renters in the
rural areas benefited from the project. Municipalities benefited from the
education and training portion 0f the project.
3.3.2. Results of Case study 2: 2001 earthquake, San Salvador,
organisation: Municipality of San Salvador (MSS)
3.3.2.1. Analysis of the TIP
Refer to Table 3.2 for the evidence upon which the following analysis is based.
Table 3.2 also summarises the headings used in the following section.
Inputs
Multi-organisatïon: The multi-organisation set up by the MSS was unable to
collect funds for the project, neither at the domestic nor at an international level.
In order to achieve the budget originally estimated, the Munïcïpality considered
the possibility of obtaining private or public bans and subsidies; however, very
lift le success was obtained from this effort and the activities of fund raising were
soon abandoned. The organisational approach assumed by the MSS involved
the participation of very few external organisations using an approach in which
the Municipality assumed most of the activities of the project planning, design
and execution. Even though this aspect gave a relative independence to the
activities of the Municipality, the municipal government turned out to be
incapable 0f obtaining alone the resources required to deal with a complete set
of outputs.
The MSS created a Working Team that included representatives 0f the local
community (academics, politicians, experts, etc); this participation plus the fact
that the MSS had previously worked in direct contact with the community were
Table 3. project: reconstruction project Municipality of San Salvador
section group No.
55 debt
indicator j dif. orgj
Jinputs mufti-organisation T ffie capacity to afractftmnds forthe project
2 level of integration with flie community 9.6
3 level of integration between organisations 0.0
4 level of differentiation between organisations 1.4
5 projects administrative costs 15.3
6 organisations capacity to adaptto environm. 2.4
management tools 7 a census of local residents 8.1
8 previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc) 9.4
9 surveys of peoples needs 4.3
10 consultation with the community 10.1
local resources 11 residents capacity to work in construction 2.9
12 indigenous matenals available 6.5
outputs financial / ftinding: 13 tax incentives for companies/ individuals 0.0
14 bans for housing 1.2
15 subsidies for housing 2.4
16 bans for infrastructure or others 0.0
17 subsidies for infrastructure or others 0.0
infrastructure 18 dams, bamers, retaining walls 14.9
19 roads 0.0
20 water supply
21 elecfricity 00
22 sewage 0.0
23 telephone 0.0
community service 24 schools
25 health centers 0.0
26 community centers / religious bldg. 12.3
27 police I lire station 0.0
housing 28 new lots 18.0
29 emergency shelters 9.8
30 temporary housing 6.2
31 newhouses 18.0
32 reconstructedhouses 0.0
indusfry/employm. 33 bldgs/inftas. for industry & income generation 0.0
34 unemployment subsidies 0.0
others 35 rescue 0.0
36 psychological aid 0.0
37 food 0.0
38 medical aid 0.0
39 temporary infrastructure 0.0
40 education and technical assistance 0.0
41 information 6.0
I resafts fransfer 42 bans given and subsidies allocated 6.3
43 direct and indirect jobs created 0.0
44 houses occupied 0.0
45 insurance policies taken 0.0
46 emergency protocols implemented 36
47 increment on land ownership 7.2
48 inctement on home ownership 0.0
community particip. 49 design 0.0
50 management 0.0
51 financing of the project 0.0
52 production components 0.0
53 construction 7.2
54 individual responsibility of decision making 0.0
j impacts project goals 18.0
environmental impact
57 recovery of normal activities
58 physical resistance to hazards
59 transfer better building practices
60 institutionab capacity and devebopment
61 equality of gender and minotifies
6.8
0.0
9.0
0.0
12.2
16.2
62 aIl sefflements in safe areas 0.0
Fold out to see trie
197
expected to have created the proper environment for understanding the local
problems and needs.
However, the scarce involvement of other partners and other institutions was
reflected in a very Iow level of integration and differentiation of responsibilities.
Besides, when dïfficulties related with obtaining funds appeared, the multi
organisational structure of the project proved ta be insufficient to adapt the
project ta the constraints of the environment (such as the political polarisation
between parties). On the other hand, the use of “in house” personnel and
volunteers in the Working Team had a positive effect as it reduced the
operational and administrative costs of the project. In summary, it can be said
that the structure and the strategy adopted for this project centralised most of
the risks (financïal, technical and managerial ones) in only one institution, the
Municipality.
Management tools: The Municipality conducted most of the frequently used
management tools for the collection of information and knowledge about local
conditions; these tools included a census 0f victims, studies of local techniques,
a survey of needs and consultation with the community. However, these
activities are over-shadowed by the absence of a systematic application of this
knowledge ta the outputs of the project. For example, despite of the expected
diversity of users’ needs and expectations, a unique model of housing unit was
designed by the consultants of the Working Team (see appendix 2).
Local resources: the project did not reach the stage of housing construction
because of the lift le success of the activities of fund-raising. However,
observation of the precarious conditions of the spontaneous construction of pre
and post-disaster housing in San Salvador reveals that 10w incarne familles
(particularly squatters) encounter the typical difficulties found in many other Latin
American cities in housing construction; namely: (i) low incarne urban residents(J have liftle knowledge about appropriate construction practices (or they do not
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have the means to apply those practices); (ii) in the cities they do not have
enough access to indigenous materials (contrary to the country side, where
wood, earth, water, sand, etc. are easily found), and (iii) tools and construction
equipment are not easily accessible for the appropriate construction of
spontaneous housing.
Outputs
Financial I funding: Loans and subsidies for housing were offered exclusively
to a small group of residents that corresponded to employees of the Municipality
itself. The limited scope of this output contributed very tille to the overali
recovery of the housing situation in the city.
Infrastructure: The construction and repair of barriers and retaining walls were
included as outputs of the project reaching most of the objectives determined by
the MSS in terms of budget, schedule, quality and scope. However, the
construction and repair of urban roads were flot included in the project. Similarly,
even though access to public services does not exist for many of the squaffer
sellements of the city (and despite the effects of the disaster on the existing
infrastructure) neither the construction of new infrastructure nor the
reconstruction of the affected systems for water supply, electricity, sewage and
telephone were included in the project.
Community services: The construction of facilities and infrastructure for the
functioning of schools, health centers, community centers, police or fire stations
was not part of the outputs of the project. However, public community centers
affected by the earthquake were repaired and some reconstructed by the MSS
using in-house resources and fulfilling most of the objectives targeted in the
design of the project.
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Housing: A program of emergency shelters was initiated by the MSS soon after
the disaster. The project ïncluded the construction and later dismantling 0f large
tents that were used as communal emergency housing. However, officers of the
MSS recognise that lack 0f privacy and Iack 0f services characterised these
emergency shelters. More than 600 families of San Salvador benefited from the
program of temporary housing and relocation started by the national government
in the region of Tonocatepeque. However, the units were provided late and the
relocation project resulted in a major failure characterised by social problems,
high levels of crime, lack of employment opportunities, lack of infrastructure and
lack of community services.
In fact, the outputs concerning housing did not succeed as the project of new
housing and housing reconstruction was abandoned before reaching the stage
of construction.
lndustry and employment: As explained in the second part of Chapter III, one
of the major components of urban vulnerability in San Salvador is associated
with Iack of access to legal and formaI jobs. However, neither the construction of
facilities, structures or infrastructures for income-generation activities flot the
provision of economic compensation or unemployment subsidies were
accessible to residents of San Salvador as a result of the project led by the
MSS.
Others: Soft outputs such as rescue, psychological aid, food, medical aid,
temporary infrastructure, education and technical assistance did not form part of
the project. Doubtless, the opportunity to combine hard and soft outputs in order
to provide a holistic response to the needs of the urban population was missed.
Resuits
:00
Transfer: The few subsidies and bans that were implemented to help the
empboyees of the Municipality were dïstributed late and wïthout reaching the
amount expected to be distributed according to the original plan. Besides, the
creation of direct or indirect employment opportunities was flot an important
component of the project. In fact, the Municipality has not kept track of the jobs
and opportunities created by the activities of the project. Obviously, the
abandonment 0f the project resulted in no occupation 0f housing units. Similarly,
the lack of a proper program of insurances and the non construction of the
housing project suggest that the access to insurance policies did not increase
due to the outputs 0f the project. Plans of risk mapping and risk management
implemented after the disaster in some units of the Municipality (such as the
urban planning unit) might be considered as the basis for the implementation of
emetgency protocols.
It can be expected that the 600 families that were relocated in Tonocatepeque
(as part of the National project from which residents of San Salvador benefited)
increased the level of land ownership. However, land ownership did flot increase
due to projects directly lead by the MSS; similarly, the failure of the housing
component of the project did flot permit the increase of home ownership.
Community participation: beneficiaries of the project did not have direct
participation in the design, management, financing and production 0f
components for the project. However, some type of indirect community
participation might be said to be associated to the short-term results of the
project. First, the participation of specialists, academics and practitioners in the
Working Team established by the Municipality, and second, through the
participation of the residents of San Salvador in the parallel program of
relocation in Tonocatepeque. In this parallel program of emergency housing and
relocation, residents were required to work in the construction of the emergency
units using the materials given by the government. As it has been mentioned
before, this parallel program lead by the National Government is not part of the
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project of the MSS; however, it included beneficiaries from San Salvador as a
remedial solution to compensate in part for the lack of a successful project at the
level of the local authorities. In the design of the MSS’s permanent housing
project, end users were expected to have very lift le responsibïlity for decision
making; in fact, a traditional program of self-help (concenttated in the provision
of labour) was prepared including a unique model of house that was planned to
be buïlt (flot even the prototype unit was built).
Impacts
Project goals: Considering that the municipal government did not obtain bans
or credit for the reconstruction project, there is no additional burden of debt
resulting from post-disaster reconstruction activities. Similarly, the non
construction of housing and infrastructure did flot permit negative effects in
urban sprawl. However, negative impacts of the failure of the project on the
natural environment include the pollution of natural sources of water due to the
lack of any sewage infrastructure in the urban slums which were in no way
improved upon. The project did not contribute to the organisation and
consolidation of informai seillements nor to the improvement of conditions of life
cf squatters. The ptoject was insufficient to reduce the effects of the disaster on
the environment, including the potential for reducing the effects on public health,
on the pollution of rivers and sources of water, and on the degradation of the
physical conditions ofthe urban siums.
The failure of the housing component of the project suggests that minimum
effects on the recovery cf normal activities — particularly among bow-income
familles - were obtained in San Satvador. For fhe same reason, the physical
resistance to hazards in bow-income housing structures is flot expected f0 have
increased. Furthermore, the failure of the permanent housing project (including
its self-help initiative) did not permit the transfer of beffer building practices.
These negative outcomes contrast with the repair cf infrastructure (barriers and
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retaining walls) and public buildings, which is expected to have contributed to
the physical resistance of these facilities and therefore to the reduction of
vuinerabilities.
Awareness about existing risks and the importance 0f risk assessment among
the officers of the Municipality led to the development 0f a program of risk
mapping and risk management. A certain level of institutionai development and
increase of institutional capacity can therefore be expected after the experience
of the MSS. Considering race, gender, and social characteristics, a fair
selection of beneficiaries was established by the MSS and the Working Team in
order to accomplish the few outputs that were produced. However, considering
the character of the Municipality as a public institution, the collection and
distribution of economic resources to help the empioyees 0f the Municipality that
wete affected by the disaster might be perceived as a biased delivery of help.
The ultimate impact of reducing local vulnerabilities by reducing the seillements
in unsafe areas was flot obtained by the project. In fact, the condition and
number of informai sefflements and slums in San Salvador is flot expected to
have improved due to the project lead by the MSS.
3.3.2.2. Analysing unexpected resuits and impacts
Referto section 2.2.3.4. orto section 3.3.1.2 forthe description 0f the seven
assumptions that correspond to the most frequent (or most likely to happen)
cause-effect relatïonships in projects leading to offer a pcoduct in the context of
deveiopment-oriented objectives.
The assumptions proposed for the analysis 0f the other three case studies do
not apply to the housing project lead by the MSS because of the very fact that
most of the expected outputs were neyer accomplished. Note that the
assumptions that were prepared relate outputs to results and results to impacts.
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In fact, a different type of assumptions seems to have been contradicted by the
facts which occurred in the early stages of the project, particularly the ones that
could have been established by the Municipality with regard to obtaining the
resources. The importance of the strategic plan required to obtain funding
seems, indeed, to have been underestimated by the municipal officers. At the
same time, the effects of the political environment in which the project had to be
developed seem to have been insufficiently considered or mitigated. In both
cases, the assumptions established by the MSS encountered difficulties in the
project which finally leU to the failure of the housing component.
3.3.2.3. Representation and description of the organisational system
3.3.2.3.1. Organïsational system of the MSS
b conduct the reconstruction project in the urban area of San Salvador, the
Municipality opted for the use of in-house resources. This approach aimed to
take advantage of the existing functional units of the organisation and to
reinforce the existing resources through the consolidation of a Working Team
mandated for the design and execution of the project. In this regard, the
organisational design assumed a project-based structure (as proposed in
section 2.3). However, this structure did not have the leadership of a single
project manager directly responsible for the project; instead it aimed to create a
consensus among a series of specialists and professionals. This innovative
structure implied that the Working Team acted as an external consultant but
received at the same time the responsibilîty for executing the project (see Fig.
3.19). Both the design and financing of the ptoject (including the design ofthe
units) was directed by the in-house resources and in coordination with the
Working Team. The permanent administrative units of the Municipality that were
employed in the project remained after the project was abandoned, and thus a
certain level of continuity and organisational learning can be expected. However,
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the Working Team was dissolved at the end of the project without leaving a
systematic report of the lessons learned or the difficulties and opportunities
encountered.
3.3.Z32. Organisational system of the multi-organisation
The character of management independence assumed by the MSS for the
reconstruction of the city is also perceived at the level of the project’s multi
organisation. Fig. 3.20 (that summarises the organisational structure of the
whole project) shows that very few participants were brought together by the
Municipality. As a complement to the intentions of the local administration, the
National Government established the parallel project of relocation which, as
shown in the diagram, included the delivery of temporary housing and new lots.
In order to ïllustrate the ïnsufficient relations existing between the local and
national administrations, a red arrow links the MSS and the National
Government. Construction workers and contractors were hired by the
Municipality to conduct the works of infrastructure (retaining walls and cleaning
of water channels) and for the repair of public buildings.
The diagram shows the activities that were conducted in the project. From the
activities identified in the WBS of reconstruction projects (section 2.3) the ones
implemented in the project lead by the MSS or by the parallel program of
relocation lead by the National Government are checked in the following list:
Cooperation agreements
X Funding
X Procurement
X Research & studies
Distribution of money
X Selection of beneficiaries
X Project management
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X ContraI
Cooperation
X Provision of land / housing solutions / temporary housinq*
Decision making
Educating and training
Self-help
X Construction
* Within the activity called “provision of:...” the group of outputs that were
included in the project are underlined in this list
The following outputs of the MSS’s project were offered to urban residents of
San Salvador: (i) barriers, retaining walls (ii) repair of community centres and
public facilities (iii) emergency shelters (in the form of communal tents). For
employees ofthe Municipality the following outputs were offered: (ï) bans and
(ii) subsidies for housing. From the parallel program of relocation conducted by
the National Government, urban citizens of San Salvador benefited from (j) new
lots and (ii) materials for temporary housing.
3.3.3. Results of Case study 3: 1999 earthquake, Colombia, organisation:
Coffee Growers’ Organisations fCGOs)
3.3.3.1. Analysis of the TIP
Refer to Table 3.3 for the evidence upon which the following analysis is based.
Table 3.3 also summarises the headings used in the following section.
Inputs
Multi-organisation: The multi-organisation set up by the CGO5 took advantage
of their local and external relations in ordet to attract resources for the project.
Table 3.3 project: 1999 CGO’s rural reconstruction project in Colombin
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section group No.
Iinputs mufti-organisation T the capacity to atract funds for the project O
2 level cf integration witi, the community 13.2
3 level cf integration between organisations 18.0
4 level of differentiation between organisations 18.0
5 projecrs administrative costs 18.0
6 organisation’s capacity to adapt to environm. 16.2
management tools 7 a census of local residents 15.3
8 orevious studies (typologies, techniques, etc) 18.0
9 surveys of peoples needs 13.7
10 consultation with the community 7.9
local resources 11 residents capacity to work in construction 15.8
12 indigenous matenals available 15.8
financial I funding: 13 tax incentives for companies/ individuals 18.0
14 bans for housing 18.0
15 subsidies for housing 18.0
16 bans for infrastructure or others 18.0
17 subsidies for infrastructure or others 18.0
inftastructure 18 dams, barriers, retaining walls 15.4
19 roads 16.5
20 water supply 18.0
21 elecfricity
22 sewage 18.0
23 telephone 11.4
community service 24 schools 16.5
25 heaWi centers 16.5
26 community centers I religious bldg. 16.5
27 police I lIre station
housing 28 new lots 0.0
29 emergency shelters 15.4
30 temporary housing 18.0
31 newhouses 9.3
32 reconstructedhouses 18.0
industrylemploym. 33 bldgsRnfras. for indusfry & income generation 18.0
34 unemployment subsidies 0.0
others 35 rescue 18.0
36 psychological aid 11237 food 15.0
38 medical aid 18.0
39 temporary infrastructure 18.0
40 education and technical assistance 18.0
41 information 18.0
I tesuits transfer 42 bans given and subsidies allocated 18.0
43 direct and indirect jobs created 15.3
44 houses occupied 18.0
45 insurance policies taken 0.0
46 emergency protocols implemented 7.2
47 increment on land ownership 7.2
48 increment on home ownership 7.2
community particip. 49 design 18.0
50 management 18.0
51 financing ofthe project 16.2
52 production components 18.0
53 constwction 13.
54 individual responsibility of decision making 18.0
.
J2E41.
:2:1
i2:I:
:::I::
56 environmental impact Î.
57 recoveiy of normal activities 18.
56 physical resistance to hazards 18.
59 fransfer better building practices 12.1
60 institutional capacity and development
61 equality of gender and minonties 12.1
Fold oit toiee the TIP while reading the text
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This capacity to collect funds permiffed a continuous and timely investment of
resources according to the objectïves of the project and according to a complete
set of outputs determined in the design of the reconstruction plan. The CGO’s
network of regional and local institutions permiffed direct and constant contact
with organisations and members of the community. However, local municipalities
were not directly involved in the project, leaving hile possibility of knowledge
transfer and institution building at the level 0f the local authorities.
The structure set up by the CGO5 included the partïcipation of various local and
external participants which represented the additional challenge of obtaining an
appropriate level of integration and differentiation among them. A clear
distribution of roles accompanied by cooperation among the participants to the
delivery of common objectives was obtained under the leadership of the Coffee
Growers’ Federation. This leadership not only permiffed the distribution of
responsibilities among the various levels of the network of the Coffee Growers’
Organisations but also among external organisations and partners.
Clear and simplified methods for collecting, managing and transferring
information permuffed a small group of speciahists (mostly engineers) to manage
and control the execution of the construction activities. With this strategy, and
with the use of regular (permanent) in-house resources, administrative costs
were kept to the minimum. This approach implied that permanent administrative
units at various levels of the organisation were employed for a period of time to
manage the project (taking advantage that it was the slack season for coffee)
and thus very few new employees were hired foc the project.
The multi-organisation’s capacity to adapt to the environment was based on a
plan of risk mitigation in which several of the financial, technical and logistical
risks were shared among various organisations, and more importantly among
the end-users. Within this strategy, financial institutions were involved to
manage the collection, distribution and transferring of money. Construction
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companies and pre-fab industries were called-up to participate and some were
selected (by bidding) in order to share the financial and technical tisks
associated with developing and marketing new construction systems. Public
service companies were also technically and economically supported by the
CGOs in order to obtain from them efficient repair of the infrastructure. The use
of the reg ional and local network of participants can also be considered as a
strategy to adapt the project to the specific conditions of the environment. With
this approach, officers who are used fo working in the local conditions executed
the main activities ofthe project. Fïnally, end users were required to assume
responsibility for their own reconstruction projects transferring f0 them the
financial and organisational risks ofeach oftheir individual initiatives.
Another strategy to adapt the project to sudden changes and other risks of the
environment was to establish in parallel different planned outputs and solutions
(if plan ‘A’ failed a plan ‘B’ was ready to be used). With this approach, the self
help component of the project was complemenfed by the pre-fab housing
initiative, subsidies and bans were delivered in parallel, information and
education was transmitted by various means (brochures, newspapers,
magazines) and parallel programs of infrastructure and community services
were conducted simultaneously.
Management tools: In order to respond to the needs and expecfations of
affected residents, the CGOs established the management tools required for the
collection and processing of information and knowledge. These activities
included conducting a census of affected residents, studies about architectural
typologies and techniques, a survey of people’s needs and consultation with
members and representatives of the community (through the local Coffee
Growers’ Commiffees). By using these tools, the information about affected
Iand/home owners and tenants was collected and used for the design of the
outputs. However, residents living in illegal conditions in the rural areas were not
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included and their situation was not reported. Since the early stages of the
reconstruction activities this group was excluded from the project.
Local resources: Local rural residents met the conditions required to participate
in construction activities. Even though their construction practices were not
optimum before the disaster (in terms of the use of disaster resistant
construction standards), affected peasants traditionally have the time, interest
and physical capacity to solve their housing deficit by building for themselves.
With the outputs offered by the project, they received the proper guidance to
improve their traditional construction practices in order to meet disaster-resistant
norms.
The character of a rural area permifted the residents of the region to have
relatively easy access to construction materials such as wood, earth, water and
sand. Residents combined concrete structures with brick and the traditional
construction technologies based on the use of bamboo (guadua). Traditionally,
peasants are used to building using these materials in the construction of
bahareque walls, clay tiles, timber structures and even for the construction of
furnïture and other structures. However, the wide-spread use of bamboo
threatened the environmental conditions of the region after the disaster.
Therefore, the efficient and rational use of this material had to be monitored and
supervised by the CGOs’ auditors in order to prevent dangerous effects on the
envi ro n ment.
Outputs
Financial I funding: The national government established tax reductions, tax
waivers and fiscal incentives for both individuals and companies. These
incentives aimed to facilitate the creation of employment, to aftract the
participation of the private sector and exterior companies and to mitigate the
economic losses in the region.
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As explained in the fitst section of this chapter, the backbone of the housing
component of the rural reconstruction was based on a plan of bans and
subsidies targeted not only to the reconstruction 0f housing units but also to the
reconstruction and repair of coffee processing infrastructure. With this approach,
beneficiaries received enough resources to proceed with their own individual
and customised projects using a great variety of solutions and easily permiffing
them to adapt the projects ta a case-by-case reconstruction situation. Loans and
subsidies were given to the beneficiaries that needed them, within the objectives
of the project and accord ing to the time table established by the CGOs.
Infrastructure: Barriers and retaining walls were buiit to control and prevent
landslides. Even though the total need of retaining walls could not be met by the
project, a significant contribution to reduce the physical vulnerability associated
with landslides on roads and private land was accomplished.
Similarly, many of the rural roads were repaired or reconstructed and many
others (but not yet ail of them) that were not properly finished before the disaster
were paved as part of the project. Beneficiaries of bans and subsidies could
also use the available resources ta build roads inside the limits 0f their own land
and to build the necessary infrastructure of public services (connection to
sources of watet, to the water mains, to the sewage systems and to the
electricity and telephone networks). Observation of the local conditions and the
statistics of the national government suggest that an appropriate level of
coverage in public services exists in the region, telephone system being the one
that is less accessible to rural residents.
Community services: A specific sub-project with its own funding (called
FORECAFE 3) was established in partnership between the National
Government, FOREC and the CGOs in order to build public facilities such as
schools, health centets, churches and police stations. These outputs were
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delivered according to the objectives initially determined and the budget and
time-tables originally established.
Housïng: New lots were flot offered as part of the project. This aspect reflected
the fact that the project was targeted directly to land owners and only indirectly
to land renters. In the housing project, peasants who did not have legal
documents of land ownership could legalise their tenure after demonstrating
long-term residence on the property. However, residents living in illegal
conditions of occupation of land were not accepted as beneficiaries 0f the
outputs offered. Rural families that illegally occupy land usually live in the
easements of roads, close f0 sources 0f water and on slopes, very frequently in
dangerous locations exposed f0 the risk 0f floods and landslides. The project
failed to solve the situation of hundred of families living in such conditions.
Housing-related outputs offered by the project started, a few days after the
disaster, wïth the delivery of plastics for emergency sheltering. The delivery of
this output responded to a joint effort of the United States Office for Disaster
Assistance (USOFDA) and the CGO5, and affempted to provide the basic
material for the quick repair of affected houses or for the construction of
provisional shelters. However, the amount 0f plastics delivered was insufficient
to cover the general needs of the whole rural population affected.
Temporary housing was not part of the project led by the CGOs. However,
FOREC organised through other NGOs (including the National University 0f
Bogota) a parallel program of temporary housing that included the consolidation
of spontaneously-made shelters and the construction 0f new units. Various
sefflements of up to one hundred families were built and consolidated mostly in
small towns and in the affected large cities. A proper coordination of information
and responsïbilities between the NGOs in charge of temporary housing and the
NGOs in charge of permanent housing perm ifted a relatively smooth transition
from one stage to the other.
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In order to provide multiplicity of choice and to accommodate the project to
different types of needs and expectations, the permanent housing project
included two parallel streams. One stream was based on the reconstruction of
existing units (repair or rebuilding of damaged houses) and the other was based
on the marketing and promotion 0f new pre-fab units. lnitïally, the pre-fab
component of the program targeted the promotion of finished units made by a
group of pre-selected companies; for this, a bïd was called for and received from
pre-fab companies, and a housing exhibition was organised. Companies
participating in the exhibition exposed different and innovative technologies to
respond to the model proposed by the architects of the Coffee Growers’
Federation. Despite the appropriate quality and reasonable prices which were
obtained through the bid, very few finished houses were actually sold. In reality,
the housing exhibition facilitated the marketing of construction materials and
components that most of the residents acquired to use as they built their own
houses by themselves. In the end, the two streams of the project merged
through the self-help component of the project. The majority of peasants (that in
general are used to build housing for themselves) used traditional technologies
by building with concrete, bamboo, bahareque, adobe, etc. while also
incorporating industrialised components such as corrugated sheets, steel
beams, pre-fab doors and windows, plastic water tanks, pre-fab septic tanks,
roof drains, etc.
Regardless of the construction technique or the labour force used, the ïndividual
projects had to be completed according to the schedule and meet disaster
resistant standards as agreed between each family and the CGO’s inspector.
The results of the control that the inspectors conducted over the quality and time
of construction determined the approval of monthly payments (resulting from the
bans and/or subsidies made available to the beneficiaries).
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Industry and employment: The main objective of the CGOs was the tapid
recovery of the coffee industry. For this reason, a major component of the
project was the physical recovery of the infrastructure required for growing,
processing and transportïng the coffee. In this regard, bans and subsidies were
availabie for the construction or reconstruction of water systems, water tanks,
septic tanks, irrigation systems, storage rooms, access roads (inside private
property) and the so-called ‘beneficiaderos’. A ‘beneficiadero’ is a basic one or
two storey high structure to wash, dry, pack and store the coffee beans before
delivery. The quality of these structures was also certified by the inspectors who
controlled not only the structural resistance to natural hazards but also the
compliancy with envïronmental standards regarding the preservation of natural
resources, the prevention of erosion, the reasonable use of local bamboo and
the pollution of sources of water.
Despite the high levels of under and unempboyment, subsidies for people who
iost their jobs or did not have access to alternative sources of income were flot
included.
Others: Other outputs such as psychological aid, food, temporary infrastructure,
education, technical assistance and information were included in the project. As
designed by the CGOs, the project was seen as an opportunity to combine ‘hard’
and ‘soft’ outputs in order to provide a holistic response to the needs of the rural
residents and to obtain the desired level of economic recovery. These soft
outputs were ail delïvered through the coordination of efforts between the CGOs
and other institutions (The World Food Program, the local public service
companies, etc.). Medical aid and immediate post-disaster rescue were provided
by other NGOs (including the Red Cross and Civil Defense) and were flot part of
the project Iead by the CGOs. The scope of the delivery of food rations and
psychological aid reveais that they were not enough to cover the needs of ail the
affected population.
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Results
Transfer: The project obtained an on-time delivery of financial outputs with a
strict control over their use and distribution. This implied that the resources were
ail used by the residents according to the objectives of the project.
Even though the direct and indirect jobs created contributed to the recovery of
the population, the rates of under and unemployment after the project were stili
high in the reg ion. Conversations with officers of the CGO suggest that the
generai economic recession of the country, the decrease of the selling price of
coffee and other financial difficulties proper to the coffee industry and related
exports contributed to the difficulty of reactivating the local economy.
The fact that each beneficiary was responsible of his/her own project implied a
transfer of responsibility in which each beneficiary could use the resources
obtained to respond to his/her own needs. This resulted in total acceptability of
the houses built and therefore in total occupation ofthe units.
There is no evidence that more insu rance policies were taken out for the new
projects as built. The project did not include insurance companies to participate
in the reconstruction and the bans and subsidies were given without the
requirement of obtaining insurances. In general it can be said that neither at the
level of the project nor at the level of the national program was there a campaign
or a program to increase the access to insurance policies for housing and
infrastructure.
Despite the fact that the project delivered a series of timely outputs for the
recovery of the rural community, the local authorities (municipalities and
municipal councils) did flot directly participate in the project. In fact, when the
project was finished, the CGOs continued to do their normal activities and
FOREC was dissoived. The capacity to implement emergency protocols (both
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regular or modified) is Iikely to be compromised by the temporariness of the
project and of the multi-organisation that developed it.
The fact that the project only targeted land owners and that renters benefited
only indirectly did flot permit an increase of land and home ownership in the rural
area. However, land and home ownership increased indirectly due to the
legalisation of rural properties, contributing in this way to a reduction of soft
vu I nerabi I ities.
Community participation: The project transferred to residents the responsibility
over the execution of the design, the management, the financing, the production
of components and the construction of their projects. In order to benefit from the
project, each family was expected to actively participate in defining the scope of
their own needs and expectations, proposing a design for approval and
executing the project (either through self-help or hiring labor). Other resources,
different from the ones provided by the CGO5, could (and were expected to) be
used by the residents to complete their projects; this including other bans and/or
their own funds. This implied total responsibility over decision making at different
levels of the project (from defining the location of the house in the lot to defining
the sequence of construction activities to be conducted). Compliance to
standards of quality in terms of disaster resistance and environmental protection,
plus the contrai over the proper use of resources, were conducted by expert
engineers acting as inspectors. The engineers also contributed in helping the
residents design their houses and infrastructures.
Rural residents were not automatically included as beneficiaries of the financial
resources offered; instead, they had to take the initiative to apply for the funds
by proposing the project, the schedule and the budget required (besides
proving land tenure). This approach was taken deliberately by the officers of the
CGOs in order to let peasants know that they had to assume the tesponsibility
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for their own recovery and in this way to guarantee total satisfaction with the
initiatives built.
Impacts
Project goals: In order to create FOREC, the national government obtained a
ban from the World Bank. This ban increased the already high and expensive
public external debt of Colombia (estimated at $21,754 million USD in 2001 after
the disaster — Clavijo 2001). From the national government’s disaster-relief
budget, 46 % came from bans given by the World Bank (El Espectador,
Newspaper, January 25, 2000); this figure suggest that a considerable
proportion of the project was transferred as an additional burden to the abready
high externat public debt.
The timeby solutions of the project contributed to the recovery from the effects of
the disaster in the environment and in public health, as well as to the
consolidation of rural housing (legalisation of properties and physical
consolidation of structures). Despite that large amounts of bamboo were used,
the control over the use of natural resources mitigated the potential negative
effects of the project on the natural environment. The delivery of special
solutions targeted to the rural community prevented the migration of peasants to
the city, reducing the possibility of increasing urban problems (including urban
sprawl and illegal sefflements).
The prompt and integral response to the problems of housing, infrastructure,
public services, community services and sources of income, permitted a timely
recovery of normal (domestic and civil) activities. This response also increased
the physical resistance of most constructions and permiffed the transfer of beffer
building practices. However, the post-project lack of resources (due to the still
difficult economic situation in the region) and the lack of confrol over
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constructions in rural areas are expected to compromise the quality and
maintenance of constructions built after the project.
By creating an institution exclusively devoted to reconstruction activities (and
therefore of short duration), the strategy chosen by the national government
limited the possibility of facilitating institutional development of regular public
units. In fact, FOREC was dissolved as soon as its mission was completed,
leaving very liftle information or studies about the expertise gained during the
reconstruction experience; on the other hand, the CGOs published several
reports and detailed information about the project. It can therefore be said that
even though some form of organisational learning was obtained at the level of
the organisation in charge of the project, at the multi-organisational and the
program level the possibility of organisational learning was lost.
Considering race, gender, and social characteristics, a fair selection of
beneficiaries was established by the CGO5 in the project. However, the
reconstruction project targeted a specific group 0f beneficiaries (rural land
owners) from which people living in illegal occupation of land were excluded.
This group represents a vuinerable sector of the society for which there was no
solution after the disaster. The objective of reducing the settlements in unsafe
areas was achieved by the CGOs except for this particular group of people living
in illegal conditions.
3.3.3.2. Analysing unexpected results and impacts
In section 2.2.3.4 a list of seven assumptions were first presented as a guide to
the identification 0f the most frequent (or most likely to occur) cause-effect
relationships in projects offering a product in the context of development
oriented objectives. By applying these assumptions to the evaluation of the
project lead by the CGOs, the following unexpected results and unexpected
impacts were identified:
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Assumption No. 1: if: (j) users have access to the ptoduct (if the product is
affordable, accessible, etc) and (ii) the users ‘like’ it (if the product corresponds
to the needs, desires and expectations of the users), then: the output is
acquired: The assumption was false. In general, the assumptions presented in
chapter two correspond to the sequence of cause-effect relationships between
the outputs, the results and the impacts of the CGOs’ project. However, the fact
that the finished pre-fab houses presented in the housing exhibition were not
sold demonstrates that the first assumption did not occur in the project. The
promotion and marketing of pre-fab units was based on the assumption that
users having access to a product of acceptable quality will acquire it. In fact, the
work of specialists in the careful design of the units and the decision to employ
the most competent construction companies was expected to guarantee the
success of the sales in the housing exhibition. However, in reality, residents
acquired construction components instead 0f complete houses. Residents seem
to have recognised the quality of the units; in fact, many used the housing
exhibition to ‘copy’ and take ideas for the construction of their own units. In this
case, the unexpected result of ‘good’ and affordable houses not being
purchased is explained by the tact that traditionally, peasants are used to build
for themselves their own shelters over a long period of time (that can extend
over several generations). As explained by the officers of the Coffee Growers’
Federation, “for peasants, building their homes is much more than acquiring a
house”. Traditionally, it is an evolutionary process that involves various members
of the family through a do-it-yourself process that accommodates the availability
of resources and the needs of the family.
Assumption No. 2: if the product is acquired and its use corresponds to the
needs, desires and expectations of the users, then: the product is used. The
assumption was true.
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Assumptïon No. 3: if: fi) end-users are shown that resources do flot allow for
paying labour force; (ii) end-users are taught how to participate in the activities
of the project; (iii) end-users have the time (or can manage to get the time) to
participate in the project; (iv) end-users are given the resources (tools and
materials) to participate; and (y) end-users are shown that the product is not
given ‘for free’ but instead it can be ‘paid’ for by helping in its production, then:
they will participate in producing the product. Ihe assumption was true.
Assumption No. 4: if: people use the products (using as opposed to just
acquiring the product which is not enough), then: the goal is aftained. The
assumption was true.
Assumptïon No. 5: if: people participate in producing the product, then: the goal
is attained: The assumption was true
Assumption No. 6: if: no sudden and/or unexpected changes occur in the
environment, then: the expected resufts and expected impacts occur. The
assumption was true.
Assumption No. 7: if: a certain expected change occurs in the environment,
then: the expected results and expected impacts occur. The assumption was
true.
3.3.3.3. Representation and descrïption of the organisational system
3.3.3.3.1. Organisational system ofthe CGOs
To conduct the reconstruction project in the affected rural area of Colombia, the
CGOs opted for the optimisation of the regional, national and international
network of institutions and contacts established by the organisation for the
regular development of the coffee industry (see Fig. 3.21). The organisation
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developed the project by using the different leveis of committees that the CGOs
have established in their regular commercial activities. The project was
coordinated in the affected region by transferring there some of the managers
normaiiy Iocated in the headquarters of the Coffee Growers’ Federation in
Bogotà. This structure is different from the traditional ones presented in chapter
two (functional, project-based or matrix organisations). In reality it corresponds
to a pyramidal network of organisations connected in hierarchicai order.
A general external audit was estabiished for the project while an internai (mostly
technical) audit was conformed to control the execution of individuai projects.
This internai audit inciuded engineers already employed by the CGOs and some
new ones hired for this activity, ail of them working as construction inspectors.
As explained before, the coffee growers were also directly invoived in the
project. Even though they are represented in the base of the pyramid (as
resources were transferred from the top to the boffom of the diagram) they had
total responsibility of their own projects.
3.3332. Organisational system of the muiti-organisation
Fig. 3.22 (which summarises the organisational structure of the whole project)
shows the compiex network of organisations implied in the CGOs’ project. In
order to understand this network, it is useful to identify two leveis in which the
participants of the muiti-organisation were involved. A first levei corresponds to
the national program of reconstruction with which the CGOs’ project got involved
and the second level is the project itself. in the first ievel, the activities of
program procurement lead to the creation of FOREC, in part by using the
funding provided by the World Bank. FOREC served as a bridge between the
program at large and the individual projects. in this way, FOREC created a
project procurement strategy that resulted in seiecting the CGOs for the rural
reconstruction. The Coffee Growers’ Federation assumed part of the project
QO
rQ
an
isa
tio
na
le
n
v
iro
nm
en
t
v
isi
bl
e
he
ad
re
sp
on
si
bl
e
cf
th
e
pr
oje
ct
di
re
ct
re
sp
on
si
bl
e
0f
th
e
pr
oje
ct
un
it
w
o
rk
in
g
on
th
e
pr
oje
ct
un
it
c
te
at
ed
fo
rt
he
pr
oje
ct
Q
he
ad
qu
ar
te
rs
N
at
io
na
l
Co
ffe
e
G
ro
w
er
s’
C
on
gr
es
s
N
at
io
na
l
Co
ffe
e
G
ro
w
er
s
C
om
m
itt
ee
j
‘
14
.
j
j
C
of
fe
e
G
ro
w
er
s’
j
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
j
H
ea
dg
ua
rte
rs
j
u
n
its
on
th
e
sit
e
Co
ffe
e
G
ro
w
er
s’
R
eg
io
na
l
C
om
m
itt
ee
s
Co
ffe
e
G
ro
w
er
s
R
eg
io
na
l
C
om
m
itt
ee
s
I
I
I
Ï
C
of
fe
e
G
ro
w
er
s’
Co
ffe
e
G
ro
w
er
s’
C
of
fe
e
G
ro
w
er
s’
C
of
fe
e
G
ro
w
er
s
Lo
ca
l
Lo
ca
l
Lo
ca
l
Lo
ca
l
C
om
m
iff
ee
s
C
om
m
ift
ee
s
C
om
m
ift
ee
s
C
om
m
ift
ee
s
I
I
I
C
of
fe
e
G
ro
w
er
s’
R
eg
io
na
l
C
om
m
ift
ee
s
C
of
fe
e
G
ro
w
er
s’
Co
ffe
e
G
ro
w
er
s
Lo
ca
l
Lo
ca
l
C
om
m
itt
ee
s
C
om
m
itt
ee
s
C
of
fe
e
gr
ow
er
s
L
i
4
le
ge
nd
:
D El und
er
fln
ed
Fi
g.
3.
21
C
G
O
s
In
te
rn
ai
O
rg
an
is
at
io
na
l
de
si
gn
M M
fo
r o
rg
an
isa
tio
ns
:
pa
rt
0f
th
e
m
uf
ti-
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n
no
ti
nc
lu
de
d
in
th
e
m
ul
ti-
or
ga
n.
pr
oc
es
se
s
c
n
g
ro
cu
re
m
en
t-
fu
nd
in
Ipr
oc
ur
em
en
t a
n
d
co
ntr
oll
-
Ipr
oie
ctm
an
ag
Ifu
nd
in
g
Ii
n
i
c
u
rn
u
u
n
l—
lo
ca
lr
es
id
en
ts
H
i
n
s
p
e
c
t
o
co
n
fro
l
I
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
se
lf
he
tp
I
_
s
i
o
n
h
s
n
g
s
o
0
n
—
I
co
o
pe
ra
tio
n
I
ed
uc
at
in
g
an
d
tr
ai
ni
ng
F
fo
ro
ut
pu
ts:
in
ra
d:
flo
ti
nc
lud
ed
in
th
e
pr
oe
rt
w
hi
to
bo
x:
de
ve
lo
pi
g
r
e
y
b
o
x
:
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
fo
r c
o
n
n
ec
to
rs
:
re
la
te
d
w
ith
—
b
co
n
tr
ib
ul
ed
10
...
./
in
flu
en
ce
d
in
m
d:
w
es
k
o
r
in
su
ffi
ci
en
tr
el
at
io
n
br
id
ge
Fi
g.
3.
22
D
ia
gr
am
o
f t
he
m
u
lti
-o
rg
an
is
at
io
n
a
pp
lie
d
to
th
e
CG
O
1s
re
c
o
n
s
tr
u
ct
io
n
pr
oj
ec
t
o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
e
x
te
rn
al
lo
ca
l
B
5
f
lk
N
a
b
o
n
a
lG
o
v
.
I
FO
RE
C
[=
o
C
G
s
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
G
le
ge
nd
:
fo
r h
ou
si
ng
ta
x
in
ce
nt
iv
es
fo
rc
o
m
pa
ni
es
/i
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
iu
bs
ld
le
sf
or
ho
us
in
g
I
re
se
a
rc
hl
st
ud
ie
s
I
ba
ns
foi
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
or
o
th
er
s
iu
bs
id
ie
sfo
rin
fra
str
uc
tu
re
or
o
th
er
s
da
m
s,
ba
nl
er
s,
re
ta
in
in
g
w
all
s
ro
ad
s
o
u
tp
ut
s
be
ne
fic
ia
rie
s
o
n
S
tr
uc
ti
on
c
o
m
pa
ni
es
I
-
r
I
ail
ru
ra
l r
e
si
de
nt
s
I
&
e
c
a
u
g
n
a
he
dt
h
en
te
ra
I
pr
e-
fa
b
c
o
m
pa
ni
es
I—
‘I
co
n
st
ru
ct
or
s
I N
GO
sI
o
m
m
u
fll
tv
c
e
n
te
rs
I r
el
ia
ic
us
bi
da
.
o
c
e
1f
r.
s
ta
ti
on
Iin
tern
at.
don
ors
[
ne
w
lo
ts
qf
lie
rQ
en
ov
s
h
ei
t
te
m
po
ra
ly
ho
us
in
g
—
—
V
Ilo
ca
l o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
H
ow
ne
rs
ru
ra
l r
es
id
en
tsl
‘
x
s
fo
rf
rt
d
u
st
ry
&
in
co
m
e
o
en
er
at
ic
’
Ii
na
m
nl
nu
na
nt
c
i
h
c
ir
li
n
e
re
sc
u
e
w
ch
o4
oa
ic
&
d
fo
o
m
ed
ic
al
alU
fe
m
pç
V
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
a
rl
ii
r.
c
tt
n
n
n
r
1
fa
n
h
1
n
c
fc
n
n
a
4 -9
-
j
ail
ru
ra
l r
e
si
de
nt
s
I
I
by
a
di
ffe
re
nt
o
rg
an
is
at
io
n
Dl
ud
ed
in
th
e
pr
oje
ct
M M
225
funding and the overail management of the project, under the control and
supervision of FOREC.
The first initiatives of project management led to the deveiopment of a short
period of research and studies (conducted while the phases 0f immediate relief
and rehabilitation took place) and to the selection of a financial institution for the
distribution of subsidies and bans. The local and regional commiffees were in
direct contact with the local residents who conducted their own individual
projects by making decisions over many of the outputs offered. Control over and
technical support for ïndividual projects was conducted by the inspectors
(specialised engineers), directly managed by the regional committees. Through
the local and regional commiftees, a self-help plan was implemented; however,
beneficiaries could also take advantage of the housing solutions provided by
both the pre4ab companies (through the housing exhibition organised by the
CGOs), and other constructors and NGOs.
Inter-organisational arrangements between the CGOs, international donors and
local organisations permifted the delivery of other outputs such as solutions for
emergency shelters, psychological aid, food and temporary infrastructure. In
order to guarantee the success of ‘hard’ outputs, education, training and
information were provided as a general umbrella for ail of the other services and
products offered.
From the activities identified in the WBS of reconstruction projects (section 2.3)
the ones implemented in the CGOs’ project are checked in the following list:
Cooperation agreements
X Funding
X Procurement
X Research & studies
X Distribution of money
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Selection of beneficiaries
X Project management
X Control
X Cooperation
X Provision of land I housing solutions I temporary housing*
X Decision making
X Educating and training
X Self-help
X Construction
* Within the activity called “provision of:...” the group of outputs that were
included in the project are underlined in this list
From the list of outputs presented in the TIP, the following outputs were flot
offered in the CGO5’ project: fi) new lots and (ii) unemployment subsidies. The
following outputs were delivered by other organisations: fi) temporary housing,
(ii) rescue and (iii) medical aid. Construction companies benefited from the tax
incentives offered by the National program while ail the rural residents benefited
from the outputs related with infrastructure and community services. The outputs
of FORECAFE 1 and 2 fas explained in part 2 of Chapter lii) were targeted
exclusively to land owner rural residents.
3.3.4. Results of Case study 4: 1998 after Mitch, Choluteca, Honduras,
organisation: CECI
3.3.4.1. Analysis of the hP
Refer to Table 3.4 for the evidence upon which the following analysis is based.
Table 3.4 also summarises the headings used in the following section.
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TabIe3.4 project: CECrs reconstruction project in Choluteca, Hondur
section group No. indicator
j inputs mufti-organisation i tue capacity to afract ftinds for the project
2 level of integration with flue community 11.4
3 level of integration between organisations 5.0
4 level of differentiation between organisations 1.4
5 project’s administrative costs 3.6
6 organisations capacity to adapt to environm. 2.4
management tools 7 a census of local residents 0.0
8 orevious studies (typologies, techniques, etc) 0.0
9 surveys of peoples needs 1.4
10 consultation with the community 2.9
local resources 11 residents capacity to work in construction 7.9
- 12 indigenous materials available 13.7
tinancial / funding: 13 tax incentives for companies/ individuals
ï bans for housing
15 subsidies for housing 0.0
16 bans for infrastructure or others 0.0
36 osychobogical aid
37 food 0.0
38 medical aid 0.0
39 temporary infrastructure 0.0
40 education and technical assistance 12.6
41 information
42 bans aiven and
43 direct and indirect iobs created
44 houses occupied
45 insurance policies taken 0.0
46 emergency protocols implemented 7.2
47 increment on land ownership 18.0
48 increment on home ownership
50 management
51 financing of the project 0.0
52 production components 18.0
53 construction 18.0
56 environmental impact 7.2
57 recovery 0f normal activfties 7.2
58 physical resistance to hazards 6.3
59 transfer better building practices 3.6
60 institutional capacity and devebopment 13.7
61 eguality of gender and minorities 16.9
62 lalI settiements in safe areas
evaluation scale
—
—
I
I
.
.
.
I
.
I
.
I
I
dif. or,j 00 3.7 73 10.9114.5118.1
3.6 7.2 108 1441180136.
0.0
17 subsidies for infrastructure or others 0.0
infrastructure Î dams, barriers, retaining walls 0.0
19 roads 0.0
20 water supply 4.6
21 electricity 36
22 sewage 2.1
23 telephone 0.0
community service 24 schools
25 health centers 18.0
26 community centers I religious bldg. 18.0
27 police I fire station 16.0
housing 28 new lots 12.3
29 emergency shelters 0.0
30 temporary housing 0.0
31 newhouses 13.4
32 reconstructed houses 0.0
indusfrylempboym. 33 bldgsîinftas. for indusfry & income generation 0.0
34 unemployment subsidies 00
otuers 35
—
—
rescue
.
r===
:Ei!EE
.t]
!:i
0.0
transfer
9.6
0.0
5.4
commurniy particip. 49 design
18.0
0.0
project goals 55 Idebt
54 individu al responsibiliof decision making 4.6
18.0
9.9
Fold out to see tue TIP while reading tue text
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Inputs
Multi-organisatïon: Despite its experience in international development and
fund-raising, CECI could flot create a multi-organisation capable of collecting
enough funds for the delivery of ail the outputs required for the overail recovery
of reiocated familles in Choluteca. Forced to choose among the outputs to be
delivered, CECI opted for a self-help housing strategy accompanied by the
provision of latrines, construction of communal kitchens and a small project of
formation on leadership. The late transfer of funds between the funding agency
and CECI disrupted and limited the scope of the ‘soft’ components of the project
(such as formation on leadership and social development).
Local residents, associations and authorities were integrated in the project. Even
though the CECI and the project manager had previous experience of work in
Central America, they had flot previously worked in Choluteca before the
disaster. Unable to develop the whole project on its own, CECI’s approach
consisted in working jointly with local and external NGOs already working in
place. However, low levels of integration and differentiation between the
organisations are identified in this evaluation, particularly in the distribution of
responsibilities leading to the delivery of poorly integrated outputs (including
infrastructure and commun ity services).
The use of expatriated personnel and the creation of a unit in place to conduct
the project increased the administrative costs of the project to the detriment of
the resources allocated to help the affected familles. The organisation seems to
have underestimated its capacity to find resources and to face up to the financial
risks of the project, compromising in this way (after the money was distributed
for multiple projects) its possibilities to provide a complete set of outputs for
Nueva Choluteca. Besides, the multi-organisation was not prepared to respond
to a hostile environment where the lack of resources of the public sector
challenged the provision of infrastructure for the construction of new housing.
229
Management tools: CECI feu short in the development of traditional
management tools for collecting information and knowledge about the local
needs and expectations. Not conducting an up-front study of local housing
reduced the capacity of the organisation to provide an appropriate housing
typology for users. In the midst of the project, affempts to match the proposed
housing unit to more traditional typologies included changing the material 0f the
roof for clay tiles. Studies of peoples’ needs were conducted late and were not
reflected in a desirable diversity of solutions. The design of the housing units
and in general the design of the outputs of the project were the result of
considering what was ‘best’ for residents rather than the result of consultation
with the community.
Local resources: The semi-rural character of the project seems to have
facilitated the implementation of the self-help project. Rural residents have a
good capacity and interest in working in the construction of their own houses;
also local materials (clay, sand, stone, earth) were available for producing the
construction components such as bricks, tiles, mortar, and foundations.
Outputs
Financial I funding: No type of financial or funding outputs was offered to
residents. Instead, the project was based on the direct delivery or development
of certain housing outputs.
Infrastructure: Because of the wide-spread vulnerability associated with floods
in the riversides of the Choluteca river, CECI opted for geffing involved in the
relocation project of Nueva Choluteca, a project that consisted in creating a new
sefflement for the residents living previously in flood-prone areas close to the
river. However, this resefflement initiative did not include the reduction of
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vulnerability by building retaining walls, dams, channels, etc., ail necessary to
control the flow of local rivers and streams.
Despite that the sefflement was new, none of the NGOs working in Choluteca
worked in the construction of roads; in fact, not even the main access to the
seUlement (from the road that goes from Choluteca to Tegucigalpa) was paved.
Similarly, an infrastructure network to connect the seUlement to the regular water
system was flot included. Instead, and in order to respond to basic needs, water
tanks (in the form of large plastic containers) were installed for a centralised
distribution of watet, which turned out — as might be expected ta be insufficient
for the needs of the whole population of the settiement. Similarly, the lack of a
proper system of electricity has been replaced in Nueva Choluteca by
improvised connections to electricity networks made by the residents
themselves; flot were a network of sewage systems or connections to
telephones made. Some of the houses benefited from latrines built by CECI in
partnership with United Nations’ agencies.
Community services: Two schools, a health center, a police station and
several churches (from religious-based organisations working in place) were
built in the seUlement by parallel projects organised by other NGOs.
Housing: The back bone of the project conducted by CECI in partnership with
Atlas Logistics was the construction of new housing units in the lots that were
sold to the families after the subdivision of the land that was provided by the
local Bank. As mentioned in section twa of this chapter, the size of the lots
neither corresponded ta the traditional agricultural use of land nor to a
sustaïnable suburban concept. When CECI started its participation in the
resefflement program, the period of emergency shelter and temporary housing
had finished without the people having proper accommodation. In tact, residents
were forced to improvise shelters with plastics and debris whïle participating in
the construction of the new seUlement.
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The new houses were delivered late, after people lived up to three years in
improvised shelters. The design of the house did flot correspond to peoples’
needs and later modifications to the units demonstrate that the units were really
only a core house that required later completion to respond to the cultural
characteristics and needs of the families as well as to respond to the high
temperatures and heavy rains of the region.
The resefflement strategy invotved the construction of housing “from scratch”
neglecting the possibility of reconstructing the houses located in flood-prone
areas (provided dykes and dams were built first). In this process, the oppor[unity
of recycling construction and housing components from the existing houses was
missed; while the new housing was built without kitchens, washrooms, showers
and verandas.
Industry and employment: Despite the major need for sources of income in the
Choluteca region, the project did not include the construction or reconstruction of
buildings for industry or creating employment, nor did the project include the
provision of unemployment subsidies or financial help.
Others: Only a few soft outputs were delivered with the project; they were
associated with the education and training component of the self-help program
and a parallel initiative of formation on community leadership and social work
with women. Other outputs such as rescue, psychological aid, food, medical aid
and temporary infrastructure were neyer included.
Resuits
Transfer: As it was mentioned earlier, the project did not permit the residents to
use the available funds to respond to their own needs and expectations, as
neither subsidies nor bans were provided. The creation of direct or indirect
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employment opportunities only existed in the short term and is only associated
to construction activities in which residents were used for either the production of
components (doors, windows, tues, etc) or for the construction of the units. Even
though some type of knowledge transfer was implemented in this process and
therefote, an increased capacity to work in qualified jobs can be expected, the
jobs created by the project were not enough to facilitate the recovery of the local
economy.
One of the major setbacks of the project was the lower percentage of occupation
of the units built, which reveals the non-conformity of the outputs with the real
needs, characteristics and expectations of the community. The lack of a housing
policy in the region (even after the disaster) suggests that nothing has been
done in order to increase access to housing insurance. Some type of institution
building after the direct work between CECI (and other NGOs) and the
Municipality of Choluteca was expected to have influenced the institutional
capacity to implement emergency protocols, and to increase the awareness of
risk and vulnerability. However, these measures have flot been reported and
appear not to have been implemented in a systematic manner.
The provision of legal property to affected families is a step forward to the
reduction of vulnerability in the region as it increases land and home ownership
in the region by giving titles of land and housing to many residents who were
previously living in illegal occupation of land.
Community participation: beneficiaries of the project did not have direct
participation in the design, management and financing of the project. Community
participation, as proposed by CECI and other NGOs was Iimited to the
involvement of the beneficiaries in the production of construction components
and in the construction 0f the housing units. Consequently, residents have very
limited responsibility over their own housing and instead were allocated tasks
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and responsibilities to be fulflhled in a scheme that allowed very hile individual
decision making over the products and services required for recovery.
Impacts
Project goals: The public sector in Honduras did not assume major bans or
ctedits for post-Mitch reconstruction, leaving most of the activities and
responsibility of reconstruction to local and external NGOs. This was the case in
Nueva Choluteca where the construction of the project represents no financial
burden for the Municipality or the central government.
Even though it is out of the scope of this study to evaluate in detail the effects on
public health, the lack of infrastructure and public services in Nueva Choluteca is
expected to have a major negative effect on the environment and on public
health. Several diseases common in the region (such as malaria and ‘dengue’)
are usually assocïated with the Iack of proper drainage systems. Besides,
nothing has been done in Choluteca to reduce the effects in the natural
environment if another similar disaster occurs.
Due to the late provision of outputs, and the lack of infrastructure and
employment, the recovery of normal activities in Nueva Choluteca star[ed very
late and has not completely occurred. Even though the original houses
developed in CECI’s project are disaster-resistant, the poor design and small
size of the units has forced residents to adapt them to their real needs of space
and to the extreme temperatures ofthe region. In many cases, these additions
have not followed disaster resistance principles; in fact, it is common to find new
verandas, new rooms, and new spaces for the showers built with improvised
materials (wood, plastics, corrugated iron sheets, etc.) without any consideration
of disaster resistance and disconnected from the structure of the original units.
This very fact suggests that despite of the emphasis of the project on the training
component during self-help activities, the transfer of better building practices has
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flot necessarily been reflected in the later constructions made by the residents.
This might also be related to the lack of resources to build proper structures, and
to the lack of resources to maintain them.
The direct work of CECI and other NGOs with the Municipality of Choluteca,
suggests that some type of institution building was included in the project.
However, a visit to the Municipality and discussion with the officers, revealed
that even though a beller understanding of the risks and the living conditions of
the poor residents exists, systematic measures to reduce vulnerabilities have not
taken place.
The selection of the beneficiaries was conducted with a fair consideration of
minorities and the most vuinerable groups in the region. This work included the
participation of local institutions and permifted single parent families and women
to be beneficiaries of the project and therefore to become land and home
owners.
By giving land and shelter to residents, a step forward has certainly been made;
however, major vuinerabilities (particularly soft ones such as unemployment,
lack of education, lack of services, etc.) still exist in Nueva Choluteca. A similar
disaster can still happen if these vulnerabilities are flot mitigated.
3.3.4.2. Analysing unexpected resuits and impacts
In section 2.2.3.4 a list of seven assumptions were first presented as a guide to
the identification of the most frequent (or most likely to occur) causeeffect
relationships in projects offering a product in the context of development
oriented objectives. By applying these assumptions to the evaluation of the
project lead by CECI in Nueva Choluteca, the following unexpected results and
unexpected impacts were identified:
C235
Assumption No. 1: if: (j) users have access to the product (if the product is
affordable, accessible, etc) and (ii) the users ‘like’ it (if the product corresponds
to the needs, desires and expectations of the users), then: the output is
acquired: The assumption was truc.
Assumption No. 2: if the product is acquired and its use corresponds to the
needs, desires and expectations of the users, then: the product is used. The
assumption was false. The Iow level of housing occupation (only 42% of the
houses are occupied by their original beneficiaries) reveals that this assumption
failed in the Nueva Choluteca project.
Assumptïon No. 3: if: (i) end-users are shown that resources do flot allow for
paying labour force; (ii) end-users are taught how to participate in the activities
of the project; (iii) end-users have the time (or can manage to get the time) to
participate in the project; (iv) end-users are given the resources (tools and
materials) to participate; and (y) end-users are shown that the proU uct is not
given ‘for free’ but instead it can be ‘paid’ for by helping in its production, then:
they will participate in producing the proU uct. The assumption was truc.
Assumption No. 4: if: people use the products (using as opposed to just
acquiring the product which is not enough), then: the goal is aftained. The
assumption was false. In fact, even though some residents used 0f the products
offered by the project (the houses, kitchens, latrines and some training
sessions), the final goal of reducing the overall vulnerability of the community
was not affained.
Assumption No. 5: if: people participate in producing the product, then: the goal
is affained: The assumption was false. The participation ofthe residents in
construction activities did not lead in this project to a total reduction of the
vu! nerab il ities.
Assumotion No. 6: if: no sudden and/or unexnected chanaes occur in the
environment. then: the exDected resuits and exDected imoacts occur. The
assumntion was true.
Assumotion No. 7: if: a certain exDected chancie occurs in the environment.
then: the exoected resuits and exoected imoacts occur. The assumotion was
trii
3.3.4.3. Reoresentation and descriotion cf the oraanïsational svstem
3.3.4.3.1. Orqanisational svstem of CECI
A unit that was workina in Guatemala (and that had orevious exoerience in the
reciion) was used to conduct this oroiect (see Fia. 3.23). One oroiect director
was selected for Guatemala while anothet one was emoloved for the oroiect in
Honduras. The oroiect in Honduras was subdivided in two main arouos, one
included 5 soecific oroiects in the reaion of Choluteca (one of these soecific
oroiects is the case reoorted on this studv) and another one in Teauciaaloa. The
unit workina in olace shared an accountant and a construction officer for both
the Guatemalan and Honduran oroiects.
This local manaaement unit reoorted to units in the headauarters in Montreal
and was suooosed to work in direct coordination with the Coordinator of
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Proarams in a traditional oroiect-based
structure (as orooosed in section 2.3). However. later conversations with the
Coordinator in Montreal revealed tht çhç djd flot Hirpr.t ontroI nd
understanding of the specifics of the project. In other words, the officer in place
was working very much on his own, at least with regards to the project in Nueva
Choluteca. A later affempt of the coordinator to evaluate the project in Nueva
Choluteca in 2001 also failed as the unit in place was dissolved soon aftet the
end of the project and most of the contacts in place had been Iost.
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The Iack of control and follow U of the specific project in Nueva Choluteca and
the difficulties of the project in terms of performance did flot represent a
particular embarrassment for CECI as the project was only a part 0f a large
program (reconstruction in Honduras and Guatemala as a whole), which CECI
could account for in a more systematic manner. In fact, the reports conducted
by CECI include the specific project in Nueva Choluteca as only a small
component of a larger and successful intervention in Central America after
Mitch. In these reports, the limited success of the project in Nueva Choluteca is
disguised by the statistics 0f the overail intervention at the program scale ta fund
raising campaign of more than one million Canadian dollars and more than
2,300 families benefited).
3.3.4.3.2. Organisational system of the multi-organisation
The structure of the Nueva Choluteca reseillement program was based on a
network of organisations each responsible for individual projects. CECI’s project
was particularly attached to the initiatives initiated by Atlas Logistics for the
construction of houses in the lots sold to beneficiaries. The funding campaign
conducted by CECI collected funds from CIDA and other Canadian donors.
Community services and latrines, and the provision 0f water in Nueva Choluteca
were conducted through cooperation activities with other local and external
NGOs. Even though CECI conducted the central role of project management for
its specific project, most of the outputs (housing, education and training) were
delivered though the self-help activities (see Fig. 3.24).
At the scale of the overall relocation program, the enlarged multi-organisational
structure lacked a leader organisation capable of determining the priorities of the
project and capable of distributing different responsibilities among the NGOs
involved. The lack 0f a central plan and coordinated activities for the provision of(J community services and public services demonstrates the disadvantages of not
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having a proper level of integration and differentiation among the organisations
involved.
Figure 3.24 shows the activities that were conducted in the project. From the
activities identified in the WBS of reconstruction projects (section 2.3) the ones
implemented in CECI’s project in Nueva Choluteca are checked in the following
list:
Cooperation agreements
X Funding
Procurement
Research & studies
Distribution of money
X Selection of beneficiaries
X Project management
X Control
X Cooperation
X Provision of land I housing solutions / temporary housing*
Decision making
X Educating and training
X Self-help
Construction
* Within the activity called “provision of:...” the group of outputs that were
included in the project are underlined in this list.
The following outputs of the project were targeted to relocated residents: in
terms of community services (provided by other NGO5): (i) schools, (ii) a health
centre, (iii) churches and (iv) a police station. In terms of housing: (j) new lots
and (ii) new houses; and in terms of soft outputs: (i) education and technical
assistance and (ii) information.
Chapter IV, Discussion and conclusions
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C Chapter IV - Discussion and conclusions
Thïs section analyses the resuits of the research at four main levels: (ï) the
resuits obtaïned by developing the research methods used in the study;
(ii) the resuits of the methods applied to the four case studies — validation
of the hypothesïs and its corresponding micro-hypotheses, (iii) the resuits
obtained by comparing the pafterns found in the empirica! study with
previous research findings in order to obtain analytical generalisations,
and (iv) the main contributions of the research.
41. The resuits obtained by developing the research methods used in the
study
The need to assess the performance of the ptojects required answering two
basic questions: what to evaluate? and, how to evaluate it? Answeting these two
questions implied identifying the existing approaches to evaluation and adapting
or adopting a method responding to the particular needs of the study. Defining
what type of evaluation was required was crucial at this stage; fïnally, an ex-post
evaluation characterised for the assessment of development oriented criteria
was chosen. lndeed the so-called Log. Frame. proved to be the most used
evaluation tool in the field of international development; however, it proved to
have important limitations in regard to (i) considering the project as a system
(with different levels of influence between the project system and its
environment) and (ii) evaluating the unexpected outcomes (be they positive and
negative). During this process, the opportunities and limitations of project
evaluation were ïdentified and, keeping them in mmd, the specific method of
evaluation was developed for this research. Building up on the Log. Frame., an
improved model of evaluation was proposed (and adapted to the requirements
of this research) and the definition of the performance criteria was made
corresponding to certain defined objectives.
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Working from these objectives, sixty two indicators of performance were
selected to assess different stages of the project (from inputs to impacts). The
study of evaluation methods had demonstrated that by selecting the
performance criteria the evaluator assumes a stake (a biased position) regarding
the aspects that he/she wants to evaluate. After recognising this, the chosen
criteria become the “rules of the game” from which the test of the argument is
conducted. A Iist of indicators of outputs required for the overali recovery 0f
affected people was prepared; however, the analysis of “how to assess those
outputs” revealed that their importance regard ing the overali performance of the
project depended on the degree of vulnerability existing before the project
started (before and/or after the disaster). Once this list was prepared, a Form of
Indicators of Performance (FIP) was developed for each indicator; each form
has a simple and standardised way of assessing the indicator and assigning it a
value corresponding to its level. b try to make the evaluation as objective and
systematic as possible (and therefore to achieve the goal that same values
would be assigned by different evaluators) the forms translate the indicators of
performance into a series of statements that can be easily assessed in a
multiple choice manner.
Taking advantage of the computerised systems, the FIPs were developed in MS
ExcelI spreadsheets from which the final values of evaluation of each indicator
were related to a summary table called the Table of Indicators of Performance
(TIP). Bringing together the values obtained from the FIPs, this table illustrates,
in a simple and graphic manner, the level of performance of each indicator,
allowing the reader to easily have an idea of the overall performance of the
project. In these tables, higher levels of performance are represented in gtay
and lower levels in red, permilling the reader to easily compare the TIP of each
project and thus to have an idea of the benchmarking level 0f each of them. A
series of assumptions (usually established in the process of developing a
development oriented project) have been identified in order to be used as a
guide revealing possible unexpected resuits and impacts. According to the
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method of evaluation chosen, a careful analysis of unexpected outcomes is
crucial to understand flot only the logical sequence of events in the project
system but also to master the eventual impacts resulting from influences of the
envi ronment.
4.11. Benchmarking the overail performance of the four projects:
Following the method of evaluation, the four TIPs (one for each project) were
compared in order to create a comparative scale of performance of the four
projects. This comparison was complemented by the review of unexpected
results and impacts in ordet to obtain a larger picture of the level of success of
the projects. The observation of the TIPs shows that the project with higher
values in the indicators of performance is the CGOs’ project in rural Colombia (it
is the project with more outputs developed), followed by FUNDASAL’s project in
rural El Salvador. CECI’s project in Honduras and the MSS’s project in San
Salvador had the lower values in most of the indicators (also very few outputs
were conducted). It is also observed that dramatic effects in the delivery of
outputs were caused by the unexpected outcomes of the projects in San
Salvador and Honduras. Less negative effects occurred in the projects in
Colombia and rural El Salvador, where the unexpected outcomes had less
repercussion in the development of the CGOs’ and FUNDASAL’s objectives.
Keeping this in mmd, the level of overall performance of the projects can be
benchmarked as follows 1:
First case study: FUNDASAL’s project in rural El Salvador:
lntermedïate high level
Second case study: MSS’s project in San Salvador:
Lowest level
‘The projects are flot Iisted accordiflg to their level of performance but in the order they are
aiways presented in the text
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Third case study: CGOs’ project in rural Colombia:
Highestlevel
Fourth case study: CECI’s project in Honduras:
Intermedîate low level
4.2. The resuits of the methods applied to the four case studies —
validation of the hypothesis and its correspondïng micro-hypotheses
This section develops the relations between the performance 0f a project and its
organisational design. b do so, it is important to remember that the hypothesis
of the study proposes that the performance of the project is a dependent
variable of four main variables:
First variable The level of integration and differentiation within the multi
organisation, including inserting the project in a larger program of
reconstruction
Second variable: The multi-organisation’s strategic capacity to attract funding
Thïrd variable: The multi-organisation’s capacity to share and react to the risks of the
environ me nt
Fourth variable: The level of user’s responsibility for individual decision-making among
a series of choices offered
As presented in Chapter II (section 2.5, page 107), various cause-effect
relationships need to be examined to validate each of the four aspects included
in the hypothesis. For each relationship a few micro-hypotheses are proposed.
These micro-hypotheses are validated (true or false) based on the evaluation of
the set of projects studied in this research. Some micro-hypotheses are
validated by cross analysis -that is to say by comparing different indicators and
the overali performance of the project; others are validated in a more discursive
manner in which an analysis of important aspects of the projects is conducted.
Please note that flot aIl of the indicators of performance are used here for the
cross analysis, only the ones that are directly related with the micro-hypothesis
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proposed. However, ail the indicators of the TIP are considered for assessing
the overall performance of the projects.
4.2.1. FirstvariabPe of the hypothesis
First variable The level of integration and differentiation wïthin the multi
organisation, including inserting the project in a larger program
of reconstruction
A. Possible relationships between the level of differentiation and integration
(indicators of inputs No. 2, 3 and 4) and the overali performance of the project
(including expected and unexpected resuits and impacts): The micro
hypothesïs is: higher levels of integration and differentiation Iead to higher
levels of performance.
The following ‘values’ were obtained in these aspects for each project:
FUNDASAL’s project: -13,2 points for level of integration with the
commun ity
-5,8 points for integration between
organisations
-15,8 points for differentiation between
organisations
MSS’s project in San Salvador: -9,6 points for level of integration with the
community
-0,0 points for integration between
organisations
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-1,4. points for differentiation between
organisations
CGOs’ project in Colombia: -13,2 points for level of integration with the
community
- 18 points for integration between
organisations
-18 points for differentiation between
organisations
CECI’s project in Honduras: -11,4 points for level of integration with the
community
-5,0 points for integration between
organisations
-1,4 points for differentiation between
organisations
The evaluations demonstrate that, in fact, higher levels performance (see
‘benchmarking’, section 4.1.1, page 244) occur in the projects that present
higher levels of integration and differentiation. The micro-hypothesis is true.
B. Possible relationships between the fact that the project was either
independent or else coordinated with a larger program of reconstruction and the
overali performance of the project (including expected and unexpected results
and impacts): The micro-hypothesis is: if the project îs weII integrated ïnto
a larger program of reconstruction the level of performance is higher.
The CGOs’ rural project in Colombia was developed under the framework of a
larger program of reconstruction lead by FOREC. Due to the complexity and
large variety of outputs required for recovery, the project benefited from the
complementary products and services offered by other NGOs and the National
Government through the FOREC fund. Similarly, CECI’s project in Honduras
affempted to get integrated in a larger program of relocation in Nueva Choluteca.
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However, in this case, the addition of NGOs working in place did not form a
coherent program with a common objective and with the required distribution of
responsibilities.
On the other hand, FUNDASAL’s and the MSS’s projects were developed in a
rather independent manner detached from othet initiatives. This approach
limited the quantity and variety of outputs that were offered to residents,
compromising the overali performance of the two projects. Higher performance
appeared in the CGO5’ project - which was adequately coordinated with other
initiatives in a coherent master plan of reconstruction; the micro-hypothesis is
true.
C. The relationship between the different organisations in the diagram of
organisational design and the delivery of outputs. Particularly if an output is not
delivered in the project and none of the organisations took care of it: The micro
hypothesis îs: the outputs that were flot developed correspond to missing
or insufficient Iinks within the multi-organîsation.
The diagrams of multi-organisational designs (3.18; 3.20; 3.22 and 3.24) show
that the organisational structure with most links integrating project participants
was the CGO5, followed by FUNDASAL, CECI and the MSS. In the same order
their projects had higher to lower levels of overali performance. Even though it
might seem obvious, it is important to remark here that, in fact, the capacity to
deliver multiple outputs corresponds to the multi-organisational Iinks in between
project participants. This is not surprising considering that the variety and
quantity of products and services required to increase the local residents’
capacity to have access to resources can rarely be provided (or developed) by a
single institution. Multiplicity and quantity of outputs corresponds then to
multiplicity and variety of institutions working together with a common objective.
This observation demonstrates that the micro-hypothesis is true.
C
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D. The possible relationship between the amount of relations and organisations
participating in the multi-organisation and the variety and quantity of outputs
offered: The micro-hypothesis is: more organisations participating and
more relations in between them lead to higher levels 0f performance.
The results explained for the previous micro-hypothesis also demonstrate that
this micro-hypothesis is true. In fact, both of the micro-hypotheses are very
similar and both apply to the situation found in the case studies.
E. The possible relationship between the amount of processes included in the
project (processes listed in the WBS) and the overali performance of the project
(including expected and unexpected resuits and impacts): The micro
hypothesis is: the more processes included in the project the befter the
performance of the project.
The analysis of the multi-organisations established for the projects demonstrates
that the number of activities per project was:
FUNDASAL’s project in El Salvador: -12 activities
MSS’s project in San Salvador: -8 activities
CGOs’ project in Colombia: -12 activities
CECI’s project in Honduras: -8 activities
It is not surprising that the two projects with more activities conducted had higher
levels of performance than the two other projects with Iess activities developed.
In fact, this demonstrates that the level of performance is directly related with the
variety and multiplicity of activities conducted among the participants of the
multi-organisation. The micro-hypothesis is true.
F. The possible relationship between the amount of organisations participating in
the project and the amount of processes conducted: The micro-hypothesis is:
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more organisations participating in the project lead to more processes
beingconducted.
The analysis of the mufti-organisations established for the projects shows that
the number of organisations participating in each project was:
FUNDASAL’s project in El Salvador: -8 participants
-12 activities
MSS’s project in San Salvador: -4 participants
-8 activities
CGO’s project in Colombia: -12 participants
-12 activities
CECI’s project in Honduras: -14 participants
-8 activities
This list suggests that the micro-hypothesis is only in part valld. Certainly the
project in San Salvador was negatively influenced by the fact of not having
enough partners in order to conduct the complexity of outputs required. In the
CGO’s and FUNDASAL’s projects these partnerships proved crucial for
developing the wide range of products and services required for recovery.
However, in the case of CECI’s project in Nueva Choluteca, the assembly of a
great number of participants did not translate in more processes developed and
beller performance.
o
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4.2.2. Second variable of the hypothesis
Second variable: The multi-organïsation’s strategic capacity to aftract funding
A. Possible relationships between the multi-organisation’s capacity to aftract
funding (indicator of inputs No. 1) and the overali performance ofthe proiect
(including expected and unexpected results and impacts): The micro
hypothesis is: beffer capacity to aftract funding leads to befter
performance of the project.
In terms of capacity to aftract funding the following ‘values’ were obtained in
each of the projects:
FUNDASAL’s project in El Salvador: -14.4 points
MSS’s project in San Salvador: -O points
CGO’s project in Colombia: -18 points
CECI’s project in Honduras: -2.4 points
In the empirical study, the capacity of the multi-organisations to aftract funds to
develop the outputs required for recovery corresponds to the overall
benchmarking of the performance of the projects. However, before validating the
hypothesis as ‘true’ it is important to consider the following - related - micro
hypothesis.
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B. The relationships between the external factors influencing the project and the
multi-organisation’s capacity to allract funding: The mîcro-hypothesis is: if the
multi-organisation’s capacity to aftract funding is low it is due to
ïnfluences of the environment (external factors).
In the project Iead by the MSS in San Salvador, the capacity to attract funding
for the project was compromised by aspects of the environment, notably the Iack
of cooperation between the National Government and the Municipality.
However, the Iack of funding in the case of CECI’s project in Nueva Choluteca
responds to a different reason. In Nueva Choluteca, the Iack of initiatives from
the local and national governments resulted in total lack of public investment in
infrastructure for the new settlement. Ihe funds obtained by CECI were flot
enough to deal with both housing and compiete infrastructure at the same time.
With a restricted budget, CECI opted for the construction of more houses (and
some latrines). The restricted budget assigned by CECI for the project in Nueva
Choluteca contrasts with a larger budget obtained by CECI in the funding
campaign of the general program of reconstruction for Central America.
As a development-oriented NGO, based on donations and funding campaigns,
the restricted budget allocated to the initiative in Nueva Choluteca is oniy
expiained by the deliberate decision made by CECI of sharing the resources
obtained for the reconstruction program for Centrai America (the program at
large) in the iargest number of individual projects as possible. This decision
might be explained in two ways. The reason that is officially presented by CECI
is that the resources were distributed with the objective of spiiffing them as much
as possible in order to help the largest number of familles. This for example, is
used as an explanation 0f why the houses did not include indoor washrooms.
However, another possible expianation, which is not an officiai reason given by
CECI, is that this organisation seeks as much visibility as possible; and
therefore, the option of building many units was chosen over -for example- the
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option 0f building infrastructure (which is a Iess visible output). This second
explanation seems reasonable considering that CECI is a donations-based NGO
and therefote needs to show tangible (and eventually visually impressive) resuits
to its donors.
This analysis suggests that, in reaIity, the way in which this second aspect of the
research hypothesis is established is insufficient. The hypothesis of the study is
based on the notion that the funds obtained for the project are linked to its
overail performance. The four cases studied here suggest that this is only true
up to a certain level. The probiem of quantity vs. quality 0f housing solutions
seems to be important here. Let us explain this. When doing a housing project,
an organisation has two main approaches (an infinite number of combinations of
these two possibilities may exist): (i) to develop more basic outputs (ie. houses)
with Iower standards of quality (for example without infrastructure as it was the
case in Nueva Choluteca); or (ii) to develop fewer outputs (i.e. houses) but with
higher standards of quality or accompanied by compIementary soft outputs. In
the first approach more residents benefit whereas in the second fewer residents
benefit but they obtain better outputs.
Therefore, the problem of performance depends here on the criterion that is
used to assess it. If the criteria of quantity of familles benefited is prioritised
(which by the way, s also a valid criterion) then a project that applies the first
approach is considered ‘good’; however, if the criterion used to assess the
performance is mostIy based on the quality of habitat as a whole, then the
second approach is consider to be ‘beffer’. The method of evaluation developed
here in Chapter II to assess the performance of the case studies considers both
quantitative and qualitative aspects. The quality is related to the deveIopment of
a complex series 0f outputs and objectives that are required for overall recovery,
keeping in mmd a comprehensive view 0f the resources need for appropriate
human habitat. The quantity is assessed in the F1P5 when asking, for exampie,
are the outputs enough to cover the needs 0f the population, are ail the
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sefflements in safe areas, was equality obtained, etc. However, the method
deliberately puts particular emphasis in the qualitative aspects of reconstruction
(remember that as mentioned in Chapter Il, the rules of the game include that
the evaluator selects the criteria by which she or he wants to assess the project)
Considering this particular way of assessing the performance of projects (a way
that prioritises quality-over-quantity), the amount 0f funding collected for the
project is less important as a variable of performance. lndeed it can be argued
that a project with a very low budget can be considered ‘good’ if it only develops
10 houses of hïgh level of quality.
However, the situation seems to be more complex than that. It s interesting to
highlight that if we assess the performance of the projects from the point of view
of quantity (number of units built, number of loans/subsidies given, and so on)
we corne to the same benchmarking levels we obtained from the method of
evaluation chosen for the study (see the analysis of the previous micro
hypothesis), that is to say, that the CGO’s project would stiil be in the highest
level, FUNDASAL’s project in second, CECI’s project in third and MSS’s project
in the lowest level.
It is obvious that in extreme cases such as the MSS’s project in San Salvador,
the lack of funding is largely responsible for the 10w level of performance
obtained. However, it is flot possible to generalise that the level of performance
of a project (considering the criteria chosen for the evaluation method used in
this study) is directly related with the multi-organisational capacity to obtain
funds. It rather seems to be related to the priorities chosen by the organisation.
Notably, the priorities related with how (on what) to spend the resources that are
obtained.
If we accept this argument, the micro-hypothesis suggested here Ioses its
purpose, because it no longer demonstrates that an influence of the environment
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over the collection 0f funds determines the level of performance expected from
the project.
C. The relationships between the strategic planning of the organisation
responsible for the project and the multi-organisation’s capacity to aftract
funding: The micro-hypothesis is: a well-established strategic plan that
includes positioning the organisation in the market of international
fundîng leads to a better capacity to aftract fundîng.
The CGO’s project in Colombia and FUNDASAL’s project in El Salvador
demonstrate that, in fact, pre-disaster arrangements with other institutions
(national and/or international) were crucial for the performance of the project.
This privileged position was, in both cases, obtained through a strategic plan of
positioning the organisation in the global environment. In the case of the
Colombian CGOs, this strategic plan corresponded to the functioning of the
coffee growers’ business, which requires careful relations with the National
Government (particularly with the Presidency) and with international
organisations. In the case of FUNDASAL, it responded to the interest of the
organisation in finding a place in the international market 0f international funding
in order to accomplish its regular initiatives. The lack of public support in El
Salvador had forced FUNDASAL to develop adequate strategies for private and
international fund-raising that proved beneficial in the reconstruction initiative.
In the case of CECI, its capacity to apply for funding from the government of
Canada, and its long-term reputation among private philanthropists in Quebec
was also beneficial. 0f course both of these relations are part of a strategic plan
of fund-raising established by CECI way before the disaster. On the other hand,
the case of the MSS suggests that only a very Iow chance of success exists if
the funding campaign starts from a tactical need in the immediate aftermath of
the disaster. The four cases certainly demonstrate that the micro-hypothesis is
C
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4.2.3. Thïrd variable of the hypothesis
Third variable: The multi-organisation’s capacity to share and react to the risks
of the environment
A. Possible relationships between the organisation’s capacity to adapt to the
environment (indicator of inputs No. 6) and the overall peilormance of the
ptoject (including expected and unexpected resuits and impacts): The micro
hypothesis is: the befter the capacity of the organisation responsible for
the project to adapt to the environment the beffer the performance of the
project.
The ‘value’ obtained by the four projects in relation with their capacity to adapt to
the environment is:
FUNDASAL’s project in Et Salvador: -14.4 points
MSS’s project in San Salvador: -2.4 points
CGO’s project in Colombia: -16.2
CECI’s project in Honduras: -2.4 points
These values correspond to the same order to the benchmarking of the level of
performance of the projects. The micro-hypothesïs is true.
B. Possible relationships between sudden changes of the environment (so
called “external factors” in the model of evaluation) and the overali performance
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of the project (including expected and unexpected resuits and impacts): The
micro-hypothesis is: external negative factors affect the performance of
the project, particularly the capacity to deliver the outputs.
The following external factors had negative effects in the performance of the
projects:
In the case of FUNDASAL’s project in El Salvador the Iack of initiatives from the
Central government for the construction of rural infrastructure caused
FUNDASAL’s housing initiative flot to have an equivalent support from the public
sector for complementary services and infrastructures. With this major influence
of the environ ment, FUNDASAL opted for a tactical decision that responded to
the construction of a large amount of core-type housing units (quantity) rather
than to the development of fewer completely serviced houses. A similar external
influence conducted CECI to adopt the same strategy in Nueva Choluteca. As is
demonstrated in the evaluations, these external factors (followed by the chosen
tactical decisions) had a negative impact on the overall performance of the
projects.
In the case of the MSS’s project in San Salvador the negative impact of the lack
0f cooperation between the national government and the local authorities had an
evident impact on the collection of funds. In the case of rural reconstruction in
Colombia, the underestimation of the local residents’ reluctance to buy finished
houses had a negative impact on the intention of marketing and selling pre-fab
units. In both cases the external factors seem to have had an influence in the
performance of the project.
However, it is also important f0 note that the negative aspects of the CGO’s
project in Colombia respond more to tactical decisions made within the multi
organisation than f0 external factors particular to the environment. The negative
values obtained in the program (no provision of lots or unemployment subsidies,
258
high debt, lower level of institutional capacity and development, etc.) respond to
deliberate decisions following from the way the project was prepared (i.e. a
project for land-owners, a project based on a public ban, deliberate
independence from local authorities to avoid corruption, etc.).
In conclusion, it is possible to say that the major influences of the environ ment
(lack of initiatives from the public sector, lack of cooperation, cultural approaches
to developing housing, etc.) had an influence in the system that creates the
project. In reaction to these negative effects, the organisations assumed tactical
approaches (such as building just cote-type units instead of completely served
houses) that translated into a certain level of performance. Therefore, the micro
hypothesis is only in part true and requires the following corollary: external
negative factors affect the system that creates the projects and flot directly the
performance of the project.
C. Possible relatïonships between management tools used to reduce uncertainty
(indicators of inputs No. 7, 8, 9 and 10) - uncertainty, it is well known, is one of
the major causes of risks - and the overali performance of the project (including
expected and unexpected resuits and impacts): The micro-hypothesis is: the
beffer the performance in the development of the management tools the
befter the performance of the project.
The ‘values’ obtained by the four projects in relation with the management tools
are:
FUNDASAL’s project in Et Salvador: -12.6 points for “census of local
residents”
-15.8 points for “study of previous
typologies”
-11.5 points for “survey of people’s
needs”
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-7.9 points for “consultation with the
community”
MSS’s project in San Salvador: -8.1 points for “census of local
residents”
-9.4 points for “study of previous
typologies”
-4.3 points for “survey of people’s
needs”
-10.1 points for “consultation with the
community”
CGO’s project in Colombia: -15.3 points for “census 0f local
residents”
-18.0 points for “study 0f previous
typologies”
-13.7 points for “survey of people’s
needs”
-7.9 points for “consultation with the
community”
CECI’s project in Honduras: -0.0 points for “census of local
residents”
-0.0 points for “study of previous
typologies”
-1.4 points for “survey of peoples
needs”
-2.9 points for “consultation with the
community”
If the projects are classified from higher to Iower values we have: first: the
CGOs’ project in Colombia, second: FUNDASAL’s project in El Salvador, thïrd:
the MSS’s project in San Salvador and fourth: CECI’s project in Honduras.
Except for the fact that CECI’s project had a lower level than the MSS’s project
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in San Salvador this order corresponds to the benchmarking level of
performance of the projects. The micro-hypothesis is true.
4.2.4. Fourth variable of the hypothesis
Fourth varïable: The level of user’s responsibility for indîvidual decisïon-making
among a series of choices offered
A. Possible relationshios between the indicators of community participation
(indicators of resuits No. 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 and 54) and the overali performance
of the project (including expected and unexpected results and impacts): The
micro-hypothesis is: higher levels of performance in the indicators of
community participation lead to hïgher overall performance of the project.
The ‘values’ obtained by the four projects in relation with the six aspects of “level
of community participation” are:
FUNDASAL’s project in El Salvador: -5.4 points for “design”
-5.4 points for “management”
-2.4 points for “financing of the project”
-18.0 points for “production of
components”
-18.0 points for “construction”
-6.7 points for “individual decision
making”
MSS’s project in San Salvador: -0.0 points for “design”
-0.0 points for “management”
-0.0 points for “financing of the project”
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-0.0 points for “production of
components”
-7.2 points for “construction”
-0.0 points for “individual decision
making”
CGO’s project in Colombia: -18.0 points for “design”
-18.0 points for “management”
-16.2 points for “financing of the project”
-18.0 points for “production of
components”
-13.5 points for “construction”
-18.0 points for “individual decision
making”
CECI’s project in Honduras: -0.0 points for “design”
-0.0 points for “management”
-0.0 points for “financing of the project”
-18.0 points for “production of
components”
-18.0 points for “construction”
-4.6 points for “individual decision
making”
If the projects are classified from higher to Iower values we have: first: the
CGOs’ project in Colombia, second: FUNDASAL’s project in El Salvador, third:
CECI’s project in Honduras and fourth: the MSS’s project in San Salvador. This
order corresponds to the benchmarking level of performance of the projects. The
micro-hypothesis is true.
B. The relationship between the level 0f community participation in decision
making (indicator of resuits No. 54) and the organisation’s capacity to adapt to
the environment (indicator of inputs No. 6) and the overall performance of the
‘j’
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project: The micro-hypothesis is: High Jevels of community partïcïpation in
decïsion-making (whïch transfers the rïsk associated with acceptability to
the users) increases the capacity to adapt to the environment leading to
higher levels of performance.
The ‘values’ obtained by the four projects in the “level of community participation
in decision making” and in “organisation’s capacity to adapt to the environment”
are:
FUNDASAL’s project in El Salvador: -6.7 points for “individual decision
making”
-14.4 points for “capacity to adapt to the
environment.”
MSS’s project in San Salvador: -0.0 points for “individual decision
making”
-2.4 points for “capacity to adapt to the
environment.”
CGO’s project in Colombia: -J 8.0 points for “individual decision
making”
-16.2 points for “capacity to adapt to the
environ ment.”
CECI’s project in Honduras: -4.6 points for “individual decision
making”
-2.4 points for “capacity to adapt to the
environment.”
These values show that, in the projects studied here, the level of individual
decision making corresponds to the level 0f organisational capacity to adapt to
the environment, and also to the level of overail performance of the projects. The
hypothesis is true.
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4.2.5. Validation of the hypothesîs
The first variable of the hypothesis (the relationship between the performance of
the projects and the level of integration and differentiation within the multi
organisation, including insetting the project in a larger program of reconstruction)
is validated and found true.
The relationship between the performance of the projects and the second
variable of the hypothesis (the multi-organisation’s strategic capacity to affract
funding) is flot validated by the cases studied here and requires careful analysis.
0f course, a higher budget (more funding) has a higher potential to permit
developing a beffer project than a small budget. Certainly, a well-established
sttategic plan that includes positioning the organisation in the market of
international funding leads to a better capacity to ailract funding fit is true for the
cases studied). However, the relationship between the amount of resources
obtained for the project and its performance is not a direct cause-effect
relationship. Besides, it cannot be said that if the multi-organisation’s capacity to
aftract funding is low, it is necessarily due to influences of the environment
(external factors) or that a better capacity to aftract funding leads to beffer
performance of the project. Certainly, the environment plays a fundamental role
in the capacity to affract funding, however, if the quantity of outputs delivered is
not prioritised as a criterion of performance, a Iimited budget does not
necessarily means a ‘bad’ project, because the quality of few outputs (even if the
aim s just to produce a few of them) is rather dependent on the careful
consideration of a complete set of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ aspects required for recovery.
Justifying the validation of the hypothesis on the basis of the criteria of
evaluation that were chosen to prove it does not mean here that the argument of
the study is being manipulated in a circular manner (for example that the
hypothesis is false because the method that was chosen to validate it lead to
prove if false). lnstead, it is the opportunity to recognise that the study is being
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conducted following the principle of selection of evaluation criteria, where the
evaluator is free to chose the aspects that he/she wants (or requires) to assess
and that this selection of evaluation criteria is aiways biased by his/her
deliberate selection.
It can be concluded that the second variable of the hypothesis is false. Besides,
it is important to note that the organisational capacity to allract funding depends
on a strategic attitude that needs to be implemented way before the project and
not in the rush and chaos of the aftermath of the disaster.
The relationship between the performance of the projects and the third variable
of the hypothesis (the multi-organisation’s capacity to share and react to the
risks of the environment) is validated and found true, but some remarks are
required. It has been found that -as common sense would have predicted - the
better the capacity of the organisation responsible of the project to adapt to the
environment the beffer the performance of the project. The capacity of the
organisation to understand and adapt to the environment will determine its
capacity to deliver the expected resu Its and to reduce the unexpected outcomes
(particularly the negative ones). It is therefore not surprising that improved
performance in the development of the management tools (targeted to reduce
uncertainty) corresponds to befler performance of the project. These
management tools certainly reduce the possibility that risks have negative
effects on the project.
However, it cannot be said that external negative factors directly affect the
performance of the project (particularly the capacity to deliver the outputs), it can
rather be said that external factors push organisations to make decisions that
reflect in a positive or negative manner on the overali performance of projects.
External factors then affect the system where the projects are developed and the
decisions made within that system will ultimately determine the level of success
of the project.
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The relationship beeen the performance of the projects and the fou rth variable
of the hypothesis (the level of user’s responsibility of individual decision-making
among a series of choices offered) is validated and found true. It has been found
that higher levels of performance reflected in the indicators of community
participation (including individual decision making) correspond to higher overali
performance of the project.
4.3. Analytical generalisations
Regarding the hypothesis proposed, the pafterns found in the case studies can
be summarised as follows:
o
Varïable patterns
First The level of integration and The performance of a project is a
variable differentiation within the multi- dependent variable of the levels of
ii including inserting integration and differentiation
the project in a larger program
of reconstruction
Second The multi-organisation’s The performance cf a project is not
variable: strategic capacity to attract necessarily a dependent variable of
funding the multi-organisation’s strategic
capacity to attract funding.
However, a well established strategic
plan that includes positioning the
organisation in the environment
Ieads to better capacity to aftract
fund ing
Third The multi-organisation’s The performance of a project is a
variable: capacity to share and react to dependent variable of the multi
the risks of the environment organisations capacity to share and
react to the risks of the environment.
However, external negative factors
do not directly affect the performance
of the project, they push
organisations to make decisions that
reflect in a positive or negative
manner in the performance of the
project
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Fourth The level of user’s The performance of a project is a
variable: responsibility for individual dependent variable of the level of
decision-making among a user’s responsibility for individual
series of choices offered decision-making among a series of
choices offered
The patterns found in this study bring together and consolidate - in the particular
context of post-disaster reconstruction projects - several approaches previousiy
discussed in the field of project management. indeed, the influence of (i)
integration and differentiation, (ii) strategic planning and (iii) the environment of
the projects on the overail performance of the project has been studied by many
authots in the field (see chapter I, Introduction). However, the findings reported
here are innovative in the field of housing development for developing countries,
in particular in the field of post-disaster reconstruction (where we have no
evidence of any similar study ever having been proposed).
In the field of post-disaster reconstruction, the pafferns we have found confirm
the relations proposed by Roberts (1972) regarding the influence of integration
and differentiation on projects’ performance. It can therefore be said, that as
much as integ ration and differentiation are important variables of the
performance of organisations (Lawrence,1970; Lorch and Lawrence, 1970), they
are aiso crucial variables of the performance of multi-organisations. A clear and
balanced distribution of responsibilities among the participants of the project
team reduces conflict and optimises the available resources facilitating higher
levels of performance (Mohsini, 1985). In the particular case of post-disaster
reconstruction (where the amount and variety 0f outputs can hardly be provided
by a single institution requiring the consolidation of some form of team to carry
out the projects) the concept of inter-organisational arrangements and
partnerships is crucial for the development of ail the products and services
required for recovery.
This study reinforces the importance of pre-disaster relations of the organisation
responsible of the project with local residents for the success of post-disaster
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initiatives. These relations can also be regarded as strategic organisational
design decisions leading to the increase of both integration and differentiation of
rotes among the project team. Due to the importance of the residents’ active
decision making, the relations between the project’s promoter and the
community are fundamental for the performance of the project. This pattern we
have found in our research confirms previous studies made by Jigyasu (2002),
Jayaraj (2002) and Sivaji (2002), among others. However, we take a step
forward here to highlight that this relation (creating partnership and sustained
arrangements with local residents) is not only a tactical approach but rather a
welI known strategic approach in the project management field to reduce risks,
mostly the risks associated with the acceptance of the products that resuit from
the project.
The study also permits us to issue an important warning: flot to forget that
community participation needs to go beyond the involvement of residents simply
in sweat equity. The real effects of community participation (as demonstrated in
the case studies) lie in allocation to members of the community 0f an appropriate
level of responsibility over decision-making concerning several 0f the aspects of
the project (as proposed by Da Silva, 1980): design, management, financing,
production of components and construction.
The case studies also highlight the increased influence of risks on international
projects of construction, a notion that has been largely studied by Langford and
Male (2001). Basic notions of risk analysis and risk management, as previously
studied by the Project Management Institute (1996) prove to be fundamental in
the case 0f post-disaster reconstruction. In this regard, traditional approaches
frequently discussed in the building industry, such as partnering (as discussed
by Black et aI., 2000), are highly pertinent in the analysis of performance 0f
reconstruction projects.
C
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The difficulties and obstacles found in post-disaster resefflement (as frequently
argued by UNDRO, 1982) are demonstrated in the case of Nueva Choluteca.
This project becomes a paradigmatic example of the disadvantages of
resefflement as identified by UNDRO (see section 1.7.3, page 39), including
difficulties in the provision and maintenance of infrastructure, the creation of
ghettos, and environmental degradation. It can be said that the performance of
the project in Nueva Choluteca reinforces the paffern previously identified by
UNDRO regarding the consequences of the relocation of residents.
Basic concepts of multi-organisational design as discussed by Mohsini (1985)
(who wrote: “the performance of a project is not merely a function of input
resources, but instead of the state of collaboration which exists among the
project team members in fulfilling their tasks”) take full meaning in the case
studies presented here. Similarly, the notion developed by Abdel Meguid (1997)
(which builds up on the work conducted by Mohsini, 1985; Roberts,1972 and
Haviland, 1984) to the effect that “maximising the overall project performance
means a high level of coordinated decision making, which in turns means
affaining the lowest possible level 0f inter-organisational conflict (i.e. conflict
between participating task-organisations)” is confirmed with the empirical
research conducted here.
In summary, this research has demonstrated that the previous work conducted
by Roberts (1972), Katsanis (1998), Mohsini (1985), Haviland (1984), Davidson
and Abdel Meguid (1997) about the characteristics of projects in the general
building industry finds an important field of application in the case of post
disaster housing reconstruction.
The pafterns found in the research contradict the general and widely accepted
argument about the performance of a post-disaster reconstruction project as a
dependent variable 0f the level 0f participation 0f the local community, and
particularly of its participation in self-help construction. The patterns suggest that
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a systems apptoach to the ‘problem’ of performance permits a beffer
understanding of the real factors that significantly influence the success of
reconstruction projects.
4.4. Contribution
The major contribution 0f this research lies in the fact that it disturbs the
traditional discourse towards the improvement of the performance of
reconstruction projects. This study demonstrates that it is necessary to distance
oneself from the discussion about tactical aspects of the projects (self-help or no
self-help, local technologies or imported ones, users’ labor force or hired labor,
etc.) and that it is necessary to see the project as a system where the
organisational design, the management aspects and the environment play a
fundamental role.
This study also challenges the traditional myth that exists in the field of post
disaster reconstruction regarding the use of sweat equity as a source of
success:
“The key to success ultimately lies in the participation of the local community —
the survivors — in reconstruction” UNDRO claimed in 1982.
This study has shown four projects in which self-help has been implemented (or
has been allempted to be implemented) and yet the four projects have totally
different levels of performance because, as we have shown, the performance
ultimately does NOT lie significantly in the participation of the local community in
reconstruction, it lies in a series of aspects that go beyond the tactical decisions
related uniquely to one single project.
Breaking this myth also means understanding a post-disaster reconstruction(J project as a system where local and external resources play a fundamental role.
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In this systems approach, extreme positions towards the use of local resources
lose their meaning. Consequently, the widely accepted myths of so-called best
practice in post-disaster reconstruction need to be re-evaluated; this includes
re-formulating the principles of ‘best practice’ proposed by Annie Jayaraj (2002)
that suggest that “the labour intensive technology should be encouraged and
mechanisation of construction and labour dispiacing technology should be
opposed and discouraged [and the projects] should encourage and make use of
the materials produced by village industries and rural artisans” (the complete
principles proposed by Jayaraj are already quoted in Chapter I, page 22)
It is also an important contribution to remark that the performance of
reconstruction projects depends less of the aspects related with the
organisation’s role as a ‘builder’ and more of the aspects related with the
organisation’s role as a ‘promoter’. These aspects include positioning the
organisation in the environment, affracting resources, creating an appropriate
multi-organisation, establishing appropriate links, and so on.
A remarkable contribution to the field of project evaluation has been proposed
here with the development of an improved method 0f performance assessment
that builds up on the methods that were previously used in international
development and the building industry. This improved tool still requires further
development and testing. However, it already shows its advantages as an easy
to-use method for practitioners and researchers. Most of the crucial
opportunities and limitations of project evaluation have been analysed here, and
even though this research project is constrained by the limitations of the
methods used, if gives reliable information about the deliberate decisions that
were made while conducting the study. This information permits further
researchers to contribute to the methods proposed here (including correcting
and improving them).
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Refined definitions for basic concepts such as ‘reconstruction’ and ‘vulnerability’
are proposed here; these definitions are based on internationally agreed terms
but they are taken a step forward to make their dimension and meaning in the
particular field of housing reconstruction more precise. Also, bringing to the field
of post-disaster reconstruction the notions cf self-help proposed by Da Siiva
(1980) affempts to contribute a further dimension to the discussion cf post
disaster housing deiivery in developing countries. This study suggests that much
more research is needed regard ing the concept cf procurement in the field of
post-disaster reconstruction. Furiher research is required to identify and to
create models cf the procurement strategies used in reconstruction.
Finaliy, this research aise highlights the fragiiity 0f iow-cost housing projects in
the reconstruction situation, a situation where chaos and disruption coincide with
the need for speed of reaction and the need of maximum effectiveness
regarding decision-making. in this unusuai scenario, (that pushes the problems
cf organisation and planning to their maximum limit cf complexity) basic notions
of project management are crucial, yet they are very often underestimated or
neglected. 0f course, the technological choice and optimisation of resources are
important for every project; however, a careful organisational design and up
front strategic planning prove to be even more fundamentai for the success of
post-disaster housing reconstruction in developing countries.
O
CAnnex I
Guide to open interviews with residents
1. During the reconstruction of your house did you - or your family - participate
in... (please comment about each point):
• Defining the construction site
If yes: Were you free to decide to relocate or to change the location of
your house?
• The design of the house
If yes: Were you free to decide the type of house (the layout) you wanted
• The management of the construction
If yes: Were you able to adapt the house to your particular needs
• The financing of the project
If yes: Were you free to decide the type of financing you received
• The creation of construction components
If yes: Were you free to decide the finishes and materials for your house
• The construction itself
If yes: How did you participate? What did you do?
2. Who was responsible for giving you a house after the disaster? (please
comment)
The government? The NGO in charge? Individual donors? Your family?
3. How long after the disaster did you have your house finished?
What is or was missing?
4. Was your opinion consulted when defining the following.... (please comment
about each item):
• The type of help you should receive
• The amount of money/ resources you were to receive
• The size of your reconstructed house
• The color of your house
• The type of washroom you wanted
5. What products and services were offered? Which ones did you receive?
6. Did you hire labor force for construction?
Guide to open interviews with officers responsible of the project
1. Duting the reconstruction project did the residents participate in... (please
comment about each aspect):
• Defining the construction site
• The design of the house
• The management of the construction
• The financing of the project
• The creation of construction components
• The construction itself
2. Did they have active decision-making in (were they free to do the following
activities?)? (please comment):
Deciding the type of house (the Iayout) they wanted
Deciding the finishes and materials for their house
Adapting the house to their particular needs
The type of financing they received
Deciding to relocate or change the location of their house
3. Who was responsible for giving them a house after the disaster (please
comment)?
The government? The NGO in charge? Individual donors? Each family?
4. How did you consult the opinion of residents?
5. Was their opinion consulted when defining the following?
The type of help they should receive
The amount of money/ resources they were to receive
The size of their reconstructed houses
The color of their houses
The type of washroom they wanted
6. Were the administrative costs of the project high? How can they be reduced in
a following experience?
7. Please comment about the partnerships or relations with other
institutions/companies/NGOs
8. Who (which organisation) was doing what in the project?
.9. How did you organise your employees and departments to develop the
project?
I O. How was the process to select the beneficiaries?
11. What products and services were offered to the community?
12. Please comment on the following:
efficiency: were the local and external resources optimised?
resuits: were the targeted outputs aftained?
timing: were the outputs available at the right time?
the quality of the product: is the product good in the environment it is going
to be used?
pertinence: were the outputs available to the right people?
acceptability: did the local community use the outputs/ services offered?
strategy: did the outputs offered correspond to the needs of the population?
coverage: how much of the real needs was covered? Is that percentage
satisfactory?
impactslobjectives: did the project reduce the vuinerabilities of the
population?
external aspects: how did the environment affect the resuits of the project?
13. Please comment on the overali performance of the project
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C’i Annex 2, Plans of the houses of the projects
______
Case Study 1.
200f earthquake, E!
Salvador, organisation:
_ ___
FUNDASAL.
Plan of the houses that
___
were built (the veranda is
__________
a possible future
addition)
Case Study 2.
2001 earthquake, San
Salvador, organisation:
Munïcipality of San
Salvador.
Plan of the houses that
were expected to be buflt
Case Study 3.
1999 earthquake,
Colombia,
organisation: CGOs.
Model of one of the
houses promoted in the
housing exhibition
Case Study 4.
1998 after Mitch,
Choluteca, Honduras,
organisation: CECI.
Legend: Plan of the houses that
were bujit1. Bedroom
2. Finished kitchen
3. Finished w.c. * Ail the plans at the same
4. Living room scale. Drawn from the plans
5. Storage room given by the organisations
6. Finished veranda responsible of the projects
E
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reconstruction projects
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Appendîx 3: Forms of Indicators of Performance (FIPs)
NOTE: AIT the FIPs for the four case studies are included in the CD. The FIPs
were prepared in Exceli Mac version; therefore, the font size and type may
change if opened in MS Exceil - for PCs. Please adjust the font size and type if
necessary.
Type cf indicator in the model (in the computer, click here te obtain more information)
Group cf indicators (click for more info)
Code cf the indicator
J, Nm nf tht inUintor
‘ before the proect (before andior alter the disaster):
the pre-disaster evel cf access te housing fer the çontrary the tevel cf housing shertagst and post-disastet Explanation cf the
hornefessness caused by the dster
I - level cf demand
houses r’,r
absolutely
—j t’, i r’i”i ‘-,r tf’m
I roi compry J
ne.-. houses mere
absolulely L_J unnecessary after the disaster Statements
no. cemOetelu I 4 --
incomplele I ok I
Ï
In the computer, click te go to the next FIP
Indicates errer” if an extra x” has been typed by mistake
Indicates “complete” when aIl the x” have been typed
j outputs housine f3t( ihouses 1 Level cf demand
Level cf performance
cf the prcject
Explanation cf the
level cf performance
within the project:
intiatves targeted te feclitale the acQuisition cf new permanent housng incIudng (if necessary) relocation cf
residents living n dangerous conditions Permanent new heusing can be obtained fi) through the pres’ision cf finished
unis (s) by facilitafing and org nising saif-help construction, or 1vi) by faciiltating and organisIng the purchase ot new
hausin exstnO in the market
______________________________________________________
not oftered al ail te the affected population fend)
ne,’,’ flouses mare I offered by s d,tterent prog’am;organlsation end)
_____________
offered_as_part_cf_the_prolect
sL’s’’Iuel L_J
5.-are almost achivr’ed as plsnned
net at ail
,aDsoute L_J
smost on troc ,‘;flvn needed
ioiaiaH
r e I &mos’ t fj b o of e p-j ro
‘rosat Fi
absoiuteiy
mere slmost offvred ta toc rght peapie rvbo nec-ive them
ont at ail 4
sbsoiuteiy
v;ere aimest tue appropriate strategy te be used
al ail
_____ _____ _____ ___
absoutay
almost safe os offereC (rosat to bonn-dO n tic cnn-no’
‘îota!ali l
absoiutely
roere almest enougo ta caver the nseas cl the popuis:..00
flot at s
Statements
Three-choice
assessment cf the
statement
Typical FIP
FIPs of FUNDASAL’s project in El Salvador
I inputs muitï organisation 1 the capacity to attract funds for the projecti
before the project (before and/or after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
capacity to obtain donations and/or financing. t assesses the amount cf resources obtained v
s. the initial estimation and budget
absolutely X
the capacity to attract funds almost permitted to collect the funds required according to the initiai estimations
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost permitted to get on time the funds that wete requiced
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost guaranteed a continuous investment of resources
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost x permiffed ta target an appropriate ievel of quality in the o
utputs offeced
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
almost x permitted to deal with a complete secies of outputs
notatali —
absolutely x
almost — permitted the organisation an adequate independence ofdecision making
not at ail —
complote ok next I I
n ext
completely -
partially —
flot
Iinputs I multi organisation I 2 level of integration with the communityl
before the pmject (before and!or afler the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
directly related with the definition 0f integration used here. lncludesthe capacity ofthe organisation to develop horizontal relations with
members of the community, beneficiaries and grass roots organisations in order to accomplish common objectives
absolutely -
almost —
not at ail
had an active participation within the multi-organisationlocal residents
local associations
local authorities
grass-roots NGOs
local contractors
the organis. in charge cf the project
absolutely
almost x had an active participation within the multi-organisation
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — had an active participation within the multi-organisation
not at ail —
absoiutely —
almost — had an active participation within the multi-organisation
notatail X
absolutely x
almost — had an active participation within the multi-organisation
not at ail —
had established relations in the region before the beginning of the praject
complote I ok I I
individual objectives of each otganis. were
the organisation in charge ofthe project had
integration with other organisations
integration with other organisations
the relations between the organisations were
I inputs I multi organisation I 3 I level 0f integration between organisationsJ
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
nia
within the projed:
directly related wiffi the defin Won ofintegration used here. Includes the capacity ofthe organisation to develop horizontal and vertical relations
with banks, NGOs, private companies, etc. in orderto accomplish and reinforce common objectives
coordinated to achieve a common objective
absolutely
almost
not at ail
enough
almost enough — Iinks with other organis. to work togethet towards a common objective
notenough x
absolutely —
almost x resulted in appropriate cooperation
notatail —
absolutely —
almost x facilitated collecting funds and obtaïning financing
not at ail —
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
X consolidated when needed
I cc’rnpIot 01: I I I
jinputs I multi orqanisation I 4 level of differentiation between organisations
f before the project (befom andlorafterthe disaster);
nia
wfthin the project:
based on the assessmetf corporate performance as proposed by Lawrence and Lorsh. In ethe essm of the level of definition
of different roles among the organisations of the project team. The performance decreases if activities made by different organisations
overlapped incurring in redundancy, too much assistance, or repetition
the differentiation of tesponsibilities was
the differentiation of responsibilities
the differentiation 0f responsibilities
the differentiation of responsibilities
X
neyer X
sometimes — overlapped incurring in repetition and redundancy
aiways
absolutely x
almost — took advantage of the strengths and weaknesses of each organisation
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost x contributed to attain a common objective
notatail —
absolutely
almost
not at ail
deflned in a clear manner
the differentiation of responsibilities wa s
absolutely
aimost
not at ail
X
set up when needed
I complete 0k flek I
I inputs muiti organisation I I project’s administrative costsl
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the level of optimization of economic resources for the benefti of beneficiaries. Assessed as a the percentage ofthe projects
budget. Lowet administrative costs = better performance
absoluteiy x
projects administrative costs were aimost — reduced through the optimisation of local resources
not at ail —
absolutely x
were almost — reduced by minimising the costs of expatriate officers
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
were aimost — justified by having reduced overail costs for the project
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — favored the maximum use of money for the benefit of beneficiaries
notatali —
complote I ok I I I
lin puts
- I multi oroanisation I 6 the capacitv 0f the svstem to adapt to the environm.I
before the project (before and!or after the disaster);
n/a
wfthin the project:
the capacity to react to the risks and opportunities of the environment at the social, economic and political levels. Includes an
assessment ofthe influence of the environment in the objectives targeted by the mufti-organisation
not at ail X
the objectives ofthe ptoject were somehow — affected by negative unexpected changes cf the environment
greatiy —
absoluteiy —
the risks inherent to the environment were almost X assessed by the multi-organisation during the project
not at ail —
absolutely —
the organis. responsible ofthe project aimost x anticipated a plan to minimise (share) financial risks
not at ail —
absolutely x
the organis. responsible ofthe project aimost — took advantage of unexpected opportunities in the environment
notatali
absolutely x
when required, changes in the project were aimost — mplemented
notatali —
absoiutely x
the organi. responsible ofthe project was almost — ptepared to work in a hostile environment
notatall —
compiete I ok I nex
inputs I manaqement tools I a census of local residents!
before the project (before and!or after ttie disaster):
n/a
within the project:
dams, barriers and retaining walls built to protect housing ftom natural hazards (landsiides, floods, fires, etc). Safe
conditions and reduction of risks for the population are assessed in this indicator
flot conducted (end)
a census cf local residents was — conducted by a different program/organisation fend)
x conducted as part 0f the project
absolutely x
was almost — inclusive of diversity and everybody in the community
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was almost x conducted and used on time
not at ail —
absolutely x
was almost — used to adaptthe projectto the real needs ofthe population
not at ail —
absoiutely —
was almost x the appropriate strategy (management tool) to use
notatali —
I comnIcte I I I I
were
were
were
were
were
wete
Iinputs Imanaqementtoois I 8j
before the project (before andior after the disaster):
nia
within the project:
previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc)I
previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc)
pre-project technicai studies (pre- or post-disaster) toUect info ton about ocai living conditions, architectural typologies, construction
techniques, etc.
______________________________________________
_____________
— flot conducted tend)
conducted by a different program/organisation tend)
x conducted as part ofthe proiect
absolutely x
almost — useful to discover new information about local characteristics
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy —
aimost x conducted and used on time
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — used to adapt the project to local characteristics
flot at ail —
absolutely x
aimost — properiy reported or pubiished for future reference
not at ail —
absoluteiy
aimost —
flot at ail
the approptiate strategy (management tool) to use
complete ok I nxi. I
I inputs I management tools I I surveys of peoples needsl
before the project (before andior after the disaster):
nia
wfthin the project:
post-disaster assessment et damages and reaf needs (through questionnaires, visits, meetings with the community, etc.)
flot conducted(end)
surveys cf peopie’s needs were — conducted by a different programforganisation tend)
x conducted as part of the project
absoluteiy —
were almost x useful to reveal new information about residents expectations
flot at aH —
absolutely —
were almost x conducted and used on time
net at ail —
absoiuteiy —
were almost x used to adapt the project to reai needs
notatali —
absoluteiy x
were almost — properly reported or pubiished for future reference
flot at ail —
absoiutely x
were aimost — the appropriate strategy (management tool) to use
not at aH
I complete I ok I I I
I inputs manaqement tools I iol consultation with the communityl
before the project (before andior after ffie disaster):
nia
wfthin the project:
assessment cf the users’ opinions and suggestions regarding living conditions, expectations, and requirements
flot conducted (end)
consultation with the community was — conducted by a different program/organisation fend)
x conducted as part of the project
absolutety —
almost x contributed in the beginning to set up the priorities of the project
not at ail
absoiutely —
almost x permitted to make changes and adapt the project during the process
flot at ail
absoiutety x
aimost — enhanced diversity and multipiictty
not et ail
absoiutely —
almost x permitted a fair representation cf alt the residents
flot et ail -
intended to design the project
was — intended to adapt the existing project
x intended to present the project to residents
. complote ok nxi I
I inputs local resources I ii I the capacity of residents to work in constructionj
belote the project (befoi andlor after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
indicates availbility oftime, knowledge and interest to work in construction. lt assesses the users’ availability of time to work in
construction; users’ skills and know how in building practices; and users’ interest to invest their time and expertise in construction
sufficient —
relative x knowledge about construction practices
insufficient
sufficient
relative x availability of time to work in construction
insufficient —
sufficient x
relative — interest to work in construction activities
insufficient —
sufficient x
relative — guidance to work in construction activities
insufficient —
beneficiaries cf the project had
had
had
had
had
sufficient
relative
insufficient
physical conditions to work in construction activities
complete I ok nxt I
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
I inputs I local resources I 121 materials and eguipment availablel
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
wfthin the project:
the capacity to use indigenous materiais (wood, sand, earth, paim leaves, bamboo, clay, etc.) for the production of construction
components and the availability of tools and equipment for construction
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
X
local indigenous materials were
were
tools and equipment were
available in the region
absoluteiy
almost — corresponded to the skills ofthe affected population
not at ail —
absolutely x
aimost safe for the environment (preventing degradation 0f natural resources)
notatall —
absolutely x
almost — available in the region
notatall —
X
corresponded to the skills of the affected population
I complote I ok next I I I
outputs fînancial lfundinq 13 tax incentives for compa nies I individualsj
[before the project (before and/or after Hie disaster):
n/a
wfthin Vie project:
the implementation of tax incentives to attract investment and economic recovery after the disaster. Tax incentives are
targeted to promote the creation of employement opportunties, new businesses and the development ot local industries.
Equally, tax incentives ta individuals during a certain period oftime ease the financial burden 0f recovery ofthe affecetd
fa mites
absoluteiy =
almost — achieved as planned
notatail —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at aIl —
absolutely —
aimost — appropriate for the needs of the population
notatall =
absolutely —
almost — offered ta the right people who needed them
flot at ail —
absolutely
almost = the appropriate strategy ta be used
flot at ail —
tax incentives
x not offered at ail ta the affected population fend)
offered by a different program/organisation fend)
offered as part ofthe project
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely —
almost — enough ta caver the needs ofthe population
not at aIl
I incoinplte I ok I I
Ioutputs I financial/ftndinp 1141 bans for housingi
before the omiect tbefore and!or after the disaster):
pre-disaster capacity of local residents to have access to banking bans and mortgages for housing
bans for housing were
were
were
widely
flot widelv
absolutely
flot cornpletely
absoluteiy
not compieteby
X
X
X
within the project:
the impiementatbon 0f bans for repairs, seif-help initiatives or buying a new house. This indicator denotes the confidence
ofthe financiai system in the affected community and the capacity of the users to enter into the regular banking system
accessible to residents before the project
appropriate for the needs of the population
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
bans for housing were
were
were
were
were
were
were
x not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
offered by a different program/organisation fend)
offered as part ofthe proiect
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absolutely —
aimost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
aimost — appropriate for the needs of the population
notatali —
absoluteiy —
almost — offered to the right people who needed them
notatali —
absoiuteiy —
abmost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoiutely
aimost
not at ail
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
incomplote oh I neyt j
Ioutputs I financial/fijndinq 151 subsidies for housingi
before the project(before andforafterthe disaster);
pre-disaster capacity of local residents to have access to governmental subsidies for housing
subsidies for housing were
were
were
widely
flot widelv
absolutely
flot campletely
absolutely
flot comoletelv
X
X
X
accessible to residefits before the project
apprapriate for the fleeds 0f the populatiafl
eflough to caver the needs ofthe population
within the proiect:
nofl-reimbursable fiflancial alU for repairs, purchase of a flew house or self-help
subsidies for housing were
wete
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost
flot at aIl
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
ebsolutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
absoluteiy
almost
flot at aIl
absolutely
al most
flot at ail
X flot offered at ail ta the affected population fend)
offered bv a differeflt aroaram/oroanisatiafl tefld)
affered as aartofthe araiect
achieved as planned
on time when needed
appropriate for the needs of the population
affered ta the right people who needed them
the appropriate strategy ta be used
enough ta cover the needs ofthe population
incornp!cte j ak I ‘ct I I
joutputs financial/fundinfl 16) bans for infrastructure or othersi
beforethe project (before andlorafterthe disaster:
pre-dsaster capacity of local residents to have access to regular bans for individual or familial investment
bans for infrastructure or others were
were
were
widely
flot widelv
absolutely
flot completely
absolutely
flot comoletebv
X
X
X
accessible to residents befote the project
appropriate for the needs of the population
enough to coverthe needs 0f the population
within the project:
bans for infrastructure repair, for buildings related with sources of income (for individual shops, small industries, etc), or
oU-ier initiatives for recovery. This indicator denotes the confidence ofthe financiab system in the affected community and
the capacity ofthe users to enter into the regular banking system
bans for infrastructure or others were
were
were
were
were
were
were
x not offered at aIl to the affected population (end)
offered by a different program/orqanisation fend)
offered as part ofthe proiect
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
notatall —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at aIl —
absolutely
almost — offered to the right people viho needed them
notatall —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at aIl —
absolutely
almost
not at ail
enough to covet the needs ofthe population
I ircGmpbete I I
I outpUts financial/fundinq 1171 subsidies for infrastructure or othersi
before the project (before andlor after the disaster);
pre-disaster capacity of local residents to have access to govemmentai subsidies for individual or familial investment
subsidies for infrastructure or others were
v1ndeiy
— accessible to residents before the project
not widely x
absolutely
were — appropriate for the needs of me population
not completeiy x
were
absoiuteiy
— enough to cover me needs ofthe population
not compieteiy X
within the project:
—
I
non-reimbursable financiai aid for infrastructure repair, for buildings related with sources 0f income (for individual shops, small
industries, etc), or for other initiatives for recovery
not offered at ail to the affected population tend)
subsidies for infrastructure or others were — offered by a different program/organisation fend)
x offered as part 0f the project
absoiutely x
were aimost achieved as pianned
not at ail —
absoiutely —
were aimost x on time when needed
not at ail
absoiuteiy x
were aimost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail
absoiutely x
were aimost — offered to the right people who needed them
not at ail
absoiuteiy x
were aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail
absoiutely —
were aimost — enough to cover the needs of the population
not at ail X
cornpitc c-: n-xt I I
absolutely
al mo st
flot at ail
Ioutputs j infrastructure 1181 dams, barriers, retainrng waHsl
before Hie project (before and!or after Hie disaster):
assesses if dams, barriers and retaining walls existed to protect housing ftom natural hazards (landslides, floods, fires,
etc) and if this infrastructure guaranteed security and did flot represent risks for the population
dams, barriers, retaining walls were
absolutely
— safe to protect residents before the project
not completely X
absolutely
were — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
not compietely x
absolutely
were — functional after the disaster
not compietely X
within Hie project: —
dams, barriers, retaining walls
dams, barriers and retaining walls builtlo protect housing from natural hazards (landslides, fioods, fires, etc). Safe
conditions and reduction of risks for the population are assessed in this indicator
X not offered at ail to the affected population tend)
offered by a different program/orqanisation tend)
offered as nart of the oroiect
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
wece
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — offered to the right peopie who needed them
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
notatali —
absoluteiy —
almost — safe to protect residents
not at aIl —
enough to cover the needs of the population
I incomplete 0k I I I
Ioutputs I infrastructure ligi roadsl
before the project fbefore and!or affer the disaster):
assesses if roads (urban or rural) were appropriate and enough to covet the needs of housing in the community and Vie
risks that they might represent for Vie population. It also assesses the damages in roads caused by the disaster
roads were
absolutely
flot completely
— appropriate for Vie context before the project
were
absolutely
— enough to cover Vie needs of the population
flot completely x
were
absolutely x
— safe n case of emergency and danger
flot completely —
were
absolutely
- functional after the disaster
not completely —
within the project:
the performance in the construction of roads. The indicator applies at twa levels: public infrastructure (for the benefit of
the community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of its owners). lndividual infrastructure
includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services. These indicators illustrate Vie
sustainability of Vie project and Vie consideration of long term effects in public health and safety
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
X not offered at aIl to the affectedppation(en
ra a Us offered by a different program/organisation fend)
offered as part 0f the prolect
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absoiutely —
almost offered ta the right people who needed them
flot at aIl —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy ta be used
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — safe in case of emergency and danger
not at ail —
enough ta caver the needs ofthe population
I incomplete ok I I I
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
Ioutputs I infrastructure 20 water suppiy
before the project (before andior after the disaster):
assesses if water suppiy was appropriate and enough to cover the needs 0f housing in the community and the risks that
it might represent for the population. t also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
water supply infrastwcture was
absolutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot compieteiy X
absoluteiy
was — enough to coverthe needs 0f the population
flot completely x
absolutely
was — safe for public health
not completely X
absolutely
was — functional affer the disaster
not completely X
within the project:
water supply infrastructure
the performance in the construction of water supply infrastructure. The indicator applies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit of the community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of its
owners). Individual infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services.
These indicators illustrate the sustainability ofthe project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and
safety
x not offered at ail to the affected population tend)
offered as Dart 0f the oroiect
offered by a different program/organisation (end)was
was
was
was
was
wa s
was
was
absolutely
almost — achieved as pianned
notatali —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — offered to the right peopie who needed it
not at ail —
absoiutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absoiutely —
almost — safe for public health
notatali —
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
I incompiete I ok I oxi 1 I
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
Ioutputs infrastructure 21 &ectricityl
before the project(befom andlorafterthe disaster):
assesses if eiectricicty supply was appropriate and enough to cover the needs of housing in the community and the risks
that it might represent for the population. t aiso assesses the damages caused by the disaster
electricity infrastructure was
absoiutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot completely X
absolutely
was — enough to cover Vie needs ofthe population
not completely x
absolutely
was — safe considenng local codes
not completely x
absolutely
was — functionai after the disaster
not completeiy x
within the project:
the performance in the construction of infrastructure for eiectricity supply. The indicator appiies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit of the community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for Vie benefit of its
owners). individuai infrastructure inciudes the activities and construction requiced for the connection to public services.
These indicators iliustrate Vie sustainability ofthe project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and
safety
_____________ ______________________________________________________
x not offered at ail to the affected population tend)
eiectricity infrastructure offered bv a different proaramloraanisation fend)
offered as part of the oroiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absoluteiy
almost — achieved as planned
notatail - —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
aimost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost — offered to the right peopie who needed it
notatali —
absoiutely —
aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost — safe considering local codes
notatali —
enough to cover Vie needs ofthe population
I inconinite I ok I I I
I outputs infrastructure 1221 sewage I
beforethe pmject(before and!orafterthedisaster):
assesses if the sewage system was appropriate and enough to coverthe needs of housing in the community and the
risks that t might represent for the population. t also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
sewage infrastructure was
absolutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
not completely X
absolutely
was — enough to caver the needs ofthe population
not completely x
absolutely
was — safe for public health
not completely X
absolutely
was — functional after the disaster
not completely X
wfthin the project:
the performance in the construction of sewage inftastwcture. The indicator applies at twa levels: public infrastructure
(for the benefit 0f the community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of its owners). lndividua
infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services. These indicators
illustrate the sustainabiiity of the project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and safety
absolutely
almost
not at ail
sewage infrastructure
X not offered at ail ta the affected population (end)
offered bv a different proqram/organisation tend)
offered as oart of the proiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — offered to the right people who needed t
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy ta be used
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — safe for public health
not at ail —
enough to caver the needs of the population
I incomplete I ok j I I
IOUtPUtS infrastructure 1231 telephonel
before the project (before andlor afterthe disaster):
assesses if the infrastructure for telephone system was appropriate and enough to caver the needs of hausing in the
community. It also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
infrastructure for telephone was
absolutely
—
appropriate for the context befare the project
flot completely x
absolutely
was — enough to cover the needs 0f the populationflot compietely x
absolutely
was — functional afterthe disaster
not completely X
wfthin the project:
Vie performance in the construction 0f infrastructure for telephone systems. The indicator applies at twa levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit of the community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of its
awners). Individual infrastructure includes the activihes and construction required for Vie connection to public services.
These indicators illustrate the sustainability of the project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and
safety
absolutely
atmost
flot at ail
offered as oart of the oroiect
x not offered at ail ta the affected populaflcn fend)
offered bv a different oroaram/oranisatian tend)infrastructure for telephone was
was
was
was
wa s
was
was
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate far the needs of Vie population
flot at aIl
absolutely —
almost — offered to the right people wha needed it
notatall —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy ta be used
not at alt —
enough ta caver the needs 0f the population
I incomplete ok I I I
Ioutputs I communitvservices 1241 schoois
before the omiect (befom and/or after the disaster):
pre-project conditions 0f faciiities
schools were
were
were
were
absolutely
flot completely
absolutely
flot comnletelv
absoluteiy
flot comDietelv
absoluteiy
not completely
X
X
X
X
appropriate for the context before the project
enough to cover the needs of the population
safe (resistance to hazards)
fijnctional after the disaster
within the pcojectt —
the performance in the coflstructiofl of facilities
schools were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absoiuteiy
almost
flot et ail
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
absoiutely
al most
flot at ail
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
absoluteiy
almost
flot et ail
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
X flot offered at ail to the affected population (end)
offered by a different program/organisation fend)
offered as part cf the proiect
achieved as planned
on time when needed
appropriate for the needs 0f the population
offered to the right peopie who needed them
the appropriate strategy to be used
safe as offered (resist. to hazards cf the original product)
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
. incomniete I ok I I I
I OUtpUtS I community services 1251 health centersi
before the pmject (before and!or after the disaster):
pre-project conditions 0f facilities
health centers were
absolutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot completely X
absoluteiy
were — enough to cover the needs of the population
flot completeiy X
absoluteiy
were — safe (resistance to hazards)
flot completely X
absolutely
were — functional after the disaster
flot completeiy x
within the project: —
the performance in the construction 0f facilities
X flot offered at ail to the affected population fend)
health centers were — offered by a different program/organisation tend)
oftered as part 0f the project
absoiuteiy —
were aimost — achieved as pianned
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
were aimost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
were almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
were almost — oftered to the right peopie who needed them
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
were aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
were almost — safe as offered fresist. to hazatds ofthe original product)
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
were aimost — enough to cover the needs of the population
not at ail —
incompiete I ok I net I I
9Utputs I community services 1261 community centers I religious bIdg.
before the pmject (before andlor afterthe disaster):
pre-project conditions of facilities
community centers / reIigious bidg. were
absoiutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot compieteiy X
absoIutely
were — enough ta caver the needs ofthe population
flot compietely x
absolutely
wete — safe fresistance to hazards)
flot completely X
absoiuteiy
were — functionai after the disaster
flot completely X
within the project: —
the performance in the construction of fact ties
not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
community centers / religious blUg. were — offered by s different program/organisation fend)
offered as part of the project
absoluteiy —
were almost — achieved as planned
not at ail
absolutely —
were almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
were almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
were aimost — offered to the right peopie who needed them
not at ail —
absoiutely —
were aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy —
were aimost — safe as offered fresist. to hazards of the original product)
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
were almost — enough ta coverthe needs ofthe population
not at ail
incomplete I ok I r’t
Ioutputs communitv services 127 I police I fire stationsi
before the project (before andlorafterthe disaster):
pre-ptoject conditions of faciiWes
police I fire stations were
were
were
were
absolutely
flot completely
absolutely
not completeiy
absolutely
flot comoietelv
absolutely
not completely
X
X
X
X
appropriate for the context before the project
enough to cover the needs of the population
safe (resistance to hazards)
ftinctional after the disaster
within the project:
the performance in the construction of facil
police / fire stations were
were
were
were
were
were
were
wece
ties
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absolutely
al most
not at ail
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
al most
flot at ail
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
X not offered at ail to the affected oooulation (end
offered by a different program/organisation tend)
offered as part 0f the pro ject
achieved as planned
on time when needed
appropriate for the needs ofthe population
offered to the right people who needed them
the appropriate strategy to be used
safe as offered (resist. to hazards cf the original product)
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
I ircompiete ok I I
absoiutely
almost
flot at alt
Ioutputs I housint 1281 newlotsl
belote the project (before andlor after the dis aster): -
the pre-disaster level ot access to land property; and/or pre- and post-disaster risks associated with the tenure of land,
particularly due to location in zones of risk
absoiutely
lots were — appropriate for the context before the project
not compieteiy x
absoiuteiy
land tenure was — enough to cover the needs of the population
flot compietely x
absoluteiy
land was — safe (resistance to hazards)
not completeiy x
wideiy
land tenure was — accessible to residents
flot widely x
within the project:
new lots
initiatives targeted to increase the residents capacity to acquire safe lots for housing; including bans or subsidies given for
purchasing land or the direct donation 0f lots
X flot otfered at ail to the affected population (end)
offered by a different program/organisation (end)
offered as part 0f the project
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoiuteiy
almost — achieved as pianned
notatali —
absoiutely —
aimost — on time when needed
flot at ail
absoiuteiy —
aimost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — offered to the nght people who fleeded them
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — the eppropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoiutely —
aimost — safe as offered (resist. to hazards of the original product)
flot at ail —
enough to cover the needs of the population
I incompiete j ck I ftt I I I
Ioutputs I housinci 1291 emergencysheltersl
before the project (before and/orafterthe disaster):
pre-disaster arrangements and planning made by the organisations to adequately respond to the emergency. t represents
the access ofthe community to contingency plans by the civil defense, tire departments, Red Cross, etc.
emergency shelters were
absolutely
— planned, before the disaster, through contingency plans
not completely x
absolutely
emergency organisations were — prepared for a housing emergency
not completely x
absolutely
authonties were — prepared for a housing emergency
not completely x
info about contingency plans was
widely
—
accessible to residents before the disaster
notwidely X
wfthin the project:
implementation of an emergency sheltering plan; including provision of tents, plastics or orner materials to build shelters for
the first days after the disaster
flot
offered at ail to the affected population fend)
emergency shelters were — offered by a different programIorganisatianend)
offered as part of the project
absolutely
were almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely —
were almost on time when needed
notatali —
absoiutely —
were aimost — appropriate for the needs ofthe population
flot at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — offeted to the right people who needed them
notatali —
absolutely —
were almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — safe to short-term protection of residents
flot at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
notatali —
incomplete ok I nei
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
Loututs housin 301 temporaryhousingj
before the project (befom andlor after tfie disaster):
pre-disaster arrangements and planning made by authorifies and local NGOs to adequateiy tespond to the requireness for
transitory housing
.
absoiutely
temporary housing was planned, before the disaster in urban plans
not completely X
.
.
absoluteiy .
emergency organisations were — prepared for building transitory housing
flot completely x
authorWes were
absolutely
— prepared for building fransitory housing
flot completely x
.
widely
info about temporary housing plans was . — accessible to residents before the disaster
not widely X
within the project:
temporary housing
this might inciude the implementation of: (I) I emporary units (i.e. pre-fab and winterised units); (ii) adapted temporary housin
(pubhc facilities or rented apartments); or (iii) self-provided temporary housing (homes of families I friends, user-built
shelters, or second homes)
________________________________________
_____________
—
not oftered at ail to the affected population tend)
X offered as nart 0f the oroiect
offered by a different programforganisation (end)was
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost x achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost x on time when needed
notatali —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
notatali X
absolutely x
almost offered to the right people who needed them
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail x
absolutely —
almost — safe for mid-term protection of residents
notatali X
X enough to cover the needs of the population
complete I I I I I
I 0UtPUt I housinq 31 new housesi
before the project (before andlor after fie disaster):
the pre-disaster level of access to housing for trie contrary: the level of housing shortage) and post-disaster homeiessness
caused by the disaster
absolutely
houses were — accessible to ail restdents before the disaster
flot completeiy x
absoiuteiy
new bouses were — unnecessary arter the disaster
not completely x
within the project:
initiatives targeted to facilitate the acquisition of new permanent housing, inciuding (if necessary) relocafion of residents
living in dangerous conditions. Permanent new housing can be obtained: (j) through the provision 0f finished units; (ii) by
facilitating and organising seif-help construction; or (iii) by facittating and organising the purchase of new housing existing in
the market
______________
—
not offered at ail to the affected ooouiation Cendt
offered by a different program/organisafion (end)
x offered as part of the pro ject
absoiutely
almost — achieved as pianned
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost x on time when needed
not at ail
absoluteiy —
almost x appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoiutely x
aimost — offered to the right people who needed them
not at ail —
absoiuteiy x
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail
absoiuteiy x
aimost — safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
not at ail —
new houses were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
X
enough to cover the needs of the population
I complote ok I I I
Ioutputs I housinq 1321 reconstructed housesi
before the proiect lbefore andlor after the disaster):
the pre- and post-disaster risks of coilapse of housing structures due to one or sorne of the foilowing reasons: (i) iack of
maintenance; (ii) use 0f inadequate materiais; (iii) use 0f inadequate technologies; (iv) unsafe additions and structurai
modifications to housing; (y) insufficient construction codes and standards
X
X
X
houses were
were
were
absoiuteiy
flot comoieteiv
absoiuteiy
not compietely
absoiuteiy
not compietely
functionai after the disaster
appropriate forthe needs ofthe population
safe after the disaster
within the project:
the reconstruction of affected structures, including minor repairs and major reconstruction
the reconstruction of affected houses was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
absoiuteiy
almost
not at ail
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ait
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
X flot offered at ail to the affected oooulation (end)
offered by a different orogram/oroanisation tend)
offered as part of the project
achieved as pianned
on time when needed
appropnate for the needs of the population
offered to the right people who needed t
the appropriate strategy to be used
safe for long-term protection of residents
enough to cover the needs of the population
incompiete I ok I I
Ioiitputs I industry femploym. 1331 bldgslinfras. for industry & income generation
before the project tbefore and!or after the dïsaster): -
the pre-disaster level of access to sources of income; and/or pre- and post-disaster risks associated wifli the buildings and
infrastructure related with income generation, particulady the risks of collapse, destruction of infrastructure, destruction of plantations,
machinery or equipment, etc.
bidgs/inftas. for industry & income generation were
absoiutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot compietely x
widely
were — accessible to residents
flot widely x
absolutely
were — safe (resistance to hazards)
flot completely X
absolutely
were — functional after the disaster
flot completely X
wfthin the project:
the construction of buildings and infrastructure associated with the generafion of income and employment at the scale of single familie
or smatl clusters (excluding the reconstruction 0f large industries/companies). It might include the reconstruction 0f shops, small
industries, small scale infrastructure for production, processing or agriculture activities, etc., assessing the consideration 0f long-term
needs for economic recovery, the capacity ofthe community to become economically independent, and in generai, the sustainability 0f
the project. Only physical construction is considered, flot including functioning and management offacilities
absolutely
almost
not at ail
bidgs/infras. for industry & income generation
x flot offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered as oart of the oroiect
offered by a different program/organisation (end)were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
notatali —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
flot at aIl —-
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost — offered to the right people who needed them
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoiutely —
almost — safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
flot at aIl —
enough to cover the needs of the population
I incompiete oi I I
owithin the project:
initiatives targeted to the impiementation 0f subsidies I or peopie that have iost their jobs or sources of income during the disaster. This
indicator denotes flue consideration ofshort-term needs for economic recovery
x flot offered at aH to the affected population (end)
unemployment subsidies were offered by a different program/orqanisation fend)
were
absoluteiy
aimost — achieved as planned
notataH —
absoiuteiy —
aimost — on time when needed
notatail —
abso!utely —
almost — appropriate foc the needs ofthe population
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
almost — offered to the cight peopie who needed them
notataii —
absoiutely —
aimost — the approptiate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absoiutely
aimost — enough to covet the needs ofthe population
not at ail
before the project (before andlor after the disaster):
Iotitputs industrv femploym. 1341 unemployment subsidiesi
pre-disaster access to regular governmentai unemployment subsidies (equivalent to weifare)
unemployment subsidies were
wideiy
not wideiv
were
X
absoiuteiy
net compieteiy
accessible to residents
wete
X
absoiuteiy
not compieteiy
appropriate for the context before the project
X
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
offered as part of the proiect
were
were
were
were
were
incompiete I ok nexI I
Ioutputs others 35 rescuel
before the piject (befom and!or alter the disaster):
the pre-disaster capacity of local institutions (the civil defense, the police, the army, the local NGOs, the local Red Cross, etc.) to
speedily and effectively react to the destruction
absoluteiy
local organisations were — on time to conduct emergency and rescue
not completely x
absolutely
— effectiveiy conducted contingency and rescue
not completely x
V
-
absoiutely V
extemal aid was — unnecessary for rescue activihes
not completely X
wfthin the project: —
the implementation of rescue acfivities
X not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
rescue activities were — offered by a different programlorganisation fend)
offered as part of the project
absolutely —
were almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — on time when needed
notatali —
absolutely
were almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoiutely —
were almost — offered to the right peopie who needed them
notatail
absolutely —
were almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
notatali —
absolutely —
were almost — enough to cover the needs of the population
not at ail —
incompleto oi neyt
Iouttuts I others 1361 psychological aidi
before Hie project (befom andlor after Hie disaster):
pre-disaster access to psychological aid. Even though this s a difficuit aspect to identify in utban contexts it is easier to identify as
being absent in most of rural contexts
psychologicai aid was
widely
— accessible to residents
flot widely x
absolutely
was — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot completeiy X
absoiuteiy
was — enough to caver the needs of the population
flot compietely X
wfthin Hie project:
initiatives targeted ta provide psychological aid to the affected residents. This might inciude individual or group therapies, giving advice
and information in newspapers or magazines
X not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
psychological aid was — offered by a different program/organisafion fend)
offeced as part of the project
absolutely —
was aimost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — appropriate forthe needs ofthe population
notatali —
absoluteiy —
was almost — offered ta the right peopie who needed it
notatali
absoiutely —
was almost — the approptiate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absoiutely —
was aimost — enough ta cover the needs of the population
flot at ail —
ncompir’t I I I
Ioututs I others 371 foodl
before the oroiect tbefore and!or after the disaster): -
pre-disaster access to food, t highhghts pre-disaster and post-disaster ieveis of malnutrition
X
X
X
food was
was
was
absolutely
not comøletelv
absolutely
flot completely
absolutely
flot completeiy
accessible to residents
appropriate for the needs of the population
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
. incompiete I ok I riext I
wfthin the nroiect: —
initiatives targeted to provide food to the affected resid
food was
ents in the flrst ays after the disaster.
X
was
not offered at ail to the affected oooulation fend)
absolutely
almost
not at ail
offered bv a different oroaram/oroanisation tend)
offered as part of the project
achieved as planned
was
absoiutely
almost
not at ail
was
on time when needed
absoiuteiy
almost
not at aIl
was
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
appropriate for the needs of the population
absoluteiy
was
offered to the right peopie who needed it
aimost
not at ail
was
the appropriate strategy to be used
absolutely
aimost
not at ail
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
Ioutputs others 1381 medica(aidI
before Hie pmject (befom and!or after Hie disaste,): -
pre- and post-disaster level of access to regular medical care. This vulnerability might consider the availabiiity 0f health centets in the
region and a qualitative assessment of the capacity of residents to gain access to health insurances
medical aid was
widely I- accessible to residents
flot widely
absoiutely I x
was j— appropnate for the needs of the population
not completely —
absolutely
was enough to coverthe needs of the population
not completely x
within Hie project:
initiatives targeted to ifie provision of medical assistance in the flrst days after the disaster
X not offeced at ail to the aftected population fend)
medical aid was offered by a different program/organisation (end)
offered as part ofthe project
absolutety —
was almost achieved as planned
notatail —
absolutely —
was aimost — on time when needed
not at ail
absolutely —
was almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
was almost — offered to the right peopie who needed it
notatail —
absoiuteiy —
was almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absolutely —
was aimost — enough to cover the needs of the population
not at ail —
incompiete o) 1 pt f
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
I OUtPU I others 1391 temporary infrastructurel
belote the project (belote and!or after tue disaster):
the capacity of institutions to react to the destruction of public services and infrastructure, particularly the reaction 0f governmental
organizations in charge of public services and roads
.
absolutely
temporary infrastwcture was — planned in contingency plans
not completely X
local organisations were
absolutely
— prepared to react to the destruction of infrastructure
not completeiy x
.
absolutely
external aid was — unnecessary affer the disaster
not completeiy X
wfthin flue project:
temporary infrastructure
initiatives targeted to the implementation of temporary electricat and telephone systems, temporary water supply, and tempotary
bridges, dams or any other inftastwcture required ta guarantee tue safety and recovery of residents. This indicator assesses the
capacity ot residents to quickly resume daily activities
X not offered at ail to the affected population tend)
offered by a different proqram/orqanisation fend)
offered as part 0f the proiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail
absolutely —
almost on time when needed
notatail —
absolutely
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — offered ta tue right people who needed it
not at ail —
absoiutely —
almost
— the appropriate strategy to be used
natatail —
enough ta coverthe needs ofthe population
I incomplete I ok I pxt I
I OutpUtS I others 1401 education and technical assistancel
before the pmject (before and!orafterthe disaster):
pre-disaster access to technicai education and knowledge. lt might inciude assessing the average access to schooling and informai
education in the region
. widely
schooling (up to secondary) was . — accessible to residents
flot widely x
residents had
complete
— knowledge about construction -related subjects
insufficient x
technical courses and informai education were — accessible to residents
not wideiy X
wfthin the project:
the implernentation of plans for education and technicil assistance. It niglit include education in disaster prevention, education in
better construction practices, formation on leadership, equity, human rights, protection of the environment, etc. and technical
assistance for developing better construction practices or for the assembly of construction components
not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered by a different program/organisation tend)
x offered as oart 0f the oroiect
absolutely X
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absoiutely
almost x on time when needed
notatali
absolutely x
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoiutely x
almost — offered to the right people who needed it
flot at ail —
absoiutely x
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
notatali —
education and technical assistance was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
almost
not at ail
X
enough to cover the needs of the population
cornpiete I I ot I
Ioutputs I others 41 j informationi
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
pre-disaster access to information related with risks, awareness, contingency and coping activities. It might include assessing the
average access to the media (news papers, internet, TV and radio), the existence of campaigns of information and the access to local
and external publications
information concerning tisks, awareness, etc. was
widely
— accessible to residents
not widely x
. .
widely
campaigns of information to the public were — used in the region
flot wdely x
.
widely
residents had . — access to the media in general
not widely X
within the project: —
the implementation 0f plans for dissemination of information and knowtedge regarding the disaster or the reconstruction activities. t
might include publications, meetings with the community and information through the media to inform about the causes and effects of
the disaster, the projects in action, how ta access to the benefits ofthe project, how to find a job, etc.
not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
was — offered by a differentprogram/organisation (end)
x offered as part ofthe pro ject
absolutely X
almost — achieved as planned
notatali -—
absolutely —
almost x on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost appropriate for the needs ofthe population
notatail —
absolutely x
almost — offered to the right people who needed t
not at ail —
absoiutely x
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
information
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
almost
not at ail
X
enough ta coverthe needs ofthe population
I complote I ret I I
resuits I transfet 1421 oans given and subsidies aocatedI
before the project (before and!or after the dïsaster):
nia
within the project:
the performance in the transfer of financial solutions and funding, being usefulto identify ifthe money finally teachedthe
ben efici aries
absoiutely
bans and subsidies offered were almost x albocated as pianned
not at ail
absoluteiy —
were almost x used at an appropriate time (as assumed)
notatail —
absolutely x
were aimost — used in the appropriate way (as assumed)
not at ail —
absoiuteiy x
were almost — used by the people that needed them (as assumed)
not at ail —
complete ok I ext I I
Iresuits transfer 1431 direct and indirect jobs createdi
before the project (before and!or after Hie disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the consequences in the creation of empioyment opportunities cf having deveioped the different outputs. It denotes the
capacity of the project te facilitate the recovery ofthe economy and the achievement ofthe economic independence ofthe
beneficiaries
absolutely X
new direct and indirect jobs were almost — enough to faciiltate the recovery of the local economy
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — facilitated the economic independence of beneficiaries
notatail
absoiutely x
were almost — created at the appropriate time
not at ail
absoluteiy x
almost — represented appropriate working conditions for residents
notatail —
compiete ok I I I
I resuits transfer 44 I houses occupied
before the project (before and/or alter the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the post-project rate of occupation cf dwellings. t s particularly useful to identify the acceptability of the houses provided
by the multi-organisafion
absolutely X
the houses provided were almost — occupied by residents
flot at ail —
absolutely x
were almost — occupied at the appropriate tirne (as assumed)
notatali —
absolutely x
were almost — used in the appropriate way (as assumed)
not at ail —
absolutely x
were almost — used by the peopte that needed them (as assumed)
notatall —
complete I ok I next I
I resuits I transfer 1451 insurance policies takiij
before the project (befoœ andlor atter Oie disaster:
n/a
within the project:
insurance policies are nota common output of reconstruction projects in the context of the seiected case studies. However, it is
considered here as a consequence of improving the awareness and knowledge of residents and local organisations. Transferring
the risks of destruction to insurance companies is considered here as a positive consequence 0f educafing and informing
organisations and individuals about the risks of ftture disasters
very much
taking insurance policies for housing was slightly — incremented after the disaster
notatall x
absolutely —
the risks of disasters was almost — reduced by the government by sharing it with insurance comp.
notatall X
complete I ok I nxt I
I resuits I transfer 46 emergency protocols impementedI
before the project (before andior after fie disaster):
n/a
wfthin the project:
emergency protocols are flot considered as a common output of reconstruction projects in the context of the selected case studies.
However, t s considered here as a consequence of improving the awareness and knowledge of residents and local organisations.
Implementing emergency protocols fparticularly in urban contexts) s considered here as a positive consequence of educating and
informing organisations and individuals about the risks cf future disasters
absolutely
emergency protocols were almost — implemented in the region among residential areas
not at ail x
absolutely —
contingency plans and emer. protocols were almost — included in the agenda 0f local authorWes and organisations
not at ail x
.
compete I ok I I
teSUits I transfer 471 increment 0f land ownershipl
before the project (before andior after Hie disaster)
nia
withrn Hie project:
This is a context-sensitive indicator. It s consider in this context as a positive indicator of resuits as t denotes the capacity of the
project to secure safe land for residents at the long run. Increment of land ownership can be due to the provision of new lots, due to
the success of ban or subsidies programs or due to the successfiJl legalisation of illegally occupied land
absolutely x
land ownership almost increased in the region after the project
notatall
complete I ok j oxt I
I resufts ttansfer 1481 increment o! home ownershipj
before the project (before andIor after die disastet):
nia
within the project:
This s a context-sensitive indicator. t is consider in this context as a positive indicator 0f resuits. It can be due ta construction of new
houses, by acquisition 0f existing housing stock, or by upgrading of squatter settiements and shacks. This indicator denotes the
capacity of the projectto guarantee secure safe sheltering in the long term
absolutely x
home ownership almost increased in the region after the project
not at ail
compete ok I ext I
o
tresuits--’-» I community particip. 1491 designl
before ifie project (before andior after the disaster): - -
nia
wfthin the project:
Assesses the capacity of residents to actively participate in the design of their own dwelling
significantly
residents did partially x decide the distribution et spaces 0f their ovin dwelting
not
signiflcantly x
did partially — decide the location and orientation oftheir own dwelling
flot
signiflcantiy —
did partially x select the finishes of their ovin dwelling
not
significantly —
did partially decide the size and conditions of the spaces their dwellings
not X
signiflcanuy —
did partially — select the technology ofthe structure and main components
not X
signillcantly —
did partially — select the construction method to be used
not x
complote I ok I ext I
I resuits I communitv particip. 1501 managementl
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
nia
within the project:
Assesses the capacity of residentsto actively participate in the management of their own dwelling
absolutely
residents almost could choose whether using self-help or hiring labor force
notatail X
significantly —
did partially
— manage the economic resources
not x
significantly —
did partially — manage the contracts of suppliers
not x
signiflcantly
—
did partially x determine the schedule and planning of activities
not
significantly
—
did partially x communicate Uirectly with other stakeholders
not
significantly x
did partially
— organise people and resources in the construction field
not
complote ok I next I I
Iresuits I communitv particip. 151 I financing of the project
before the project (before and/or after ffie disaster)
n/a
within the project:
Assesses the capacity of residents to actively participate in the financing of their own dweting
absoiuteiy
residents did almost x select the financing system for the project
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
did almost — participate in coflecting funds
not at aH x
absoiutely —
did aimost x knowthe costs ofconstnction and materiais
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
did aimost have the option cf incurring in expenses directiy
not at ail x
absoiuteiy —
did almost
— have the option to participate with own resources
notatafl x
absoiuteiy
did aimost — participate in financing coilectively (or as a cooperative)
notatali X
complote I ok I nxt I I
(resuits I community particip. 1521 production of components
before the project (before and/or after the disaster):
n/a
wWiin Hie project:
Assesses the capacity of residents to actively participate in the production of components for their own dwelling
absolutely X
residents did almost work in the production 0f components
not at ail
absoiuteiy x
did aimost
— learn the technique of production of components
not at ail
absoiutely x
did aimost — operate the machines for production of components
not at ail —
absolutely x
the production of components did aimost — optimise the skiils and knowledge ofresidents
notatali —
: complete I ok ( n:t I
-j
I resuits I communitv particip. 1531 constructionl
before the project (before andlor after the disaster):
nia
wfthin the project:
Assesses the capacity of residents to actively participate in construction activities for their own dwelling
absolutely X
residents did almost — work in assembly of construction components
notatali —
. absoiutely x
did almost — learn the method of construction
not at ail —
absolutely x
did almost — get remunerated fmoney, food or property) for labor force
not at ail —
absolutely x
members of the family did almost — have the option to work in the construction field
not at ail —
complote I ok I I
Iresuits I communitv particip. 54 individual responsibility of decision makingl
before die project (before andlor after die disaster):
nia
wfthin die project:
Assesses the level of responsibility of decision making
absoiuteiy
residents were aimost x responsible for registering to the project (or program)
flot at aH —
absolutely —
were almost x responsible for applying for the services and products offered
notatali —
absolutely x
were aimost — responsible for compieting the house
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy —
were aimost — responsibie for the use of funding
notatali X
absoiuteiy —
were almost x responsibie for obtaining disaster-resistance standards
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy —
were almost x responsibie for obtaining and using information and know-how
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
were aimost — responsibie for seiecting where to invest the resources
flot at ail x
complete I ok I neyt I I
I impacts pro ject poals 55 debtl
Lbefore the project (before andlor after the disaster):
tfha
within the project:
the debt acquired by local organisations or the national government ta develop the project. A low debt resulting ftom the project is
considered as a potential positive effect ofthe project
an insignificant X
the debt resulting from the project was a reasonable burden for local organisations or the national government
a very high
I compete I ok next I I
I impacts I pcoiect goals 1561 environmental impacte
before the project (before and/or after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the positive and negative impacts of the project on the environment. This might include negative impacts due to the sprawl of
urbanisation, the over exploitation of indigenous materiais, and the effects 0f the disruption of public infrastructure (particularly
sewage systems). This indicator denotes the assessment 0f long-term consequences on the sustainability ofthe project
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
the project
not at ail
almost
absolutelv
X
had a negative effect in urban sprawi
notatali
almost
— had a negative eftect of over exploitation of natural resources
absolutely —
not at aIl
aimost had a negative effect in naturai sources ofwater
absoiuteiy x
not at ail —
almost x had a negative effect in natural forests
absolutely —
notatall
—
aimost x had a negative effect in public heaith
absolutely —
absolutely —
almost x contributed to urbanirurai organisation and consolidation
notatall
—
absolutely
—
aimost x reduced the negative effects ofthe disaster in the environment
notatali —
x reduced the negative effects ofthe disaster in public health
I complote I ck I I I I
[ipacts pro ject oaIs 1571 recovery of norma I activitiesi
before the pmject (before andlorafterthe disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the performance in terms cf time for the recovery cf normal activities. It includes assessing the time t took for the majority cf the
community to resume daily activities (going to work, to school, do normally domestic activities, etc.)
absoluteiy
the project aimost x facilitated flic recovery of: people going to work
flot at ail —
absolutely
almost x facilitated the recovery of: people going to school
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
aimost x facihtated the recovery of: people doing domestic activities
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
aimost x facihtated the recovery of peopie: doing recreationai activities
flot at ail —
complete I ok I nxt I
I impacts proiect cioals 1581 physical resistance to hazardsl
before the pmject (before andlor after the disaster):
nia
within the project
cumulative performance in terms ofthe overali resistance to naturai hazards. It inciudes flot oniy the resistance ofthe original units
(as buiit during the project) but aiso the resistance of later additions and modifications to the original units. This indicator compiles
the generai resistance to hazards due to safe location, exposure to danger, awareness and mitigation of possible risks,
implementation of better building codes and standards, and in generai ail the structural and non structural risks of unsafe
conditions. t denotes the capacity ofthe projectto guarantee long term safe conditions cf housing
absoiuteiy
original houses were almost
— safe (resistance to naturai hazards) at the mid-term
not at ail —
absoiutely —
modified houses (inc. additions) were aimost x safe (resistance to naturai hazards) at the mid-term
not at ail —
absoiuteiy
infrastructure was aimost
— safe fresistance to naturai hazards) at the mid-term
not at ail x
absoluteiy —
other buildings and faciiities were aimost
— safe (resistance to naturai hazards) at the mid-term
notatail X
complote I ok ret
Iimpacts I proiect goals 59 I transfer 0f better building practices
before Hie project (before andlor after Hie disaster):
nia
within Hie project:
the performance in the assimilation of better building practices, particularly in self-help and this including better use 0f materials,
improvements in local technologies, general awareness of risks, respect of building codes and standards, etc. This variable indicates the
capacity of Hie project to reduce Hie long-term physical vulnerabilities 0f the community (particularly if a great percentage of regular
housing is user-made)
.- absolutely
user-made constructions after the project were almost x safe (resistance to natural hazards)
flot at ail —
absolutely —
construction technologies were almost x improved in user-made constructions after the disaster
not at ail —
absolutely —
user-made constructions after the project wete almost x vigilant cf construction codes and standards
not at ail —
absolutely —
proper maintenance was almost x conducted to housing structures
net at ail —
complote ok nxt I I
I impacts I pro ject qoals 1601 institutional capacity and developmentl
before the project (befoi and/or afterthe disaster):
nia
within the project:
the performance of the project n reinforcing the administrative methods, expertise, know-how, and management tools of local authorities
for disaster management. This indicator denotes the capacity of the project to increase the level of development from the local authorities
point of view. lt inciudes assessing: (i) the impiementation or not of programs 0f education, training, administrative cooperation and
information targeted to local authorities; and (ii) tue level of participation 0f regular administrative units (municipalities, regular public
entities, etc.) in tue reconstruction project. The creation oftemporary public entities with the exclusive mandate 0f dealing with
reconstruction activities - which dissolve once reconstruction is finished - is considered as a potentiai cause of ioss of the know how and
expertise gained through the development ofthe project
X
absolutely X
aimost — participated in the design and management ofttue project
notatali —
not at ail x
almost — dissolved after the project
absolutely —
not at aIl x
almost — implemented afterthe project
absolutely
absolutely
almost
not at ail
education and training programs were
local administrative units
temporary entities for reconstruction were
new administrative methods and plans were
local administrative units
implemented for local authorities and administrative units
absoiutely -
almost —
not at ail
had responsibility of the good deveiopment ofthe project
compiete I ok I neyt I I
a fair method of selection of beneficiaries
women and men had
residents from different races had
residents from different social classes had
residents with different religious affiliation had
people without civil ID or flot registered had
residents 0f the lowest economic levels were
people without egal tenure were
non land owners or home owners were
people located in unsafe areas were
I impacts I project goals 161 I eguahty of gender and minoritiesi
before the project (before andIor afterthe disaster):
n/a
wfthin the project:
the performance of the project in selecting the beneficiaries of the project. It highlights possible segregation by gender, race, social
status, religious affiliation, etc. t may also denote the selection ofbeneficiaries according to other variables such as: capacity of acquiring
debts, family income, tenure of civil address or registered D, land or home ownership, legal occupation of land, tenure of tWes of legal
property, location in safe areas, etc. This indicator denotes hie performance of the project in terms of covering and scope
absolutely
was almost x implemented in the project
not at ail
absolutely
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
not at ail —
absoiutely x
aimost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
not at ail —
absoiutely x
almost — the same hghts to obtain products and services in the project
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — included as beneficiaries of products and services
notatall —
absolutely x
almost — included as beneficiaries of products and services
notatali
absolutely x
almost — included as beneficiaries 0f products and services
not at ail
absolutely
aimost
not at ail X
complote I ok nei I
included as beneficiaties of products and services
I impacts I proiect qoals 1621 aIl settiements in safe areasi
before the project (befom and!or after hie disaster):
nia
wfthin hie project:
the contribution 0f the project to eliminate housing located in dangerous areas. it highiights the permanence of squatting settiements in
risk-prone areas and remaining risks due to location. lt denotes the capacity of the project to achieve the ultimate goal of ehminating
physical vulnerability of housing
absoluteiy
housing in the region was almost x built in sate areas
not at ail —
absolutely —
the project aimost x contributed to reduce settiements in risk-prone areas
flot at aN —
absolutely x
aimost contributed to reduce the physicai vulnerabihty of housing
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
a similar disaster s aimost x uniikely to happen to the same population in the same region
notatail —
complete I ok I faif I I
FIPs of the MSS’s project in San Salvador
Iînputs I multi organisation I 1 the capacity to attract funds for the projecti
before the pmject (befom and!or after the disaster):
n/a
within the projed:
capacity to obtain donations and/or financing. It assesses the amount of resources obtained vs. the initial estimation and budget
absolutely
the capacity to attract funds almost — permifled to collect the funds tequired according to the initial estimations
notatali X
absoluteiy —
almost — permitted to get on time the funds that were required
flot at ail X
absoluteiy —
almost — guaranteed a continuous investment of cesources
not at ail X
absolutely —
aimost — permitted to target an appropriate level of qu&ity in the outputs offered
notatali x
absolutely —
almost — permitted to deal with a complete series of outputs
flot at ail X
absolutely —
almost — permitted the organisation an adequate independence ofdecision making
notatail X
complote ok I nexf J J
completely -
partially —
flot
Iinputs I multi orcanisation 2 I level of integration with the community
before the project (before andlor after Hie disaster):
n/a
wfthin Hie project:
dtrectly related with the definition of integration used here. lnciudes flic capacfty offlie organisation to develop horizontal relabons with
members 0f the community, beneficiaries and grass roots organisations in orderto accomplish common objectives
absolutely —
almost —
flot at ail x
had an active participation within the muiti-organisationlocal residents
local associations
local authorities
grass-roots NGOs
local contractors
the organis. in charge ofthe project had
absolutely
aimost x had an active participation within the multi-organisation
notatali —
absolutely x
almost — had an active participation within the multi-organisation
notatall —
absoluteiy —
almost x had an active participation within the multi-organisation
notatail —
absolutely —
almost x had an active participation within the multi-organisation
not at ail —
established relations in the region before the beginning ofthe project
I complete ok pesi t
individual objectives of each organis. were
the organisation in charge ofthe project had
integtation with other organisations
integration with other organisations
the relations between the organisations were
inputs I mufti orqanisation I 31 level 0f integration between organisationsJ
before the project (before andlorafterthe disaster):
n/a
within the project:
directly relatedwith the definition of integration used here. lnciudesthe capacity ofthe organisation to develop horizontal and vertical relations
with banks, NGOs private companies, etc. in order to accomplish and reinforce common objectives
absolutely
almost
not at ail X
coordinated to achieve a common objective
enough
almost enough — links with other organis. to work together towards s common objective
notenough x
absolutely —
aimost — resulted in appropriate cooperation
notatail X
absoiutely
almost — facilitated collecting funds and obtaining financing
not at ail x
absoiuteiy
almost
flot at ail X
consolidated when needed
complote I ok j fl?.X I I
I inputs mufti orçanisation I 4 I level of differentiation between organisations
n/a
the differentiation of responsibilities was
the differentiation of responsibilities
the differentiation of responsibilities
the differentiation of responsibilities
the differentiation of responsibilities was
defined in a clear manner
X
set up when needed
X
C
I complote ci-: I I I
before the pmject (before and!or after the disaster):
within the project
based on the assessment 0f corporate performance as proposed by Lawrence and Lorsh. Includes the assessment of the level of defin Won
of different roies among the organisations of the project team. The performance decreases if activities made by different organisations
overiapped incurring in redundancy, too much assistance, or repetition
absoiutely
aimost
not at ail
neyer —
sometimes x overlapped incurring in repetition and redundancy
aiways —
absoiuteiy —
almost — took advantage ofthe strengths and weaknesses of each organisation
notatafl x
absoluteiy —
almost — contributed to aftain a common objective
not at ail X
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
Iinputs I multi orqanisation I 5 I project’s administrative costsl
before the project (before andior after ffie disaster):
n/a
wfthin the project:
the level of optimization of economic resources for the benefit of beneficiaries. Assessed as a the percentage of the project’s
budget. Lower administrative costs = better performance
absolutely X
project’s administrative costs were almost
— reduced through the optimisation of local resources
notatali —
absolutely x
were almost
— reduced by minimising the costs of expatriate officers
not at ail
absolutely —
were almost x just[fied by having reduced overail costs for the project
notatali —
absolutely x
almost — favored the maximum use of money for the benefit of beneficiaries
notatall —
I complote I ok net I I
oIinputs I multi orqanisation 6 the capacity of the system to adapt to the environm.I
before the projectfbefore and!orafterthe disasteij:
n/a
withïn the project:
me capacity to reactto me risks and opportunities ofthe environment atthe social, economic and polwcal levels. lncludes an
assessment of the influence ofthe environment in the objectives targeted by the multi-organisation
not at ail
the objectives of the project were somehow — affected by negative unexpected changes of the enviconment
greatly X
absolutely —
the risks inherent to the environment were almost assessed by the multi-organisation during the project
flot at ail x
absolutely —
the organis. responsibie ofthe project aimost — anticipated a plan to minimise (share) financial risks
not at ail X
absolutely
the organis. responsible of the project aimost x took advantage of unexpected opportunities in the environment
notatall —
absoiutely —
when required, changes in the ptoject were almost x implemented
notatali —
absolutely —
the organi. responsible ofthe project was almost — prepated to work in a hostile environment
notatail x
complete I 0k I next I
oI inputs I manaqement tools I 71 a census of local residentsl
before the project (before andior after the disaster):
n/a
wfthin the project:
dams, barriers and retaining walls built to ptotect housing from natural hazards (landstdes, floods, fires, etc). Safe
conditions and reduction of risks for the population are assessed in this indicator
flot conducted (end)
a census of local residents was — conducted by a different program/organisation (end)
x conducted as part of the project
absolutely x
was almost inclusive of diversity and everybody in the community
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was almost x conducted and used on time
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — used to adapt the pcoject to the real needs ofthe population
flot at aIl x
absolutely —
was almost x the appropriate strategy (management tool) ta use
not at aIl —
complote I I
I inputs management toots 8 previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc)I
before the project (before and!or after U,e disaster):
n/a
within the project:
pre-project technical studies (pre- or post-disaster) to collect information about local living conditions, architectural typologies, construction
techniques, etc.
not conducted fend)
— conducted by a different program/organisation fend)
x conductedaspartoftheproject
-
absolutely X
almost — useful to discover new information about local charactenstics
net at ail —
absolutely
almost x conducted and used on time
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost x used to adapt the project to local characteristics
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost x properly reported or published for future reference
flot at ail
previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc) were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely —
almost x the appropriate strategy (management tool) to use
_________________________________________________
not at ail —
compTete I ok I re!t I I
I InPUtS I manaqement tools I 9 surveys of people’s needsl
before the pmject (before and!or after ifie disaster:
n/a
within the projct:
post-disaster assessment of damages and real needs fthrough questionnaires, visits, meetings with the community, etc.)
flot conducted fend)
surveys 0f peoples needs were — conducted by a different programiorganisation (end)
x conducted as part of the project
absoiutely —
were almost x useful to reveal new information about residents expectations
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
were aimost — conducted and used on time
notatali X
absotuteiy
were almost x used to adapt the project to reai needs
not at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — properiy reported or published for future reference
not at ail x
absoiuteiy —
were almost x the appropriate strategy (management tool) to use
notatali —
complote ok I it I
[inputs I manacement tools I loi consultation with the community
beforethe project(before andlorafterthe disaster):
nia
within the project:
assessment of the users’ opinions and suggestions regarding living conditions, expectations, and requirements
flot conducted fend)
consultation with the community was — conducted by a different programiorganisation fend)
x conducted as part of the project
absolutely —
almost x contributed in the beginning to set up the priorities 0f the project
flot at ail
absolutely —
aimost — permitted to make changes and adapt the project during the process
flot at ail x
absolutely x
almost — enhanced diversity and muitiplicity
flot at ail
absolutely x
almost permitted a fait representation of ail the residents
not at ail
intended to design the project
was x intended to adapt the existing project
intended to present the project to residents
compiete oR I oxt I I
I inputs I local resources I ii the capacity of residents to work in constructioni
before Hie project (before and!or after the disaster):
nia
wfthin the project
indicates availability oftime, knowledge and interestto work in construction. It assesses the users’ availability of time to work in
construction; users’ skills and know how in building practices; and users’ interest to invest their time and expertise in construction
. sufficient
beneficiaries 0f tie project had relative — knowledge about construction practices
insufficient x
sufficient —
had reTative — availability of time to work in construction
insufficient x
sufficient —
had relative x interestto work in construction activities
insufficient —
sufficient —
had relative — guidance to work in construction activities
insufficient x
sufficient —
had relative x physical conditions to work in construction activities
insufficient —
complote I eT; I nxt I I
absolutely
al most
flot at ail
I inputs I local resources I 721 materials and eguipment availableJ
before the project (before andlor after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the capacity to use indigenous materials (wood, sand, earth, palm leaves, bamboo, clay, etc.) for the production of construction
components and the availability of tools and equipment for construction
absolutely
almost
not at ail X
local indigenous materiais were
wete
tools and equipment were
available in the region
absoluteiy
almost x corresponded to the skills ofthe affected population
not at ail —
absoiutely x
almost — safe for the environment (preventing degradation 0f natural resources)
flot at ail —
absoiutely —
aimost — availabie in the regïon
notatail X
X corresponded to the skifs of the affected population
I complete I ok I nt I I I
outputs financial / ftindinq 113 I tax incentives for companies I individualsi
before the project (before andlor after the disaster):
nia
wfthin the project:
the implementation oftax incentives to attract investment and economic recovery afterthe disaster. Tax incentives are
targeted to promote the creation of employement opportunties, new businesses and the development of local industries.
Equally, tax incentives to individuals during a certain period of lime ease the financial burden of recovery 0f the affecetd
familles
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
x not offered at ail ta the affected population fend)
tax incentives
offered as part of the project
offered by a different programiorganisation fend)
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
flot at ail
on time when needed
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail
absolutely —
almost — offered to the right people who needed them
not at ail
absolutely —
aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
I incompicto I I ext I I I
Ioutpuft financial / fundinq 1141 bans for housing
before the project (before andlor after lite disaster):
pre-disaster capacity of local residents to have access to banking bans and mortgages for housing
bans for housing were
were
were
wideiy
flot wideIy
absoiutely
flot compieteiy
absoluteiy
flot compieteiy
X
X
X
withïn the project:
the impiementation of bans for repairs, seif-heip initiatives or buying a new house. This indicator denotes the confidence
ofthe financiai system in the affected community and the capacity of the users to enter into the regular banking system
accessible to residents before the project
appropriate for the needs of the population
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
.
were
were
were
were aimost
not at ail
compiete ok I
bans for housing were
wete
were
not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered bv a different proqram/orqanisation tend)
offered as part of the proiect
absoiuteiy
almost x achieved as planned
not et ail —
absoiuteiy —
aimost
— on time when needed
not et ail X
absoiuteiy —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
notatali x
absoiuteiy —
aimost — offered to the right peopie who needed them
not at ail x
absoiuteby —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not et ail X
absolutely
X
enough to cover the needs of the population
Ioutputs I financiaI/fundinç 1151 subsides for housingi
before the oroiect tbefore andlor after the disasterh
pre-disaster capacity of local residents ta have access to governmentai subsidies for housing
subsidies for housing were
were
were
wideiy
flot wideiv
absoiuteiy
flot cornpieteiy
absoiuteiy
flot compieteiy
X
X
X
accessible to resideflts before the project
appropriate forthe fleeds ofthe populatiofl
eflough to coverthe needs of the popuiatiofl
within ifie project —
non-reimbursable fiflancial aid for repairs, purchase of a new house or self-help
subsidies for housiflg were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
absoiutely
aimost
flot at ail
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
absoluteiy
aimost
flot at ah
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at aN
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
flot offered at au to the affected popuiatlofl fend)
offered bv a differnt nrc irm/nrnniqfnn tend)
offered as oart of the oroiect
achieved as pianned
Ofi time when needed
appropriate for the needs of the popuiation
offered ta the right peopie who needed them
the appropriate strategy to be used
eflough to caver the needs ofthe population
I comiete I ok I net
Ioutputs I financial / fundinq 16 bans for infrastructure or othersi
bans for infrastructure or others were
were
were
withïn the project:
bans for inftastructure or others were
X
X
X
C
accessible to residents before the project
appropriate for the needs of the population
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
x not offered at ail to the affected population tend)
offered by a different program/orqanisation fend)
offered as oart of the roiect
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
pre-disaster capacity of local residents to have access to regular bans for individual or familial investment
widely
not widely
absolutely
not comnletelv
absolutely
not completeiy
bans for infrastructure repair, for buildinJs related with sur es 0f income (for individual shops, smail industries, etc), or
other initiatives for recovery. This indicator denotes the confidence of the financial system in the affected community and
the capacity ofthe users to enter into die regular banking system
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost — achieved as pbanned
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs 0f the population
not at ail —
absolutely —
aimost — offered to the right people who needed them
not at ail —
absobutely
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
notatail —
absolutely
aimoet
not at ail
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
r ncomplete I ck next I I
Ioutputs I financial I fundini 117 subsidies for infrastructure or othersi
before the project tbefore andlor after the disaster):
pre-disaster capacity of local residents to have access to governmental subsidies for individual or familial investment
subsidies for infrastructure or others were
were
were
widely
not widely
absolutely
flot comoletelv
absolutely
flot completely
X
X
X
accessible to residents before the project
appropriate for the needs of the population
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
wfthin the omiet:
non-reimbursable financial aid for inftastructui e repair, for buil
industries, etc), or for other initiatives for recovery
inc s related with sources cf income (for individual shops, small
subsidies for infrastructure or others were
wete
were
were
were
wete
were
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
absoluteiy
al most
not at ail
absolutely
almost
flot at aIl
absolutely
aimost
flot at aIl
absoluteiy
almost
not at aIl
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
X flot offered at ail to the affected oooulation (efld
offered by a differefit programlorgaflisation (endt
offered as part of the pro ject
achieved as planned
on time when needed
appropriate fotthe needs ofthe population
offered to the right people who needed them
the appropriate strategy to be used
enough to cover the needs of the population
incomplete ok I nct I
I outputs I infrastructure 1181 dams, barriers, retaining waIIsI
before the project (before andiot after the disaster)
assesses if dams, barriers and retaining waiis existed to protect housing from natural hazards (Iandsiides, floods, fires,
etc) and if this infrastructure guaranteed security and did flot represent risks for the population
dams, barriers, retaining walls were
absoIutely
— safe to ptotect residents before the project
flot compIeteiy x
absoiutely
were
— enough to cover the needs of the population
not completeiy x
absolutety
were — tunctional after the disaster
not completely X
within the project:
dams, barriers and retaining wails built to protect housing from natural hazards (iandsiides, floods, fires, etc). Safe
conditions and reduction of risks for the population are assessed in this indicator
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
o
comfiete okj I
dams, barriers, retaining walis
not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered by a different propre m/orqanisation fend)
x offered as part of the proiect
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoluteiy x
almost — achieved as pianned
not at ail —
abso!uteiy —
almost x on time when needed
notatail —
absoluteiy x
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost — offered to the right peopie who needed them
not at ail
absolutely x
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot et ail —
absoiuteiy x
almost
— safe to protect residents
not at ail —
X enough ta cover the needs cf the population
(outputs I infrastructure 1191 roadsl
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
assesses f roads (urban or rural) were appropriate and enough to cover the needs of housing in the community and the
risks that they might represent for the population. lt also assesses the damages in roads caused by tue disaster
roads were
absolutely
-
appropriate for the context before the project
flot completely —
absoluteiy
were — enough to cover the needs ofthe population
flot completely x
absolutely x
wete — safe in case 0f emergency and danger
not completely —
absolutely x
were — functional after the disaster
not completely —
within the project:
the performance in the construction of roads. The indicator applies at two levels: public infrastructure (for the benefit of
the cornmunity) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of its owners). lndividual infrastructure
includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services. These indicators illustrate the
sustainability of the project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and safety
absolutely
al most
not at ail
x not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
roads offered by a different proqramforqanisation fend)
offered as oart ofthe orolect
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
not at aIl —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
notatall —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — offered to the right people who needed them
not at ail —
absolutely —
aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — safe in case 0f emergency and danger
notatall —
enough to cover tue needs of the population
I mncemplete j ok I next I I
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
Ioutputs infrastructure 1201 water supplyl
before the pmject (before andlorafterUie disaster):
assesses if water supply was approptiate and enough to cover the needs of housing in the community and the risks that
it might represent for the population. It also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
water supply infrastructure was
absolutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot completely X
absolutely
was — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
not completely X
absolutely
was — safe for public healthflot completely x
absolutely
was — functional after the disasterflot completely X
within the project
water supply infrastructure
the performance in the construction of water supply infrastructure. The indicator applies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit of the community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of its
owners). Individual infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services.
These indicators illustrate the sustainability of the project and the considetation of long term effects in public heaith and
safetv
__________________________________________
x flot offered at ail to the affected oooulation tend
offered as part cf the pro ject
offered by a different program/organisation fend)was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
flot et ail —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
flot at ail
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot et ail
absolutely —
almost offered te the right people who needed t
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost — trie appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail
absolutely —
almost — safe for public health
not at ail —
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
incomplete I ok I next I I I
Ioutputs I infrastructure 21 electricityl
before the pmject (before and!or after the dïsaster):
assesses if electricicty supply was apptopriate and enough to cover the needs of housing in the community and the risks
that it might represent for the population. t also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
electricity infrastructure was
absolutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
not completely X
absolutely
was
— enough to cover the needs 0f the population
flot compietely x
absolutely
was — safe considenng local codes
not compietely x
absolutely
was — functional after the disaster
not completely X
within the project:
eiectricity infrastructure
the performance in the construction ci inftastrudtùre for electricity supply. The indicator applies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit of the community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of its
owners). Individual infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services.
These indicators illustrate the sustainability of the project and the consideration 0f long term effects in public health and
safety
X not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered bv a different proqram/orqanisation fend)
offered as oart of the oroiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absoiutely
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
notatail —
absoluteiy —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoiutely —
almost — offered to the right people who needed it
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
almost — safe considering local codes
not et ail —
absolutely
al most
not at ail
enough to cover the needs of the population
incompiete ck I I I
I OUtpUtS I infrastructure 1221 sewage I
before the project (before andlor after the disaster):
assesses ifthe sewage system was appropriate and enough to cover the needs of housing in the community and the
risks that it might represent for the population. It also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
sewage infrastructure was
absoluteiy
— appropriate for the context before the project
ot compietely x
was
absoiutely
— enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
flot completely x
absolutely
was — safe for public health
not completely x
absoiutely
was — functionai after the disaster
not compieteiy x
within the project:
me performance in tue construction of sewage infrastructure. The ndicator applies at two levels: public infrastructure
(for me benefit of tue community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for me benefit of its owners). Individual
infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services. These indicators
illustrate the sustainability of the project and the consideration of long term etfects in public health and safety
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
sewage infrastructure
X not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered by a different program/oroanisation tend)
offered as oart of me oroiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absoiuteiy
almost — achieved as pianned
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for me needs of me population
notatat —
absolutely —
aimost — offered to the right people who needed it
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — safe for public health
not at ail —
enough to cover the needs of the population
I inccmptcte I ok I I
Ioutputs I infrastructure 1231 telephonel
before the pmject (before andlor afterthe disaster)
assesses if the infrastwcture for teiephone system was appropriate and enough to coverthe needs of housing in the
community. it aiso assesses the damages caused by the disaster
infrastructure for telephone was
absoluteiy
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot compietely X
absoiuteiy
was
— enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
flot compietely x
absoiutely
was — functionai after the disaster
. not completeiy x
wfthin the project:
the performance in the construction 0f infrastructure for telephone systems. The indicator appiies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit 0f the community) and individuai infrastructure (in private property for the benefit 0f its
owners). Individual infrastructure inciudes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services.
These indicators illustrate the sustainabiiity of the project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and
safety
infrastructure for telephone
X not offered at ail to the affected population tend)
offered bv a different orooram/oraanisation tend)
offered as nart of the oroiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
almost — achieved as pianned
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
aimost — on time when needed
notatat —
absoiuteiy —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — offered to the right peopie who needed t
not at ail —
absoluteiy
aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
enough to cover the needs 0f the population
incompioto next I I I
Ioutputs I communitv services 124 schools
before the nmiect (before and!or after“
pre-project conditions of facilities
schools were
were
were
were
absoluteiy
flot completeiy
absoiuteiy
flot completelv
absolutely
flot comeletelv
absolutely
flot completeiy
X
X
X
X
within t”’
—. ,. ‘—J’—.
the performance in the construction of facilities
schools were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoiuteiy
almost
flot at ail
absoluteiy
aimost
flot at ail
absoiutely
aimost
flot at ail
absoluteiy
aimost
not at ail
absoiutefy
aimost
flot at ail
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
absoiutely
aimost
flot at ail
X flot offered at ail to the affected ooouiation (endt
offered by a different program/organisation (end)
offered as part of the pro ject
achieved as planned
on time when needed
appropriate for the needs of the population
offered to the right people who needed them
the appropriate strategy to be used
safe as offered (resist. to hazards of the original product)
enough to cover the needs of the population
appropriate for the context before the project
enough te coverthe needs ofthe population
safe (resistance te hazards)
functional after the disaster
incomplete ok I next I
Ioutputs I communitv services 1251 health centersi
belote the project (before and!or after the disaster):
pre-project conditions of facilities
health centers were
were
were
were
absoluteiy
flot comoietelv
absoiutely
flot completeiy
absoluteiy
flot compietely
absoluteiy
net comoletelv
X
X
X
X
appropriate for the context before the project
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
safe (resistance to hazards)
fijnctionai after the disaster
wfthin the project:
the performance in the construction of facilities
heaith centers were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
absoiutely
almost
not et ail
absolutely
aimost
not at ail
absolutely
aimost
not at ail
absoiuteiy
almost
not at ail
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
X not offered at ail te the affected population tend)
offered bv a different prooram/oreanisation tend)
oftered as cart of the oroiect
achieved as planned
on time when needed
appropriate for the needs of the population
oftered te the right people vho needed them
the appropriate strategy te be used
safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
enough te cover the needs of the population
. incomplote O; I !et I I
C
pre-project conditions offacilities
I outputs I communitv services 1261 community centers I religious bIdg.I
community centers I religious btdg. were
before the omiect tbefore andlor aftertJie disaster):
absolutely
flot completely
were
X
absolutely
not compietelv
were
appropriate for the context before the project
X
absoiutely
not comoleteiv X
were
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
absoiute?y
not compieteiy
within theproject:
safe fresistance to hazards)
the performance in the construction of facii
X
functionai after th&disaster
ties
community centers / religlous bldg. were
were
X
not offered at ail to the affected population (en)
absoiuteiy
aimost
not at ail
offered by a different programlorganisation tend)
offered as part 0f the project
X achieved as pianned
were
absoiuteiy
ai most
not at ail
X
absoiuteiy
on time when needed
were al most
not at ail
X
wece
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
appropriate for the needs of the population
X
were
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
offered to the right people who needed them
X
viere
the appropriate strategy to be used
absoiuteiy
aimost
not at ail
X
were
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
X
enough to cover the needs of the population
complote I I net I I
Ioutputs I community services 1271 police I fire stationsi
before the project (before andlor after the disaster):
pre-project conditions of facilifies
police / fire stations were
absolutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot completely x
absolutely
were — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
flot completely x
absolutely
were — safe (resistance to hazards)
flot completely x
absolutely
were — functional after the disaster
flot completely X
withïn the project: —
the performance in the construction of facil ties
X flot offered at aIl to the affected population fend)
police I fire stations were — offered by a different program/organisation fend)
offered as part of the project
absolutely —
were almost — achieved as pianned
flot at ail —
absolutely —
were aimost — on time when needed
flot at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
were almost — offered to the right people who needed them
flot at ail —
absolutely
wete almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
were almost — safe as offered (resist. to hazatds of the originai product)
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy —
were almost — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
notatali —
I incomplete ok I ncxt I I
Ioutputs housinq 28 new Iotsl
before the ptoject (before and/or after the disaster):
the pre-disaster level of access to land property; and/or pre- and post-disaster risks associated with the tenure of land,
oarticuiarlv due to location in zones of tisk
lots were
absolutely
— appropriate for the context betore the project
not completely x
land tenure was
absolutely
— enough to caver the needs otthe population
not compietely X
absolutely
land was — safe fresstance ta hazards)
flot completely x
land tenure was
wideiy
— accessible to residents
notwideiy X
wïthin ffie project;
initiatives targeted to increase the residents’ capacity ta acquire safe lots for housing; inciuding bans or subsidies given for
purchasing land or the direct donation of lots
were aimost
flot at ail
not offered at ail ta the affected oooulafion tend)
offered bv a differentoroaram/oraanisation (end)
oftered as part of the project
new lots were
were
were
were
wete
were
were
absolutely
almost — achieved as pianned
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — offered ta the right people who needed them
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy ta be used
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — safe as offered (resist. ta hazards 0f the original product)
not at ail —
absolutely
enough ta caver the needs of the population
I ieicomniete I ok I I
I OUtPUt I housin 1291 emergency sheltersi
before the project (before andlor after lie disaster):
pre-disaster arrangements and planning made by the organisations to adequately respond to the emergency. it ceptesents
the access ofthe community to contingency plans by the civil defense, fire departments, Red Cross, etc.
absolutely
emergency sheiters were — planned, before the disaster, through contingency plans
flot completely x
. . absolutely
emergency organisations were — prepared for a housing emergency
flot completely x
.
-
absolutely
authonties
—
were — prepared for a housing emergency
not completely x
. .
wide!y
info about contingency plans was . — accessible to residents before the disaster
flot widely X
within lie project:
implementation of an emergency sheltering plan; including provision oftents, plastics or other materials to build shelters for
the first days after the disaster
______________
—
______________________________________________________
notoffeced at aIl to the affected population fend)
x oftered as part of the pro ject
absolutely
almost x achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — on time when needed
notatali —
absoiutely —
almost — appropriate forthe needs of the population
notatail x
absolutely x
almost — offered to the nght people who needed them
not at ail —
absoluteiy
aImost x the appropriate strategy to be used
not et ail —
absolutely x
almost — safe to short-term protection 0f residents
notatail —
emergency sheiters offered by a different program/organisation fend)were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoIuteiy
aimost
not at ail X
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
complote j ok I I I I
oabsoiutely
almost
flot at ail
complote ok I Port I
Ioutputs housinq 301 temporary housingi
before the pmject (before and/or after the disaster):
pre-disaster arrangements and planning made by authorWes and local NGOs to adequately respond ta the requireness for
transitory housing
absolutely
— planned, before the disaster in urban planstemporary housing was
not completeiy X
absolutely
— prepared for building transitory housingemergency organisations were
not completely x
absoiutely
— prepared for building transitory housingauthorities were
not completely X
info about temporary housing plans was
widely —
accessible to residents before the disaster
notwidely X
within the project:
temporary housing
this might include the implementation of: fi) temporary units (i.e. pre-fab and winterised units); (ii) adapted temporary housing
(public facilities or rented apartments); or (iii) seif-provided temporary housing (homes of famihes I friends, user-buiit
shelters, or second homes)
_____________
—
not offered at aJl ta the affected population fend)
X
offered by a different programlorganisation (end)
offered as part of the pro ject
was
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost x achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely
aimost x on fime when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at alt x
absoiutely —
almost x offered to the right people who needed them
notatall —
absolutely —
aimost x the appropriate strategy ta be used
notatall —
absoluteiy —
almost x safe for mid-term protection of residents
notatail —
enough ta caver the needs ofthe population
GUtS j housinq 131 I new housesi
before the project (before and/or after the disaster):
the pre-disaster levei of access to housing (or tue contrary: the ieveI of housing shortage) and post-disaster homeiessness
caused by the disaster
houses were
absoiuteiy T— accessible to ail residents before the disaster
flot compieteiy J X
absoiuteiy
new houses were j— unnecessary after the disaster
flot compieteiy f X
within the project:
initiatives targeted to facihtate the acquisition of new permanent lousing, inciuding (if necessary) relocation of residents
living in dangerous conditions. Permanent new housing can be obtained: (i) through the provision of finished units; (ii) by
faciiitating and organising seif-heip construction; or (iii) by facihtating and organising the purchase of new housing existing in
the market
absolutely
almost
not et ail
j I I I I
new houses
not offered at ail to the affected ooouiation tendt
offered as part of the pro ject
offered by a different program/organisation (end)were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoiuteiy
almost — achieved as ptanned
notatail —
absoiutely —
aimost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely
aimost — appropriate forthe needs ofthe population
notatail —
absoiuteiy —
aimost — offered to the right peopie who needed them
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not et aH —
absoiutely —
almost — safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
notatail —
enough to cover the needs 0f the population
C Ioutputs I housinç 1321 reconstructed housesi
before the project (before andlorafterthe disaster):
houses were
the pre- and post-disaster nsks of collapse of housing structures due to one or some of the following reasons: fi) lack of
maintenance; (ii) use of inadequate materials; (iii) use of inadequate technologies; (iv) unsafe additions and structural
modifications to housing; (y) insufficient construction codes and standards
absolutely
flot completeiy X
were
absoiuteiy
flot completelv
functional after the disaster
X
were
absoluteiy
not completeiy X
appropriate for the needs of the population
safe after the disaster
the reconstruction 0f affected structures, inciuding minorrepairs and major reconstruction
within the project: —
the reconstruction of affected houses was
X
was
flot offered at ail to the affected population fend)
absoiutely
aimost
not at ail
offered bv a different proqram/orqanisation tend)
offered as oart of the oroiect
X
was
achieved as pianned
absoiuteiy
almost
flot at ail X
on time when needed
was
absoiuteiy
aimost
not at ail X
was
absolutely
almost
not at ail
appropriate for the needs of the population
X
was
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
offered to the right peopie who needed it
X
was
absoiutey
aimost
flot at ail
the appropriate strategy to be used
X
was
absoiutely
almost
not at ail
safe for Iong-term protection of residents
X
enough to cover the needs of the population
I complete I ck nxt I I
Ioutputs industrv /emplovm. I3 bldgslinfras. for industry & income generationi
before Hie project (before and!or after the disaster):
the pre-disaster level of access to sources of income; and/or pre- and post-disaster risks associated with the buildings and
infrastructure related with income generation, particularly the risks of collapse, destruction of infrastructure, destruction of plantations,
machinery or equipment, etc.
absolutely
—
bldgshnftas. for ndustry & income generation were
— appropriate for the context before the project
not completely x
widely
were .
— accessible to residents
not widely x
absolutely
were — safe (resistance to hazards)
not completely x
absolutely
were
— functional after the disaster
not completely X
wfthin the project:
the construction of buildings and infrastructure associated with the generation of income and employment at the scale of single familie
or small clusters (exciuding the reconstruction of large indusfries/companies). t might include the reconstruction 0f shops, small
industries, small scale infrastructure for production, processing or agriculture activities, etc., assessing the consideration 0f long-term
needs for eçonomic recovery, the capacity ofthe community to become economically independent, and in general, the sustainability 0f
the project. Only physical construction is considered, not including functioning and management 0f facilities
X not offered at ail to the affected oooulation tend)
bldgs/infras. for industry & income generation were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
offered by a different program/oraanisation (end)
offered as part ofthe project
absoluteiy
aimost
— achieved as planned
notatail
—
absoluteiy —
aimost — on time when needed
notatall
—
absoluteiy
—
almost appropriate for the needs ofthe population
notatali —
absoiutely
—
aimost
— offered to the right people who needed them
notatail —
absolutely
—
aimost
— the appropriate strategy to be used
notatall
absolutely
almost
— safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
not at ail —
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
enough to cover the needs of the population
incompicte ok I nç’ct j I I
before the project (befoœ andlor after the disastet):
unemployment subsidies were
were
were
X
X
X
accessible ta residents
appropriate for the context before the project
enough to cover Uie needs of the population
unemployment subsidies were
were
were
were
were
were
wete
X
offered as part ofthe pro ject
enough te caver the needs of the population
C Ioutputs industrv /emplovm. 1341 unemployment subsidiesi
pre-disaster access to regular governmentai unemployment subsidies (equivalent to welfare)
widely
flot wideiv
absolutely
net comnteteiv
absoluteiy
flot completeiy
wfthin Hie project:
initiatives targeted te the implementation ot subsidies Dt people that have lost their jobs or sources of income during the disaster. This
indicator denotes the consideration ofshort-term needs for economic recovery
flot offered at ail to the affected population (end)
offered by a different program/organisation fend)
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
flot at ail
absolutely —
aimost
—
on time when needed
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot et ail —
absolutely —
almost
—
offered te the right people who needed them
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
I incomplote I ck I I I
Ioutputs omets 1351 rescuel
before Hie pmject (before andlor after Hie disaster):
the pre-disaster capacity of local institutions (me civil defense, me police, me army, the local NGOs, the local Red Cross, etc.) ta
speedily and effectively react to the destwction
local organisations were
absolutely
on time to conduct emergency and rescue
not completely x
absolutely
— effectively conducted conhngency and rescue
not compietely x
absolutely
external alU was — unnecessary for rescue activities
not completely X
wfthin Hie project: —
the implementation of rescue activities
X not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
rescue activities were offered by a different program/organisation (end)
offered as part of the project
absolutely
were almost — achieved as planned
notatall —
absolutely —
were aimost — on time when needed
not at ail
absoiutely —
were aimost appropriate for the needs of the population
notatail —
absolutely —
were almost — offered to me right people who needed them
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
were almost — me appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoiutely —
were almost — enough to cover the needs 0f the population
flot at ail —
incompiete I ok I next j I
C Ioutputs I others 361 psychologicai aidi
before the pmject (before and/or after the disaster):
pre-disaster access to psychological aid. Even though this s a difficuit aspect to identify in urban contexts t is easier to identify as
being absent in most of rural contexts
widely
psychological aid was — accessible to residents
flot widely x
absoluteiy
was — appropnate for the needs of the population
flot compieteiy x
absoluteiy
was — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
flot completely X
within the project:
initiatives targeted to provide psychological aid to the affected residents. This might include individual or group therapies, giving advice
and information in newspapers or magazines
X not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
psychoiogicai aid was — offered by a different program/organisation tend)
offered as part of the project
absoiutely —
was aimost — achieved as planned
flot et ail —
absolutely —
was aimost — on time when needed
not et ail
absolutely —
was aimost — appropnate for the needs of the population
notatail —
absoiutely
was almost — offered to the right people who needed t
flot et ail
absoluteiy —
was a!most — the appropriate strategy to be used
not et ail —
absolutely —
was aimost — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
not at ail —
incomplete ok rei
.Ioutputs I others 1371 foodl
food
pre-disaster access to food, it highiights pre-disaster and post-disaster levels of malnutrition
before the oroiect (before and!orafterthe disaster):
was absolutelyflot compieteiy X
was absoiuteiy
not comoleteiv
accessible to residents
was
X
absoiutely
flot completely
initiatives targeted to provide food to the affected resid
food
appropriate for the needs 0f the population
X
within the oroiect:
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
ants in the first C ay
was
after the disaster.
was
not offered et ail to the affected population (end)
absoiutely
almost
not et ail
offered bv a different proqram/orqanisation fend)
offered as art of the oroiect
was
achieved as planned
absolutely
almost
flot et ail
on time when needed
was
absolutely
almost
not at ail
was
absolutely
al most
flot et ail
appropriate for the needs of the population
was
absoluteiy
almost
not et ail
offered to the right peopie who needed it
was
the appropriate strategy to be used
absoiuteiy
ai most
not et ail
enough to cover the needs ofthe popuiation
incomplete I ok I nt I I
Ioutputs j others 1381 medical aidi
before the project (before andlor after flue disaster):
pre- and post-disaster level of access to regular medicai care. This vulnerabiiity might consider the avaiiability of health centers in the
region and a qualitative assessment of the capacity of residents to gain access to health insurances
widely
medical aid was — accessible to residents
not widely x
was
absoiutely
— approptiate for the needs of the population
not completeiy x
was
absolutely
— enough to cover the needs ofthe population
not completely X
within the project:
initiatives targeted to the provision of medical assistance in the first days after the disaster
x not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
medical aid was — offered by a different program/organisation fend)
offered as part of the project
absolutely —
was almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely
was almost — on time when needed
notatail —
absolutely —
was almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not et ail —
absolutely —
was almost — offered to the right people who needed it
not at ail —
absoiutely —
was almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — enough to cover the needs of the population
not at ail
incomplete I I I
Ioutputs I others 1391 temporary infrastructure!
before the project(before and/orafterthe disaster):
the capacity of institutions to react to the destruction 0f public services and infrastructure, particularly the reaction of governmental
organizations in charge of public services and roads
. absolutely
temporary infrastructure was — planned in contingency plans
not completely x
local organisations were
absoiutely
— prepared to react to the destruction of infrastructure
not compieteiy x
absoluteiy
extemal aid was — unnecessary after the disaster
not completely X
wfthin Vie project:
initiatives targeted to the impiementation of temporary electricai and telephone systems, temporary water supply, and temporary
bridges, dams or any other infrastructure required to guarantee the safety and recovery 0f residents. This indicator assesses tue
capacity of residents to quickly resume daily activities
not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
temporary infrastructure was — offered by a different program/organisation fend)
offered as part of the project
absolutely —
was aimost — achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was aimost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absoluteiy
was aimost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
was aimost — offered to the right peopie who needed t
notatali —
absoiuteiy —
was almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absoiutely —
was aimost — enough to cover the needs of the population
not at ail —
incomplete I oh I I
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
I outputs others 1401 education and technical assistancel
before the project (before and!or after ffie disaster):
pre-disaster access to technicai education and knowledge. it might include assessing the average access to schooling and informai
education in the region
. wideiy
schooling (up to secondary) was . — accessible to residents
notwtdety x
. compiete
residents had . — knowledge about construction -reiated subjects
insufficient x
. . . lwideiy
technical courses and informai educaton were t . — accessible to residents
notwideiy X
within the project: —
education and technical assistance
the impiementation of plans for education and technicai assistance. it might inciude education in disaster prevention, education in
better construction practices, formation on leadership, equity, human rights, protection ofthe environment, etc. and technicai
assistance for deveioping better construction practices or for the assembiy of construction components
not offered at ail to the affected ooøuiation tend)X
offered by a different prograrn/organisation fend)
offered as part of the roject
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absoluteiy
aimost — achieved as pianned
notatat
absoluteiy —
almost on time when needed
not at ail —
absoiutely —
aimost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
aimost — offered to the right peopie who needed t
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
notataii —
enough to cover the needs 0f the population
I incompiete I oh next I
C OUtput$ I others 141 informationl
before Hie project (befoœ andlor afterthe disaster):
pre-disaster access to information related with risks, awareness, contingency and coping activities. t might include assessing the
average access to the media (news papers, internet 1V and radio), the existence of campaigns of information and the access to local
and external publications
. .
. .
wideiy
information concerning risks, awareness, etc. was — accessible to residents
flot widely x
. .
widely
campaigns of information f0 the public were . — used in the region
.
flot wtdeiy x
.
widely
residents had — access to the media n general
flot widely x
within the project:
the impiementation of plans for dissemination 0f information and knowtedge regarding the disaster or the reconstruction activities. lt
might inciude publications, meetings with the community and information through the media to inform about the causes and effects of
the disaster, the projects in action, how to access to the benefits ofthe project, how to find a job, etc.
notoffered at ait to the affected ooouiation tend)
was offered by a different program/organisation tend)
x offered as part of the project
absolutely
aimost x achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely —
a!most x on time when needed
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy
aimost x appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost x offered to the right people who needed it
flot atat - —
absoiutely —
almost x the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
X
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
information
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutety
aimost
notat ail
I complote I ok I next I
j resuits transfer 42J bans given and subsidies albocatedj
before the project (before andlorafterffie disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the performance in the transfer of financial solutions and funding, being useful to idenfify if the money finaliy reached the
beneficiaries
absolutely
bans and subsidies offered were almost allocated as planned
not at ail X
absoluteiy —
were aimost — used at an appropriate tirne (as assumed)
flot at ail x
absoluteiy x
were almost — used in the appropriate way (as assumed)
flot at ail —
absolutely —
were almost x used by the people that needed them (as assumed)
not at ail
. complete I ok I next I I
resufts I transfer 431 direct and indirect jobs createdi
belote the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the consequences in the creation of employment opportunities of having developed the different outputs. it denotes the
capacity of the project ta faciiitate the recovery of the economy and the achievement of the economic independence of the
beneficiaries
absolutely
new direct and indirect jobs were aimost — enough ta facilitate the recovery of the local economy
flot at ail X
absoluteiy —
aimost — facihtated the economic independence of beneficiaries
flot at ail x
absoiuteiy —
were aimost — created atthe appropriate time
not at ail X
absolutely —
aimost — represented appropriate working conditions fDr residents
not at ail x
complote I ok I nxt I I
resuits transfer 1441 houses occupiedi
before the project (before andlor after the disaster):
nia
wfthin the project
the post-project rate cf occupation cf dwellings. it s particularly useful to identify the acceptability cf the houses provided
by the mufti-organisation
absolutely
the houses provided were almost — occupied by residents
flot at ail X
absolutely —
were almost — occupied at the appropriate time (as assumed)
notatail x
absolutely —
were almost — used in the appropriate way (as assumed)
flot at ail x
absolutely —
were almost — used by the people that needed them (as assumed)
notatali X
complote I ok I xt I
Iresuits I transfer 451 insurance policies takeni
before the project (before and!or after flue disaster):
n/a
wfthin the project:
insurance policies are flot a common output cf reconstruction projects in the context ofthe selected case studies. However, t is
considered here as a consequence of improving the awareness and knowledge of residents and local organisations. Transterring
the risks cf destruction to insurance companies is considered here as a positive consequence of educating and informing
organisations and individuats about the risks of future disasters
very much —
taking insurance policies for housing was slightly — incremented after the disaster
not at ail x
absolutely —
the risks of disasters was almost — reduced by the government by sharing t with insurance comp.
not at alt X
complete I ok I ft I
absolutely L
emergency protocols were almost L implemented in tte region among resdential areas
notatall
absolutely
contingency plans and emer. protocols were almost included in the agenda of local authorities and organisations
flot at aIl
complete ok I nxt
fSUItS I transfer 1461 emergency protocols implemented
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
nia
wittnn Oie project
emergency protocols are flot considered as a common output of reconstruction projects in the context ofthe selected case studies.
However, t is considered here as a consequence of improving the awareness and knowledge ofresidents and local organisations.
Implementing emergency protocols tparticularly in urban contexts) s considered here as a positive consequence of educating and
informing organisations and individuals about the risks offiiture disasters
results I transfer 1471 increment of land ownership
before the project (before and!or after fie disaster):
nia
within the project
This s a context-sensitive indicator. t is consider in this context as a positive indicator of results as it denotes the capacity of the
projeot to secure safe land for residents at the long run. Increment of land ownership can be due to the provision of new lots, due to
the success of ban or subsidies programs or due to the successful legalisation 0f illegally occupied land
absolutely
land ownership almost x increased in the region after the project
not at aIl
complete I ok I net
I resuits I transfer 1481 increment of home ownershipl
before the pmject (before andior after the disaster):
nia
within the project:
This s a context-sensitive indicator. It s consider in this context as a positive indicator of resuits. It can be due to construction of new
houses, by acquisition of existing housing stock, or by upgrading of squatter sefflements and shacks. This indicator denotes the
capacity ofthe projectto guarantee secure safe sheltering in the long term
absolutely
home ownership almost increased in the region affer the project
not at ail x
complete I ok I I I
Iresuits I communitv particip. 1491 desgnI
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
Assesses the capacity of residents to actively participate in the design oftheir own dwelling
significantly
residents did partially — decideffie distribution ofspaces oftheirown dwelling
flot
significantly —
did partially — decide the location and orientation oftheir own dwelling
not X
significanfly —
did partially — selectthe finishes oftheir own dwelling
not X
significanlly —
did partially decide the size and conditions of the spaces their dwelïngs
not x
significanfiy —
did partially — selectthe technology ofthe structure and main components
not x
significantiy —
did partially — select the construction method to be used
flot x
complote I ok I net I
ma na gementJ
Iresuits f community articïp. 1501
before the project (before andior after ifie disaster)
nia
within the project
Assesses the capacity of residents to actively participate n the management of th
eir own dwelling
absotutety
residents
atmost — could choose
whether using self-help or hiring
labor force
not at ail X
significantiy —
did partialiy — manage the economic resources
not X
signiflcanuy —
did partiaily manage the contracts of suppiiers
not x
significantiy —
did partially — determine the schedule and planning of activit
ies
not X
significantly —
did partiaily — communicate directly with other stakeholders
not X
significantly —
did partafly — organise peopie and resources in the constru
ction field —
flot
GcmpLet ok I I
Ifha
Iresuits I communitv articip. 151 I financing 0f the projectl
befom the project (before and!or after the disaster):
within the project:
Assessesthe capacity et residents to activeiy participate in the financing 0f their own dwelling
absolutely
residents did almost — seiect the financing system for the ptoject
not at ail X
absoiute!y —
did aimost — participate in coilecting funds
notatail x
absoiuteiy —
did aimost — know the costs of construction and materiais
not at aIT x
absoluteiy —
did almost — have the option of incurring in expenses directiy
not at ail x
absoiuteiy —
did aimost — have the option to participate with own resources
not at ail x
absoiutely —
did aimost — participate in financing coliectiveiy (or as a cooperative)
not at ail x
conipiete I ok I net I I
Iresuits I communhtvparticip. 1521 production 0f components
[before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
wfthin the project:
Assesses the capacity 0f residents to activeiy participate in the production of components for their own dweliing
absoluteiy
residents did almost — work in the production of components
notatail X
absoluteiy —
did aimost — Iearn the technique of production of components
notatali X
absoiuteiy —
did aimost — operate the machines for production of components
not at ail x
absoiuteiy —
the production of components did almost — optimise the skilis and knowiedge of residents
notatat X
compieto I I rt I
resufts communitv particip. 1531 constructionl
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
Assesses the capacity of residents to activety participate in construction activities for their own dweiling
absoluteiy
residents did almost x work in assembly 0f construction components
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
did aimost x Iearn the method of construction
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
did almost x get remunerated fmoney, food or property) for labor force
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
members otthe famiiy did aimost x have the option ta work in the construction fleid
not at ail —
complote I ok I I I
Iresuits j communitv particip. 1541 individuai responsibiiity of decision making
before the project (before and!or after ifie disaster):
n/a
within the project:
Assesses the level 0f responsibility of decision making
absoluteiy
residents were almost — responsible for registering to the project (or program)
flot at ail X
absolutely —
were almost
— responsible for applying for the services and products offered
notatali x
absoluteiy —
were almost — responsible for completing the bouse
notatali X
absolutely —
were almost — responsibie for the use of funding
flot at ail x
absoiutely —
were almost — responsible for obtaining disaster-resistance standards
notatali x
absoiutely
were almost responsible for obtaining and using information and know-how
flot at ail x
absolutely —
were aimost — responsible for selecting where to invest the resources
not at ail x
: cotplete I 0k I next I
I impacts I pro ject poals 1551 debtl
before the project (before andior after tue disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the debt acquired by local organisations or the national government to develop the project. A low debt resulting from the project is
considered as e potential positive effect of the project
an insignificant x
the debt resuWng ftom the project was a reasonable burden for local organisations or the national government
a very high
complote I ok I nxt I I
Iimpacts J proiect qoals 156 I environmenta mpactI
before the project (before andlor after Hie disaster):
n/a
wfthin Hie project
the positive and negative impacts ofthe project on the environment. This might include negative impacts due to the sprawl 0f
urbanisation, the over exploitation of indigenous materials, and the effects 0f the diswption of public infrastructure (particutarly
sewage systems). This indicator denotes the assessment of long-term consequences on the sustainability of the project
flot at ail —
the project almost — had a negative effect in urban sprawl
absolutelv x
notatail
almost — had a negative effect of over exploitation of natural resources
absolutely —
notatail x
almost — had a negative effect in natural sources ofwater
absoiutely —
flot at ail x
almost — had a negative effect in natural forests
absoluteiy —
flot at ail —
almost — had a negative effect in public health
absolutely x
absolutely —
almost — contributed to urban/rural organisation anti consolidation
flot at ail x
absolutely —
almost — reduced the negative effects ofthe disaster in the environment
notatall X
absolutely —
almost — reduced the negative eftects ofthe disaster in public health
flot at ail X
______
______
______
______
______
______
______
______
______
comTcte I ok I net I I
I impacts I roject qoafs 1571 recovery of normai activitiesi
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
nia
within the project:
the performance in terms of time for the recovery of normal acUvities. It includes assessing the time t took for the majority of the
community to resume dally acUvities (going to work, to school, do normally domestic activities, etc.)
absolutely
the project almost — facilitated the recovery of: people going to work
not at ail x
absolutety —
almost — facilitated the recovery of: people going to school
not at ail X
absolutely —
almost — facilitated the recovery of: people doing domestic activities
notatall x
absolutely —
almost — facilitated the recovery of people: doing recreational activities
not at ail X
complote 1 ok I I I
impacts I project qoals 1581 physicat resistance to hazardsl
before the project (before andIor after lie disaster): I
n/a
wfthin the project
cumulative performance in terms of trie overall resistance to natural hazards. it includes flot only the resistance 0f the original units
(as built duting the project) but also the resistance of later additions and modifications to the original units. This indicator compiles
the general resistance to hazards due to safe location, exposure to danger, awareness and mitigation of possible risks,
implementation 0f better building codes and standards, and in general ail the structural and non structural risks of unsafe
conditions. It denotes the capacity of the project to guarantee long term safe conditions of housing
absolutely
original houses were almost — safe fresistance to natural hazards) at the mid-term
notatali x
absolutely —
modified houses (inc. additions) were aimost — safe (resistance to natural hazards) at the mid-term
notatali X
absolutely x
infrastructure was almost — safe (resistance to natural hazards) at the mid-term
notatali —
absolutely x
other buildings and facilities were almost — safe (resistance to natural hazards) at the mid-term
notatali —
complete 0k next I I
t impacts proiect qoals 1591 ttansfer of better building practicesi
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the performance in the assimilation of beffer building practices, particularly in self-heip and this including better use of materials,
improvements in local technologies, general awareness of risks, respect of building codes and standards, etc. This variable indicates the
capacity of the project to reduce the iong-term physical vuinerabilities of the community fparticulariy if a great percentage of regular
housing is user-made)
absolutely
user-made constructions after the project were almost — safe (resistance to natural hazards)
not at ail x
absolutely —
construction technologies were almost — improved in user-made constructions after the disaster
not at ail X
absoiutely
user-made constructions after the project were almost — vigilant of construction codes and standards
not at ail x
absolutely —
proper maintenance was almost — conducted to housing structures
not at ail X
complete ok I ne1
I impacts roiect oals 1601 institutional capacity and deveIopment
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
the performance ofthe project in reinforcing the administrative methods, expertise, know-how, and management tools of local authorities
for disaster management. This indicator denotes the capacity of the project to increase the evel of development from the local authorities
point of view. t includes assessing: (i) ffie implementation or not of programs of education, training, administrative cooperation and
information targeted to local authorities; and (ii) the level of participation of regular administrative units (municipalities, regular public
entities, etc.) in the reconstruction project. The creation 0f temparary public entities with the exclusive mandate of dealing with
reconstruction activfties - which dissolve once reconstruction is finished - s considered as a potential cause of loss of the know how and
expertise gained through the development of the project
X
absolutely X
almost — participated in the design and management ofthe project
not at ail —
notatalt
almost — dissolved affer the project
absolutely x
flot at aIl —
almost x implemented after the project
absolutely —
absolutely
almost
flot at aIl
implemented for local authorities and administrative unitseducation and training programs were
local administrative units
temporary entities for reconstruction were
new administrative methods and plans were
local administrative units
absolutely
almost
not at aIl
had responsibility of the good development ofthe project
I complote I ok I ne1 I I I
a fait method of selection 0f beneficiaries
women and men had
residents from different races had
residents from different social classes had
residents with different religlous affiliation had
people without civil ID or not registered had
residents ofthe lowest economic levels were
people without legal tenure wece
non land owners or home owners were
people located in unsafe areas were
Iimpacts I proiect qoals 61 eguality of gender and minoritiesJ
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
nia
within the project
the performance ofthe projectin selecting the beneficiaries ofthe ptoject. lthighlights possible segregation by gender, race, social
status, religious affiliation, etc. It may aiso denote the selection of beneficiaries according to other variables such as: capacity of acquiring
debts, famiiy income, tenure of civil address or registered iD, land or home ownership, legal occupation of land, tenure 0f tities 0f legal
property, location in safe areas, etc. This indicator denotes the performance of the project in terms of covering and scope
absolutely
was almost implemented in the project
notatall x
absoluteiy X
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
not at ail
absolutely x
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
notatall —
absoiutely x
almost — included as beneficiaries of products and services
notatall —
absolutely x
almost inciuded as beneficiaries of products and services
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — included as beneficiaries 0f products and services
notatali
absolutely
almost
not at aIl
X
included as beneficiaries 0f products and services
I complote I ok I nxt I
Iimpacts I proiectnoals 1621 atisettlements in safe areasi
before the pmject (before andlor after the disaster):
nia
wfthin the project
the contribution ofthe projectto eliminate housing Iocated in dangerous areas. it highlights the permanence of squatting settiements in
risk-prone areas and remaining risks due ta location. it denotes the capacity ofthe project to achieve the ulfimate goal of eliminating
physical vulnerability of housing
absoluteiy
housing in the region was almost — built in safe areas
notatail x
absolutely —
the project almost — contributed to reduce settlements in cisk-prone areas
not at ail X
absolutely —
almost — contributed to reduce the physical vulnerability of housing
not at ail x
absoiuteiy —
a similar disaster is aimost — unlikely to happen to the same population in the same region
not at ail X
I complote I ok I st1 I I I
FIPs of the CGOs’ project n Cotombia
C mufti orqarsation TU the capacityto attractfunds for the projecti
before Hie project fbefore andlor after the disaster):
nia
wfthln Hie projece
capacity to obtain donations and)or financing. t ass
esses the amount of resources obtained vs. the initiai estimation and budget
absoiuteiy X
the capacity to attract funds almost — permifled to coilect the funds required according to the initial
estimations
notatali —
absoluteiy x
almost — permitted to get on
time the ftinds that wete required
not at ail —
absoiutely x
almost — guaranteed a continuous investment of resources
not at ail —
absoiuteiy x
aimost — permitted to target an appropriate level 0f quahty in the outputs offered
not at ail —
absolutely z
aimost — permitted to deal with a complete series of outputs
not at ail —
absoiutely z
aimost — pecmitted the organisation an adequate independence ofdecision making
flot at ail —
compiete ok I next I
next
absolutely •
almost —
flot at ail
completeiy
partially —
flot
IiflDUtS multi omanisation I 2 I level of intearation with the communitvl
beforetheproject(befoieàidlorafterdiedisaster):
nia
withintheproject:
directly reiated with the defin Won of integration used here. Includes the capacfty ofthe organisation to develop horizontal relations with
members ofthe community, beneficiaries and grass roots organisations in order to accomplish common objectives
had an active participation within the multi-organisationlocal residents
local associations
local authorWes
grass-roots NGOs
local contractors
the organis. in charge ofthe projeut had
absolutely x
almost — had an active participation wiffiin the multi-organisation
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — had an active participation within the multi-organisation
not at ail x
absolutely —
almost x had an active participation within the multi-organisation
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — had an active participation within the multi-organisation
not at ail —
established relations in the region before the beginning of the ptoject
I complete I ok I next I
finputs I muiti orqanisation 3 j level of întegration between orgarusationsi
nia
enough X
almost enough
— links with other organis. to work together towards a common objective
flot enough —
absoiutely x
almost — resuited in appropriate cooperation
notatail
—
absoiuteiy x
aimost — faciiitated coilecting funds and obtaining financing
notatail
—
directiy related with the denition of integration usedhere. Inciudes Ue capacity ofthe organisation to develop horizontal and vertical relations
with banks, NGOs, pnvate companies, etc. in order to accomplish and reinforce common objectives
absoiuteiy x
almost — coordinated to achieve a common objective
not at ail
individual objectives of each organis. were
the organisation in charge ofthe project had
integration with other organisations
integration with other organisations
me relations between the organisations were
absoiutely
aimost
not at ail
X
consolidated when needed
f compete I ok I rrt I I I
Jinputs I mufti ornanisation I 4 J level 0f dïfferentiation betweer organisations
before the omiectibefore and!orafterffie disasteri:
nia
within the project
based on me assessment of corporate performance as proposed by Lawrence and Lorsh. Includes the assessment 0f me level of definition
of different rotes among the organisations of the project team. The performance decreases if acfivWes made by different organisations
overlapped incurring in redundancy, too much assistance, or repetition
the differentiation of responsibilities was
the differentiation of responsibitifies
me differentiation of responsibitifies
the differentiafion of responsibilities
X
neyer x
sometimes — overlapped incurring in repetWon and redundancy
aiways —
absolutely x
almost — took advantage of the strengths and weaknesses of each organisation
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — contributed to attain a common objective
flot at ail —
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
defined in a dear manner
me differentiation of responsibilities was
absolutely
almost
not at aIl
X
set up when needed
I complote ok J xt I I
Iinputs I mufti orqanisation I 5 I projects administrative costsl
before the pmject (before and!or alter the disaster): -
n/a
within the pioject
the level of optimization of economic resources for the benefit of beneficiaries. Assessed as a the percentage of the projects
budget. Lower administrative costs = befler performance —
absoluteiy x
project’s administrative costs were almost — reduced through the optimisation of local resources
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
were almost — reduced by minimising the costs of expatriate officers
notatall —
absolutely x
were almost — justified by having reduced overail costs for the project
not at ail —
absoiutely x
almost — favored the maximum use of money for the benefit of beneficiaries
not at ail —
complete I ok I I I
Iinputs mufti orqanisation 6 the capacity of the system to adapt to the environm.I
before the pmject (before and!or after the disaster): -
n/a
within the project:
the capacity to reactto me risks and opportunifies ofthe environment atthe social, economic and political leveis. Inciudes an
assessment ofthe intuence ofthe environment in me objectives targeted by me mufti-organisation
notatali
the objectives ottiie project were somehow — affected by negative unexpected changes otthe environment
greatiy —
absoiuteiy —
the risks inherent to the environment were aimost x assessed by the mufti-organisation during the project
not at ail —
absoiuteiy x
me organis. responsible of the project almost — anticipated a plan to minimise (shate) financiai risks
not at ail —
absoiutely x
the organis. responsible of the project almost — took advantage ofunexpected opportunities ir the environment
not at ail
absoiuteiy x
when required, changes in the project were almost — impiemented
notatali —
absoiuteiy x
the organi. responsible of the project was aimost — prepared to work in a hostie environment
notataii —
complete I ok I nex? I I
Jinputs I manaaement tools I 7 I a census of local residentsl
before Hie nroiect (before andlor after die disaster):
n/a
a census 0f local residents was
was
was
was
was
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
absoiutely
ai most
flot at ail
absoiutely
aimost
flot at ail
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
X
X
X
X
X
flot conducted fend)
conducted by a different programlorganisation (end)
conducted as part of the project
inclusive of diversity and everybody in the community
conducted and used on time
used to adapt the project to the reai needs ot the popuiation
the appropriate strategy (management tooi) to use
I complote I ok I aext I
wfthin die roject:
dams, barriers and retaining wails buiit to protect housing ftom natural hazards (iandslides, floods, fires, etc). Safe
conditions and reduction of risks for the population are assessed in this indicator
were
were
were
were
were
were
Iinputs manaqement tools I 8 I previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc)I
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
wfthm the project
previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc)
pre-project technical studies (pre- or post-disaster) to collect information about local living conditions, architecturai typologies, construction
techniques, etc.
_______________________________________________ _____________
— flot conducted (end)
conducted bv a different proqramlorqanisation (end)
x conducted as oart 0f the Droiect
absolutely X
almost — useful to discover new information about local characteristics
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — conducted and used on time
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — used to adapt the project to local characteristics
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — properiy reported or pubFshed for future reference
not at ail —
absolutely •
almost —
not at ail
flue appropriate strategy (management tool) to use
I complote I ok I nt I
I inputs I manaciement tools I 9 I surveys of peoples needsf
before the pmject (befote andlor afterthe disaster):
nia
within the project:
post-disaster assessment of damages and real needs fthrough questionnaires, visits, meetings with the community, etc.)
flot conducted (end)
surveys of peopies needs were — conducted by a different programlorganisaton fend)
x conducted as part of flue project
absoluteiy —
were almost x useful to reveal new information about residents expectations
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
were almost — conducted and used on time
flot at ail —
absolutely x
were almost — used to adapt the project to real needs
not at ail —
absoiutely —
were almost x properly reported or published for future reference
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
were almost — the appropriate strategy (management tool) to use
flot at ail —
complete I ok I next I
inputs manaqementtoois consultation with the community
before the project (before and!or after the disaster): - - --
n/a
within the project:
assessment ofthe users opinions and suggestions regarding living conditions, expectations, and requirements
flot conducted fend)
consultation with .the community was conducted by a different programiorganisation (end)
x conducted as part of the project
absoluteiy —
almost x conffibuted in the beginning to set up the priorities of the project
flot at ail —
absoiutely
almost x permitted to make changes and adapt the project during the process
flot at ail —
absolutely —
aimost x enhanced diversity and muitiplicity
flot at ail —
absolutely —
aimost — permitted a fair representation of ail the residents
flot at ail x
x intended to desigfl the project
was — intended to adapt the existing project
intended to present the project to residents
complete I ok I nx1 I
I inputs I local resources 11 the capacity of residents to work in constructioni
within the proect
sufficient X
relative availability of time to work in construction
insufficient —
sufficient x
relative — interest to work in construction activities
insufficient —
sufficient x
relative — guidance to work in construction activities
insufficient —
n/a
beforethepxvject(befomand/oraftetftiedlsaster):
beneficianes of the project
indicates availability ot time, knowledge and interest to work in construction. t assesses the users’ availability of time to work in
constwction; users’ skills and know how in building practices; and users’ interest to invest their fime and expertise in construction
had
sufficient
relative
had
x knowledge about construction practices
had
had
sufficient
had relative
insufficient
x
physical conditions to work in construction activities
I complete I ok I rxt I I
inputs I local resources I 121 materials and eguipment availablel
before the p,oject (before and!or after the disastei
nia
within ffie project:
tue capacity to use indigenous materials (wood, sand, earth, paim leaves, bamboo, clay, etc.) for the production of construction
components and Hie availability of tools and equipment for construction
X
absolutely
aimost — corresponded to the skiils of Hie affected population
flot at ail
absoluteiy —
aimost x safe for the environment (preventing degradation of natural resources)
flot at ail
absolutely x
aimost — available in Hie region
notatali
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
avaiiable in Hie regionlocal indigenous matenais were
were
toois and equipment were
absoiuteiy x
aimost — corresponded to Hie skilis 0f Hie affected population
________________________________
not at ail
_______________________________________________________________
complete I ok I tiet I I I
IoutpUts I financial /fundinq 13 I tax incentïves for companies! individualsi
absoluteiy
aimost
flot at ail
betoretheproject(beforeandiorafterthedisaster):
nia
within tue project
the impiementation of tax incentives to attract investment and economic recovery after the disaster. Tax incentives are
targeted to promote the creation of employement opportunties, new businesses and the development of local industries.
Equaily, tax incentives to individuals dunng a certain penod oftime ease the financiai burden ofrecovery ofthe affecetd
families
tax incentives
not offered at ail to the affected Dooulation Cend’
offered as part of the project
j offered by a different programlorganisation(end)were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail
absoiuteiy —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail
absolutely —
almost — offered to the nght people who needed them
not at ail
absolutely —
aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail
Z enough to coverffie needs ofthe population
j incomplete I ok I I I
Ioutputs I financial !fundinq 141 bans for housing
before the Droiect tbefore and!or after tue disaster:
pre-disaster capacity of local residents to have access to banking bans and mortgages for housing
bans for housing were
were
were
wideiy
flot widelv
absoiuteiy
flot completeiy
absolutely
flot completely
X
X
X
within the project:
the implementation of bans for repairs, self-help initiatives or buying a new house. This indicator denotes me confidence
of the financiai system in the affected community and the capacity of the users to enter into the regular banking system
accessible to residents before the projeot
appropriate forme needs of me population
enough to cover me needs of flue population
absoiutely X
almost — achieved as planned
notatail —
absolutely x
aimost on time when needed
not at ail —
absoiuteiy x
aimost — appropriate for me needs of the population
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost — offered to me right people who needed mem
notatali —
absoiuteiy x
almost — me appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
bans for housing
not offered at aIl to the affected population (end)
offered by a different program/organisation fend)
x offered as part of the project
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoiuteiy
aimost
not at ail
X
enough to cover the needs of the population
I complote I ok j net I I
Ioutputs I financial/ftindinq 151 subsidies for housingi
within the project: -
non-reimbursable financial aid for repairs, purchase cf a new house or self-help
subsidies for housing were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
flot et ail
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
flot et ail
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
flot offered at ail to the affected ooulation (end)
offered bv a different Droaramloraanisatiofl tefld)
offered as ûart cf Vie nroiect
achieved as plaflfled
Ofi time whefl needed
appropriate for the fleeds of the population
offered to the right people who fleeded them
the appropriate sfrategy to be used
enough to cover the fleeds of the population
complote I ok I I I I
subsidies for housing were
before the project fbefore andlor afterthe disaster): -
pre-disaster capacity of local residents to have access to govemmental subsidies for housing
widely
flot widelv
were
X
absolutely
flot completely
accessible to residents before the project
were
X
absolutely
flot completelv
appropriate for Vie fleeds cf Vie population
X
enough to coverthe needs 0f Vie population
I0UtPUtS
- I financial /fundinq 1161 bans for infrastructure or othersi
pre-disaster capacity 0f local residents to have access to regular bans for individual or familial investment
bans for infrastructure or others were
were
were
widely
not widelv
absobutely
flot completely
absolutely
flot Çompletely
X
X
X
accessible to residents before the project
appropriate forthe needs of the population
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
wfthin the pmject:
bans for infrastructure repair, for buildings related witii sources 0f income (for individual shops, smabl industries, etc), or
other initiatives for recovery. This indicator denotes the confidence of the financial system in the affected community anc
the capacity ofthe users to enter into the regular banking system
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
bans for infrastructure or others
not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
x offered as part of the proiect
offered by a different proram)orqanisation fend)were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoluteby X
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely x
abmost — on Ume when needed
notatali —
absoiuteiy x
almost — appropriate for the needs ofthe population
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — offered to the right people who needed them
notatail —
absolutely x
aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
notatali —
X
enough to cover the needs of the population
I complote ok I I I
Ioutputs I financiaI/fundinç 171 subsidies for infrastructure or othersi
before the troiect (befom andior after the disasteti: -
pre-disaster capacity of local residents to have access to governmental subsidies for individual or familial investment
subsidies for infrastructure or others were
were
were
wideiy
flot wideiy
absolutely
flot comoletelv
absolutely
not completely
X
X
X
within Uie project:
non-reimbursabie financial aid for infrastructure repair, for buildings related with sources of income (for individual shops, small
industries, etc), or for other initiatives for recovery
net offered at ail to the affected population tend)
subsidies for infrastructure or others were — offered by a different programlorganisation fend)
x offered as part of the project
absoluteiy x
were almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely x
were almost — on time when needed
notatali —
absoluteiy x
were almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
were almost — offered to the right people who needed them
flot at ail
absoiuteiy x
were almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absoiuteiy x
were almost — enough to cover the needs 0f the population
flot at ail —
complete I ok I pxt I I
accessible to residents before the project
appropriate for the needs of the population
enough to cover die needs ofdie population
Ioutputs I infrastructure 1181 dams, barriers, retaining waIIsI
before the project (before and/orafter Hie disaster ..:
assesses if dams, barners and retaining walls existed to protect housing from natural hazards flandslides, floods, fires,
etc) and if this infrastructure guaranteed security and did flot represent risks for the population
dams, barriers, retaining walls were
absolutely
— safe ta protect residents before the projectflot completely X
absoiutely
were — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
not compieteiy X
absolutely
were — functional alter the disaster
not completeiy X
wfthin Hie project: .,2 —
dams, bamers and retaining walls buift o protect housing from natural hazards (Iandslides, floods, fires, etc). Safe
conditions and reduction of risks for trie population are assessed in this indicator
— not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
were offered by a different program/organisation fend)
were
were
were
were
were
were
x offered as part of the project
X
enough ta caver the needs ofthe population
dams, barriers, retaining walis
absolutely X
almost — achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost
— on time when needed
not at ail —
absoiuteiy x
almost — appropriate for trie needs of the population
not at ail —
absoiuteiy x
aimost — offered to the right peopie who needed them
notatail —
abso!utely x
almost — trie appropriate strategy ta be used
notatali —
absoiutely x
aimost — safe ta protect residents
not at ail —
were
absoluteiy
aimost
not at ail
compiete I ok I nxt I I I
C
absolutely
roads were — appropriate for the context before tue project
flot compietely X
absoiutely
were — enough to coer the needs ofthe population
flot completely x
absolutely
were — safe in case of emergency afld danger
flot completely x
absolutely
were — functional after the disaster
flot completely x
withn Uie project - -
the performance in the construction of roads. The indicator applies at two levels: public infrastructure (for the benefit of
the community) afld individual infrastructure (in pnvate property for the benefit of its owners). Individual infrastructure
includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services. These ifldicators illustrate the
sustainability of the project and the consideration 0f long term effects in public healtu and safety
absolutely x
aimost — achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — on time when needed
notatail —
absolutely x
almost — approphate for the needs ofthe population
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — offered ta the right people who needed them
flot atail —
absolutely x
almost — tue appropriate stcategy ta be used
notatali —
absolutely x
almost — safe in case of emergency and danger
notatali —
Ioutputs I infrastructure [191 toads(
before the pmject(before and!or after the disaster): r
assesses if roads furban or rural) were appropriate and enough ta cover the needs of housing in the community and the
risks that they might represent for flue population. It also assesses the damages in roads caused by the disaster
roads
—
flot offered at ail to the affected populatiofl (end)
—
offered by a different program/organisation (end)
x offered as part of the project
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoiutely
almost
flot at ah
X enough ta caver the needs ofthe population
I complete ok gexf j I
Ioutputs infrastructure j20 I water suppiyC before Hie project (before andlor after Hie disaster):
assesses if water supply was appropriate and enough to cover the needs of housing in the community and the risks that
if might represent for the population. It also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
absolutely x
water supply infrastructure was — appropnate for the context before the project
not completely —
absolutely
was — enough to cover the needs of the population
flot compieteiy X
absolutety x
was — safe for public heaith
flot comptetely —
absolutely
was — functional after the disaster
flot completel X
within Hie pmject -
water suppiy infrastructure
the performance in the construction cf water supply infrastructure. The ndicator applies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit of the community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit cf its
owners). fidividual infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services.
These indicators illustrate the sustainability of the project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and
safety
— flot offered at ail to the affected population fend)
— offered by a different program/organisation tend)
x offered as oart cf the oroiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
vas
was
absolutely x
aimost — achieved as planned
flot at aIl
absoiutely x
almost — on time when needed
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
notatall —
absolutely x
almost — offered to the right people who needed t
notatail —
absolutely x
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost — safe for public health
not at ail —
absotutely
aimost
flot at ail
X
enough to coverthe needs ofthe popLilation
complote I ok j I
toutputs j infrastructure 21 electricityl
beforeheproject(beoreand!orafterthedisaster):
assesses if electricicty supply was appropriate and enough to cover the needs of housing in the community and the risks
that t might represent for the population. t also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
elecfricity infrastructure was
absolutely
- appropriate for the context before the project
flot completely —
absolutely
was — enough to cover the needs ofthe population
flot compietely X
absolutely
was — safe considering local codesflot completely x
absoiutely
was — functionai after the disaster
flot completely X
wêthin the projectt
the performance in the construction of infrastructure for electricity supply. The indicator applies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit ofthe community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of its
owners). Individual infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services.
These indicators illustrate the sustainability 0f the project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and
safety
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
electricity infrastructure
flot offered at ail to the affected population tend)
x offered as oart of the oroiect
offered bv a different roramIomanisation tend)was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely X
aimost — achieved as pianned
flot at ail —
absoiutely x
almost — on time when needed
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absoiutely x
aimost — offered to the right peopie who needed it
flot at ail —
absolutely x
aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy x
aimost — safe considering local codes
flot at ail —
X
enough to cover the needs 0f the population
I conwlcte f ck H I I I
loutputs I infrastructure 1221 sewage I
before the project (before and!or after Hie disaster)
assesses if the sewage system was appropriate and enough to cover the needs of housing in the community and the
nsks that if might represent for the population. It aiso assesses the damages caused by the disaster
sewage infrastructure was
absoluteiy
- appropnate for the context before the project
flot eompletely —
absolutely
was — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
not completely X
absolutely x
was — safe for public heaith
flot completely —
absolutely
was — ftinctionai alter the disaster
flot completely x
wfthin Hie project:
the performance in the construction 0f sewage infrastructure. The indicator applies at two levels: public infrastructure
(for me benefit of the community) and individual infrastructure (in pnvate property for the benefit of its owners). lndividua
infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services. These indicators
illustrate the sustainability 0f the project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and safety
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
sewage infrastructure
not offered at ail to the affected oulafion fend)
x offered as part of the proiect
offered by a different program/organisation fend)was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absoluteiy
aimost — achieved as pianned
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy x
aimost — on time when needed
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absolutely x
aimost
— offered to the right peopie who needed t
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
aimost — safe for public heaith
notataii —
X
enough to coverthe needs of the popuiation
coml3lete I I ni -
Ioutpuft I infrastructure 1231 telephonel
beforetheproject(beforeand!orafterthedïsastei):-
assesses if the infrastwcture for telephone system was appropriate and enough to coverthe needs of housing in the
community. t also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
. absolutely 1
infrastructure for telephone was i— appropriate for the context before the project
flot completely ix
absoluteiy
was — enough to cover the needs 0f the population
flot completely X
absolutely
was — functional afterthe disaster
flot completely X
within die project:
the performance in the construction 0f infrastructure for telephone systems. The indicator applies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit cf the community) and individual infrastructure (in pnvate property for the benefit of its
owners). Individual infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services.
These indicators illustrate the sustainability cf trie project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and
safety
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
flot offered at ail to the affected oooulation tendf
offered by a different program/organisation (end)
x offered as part of the project
infrastructure for telephone was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely X
almost achieved as planned
net at ail
absolutely x
aimost — on time when needed
notatali —
absolutely —
almost x appropriate for the needs cf the population
not at ail —
absoiutely
almost x offered to the right people who needed if
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
X
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
I complete ok I I
Ioutputs I communitv services 124 schoOlsi
beforetheoroiectthfomandIoraftrttiedjsastet::: -
pre-project conditions 0f facilities
schoois were
were
were
were
absolutely
flot completeiy
absoluteiy
flot compietelv
absolutely
not comnletely
absoluteiy
flot compietely
X
X
X
X
appropriate for the context before the project
enough to cover the needs of the population
safe (resistance to hazards)
functional after the disaster
within the nroiect:
the performance in the construction of facilities
schoois were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
al most
flot at ail
absoluteiy
aimost
not at ail
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
absolutely
aimost
not at ail
absoiuteiy
al most
flot at ail
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
flot offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered by a differefit programlorqanisation (efld)
offered as part 0f the proiect
achieved as piaflned
on time when needed
appropriate for the fleeds of the population
offered to the right people who needed them
the appropriate strategy to be used
safe as offered (resist. to hazards otthe original product)
enough to cover the fleeds of the population
complete I ok I I
C
pre-project conditions of facilities
I UPUtS I communitv services 25 health centersi
before the project (before and/orafterthe disaster):
health centers were
absoiutely
flot compietely
were
X
absolutely
not completelv X
appropriate for the context before the project
were
absolutely
no completely
X
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
Were absolutely
not completeiv
safe (resistance to hazards)
the performance in the construction of facilities
X
functionai after the disaster
health centers were
within the project:
X
were
not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
offered by a different program/organisation (end)
offered as ,art ofthe pro ject
X
were
achieved as planned
absoluteiy
aimost
flot at ail
X
on time when needed
were
absoiutely
almost
not at ail
X
were
absoiutely
aimost
flot at ail
appropriate for the needs of the population
X
were
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
offered to the right peopie who needed them
X
were
absolutely
aimost
the appropriate strategy to be used
X
not at ail
were
absoiuteiy
almost
flot at ail
safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
X enough to cover the needs of the population
compicte I ok I oext I I
Ioutputs I communitv services 26 community centers I religious bdg.I
before the Droiect Cbefore andlor ifter the disaster):
pre-project conditions of faciiities
community centers / religious bidg. were
were
were
were
absoiutely
flot comoieteiv
absoluteiy
flot comoletelv
absoiutei
flot completely
absolutely
flot comptetely
X
X
X
X
appropriate for the context before the project
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
sale (resistance to hazards)
functional after the disaster
wfthin the øroiect: - —
the performance in the construction offacil
community centers / reiigious bidg. were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
fies
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
absolutely
aimost
not at ail
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absoluteiy
aimost
not at ail
absoluteiy
al most
not at ail
absoluteiy
aimost
flot at ail
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
offered bv a different oroaramloraanisation tend)
offered as Dart of the oroiect
achieved as planned
on time when needed
appropriate for the needs cf the population
offered to the right peopie who needed them
the appropriate strategy to be used
safe as offered fresist. to hazards 0f the original product)
enough to cover the needs of the population
compiete J ok I I
Iout,,uts I communitv services 1271 police Ifire stationsi
before” —‘ andlor aftr th disastet)
- - ----
.... ----—
pre-project conditions of faciiWes
police I fire stations were
were
were
were
absoluteiy
not compieteiy
absoluteiy
not completelv
absolutely
flot comotetelv
absolutety
flot completely
X
X
X
X
appropriate for the context before the project
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
safe fresistance to hazards)
functional after the disaster
wfthin Ihe nrolect - - - - —
-
the performance in the construction 0f facil: hes
police I fire stations were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoiuteiy
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
absoiuteiy
almost
not at ail
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
offered by a different programlorganisation fend)
offered as part of the proiect
achieved as planned
on time when needed
appropriate for die needs of die population
offered to die right people who needed them
die appropriate strategy to be used
safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
enough to cover the needs of the population
complote I ok I nt I I
Ioutputs housinq 1281 new Iotsl
before Hie project (before andlor after Hie disastei)t
flue pre-disaster level of access to land property; and/or pre- and post-disaster risks associated with the tenure of land,
particularly due to location in zones ofrisk
lots were
absolutely
— appropriate for flue context before the project
flot completely X
land tenure was
absolutely
— enough to cover the needs ofthe population
flot completely x
. absolutely
land was — safe fresistance to hazards)
not completely x
widely
land tenure was — accessible to residentsflot widely X
within Hie project —
initiatives targeted to increase the residents capacity to acquire safe lots for housing; ncluding bans or subsidies given for
purchasing land or the direct donation of lots
X not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
new lots were — offered by a different program!organisation (end)
offered as part of the project
absolutely —
were almost — achieved as pianned
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
were aimost — on time when needed
not at ail
absoluteiy —
were aimost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
were aimost — offered to the right peopie who needed them
notatali —
absoluteiy —
were abmost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoiutely —
were aimost — safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
notatali —
absoluteiy —
were aimost — enough to coverthe needs of the population
not at ail —
incomplete I 0k I net I I
Ioutputs I housini 1291 emergency sheltersi
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
beforethepmjectfbeforeand!orafterliiedisaster): -
pre-disaster arrangements and planning made by the organisations to adequately respond to the emergency. t represents
the access ofthe community to contingency plans by tue civil defense, lire departments, Red Cross, etc.
emergency sh&ters were
absolutely
— planned, before tue disaster, through contingency plans
flot completely X
. . absoiutely
emergency organisations were — ptepared for a housing emergency
flot completely X
.. absolutely
authorities were — prepared for a housing emergency
flot completely x
.
. widely
info about contingency plans was . — accessible to residents before tue disaster
not widely X
within the ptoject:
emergency shelters
implementation of an emergency sheltering plan; including provision oftents, plastics or other materials to build shelters foi
tue first days after tue disaster
____________________________________ _____________
— flot offered at ail to the affected population (end)
-- -
X
offered by a different programlorganisaton fend)
offered as part 0f tue proiect
X
achieved as planned
X
on time when needed
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely x
aimost — appropriate for the needs of tue population
notatail —
absolutely x
almost — offered to tue right people who needed them
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — safe to short-term protection of residents
not at ail —
X
enough to coverthe needs of tue population
corpiote I ok next I I
Ioutputs I housinq 1301 temporary housing
before the project (before andlorafterthe disasteil:
pre-disaster arrangements and planning made by authorities and local NGOs to adequately respond to the requireness for
transitory housing
. absolutely
temporary housing was
— p!anned, before the disaster in urban plans
flot compieteiy x
. absoiutely
emergency organisations were
— prepared for building transitory housing
flot completeiy x
authorities were
absolutely
— prepared for building transitory housing
flot compietely x
info about temporary housing plans was
wideiy
— accessible to residents before the disaster
flot wideiy x
wfthin the project:
—
were
X offered by a different prograrn/organisaUon fend)
absoluteiy
almost achieved as planned
notatail —
absolutely
—
almost
— on Urne when needed
not at ail
absoiuteiy
—
almost
— appropriate fotthe needs ofthe population
flot at ail —
absolutely
—
a$most — offered to the right people who needed them
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy
—
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost
— safe for mid-term protection of residents
flot at ail —
absoluteiy
—
almost
— enough to cover the needs of the population
flot at ail
this might inciude Hie implementafion 0f: fi) emporary units f e. pre-fab and winterised units); (ii) adapted temporary housing
(public facilities or rented apartments); or (iii) seif-provided temporary housing (homes of families I ftiends, user-buift
sheiters, or second homes)
_____________
—
___________________________________________________
not offered at ail to the affected pouiaUon tend)
offered as part of Hie project
temporary housing was
were
were
were
were
were
were
incomplote I ok I I I I
I outputs I housing j31 I new housesi
befoietheproject(beforeandloraftertbedjsaster):
the pre-disaster level 0f access to housing for the contrary: the level of housing shortage) and post-disaster homelessness
caused by the disaster
houses were
absoiutely
•j accessible to ail residents before the disaster
flot completely x4
new houses were
absolutely
—Iunnecessary afterthe disaster
flot completely X]
withinUieproject
new houses
initiatives targeted to facilitate the acquisition of new permanent housing, including (if necessary) relocation of residents
living in dangerous conditions. Permanent new housing can be obtained: (i) through the provision of finished units; (ii) by
facilitating and organising seif-help construction; or (iii) by facilitating and organising the purchase of new housing existing in
the market
____________
—
________________________________________________
X
flot offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered by a different profiramlorqanisation fend)
offered as part 0f tue proiect
were
were
were
were
were
were
wete
were
absolutely
almost — achieved as pianned
notatall x
absoluteIy —
almost x on time when needed
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost x appropriate for the needs of the population
notatali —
absoiutely x
almost — offered to the right people who needed them
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost x the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absolutely x
aimost — safe as offered fresist. to hazards ofthe original product)
notatali —
absolutely —
almost x enough to cover the needs of the population
_______________________________________
flot at ail —
____ ___ ____ ____ ___ ___
complete ok I uext I I
( outputs housinq 1321 reconstructed housesi
before tbe “-‘ -—‘--ftr 11w -- -
- ,.,.‘—J. “. .s,.
houses were
the pre- and post-disaster nsks of coilapse of housing structures due to one or some ofthe foliowing reasons: (I) lack of
maintenance; (ii) use of inadequate materiais; (iii) use 0f inadequate technologies; (iv) unsafe additions and structural
modifications to housing; (y) insufficient construction codes and standards
absolutely
flot comoleteiv
were
X
absoiuteiy
flot completely
finctional afler the disaster
X
were
absoluteiy
not comoieteiv
appropnate forme needs 0f the population
X
safe after the disaster
the reconstruction of affected structures, inciuding minor repairs and major reconstruction
wfthin the proiect:
the reconstruction of affected houses was
X
was
flot offered at ail to the affected ooouiation tend
absoluteiy
aimost
flot at ail
offered by a different programlorganisation (end)
offered as part of the pro ject
X
achieved as pianned
was
absoiuteiy
aimost
not at ail
X
absoiuteiy
on time when needed
was aimost
flot at ail
X
was
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
appropriate for the needs of the populatiofi
X
was
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
offered to the right people who needed it
X
was
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
the appropriate strategy to be used
X
was
absoiutely
ai most
not at ah
safe for long-term protection of residents
X
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
I complete I ok I pexf I I
Ioutputs I industrv /emplovm. 1331 bldgslinfras. for industry & income generationi
befoœ the pmject (befote and!or after the disaster):
the pre-disaster level of access ta sources 0f incarne; and/or pre- and post-disaster risks associated with the buildings and
infrastructure related witii income generation, particularly the nsks of coliapse, destruction 0f infrastructure, destruction of plantations,
machinery or equipment, etc.
bidgsRnfras. for industry & income generation were
absoiutely
appropriate for the context before the project
flot compietely —
widely x
were . — accessible ta residents
flot widely
absoiuteiy
wete — safe (resistance ta hazards)
flot compietely x
absoluteiy
were — ftrnctionai after the disaster
flot completely X
wfthintheproject
me construction 0f buildings and infrastructure associated with the generation 0f income and employment at the scale 0f single farnilie
or small ciusters (exciuding the reconstruction 0f large industries/companies). t might include the reconstruction ofshops, small
industries, small scale infrastructure for production, processing or agriculture activities, etc., assessing the consideration 0f long-terrn
needs for economic recovery, the capacity of me community ta become economically independent, and in general, the sustainabiiity of
the project. Only physicai construction s considered, not including functioning and management 0f facilities
were
were
absolutely
were aimost
flot at ail
not offered at aIl ta the affected population fend)
bldgsRnfras. for industry & incarne generation were
were
were
were
were
x offered as Dart of me oroiect
offered bv a different orooram/oraanisation tend)
absolutely x
almost — achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absoiutely x
almost — on time when needed
flot at ail —
absoiutely x
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — offered ta the right people who needed them
notatali —
absolutely x
aimost — me appropriate strategy to be used
flot at aIl —
absolutely x
aimost — safe as offered (resist. ta hazards ofthe original pcoduct)
flot at ail —
X
enough to caver me needs 0f the population
complete I ok I n.xt I I
C.
incomplete oi I I
Ioutputs I industrv/emplovm. 1341 unemployment subsidiesi
unempioyment subsidies were
pre-disaster access to regular govemmental unemployment subsidies (equivaient to welfare)
before tbe omiect (befom andîar afterthe disastrni -
widely
flot wideiy
were
X
absoluteiy
flot comoleteiv
accessible to residents
wtthin the øroiect:
were
X
absolutely
flot completety
initiatives targeted to the implementation of subsidies
indicator denotes the consideration ofshort-term neec
appropriate for the context before the project
X
f’
enough to cover the needs of the population
unemployment subsidies were
x peopie that h ve Iost their jobs or sources of incorne during the disaster. This
for economic recovery
X
wete
not offered at ail to the affected ouIaton fend)
absoiutely
aimost
flot at ail
offered bv a different Drocramloraanisation tend)
offered as part of the project
were
achieved as planned
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
wete
on time when needed
absoiutely
aimost
not at ail
were
absoiutely
aimost
flot at ail
appropriate for the needs of the population
were
absoiuteiy
aimost
offered to the right peopie who needed them
flot at ail
were
the appropriate strategy to be used
absoiutely
aimost
not at ail
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
joutputs I others 1351 tescuel
before the project (betorè and!or aft.er Uie disaster):
the pre-disaster capacity cf local institutions (tue civil defense, the police, the army, the local NGOs, the local Red Cross, etc.) to
speedily and effectwely teacttc the destruction
absolutely
local organisations were — on time to conduct emergency and rescue
flot completely x
absoluteiy
— effectively conducted contingency and rescue
flot completely x
absolutely
external aid was — unnecessary for rescue activitiesflot completely X
wfthin the project
the implementation of rescue activWes
flot offered at ail te the affected population (end)
rescue activities were x offered by a different programlorganisation fend)
offered as part of the project
absolutely —
were almost — achieved as planned
notatail —
absolutely —
were almost — on time when needed
net at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — appropriate for the needs cf the population
net at ail —
absolutely —
were aimost — offered to the right people who needed them
not at ail —
absolutely —
were almost
— the appropriate strategy te be used
net at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — enough to cover the needs of the population
not at ail —
incomplete I ok I I
Ioutputs offiers 1361 psychological aidi
before the pmject (before andlor after the disaster) - -
pre-disaster access to psychological aid. Even though this s a difficuit aspect to identify in urban contexts t 15 easier to identify as
being absent in most of rural contexts
widely
psychological aid was - — accessible to residents
flot widely x
absoluteiy
was — appropnate for the needs of the population
flot completeiy x
absoiuteiy
was — enough to cover the needs of Hie population
flot completely X
within Hie project: —
initiatives targeted to ptovide psychological aid to the affected residents. This might include individual or group therapies, giving advice
and information in newspapers or magazines
not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
psychological aid was — offered by a different programlorganisation (end)
x offered as part of the project
absolutely x
was almost — achieved as planned
not at ail —
absolutely x
was almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely x
was almost — appropriate for Hie needs of Hie population
not at ail —
absolutely x
was almost — offered to Hie right people who needed it
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
was almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — enough to coverthe needs of Hie population
not at ail x
complete I ok I nxt I I
Ioutputs I others 1371 foodl
before the Droiect (befom and!or after the disaster)
pre-disaster access to food, it highlights pre-disaster and post-disaster levels of malnutrition
X
X
X
food was
was
was
absolutely
flot comoietelv
absolutely
flot comoletelv
absoiutely
flot completelv
accessible to tesidents
appropriate for the needs 0f the population
enough to cover the needs of the population
initiatives targeted to provide food to the affected resic
food was
was
was
was
was
was
was
ents in the flrst
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absolutely
aimost
not at ail
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absoiutely
almost
not at ail
Jys after the disaster.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
flot offered at ail to the affected ooouiaton (end)
offered bv a different oroaram/oraanisation(end)
offered as part of the project
achieved as pianned
on time when needed
appropriate for the needs of the population
offered to the right peopie who needed t
the appropriate strategy to be used
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
I complete I ok I I I I
wfthintheDroiect:
- -
Ioutputs I others 1381 medical aidiC before the project (belote and!or after hie disaster):
pre- and post-disaster level of access to regular medical care. This vulnerability might consider the availability of heafth centers in the
region and a qualitative assessment cf the capacity of residents to gain access to heaifli insurances
widely
medical aid was . — accessible to residents
flot wtdely x
absolutely
was — appropnate for the needs cf the population
flot completely x
absolutely
was — enough to coverthe needs of the population
flot completeiy X
withrn hie project: - .
initiatives targeted to the provision of medical assistance in the first days after the disaster
flot offered at ail to the affected population fend)
medical aid was x offered by a different program!organisation tend)
offered as part of the project
absolutely —
was almost — achieved as planned
flot at ail
absolutely —
was almost — on time when needed
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — approphate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — offered to the right people who needed it
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — enough to cover the needs of the population
flot at ail —
incomplete I ok j nt I I
l04PUts others 39j temporary infrastructurel
before the pmject fbefore andlor afterthe disaster): -
the capacity of institutions to react to the destruction of public services and infrastructure, particularly trie reaction of govemmental
organizations in charge of public services and roads
.
absolutely
temporary infrastructure was — planned in contingency plans
not completely X
local organisations were
absolutely
—
prepared to react to the destruction of inftastwcture
not completely X
extemal aid was
absolutely
— unnecessary after Ute disaster
not completely x
withm the project: —
initiatives targeted to the implementation of temporar electricaland te epi one systems, temporary water supply, and temporary
bridges, dams or any other infrastructure required to guarantee tue safety and recovery of residents. This indicator ass
esses the
capacity of residents to quickly resume daily activities
absolutely X
almost achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — on time when needed
notatali —
absolutely x
almost — appropriate forthe needs ofthe population
flot at ail —
absolutely X
almost — offered to the right people who needed t
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — Due appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
not offered at ail to the affected population tend)
x offered as part of the proiect
offered by a different proqram/organisation tend)temporary infrastructure was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
al most
flot at ail
X
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
I complete I ok { nt I I I
Ioutputs I others 1401 education and technical assistancel
before me project (before andlor after me disaster)
-
pre-disaster access to technicai education and knowledge. it might include assessing the average access ta schooling and informai
education in the region
. widely
schooling (up to secondary) was . — accessible to residents
flot widely x
residents had
complete
— knowledge about construction -related subjects
insufficient X
technical courses and informai education wete
Wldely
— accessible ta residents
flot widely X
withinmeproject
the implementation of plans for education and technical assistance. t migl it include education in disaster prevention, education in
better construction practices, formation on leadership, equity, human rights, protection of the environment, etc. and technical
assistance for developing befler construction practices or for the assembiy of construction components
absolutely x
almost
— achieved as planned
not at ail
—
absolutely x
aimost
— on time when needed
notatali
—
absolutely x
almost — appropriate far the needs of the population
not at ail
—
absoiutely x
almost
— offered to the right people who needed it
not at ail
—
absoiuteiy x
almost
— the appropriate strategy ta be used
not at ail
—
X
not offered at ail ta the affected population tend)
offered by a different program/organisation tend)
offered as part of the proiect
education and technical assistance was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
almost
not at ail
X
enaugh to cover the needs of the population
I complote I ok I nex I I I
Ioutputs I others 141 I informationJ
beforetheprojectfbeforeand!orafterffiedisaster): -
pre-disaster access to information reiated with risks, awareness, contingency and coping activities. it might include assessing the
average access to the media (news papers, internet, T’J and radio), the existence ofcampaigns of information and the access to local
and external publications
. widelyinformation conceming risks, awareness, etc. was — accessible to residents
notwideiy x
. widely x
campaigns of information to the public were — used in the region
notwidely —
residents had
Wldely
access to trie media in general
flot widely —
withïn the project:
theim lementation 0f plans for dissemination 0f inforn ation and knowledge regarding the disaster or trie reconstruction activities. It
might include publications, meetings wfth the community and information through the media to inform about the causes and effects of
the disaster, the projects in action, how to access to the benefits of the project, how to find a job, etc.
absolutely X
aimost — achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absolutely x
aimost — offered to trie right people who needed it
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — the appropriate sfrategy to be used
notatail —
X
not offered at aIl to the affected population tend)
offered bv a different proqram/orcjanisation tend)
offered as oart 0f the oroiect
information was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely x
almost — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
not at ail —
complete I ok I nxt I I I
Iresuits fransfer 421 bans gïven and subsidies allocatedi
beforethepmject(beforeand!orafterthedisaster):
nia
fthin the proect
the performance in the transfer of financial solutions and funding, being useful to identify if the money flnally reached the
beneficiaries
absoiutely x
bans and subsidies offered were aimost — allocated as planned
not at ail —
absoiutely x
were almost — used at an appropriate time (as assumed)
flot at ail —
absolutely x
were almost — used in the appropriate way (as assumed)
not at ail —
absolutely x
were almost — used by the peopie that needed them (as assumed)
flot at ail —
: complete I ok j jiçt I I
Iresuits I transfer 1431 direct and indirect jobs createdi
[belote me project (belote andlor after the
within me project:
the consequences in the creation 0f employment opportunities 0f having developed the different outputs. It denotes the
capacity of the project to facilitate the recovery 0f the economy and the achievement ofthe economic independence of
the beneficiaries
absolutely
new direct and indirect jobs were aimost x enough to facilitate the recovery 0f the local economy
notatall —
absolutely x
aimost
— facilrtated the economic independence 0f beneficiaries
notatall —
absolutely x
were almost — created at the appropriate time
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost — represented appropnate working conditions for residents
flot at ail —
complete I 0k I nx I I
C I tesuits I transfer 1441 house5 occupiedi
belote the project (belote andlor alter the disaster): -•
n/a
wthln the project:
the post-project rate cf occupation cf dweliings. It je particuiarly useful to identify the acceptability cf the houses provided
by the mufti-organisation
abso!utely x
the houses provided were almost — occupied by residents
—
notatali —
absolutely x
were almost — occupied at the appropriate time (as assumed)
flot et ail —
absolutely x
were almost — used in the appropnate way (as assumed)
not at ail —
absolutely X
were almost — used by the people that needed them (as assumed)
not at ail —
: comp!ete I ok I I I
I resuits I transfer 1451 insurance policies takeni
before the proJect (betore andlor after the disaster):
n/a
within the project:
insurance policies are flot a common output 0f reconstruction projects in the context of the selected case studies. However, t is
considered here as a consequence 0f improving the awareness and knowledge 0f residents and local organisations. Transferring
the risks 0f destruction to insurance companies s considered here as a positive consequence 0f educating and informing
organisations and individuais about the nsks of future disasters
very much
taking insurance policies for housing was slightly incremented afterthe disaster
flot at ail X
absolutely
the risks of disasters was almost reduced by the government by sharing it with insurance comp.
notatali x
I complete I ok I I I
tresuits I ttansfer 1461 emergency protocols implementedi
before die proJect (before andlor alter the disaster);
n/a
withrn the proJect:
emergency protocols are flot considered as a common output 0f reconstruction projects in the context cf the selected case stud les.
However, it is considered here as a consequence cf improving the awareness and knowledge of residents and local organisations.
Implementing emergency protocols (particularly in urban contexts) is considered here as a positive consequence cf educating and
informing organisations and individuals about the risks of future disasters
absolutely :
emergency protocols were almost x implemented in the region among residential areas
notatail —
absolutely —
contingency plans and emer. protocols were almost x included in the agenda of local authorities and organisations
net at aIl —
complete I ok I nxt I
f belote Hie project (belote andlor afterthe disaster):
I resuka I transfer 1471 increment 0f land ownershipi
within the nro4ect: -
This is a context-sensitive indicator. t s considec in this context as a positive indicator of results as itdenotes the capacity ofthe
project to secure safe land for residents at the long run. increment of land ownership can be due to the provision 0f new lots, due to
the success cf ban or subsidies programs or due te the successful legalisation cf liegally occupïed land
absobutely
land ownership almost x increased in the region after the project
not at ail
complete I ok I next I I
I tesufts I transfer 1481 increment of home ownershipl
betore the project (before and!or afler the disaster):
n/a
withintheprolect:
This is a context-sensitive indicator. t is consider in this context as a positive indTcator of resuits. t can be due to construction 0f new
houses, by acquisition 0f existing housing stock, or by upgrading cf squatter settiements and shacks. This indicator denotes the
capacity 0f the projectto guarantee secure safe sheftenng n die ong term
absoiutely
home ownership aimost x increased in the region after the project
flot at ail
compete I ok I next I I
Iresuits I communitv oarticio. 1491 designl
IbeforetheoroIecttbeforeandlorafterthedisaster:-- : I
nia
wfthlntheproject: -
Assesses the capacity of residents to actively participate in the design 0f their own dwelling
signiflcantly x
residents did partially — decidethe distribution of spaces oftheirown dwelling
flot
signficantly x
did partialiy — decide the location and orientation of their own dwelling
flot
significantly x
did partially — select the finishes of their own dwelling
not
significantly x
did partially — decide the size and conditions of the spaces their dwellings
not
significantly x
did partially — selectthe technology ofthe structure and main components
flot
signiflcantly x
did partially — select the construction method to be used
flot
complete I ok I nxt I I
teSUftS I communftv particiLi 1501 managementl
Ibefore the oroiect (belote andlor after the disaster1 I
—
-. I
wthIn the project:
Assesses the capacity of residents to actively participate in the management cf their own dwefling
absolutely X
residents almost — could choose whether using self-help or hiring labor force
not at ail —
signiflcantiy x
did partiafly
— manage the economic resources
net
significantly x
did partially
— manage the contracts 0f supphers
flot
significantiy x
did partiaily — determine the schedule and planning cf activities
not
signiflcantly x
did partiaiiy — communicate directly wrth other stakeholders
net
significantly x
did partially
— organise people and resources in the construction field
net
: compiete ok pext I
O
Iresuits I communitv particip. 151 I financing 0f the projecti
I before the nrnIf andlor alter the - - I
wfthin the project:
Assesses the capacfty 0f residents to acûvely participate in the financing of their own dweiling
absotutely
residents did almost x select the financing system for the project
not at aIl
absolutely X
did almost
— participate in collecting funds
not at ail —
absolutely x
did aimost — know the costs 0f construction and matecials
not at ail —
absoiutely X
did aimost — have the option of incucring in expenses directiy
notatali —
absoiutely X
did aimost — have the option to participate with own cesources
flot at ail —
absolutely x
did almost — participate in financing coliectively (or as a coopetative)
flot at ail —
: complete j oi< I next I I
I I communrtv particip. 1521 production ot componentsl
I before fh nrnID,% Ihfnr andior afterthe - - ---------
----- I
wfthintheproject:
Assesses the capacity of residents to activeiy participate in the production 0f components for their own dweliing
absolutely x
residents did almost
— work in the production of components
not at ail —
absolutely x
did almost
— leam the technique 0f production of components
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy x
did almost — operate the machines for production of components
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
the production of components did aimost — optimise the skiiis and knowiedge 0f residents
not at ai! —
compiete 10k! nt I I
Iresuits
E) Ia
communitv particto. 1531 constructionl
Ebefore fliC proJect (before and!or alter the disaster):
withintheproject -
Assesses the capacity 0f residents to actively participate n construction activities for their own dwelling
absolutely x
residents did almost — work in assembly 0f construction components
notatali —
absolutely x
did almost — Tearn the method of construction
notatali —
absolutely —
did almost — get remunecated (money, food or property) for Cabot force
notatail X
absolutely X
members of the family did almost — have the option to work in the construction fleld
flot at ail —
complete I ok I n.et I
Iresuits I communitv particip. 1541 individual responsibility of decision makingi
before the project (betore and!or after the disaster):
nia
within the project:
Assesses the level of responsibility of decision making
absoiuteiy x
residents were almost — responsibie for registering to the project (or program)
notatail
absolutely x
were almost — responsible for apptylng for the services and products offered
notatail
absoiutely X
were aimost — responsible for completing the house
flot at aN —
absoluteiy x
were almost — responsibie for the use of funding
notatali —
absolutely x
were aimost — responsible for obtaining disaster-resistance standards
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy x
were aimost — respcnsibie for obtaining and using information and know-how
notatali —
absoiutely X
were aimost — responsible for seiecting where to invest the resources
not at ail —
complete I ok I t I I
Iimpacts pro iect qoas 55 debtl
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
nia
within the project:
the debt acqured by local organisations or the national government to develop the project. A low debt resulting from the project s
considered as a potential positive effect of the project
an insignificant
the debt resuWng from the project was a reasonable x burden for local organisations or tue national government
s very high
complete ok f I
IimPacts I projectqoals 1561 environmental impactp
before the pmjectfbefore and!orafterfiie disaster)
-
nia
within the proect
the positive and negative impacts 0f tue project on the environment. This might inciude negative impacts due to the sprawl of
urbanisation, the over exploitation 0f indigenous materiais, and the effects offlie diswption of public infrastructure (particularly
sewage systems). This indicator denotes the assessment 0f long-term consequences on the sustainability of the project
flot at ail X
the project almost
— had a negative effect in urban sprawl
absoluteiv
notatali
almost x had a negative effect of over exploitation 0f natural resources
absoluteiy
—
not at ail x
almost — had a negative effect in natural sources ofwater
absolutely
—
flot at ail X
almost — had a negative effect in naturai forests
absoluteiy —
notatail X
almost
— had a negafive effect in public health
absolutely
—
absolutely x
almost
— contributed to urbaniwral organisation and consolidation
not at ail
—
absolutely X
almost — reduced the negauve effects ofthe disaster in the environment
not at aIl
—
absoluteiy x
almost
— reduced the negative effects ofthe disaster in public health
not at aIl —
compieto I ok j R?Xt I
I impacts I rroject çioais 57 recovery of normal activitiesi
before Hie pmject (before and!or after Hie disaster):
nia
wfthm Hie prcject
the performance in terms of time for the recovery of normai activities. t inciudes assessing the time t took for the majority 0f the
community to resume daiiy activities (going to work, to school, do normally domestic activifies, etc.)
absoiuteiy x
the project aimost — facilitated the recovery of: peopie going to work
flot at ail —
absoiutely x
aimost — faciiitated the recovery of: peopie going to school
flot at ail —
absolutely x
aimost — facihtated the recovery of: peopie doing domestic activities
not at ail —
absoiuteiy x
almost — facilitated the recovery of peopie: doing recreationai activWes
not at ail —
complete I ok I r;€yt - I I
C Iimpacts prolectaoals 1581 physical resistance to hazardsl
beethepojec(beforeand!oraftertfiedjsasterj: -
nia
within the project
cumulative performance in terms of the overali resistance to naturai hazards. t includes flot only tue resistance ofthe original units
(as bullt dunng the project) but also tue resistance of later additions and modifications to the original units. This indicator compiles
the generai resistance to hazards due to safe location, exposure to danger, awareness and mitigation of possible risks,
impiementation of better building codes and standards, and n generai ail the structural and non structural risks of unsafe
conditions. it denotes the capacity of the project to guarantee long term safe conditions of housing
absoiutely X
original houses were aimost — safe (resistance to naturai hazards) at the mid-term
not at ail —
absolutely x
modified houses (inc. additions) were aimost — safe (resistance to natural hazards) at tue mid-term
not at ail —
absolutely x
infrastructure was almost — safe (resistance to natural hazards) at tue mid-term
notatail —
absoiutely x
other buildings and facilites were almost — safe fresistance to natural hazards) at the mid-term
not at ail —
complete I ok I nct I I
C I impacts I profect qoals 159 transfer of better building practicesi
beforetheproject(befoteand(orafterthedisaster): .-.. -
n/a
within the project:
tue performance in the assimilation of beffer building practices, particulariy in self-help and this including better use 0f materiais,
improvements in local technologies, generai awareness of risks, respect of building codes and standards, etc. This variable indicates the
capacity ofthe projectto reduce the Iong-term physical vulnerabilities ofthe community fparticularly if a greatpercentage of regular
housing is user-made)
absolutely X
user-made constructions after the project were almost — safe (resistance to natural hazards)
flot at ail —
absolutely x
construction technologies were almost — improved in user-made constructions after the disaster
flot at ail —
absolutely —
user-made constructions after the project were almost x vigilant of construction codes and standards
notatali —
absolutely —
proper maintenance was aimost x conducted to housing structures
notatall —
complote I I I
( Iimpacts j proiect goals 1601 institutional capacityand deveIopmen
beforetheproject(beforeandlorafterthedisaster): -
n/a
within the project
the performance 0f the project in reinforcing tue administrative methods, expertise, know-how, and management tools 0f local authorities
for disaster management. This indicator denotes the capacity of the project to increase the level of development from the local authorities
point of view. It includes assessing: (I) trie implementation or not of programs of education, training, administrative coopetation and
information targeted to local authonties; and (ii) the level of participation of regular administrative units (municipalities, regular public
entities, etc.) in bue reconstruction project. The creation of temporary public entubes with the exclusive mandate of dealing with
reconstruction activfties - which dissolve once reconstruction is finished - is considered as a potential cause of Ioss ofthe know how and
expertise gained through the development ofthe project
absolutely
almost x participated in the design and management of the project
notatail —
not at ail —
almost — dissolved alter the project
absolutely x
not at ail —
almost x implemented after the project
absolutely —
absolutely —
almost —
not at ail x
education and training programs were
local administrative units
temporary entities for reconstruction were
new administrative methods and plans were
local administrative units
implemented for local authorities and administrative units
absoiutely
aimost
not at ail X
had responsibility of the good development of the project
complete I ok j Pxt I I I
(a fait method of selection 0f beneficiaries
women and men had
residents ftom different races had
residents from different social classes had
residents with different religious affiliation had
people without civil ID or flot registered had
residents 0f the lowest economic levels were
peopie without legal tenure were
non land owners or home owners were
people iocated in unsafe areas were
I impacts project goals 61 eguality 0f gender and minoritiesi
beforethe pmject(beforeand!orafterfliedjsaster):
n/a
within the project:
die performance of die project in s&ecting die benetlcianes ot die project. It highlights possible segregation by gender, race, social
status, religlous affiliation, etc. It may also denote the selection of beneficianes according to other variables such as: capacity of acquiring
debft, family income, tenure of civil address or registered lD, land or home ownership, legal occupation cf land, tenure of tities 0f legal
property, location in safe ateas, etc. This indicator denotes die performance of die project in terms ot covering and scope
absolutely
was almost
flot at ail
x implemented in the project
absoluteiy X
almost — the same rights to obtain ptoducts and services in the project
notatali —
absolutely x
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
notatail —
absolutely x
almost the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
notatall —
absolutely x
aimost the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
notatali —
absolutely x
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
flot at ail —
absolutely —
aimost x inciuded as beneficiahes of products and services
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
almost x included as beneficiaries of products and services
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
aimost x inciuded as beneficiaries 0f products and services
not at ail —
absoiuteiy
almost
not at ail
X inciuded as beneficiaries of products and services
complete ok I rvt
Ijmpacts project oaIs 1621 aIl seftlements in safe areasi
before the project (before andlor after die disaster):
n/a
within die project:
absoluteiy
housing in theîegion was aimost x built in safe areas
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
die project almost — contributed to reduce settiements in risk-prone areas
notatail —
absoluteiy x
aimost — contributed to reduce the physical vulnerability of housing
not at ail —
absolutely —
a similar disaster s aimost x unlikely to happen to the same population in the same region
not at ail —
complete I ok j I
the contribution ofthe projectto eliminate housing located in dangerous areas. it highlights file permanence of squatting settiements in
risk-prone areas and remaining nsks due to location. lt denotes the capacity of the project to achieve die uWmate goal of eliminating
physical vulnerability 0f housing
GFIPs of CECI’s project in Honduras
C Iinputs mufti organisation 1 the capacity to attract funds for the projectbefore the project (befom andlor after the disaster):
nia
wîthin the project:
capacity ta obtain donations andior financing. t assesses the amount of resources obtained vs. the initiai estimation and budget
absolutely
me capacity to aftract ftnds almost
— permitted ta collect me ftinds required according ta the initiai estimations
flot at aH x
absoiuteiy
—
aimost
— permiued to get on time me funds mat wete required
notatali X
absoiuteiy —
almost x guaranteed a continuous iflvestment of resources
flot at ail —
absolutely
—
almost
— permitted ta target an appropriate level of quality in me outputs offered
flot at ail X
absoiuteiy
—
aimost
— permitted ta deal with a complete series of outputs
flot at ail X
absolutely
—
almost x permitted me organisation an adequate independence of decision making
flot at ail —
. complete ok next I I
compietely —
partialiy
—
flot X
C Iinputs f mufti orqanisation I 2 I level of integration with the community
before the project (before andIor after tfie disaster):
nia
wfthin the project:
directiyrelated with the definition ofintegration used here. ndudes the capacfty ofthe organisation to develop horizontal relations with
members ofthe community, beneficiaries and grass roots organisations in order to accomplish common objectives
absolutely •
aimost —
not at ail
had an active participation within the muiti-organisationlocal residents
local associations
local authorities
grass-roots NGOs
local contractors
the organis. in charge ofthe ptoject had
absoluteiy X
almost
— had an active participation within tue muiti-organisation
notatail
—
absoluteiy x
almost — had an active participation within the multi-organisation
notatail
absoiutely —
aimost x had an active participation within the muiti-organisation
flot at ail —
absolutely —
aimost x had an active participation within the multi-organisation
not at ail —
established relations in the region before the beginning ofthe project
I complete I ok f nxt I I
individual objectives of each organis. were
the organisation in charge ofthe project had
integration with other organisations
negraton with other organisations
the relations between the organisations were
Iinputs j mufti orqanisation I 3 level of integration between organisationsi
before the project fbefom andlor after the disaster):
n/a
within the project
directiy reiated with the definWon cf integration used here. Includes the capacfty cf the organisation to develop horizontal and vertical relations
with banks, NGOs, private companies, etc. in order to accompHsh and reinforce common objectives
absolutely
almost
not at ail X
coordinated to achieve a common objective
enough
almost enough — links with other organis. to work together towards a common objective
not enough x
absolutely x
almost — resulted in appropriate cooperation
flot at ail —
absoiutely —
almost — facilitated collecting ftinds and obtaining financing
notatail X
absolutely
al most
not at ail
consolidated when needed
complete I ok I next I I
o
Iinputs I muiti orqanisation 4 I level of differentiatior between organisationsl
before ffie pmject(before and!orafterthe disaster):
n/a
within the project:
based on the assessment of corporate performance as ptoposed by Lawrence and Lorsh. Includes the assessment of the level of definition
of different roies among the organisations of the project team. The performance decreases if acfivities made by different organisations
overlapped incurring in redundancy, too much assistance, or repetition
the differentiation of responsibilities
fie differentiation of responsibiiWes
the differentiation of responsibiiWes
the differentiation cf responsibiiWes
the differentiation of responsibilities
neyer
sometimes x overlapped incurring in repetition and redundancy
aiways —
absolutely —
aimost
— took advantage of the strengths and weaknesses of each organisation
not at ail X
absoiuteiy —
almost — contributed to attain a common objective
notatali X
absolutely —
aimost
— set up when needed
not at ail x
absolutely
almost
not at ail X
deflned in a clear mannerwas
was
I complete I ok I nxt
I inputs I mufti orqanisation I 5 I projects administrative costsl
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
wfthin the project:
the evel 0f optimization of economic resources for the benefit of beneficiaries. Assessed as a the percentage of the projects
budget. Lower administrative costs = better performance
absoiutely
project’s administrative costs were almost — reduced through the optimisation of local resources
not at ail X
absolutely —
were almost x reduced by minimising tue costs of expatriate officers
not at ail —
absolutely —
were almost x justified by having reduced overail costs for the project
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost — favored the maximum use of money for the benefit of beneficiaries
not at ail X
.
I complete I ok j net I I
Iinputs I mufti oroanisation I 6 I the capacitv of the system to adapt to the environm.I
beforetheptoject(beforeandlorafterthedïsaster):
nia
wfthin the project:
the capacity to react to the risks and opportunWes of the environment at the social, economic and polWcal levels. Includes an
assessment of the influence of the environment in the objectives targeted by the multi-organisation
notatail —
tue objectives of the project were somehow affected by negative unexpected changes of the environment
greatly X
absolutely —
the risks nherent to the environment were almost — assessed by the mufti-organisation during the project
not at ail x
absolutely —
the organis. responsible ofthe project almost — anticipated a plan to minimise (share) financial nsks
not at ail x
absolutely —
the organis. responsibie ofthe project almost x took advantage of unexpected opportunities in the environment
notatall —
absolutely —
when required, changes in the project were aimost x implemented
not at ail —
absoiutely —
the organi. responsible ofthe project was almost — prepared to work in a hostile environment
notatall X
complote I ok I nxt I I
.I inputs I manaqement toois I 71 a census of local residentsl
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
n/a
within the project
dams, barners and retatmng walls bujit to protect housing from naturai hazards flandslides, floods, fires, etc). Safe
conditions and reduction of risks for ifie population are assessed in this indicator
X flot conducted tend)
a census of local residents was
— conducted by a different program/organisation fend)
conducted as part of the project
absoiutely —
was aimost — inclusive of diversity and everybody in the community
not at ail —
absolutely —
was almost
— conducted and used on time
not at ail —
absolutely —
was almost
— used to adapt the project to the reai needs of the population
flot at ail
—
absoiutely
—
was almost
— the appropriate strategy (management tool) to use
not at ail —
. incomplete I ok I nxi I
were
were
were
were
were
were
I inputs I manaqement tools I 8 previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc)I
before the project (before andior after the disaster):
n’a
wfthin lie project:
previous studies (typologies, techniques, etc)
pre-project technical studies (pre- or post-disaster) to collect information about local living conditions, architectural typologies, construction
techniques, etc.
X not conducted (end)
conducted by a different program/organisation (end)
conducted as oart of the oroiect
absolutely
almost — useful to discover new information about local characteristics
not at ail
absolutely —
almost — conducted and used on time
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost — used to adapt the project to local characteristics
notatall —
absolutely —
almost — properly reported or published for future reference
not at ail —
C
absolutely
almost
not at ail
the appropriate strategy (management tool) to use
incomplete I ok I nect
Ijnputs I manaqementtools I 9 survevs of reoil&s needsl
before the project (before andlor after the disaster):
nia
wfthin the project:
post-disaster assessment of damages and real needs (through questionnaires, visits, meetings with the community, etc.)
flot conducted fend)
surveys of peoples needs were — conducted by a different program/organisation fend)
x conducted as part of the project
absoiutely —
were aimost useful to reveal new information about residents expectations
notatali X
absolutely —
were almost x conducted and used on time
not at ail —
absoiutely —
were almost — used to adapt the project to real needs
notatall x
absoluteiy —
were aimost — properiy reported or publlshed for future reference
flot at ail x
absolutely —
were almost — the appropriate strategy (management tool) to use
not at ail X
complete ok nxt I I
I inputs manaqementtoois I loi consultation with the communityl
before the oroiect tbefom andlor after th disaster):
n/a I
within the project:
assessment ofthe users’ opinions and suggestions regarding living conditions, expectafions, and requirements
consultation with the community was
was
absolutely
ai most
flot at ail
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
absoiutely
aimost
flot at ail
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
X
X
X
X
X
X
flot conducted fend)
conducted by a different programlorganisation fend)
conducted as part of the prolect
contributed in the beginning to set up the priorities of the project
permifled to make changes and adapt the project during the process
enhanced diversity and multipiicity
permitted a fait representation of ail the residents
intended to design the project
intended to adapt the existing project
intended to present the pro ject to residents
complete ok I nt’xt I I
linDuts local resources I ii I the capacity 0f residents to work in constructioni
within the project
indicates availability oftime, knowledge and interestto work in construction. It assesses the users’ availability of time to work in
construction; users’ skills and know how in building practices; and users interest to invest their time and expertise in constwction
sufficient
beneficiaries of the project had relative — knowledge about construction practices
insufficient x
sufficient
had relative x availability 0f time to work in construction
insufficient —
sufficient
—
had relative x interest to work in construction activities
insufficient —
sufficient x
had relative — guidance to work in construction activities
insufficient —
sufficient —
had relative x physical conditions to work in construction activities
insufficient
before the oroiect tbefore andlor after“ -‘-
n/a
o
, complete I Ok I ftext I
C
Gabsoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
complote ok j next I
I inputs I local resources 121 materials and eguipment availablel
before the project (before and!or after ifie disaster):
nia
wfthin the project
the capacity to use indigenous materials fwood, sand, earth, palm leaves, bamboo, clay, etc.) for the production of construction
components and the availability of tools and equipment for construction
local indigenous materials
tools and equipment
X avaiiable in the regionwere
were
were
absolutely x
almost corresponded to the skills of the atfected population
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost — safe for the environment (preventing degradation of natural resources)
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost x availabie in the region
not at ail —
X
corresponded to the skills ofthe affected population
C IoutpUts I financialiftjndinçi 113 tax incentives for companiesl individualsibefore Hie p,oject fbefore andlor alter Hie disaster):
nia
offered by a different program/organisation tend)
absoiutely
almost
— achieved as planned
flot at ail
absolut&y
almost
— on time when needed
not et ail
absolutely
—
aimost
— appropriate for the needs of the population
flot et ail
absolutely
—
aimost
— offered to the right peopie who needed them
flot at ail
absoluteiy
—
aimost
— the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail
o
I incomplete I ok I I I I
within the proect:
tax incentives
the implementation of tax incentives to attsact investment and economic recovery after the disaster. Tax iflcentives are
targeted to promote the creation cf employement opportufities, new businesses and the development of local industries.
Equaliy, tax incentives to individuals dunng a certain penod of fime ease the financiai burden of recovery of the affecetd
families
were
were
x flot offered at ail to the affected population tend)
offered as part cf the proiect
were
were
were
were
absoiutely
were almost
flot at ail
enough te cover the needs of the population
Ioutputs j financial/fundïnn 1141 bans for housingi
before the project (before and!or after die disaster)’
pre-disaster capacity of local residents to have access to banking bans and mortgages for housing
bans for housing were
were
were
widely
flot wideiy
absolutely
flot completelv
absoluteiy
flot completeiy
X
X
X
within die project
—
the implementation of bans for repairs, ;elf-help initiativ s o- buying a new house. This indicator denotes the confidence
ofthe financial system n the affected community and the capacity of the users to enter into the regular banking system
absoiuteiy
almost
flot at ail
accessible to residents before the project
appropriate forthe needs ofthe population
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
bans for housing
x flot offered at ail to the affected ouiation fend)
offered bv a different oroaramloroanisation tend)
offered as nart of the oroiect
were
were
were
were
were
wece
were
absoluteiy
almost
— achieved as pbanned
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy
—
aimost
— on time when needed
flot at ail —
absolutely
—
aimost
— appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absobutely
—
abmost
— offered to the right peopie who needed them
flot at ail
absobuteiy
—
abmost
— the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
enough to coverthe needs oftiie population
incomplete I ok j riet I I I
C Ioutputs I flnancial/fundinq 1151 subsidies for housingi
subsidies for housing were
before Vie proiect tbefore and!or after Hie disaster):
pre-disaster capacity of local residents ta have access to governmntal subsidies for housing
widely
flot widely
were
X
absoiutely
flot comoletelv
accessible ta residents before the project
were
X
absolutely
flot completely
appropriate for the fleeds of the populatiofl
X
flon-reimbursabie fiflanciai aid for repairs, purchase of a ne
within Hie oroiect:
eflough to caver the needs ofthe popuiabofl
subsidies for housing were
w house or self-help
X
were
flot offered at ail ta the affected oooulation (efld)
-
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
offered by a differeflt programJorgaflisatiofl (efld)
offered as part of the pro iect
were
achieved as plaflfled
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
Ofi time when fleeded
were
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
were
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
appropriate foc the needs of the populatiofi
were
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
offered to the right people who fleeded them
were
absolutely
almost
the appropciate strategy ta be used
flot at ail
eflough ta caver the needs ofthe populatiofl
incompleto ok I ni I
.
Ioutputs financial I fundinq 1161 bans for infrastructure or othersi
before the Droiect (before and!or after the disasteri:
pre-disaster capacity 0f local residents to have access to regular bans for individual or familial investment
bans for infrastructure or others were
were
were
widely
flot widelv
absoluteiy
flot completeiy
absoiutely
flot completeiy
X
X
X
wfthin Hie project: —
bans for infrastructure repair, for buildings related with sources of income (for individual shops, smali industries, etc), or
other initiatives for recovery. This indicator denotes the confidence of the financial system in the affected community and
the capacity of the users to enter into the regular banking system
accessible to residents before the project
appropriate for the needs of the population
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
bans for infrastructure or others were
were
were
were
were
were
were
x not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
offered by a different programlorganisation (end)
offered as part of the project
absoiuteiy
almost
— achieved as planned
notatali —
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absobutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost — offered to the right peopie who needed them
notatabl —
absoluteiy —
aimost the appropriate strategy to be used
notatali —
absobuteiy
aim ost
not at ail
enough to cover the needs of the population
o
I inccrnpbete I ok I r’xt I I
t
Ioutputs j financiai/fundinq 171 subsidies for infrastructure or othersiC
absolutely
aimost
— achieved as planned
notatail
—
absoluteiy
—
aimost
— on time when needed
flot at ail
—
absoiuteiy
—
aimost
— appropriate forthe needs ofthe population
flot at ail —
absolutely
—
aimost
— offered to the right peopie who needed them
notatali
—
absoiuteiy
—
almost
— the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail
—
wfthin the project:
non-reimbursabie financial alU for infrastructure repair, for buildings reiated with sources cf income (for individual shops, smali
industries, etc), or for other initiatives for recovery
subsidies for infrastructure or others were — offered bv a different proram/oranisation fend)
x not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
were
offered as Dart of the Droiect
were
were
were
were
were
abso!uteiy
almost
not at ail
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
incomplete j ok I I I I
IoutpUts infrastructure 1181 dams, barriers, retaining waIIsI
beforetheprojectfbeforeandlorafterthedjsaster):
assesses if dams, barners and retaining walis existed to protect housing ftom naturai hazards (iandsiides, floods, fires,
etc) and if this infrastructure guaranteed security and did flot represent risks for the population
dams, barriers, retaining wails were
absolutely
— safe to protect residents before the project
flot completely x
absoiutely
were
— enough to coverthe needs ofifie population
not completely x
absoluteiy
were
—
finctonal after the disaster
flot completely x
within the project:
- —
dams, barriers and retaining walls buift to protect housing from naturai hazards (landsiides, floods, fires, etc). Safe
conditions and reduction ofrisks for the population are assessed in this indicator
absoiutely
aimost
not at ail
dams, barriers, retaining walls
x not offered at ail to the affected oonulation (endi
offered bv a different orooram/omanisation tend
offered as part cf the project
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoiutely
aimost
— achieved as pianned
not at ail —
absoiutely —
aimost
— on time when needed
notatali —
absoiuteiy
—
aimost
— appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
aimost
— offered to the right peopie who needed them
flot at ail —
absoiutely
—
aimost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absoiuteiy
—
aimost
— safe to protect residents
not at ail —
enough to coverthe needs of the population
incompctc I ci L I I
4 outputs I infrastructure 1191 roadsl
before Hie pmject (befoœ and!or after Hie disaster):
assesses if roads turban or rural) were appropriate and enough to cover the needs 0f housing in rbe community and the
risks that they might represent for the population. t also assesses the damages in roads caused by the disaster
roads were
absolutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
not completely X
absoluteiy
were
— enough to caver the needs ofthe population
not completely x
absolutely
were
— safe in case of emergency and danger
flot completely x
absolutely
were
— functional after the disaster
flot completely X
withinHieproject:
- -
the performance in the construction 0f roads. The indicator applies at two Tevels: public infrastructure (for the benefit 0f
the community) and individual infrastructure (in pnvate property for the benefit of its owners). Individual infrastructure
inciudes U-ie acfivities and construction required for the connection to public services. These indicators illustrate the
sustainability of the project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and safety
x flot offered at ail to the affected population (end)
roads offered bv a different program/oroanisation tend)
offered as nart of the oroiect
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost
— achieved as planned
not at ail
—
absolutely
—
almost
— on time when needed
flot at ail
—
absolutely
—
almost appropriate for the needs ofthe population
notatali
absolutely
—
almost
— offered ta the right people who needed them
not at ail —
absolutely
—
almost
— the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoluteiy
almost
— safe in case of emergency and danger
flot at ail
absoiuteiy
almost
flot at ail
enough to cover the needs of the population
incomplete I ok I nert I
C loutputs I infrastructure 1201 water suppIybelote the project (before andlor after Uie disaster -
assesses if water suppiy was appropriate and enough to caver the needs of housing in the community and the risks that
t might represent for the population. it also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
water supply infrastructure was
absoiutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot compietely X
absoluteiy
was
— enough to cover tue needs of the population
not completely X
absoluteiy
was
— safe for public health
flot completeiy x
absolutely
was
— functional after the disaster
flot completely x
within the project:
the performance in the construction of water supply infrastructure. The indicator appiies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit of the community) and individuai infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of ta
owners). lndividual infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection ta public services.
These indicators illustrate the sustainability ofthe project and the consideration of long term effects in public health and
safetv
absolutely
almost
not at ail
water suppiy infrastructure
X
not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered by a different proqram/orqanisation tend)
offered as part of the proiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
aimost
— achieved as planned
not at ail x
absolutely
—
almost
— on lime when needed
not at ail x
absoluteiy
—
almost
— appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail X
absoluteiy x
almost — offered to the right peopie who needed it
not at ail
—
absolutely
—
almost x the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail
—
absolutely —
almost x safe for public heaith
not at ail
—
X
enough ta caver the needs ofthe population
I complete I ok 1 I
Ioutputs I infrastructure 121 I eiectricity
before the project (before andlor after the disaster):
assesses if electricicty supply was approptiate and enough to cover the needs 0f housing in the community and the risks
that it might represent for the population. It also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
electricity infrastructure was
absoiutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot compietely x
was
absoluteiy
— enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
flot completely x
absoiutely
was
— safe considenng local codes
flot compieteiy X
absoiutely
was — functional after the disaster
not completely X
within the project:
the performance in the construction of infrastructure for electricity supply. The indicator applies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit ofthe community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for flue benefit of its
owners). Individual infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services.
These indicators illustrate the sustainability of the project and the consideration 0f long term effects in public health and
absolutely
almost
not at aIl
o
safetv
electricity infrastructure
X
not offered at ail tothe affected oooulation tend)
offered by a different programlorganisalion (end)
offered as part of the project
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail x
absolutely —
almost — on time when needed
not at ail x
absolutely —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
notatall x
absolutely x
almost — offered to the right people who needed it
not at aIl —
absolutely —
almost x the appropriate strategy to be used
not at aIl —
absolutely —
almost — safe considering local codes
flot at aIl x
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
X
r complote I ok I nt l I I
Ioutputs I infrastructure 1221 sewage I
beforethepoject(beforeand!oraftetthedïsaste,:
assesses ifthe sewage system was appropriate and enough to coverthe needs 0f housing in the community and the
nsks that it might represent for the population. It also assesses the damages caused by the disaster
sewage infrastructure was
absolutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
flot completely X
absoluteiy
was
— enough to cover the needs of the population
flot completely X
absoiutely
was
— safe for public health
flot completely x
absolutely
was
— functional afterthe disaster
flot completely x
within the project:
the performance in the construction of sewage infrastructure. The indicator applies at two levels: public infrastructure
(for the benefit of the community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of its owners). Individual
infrastructure includes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services. These indicators
illustrate the sustainability ofthe project and the consideration 0f long term effects in public heaith and safety
absolutely
almost
not at ail
sewage infrastructure
not offered at ail to the affected population tend)
offered by a different programlorganisation fend)
x offered as oart of the oroiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
almost
— achieved as planned
not at ail x
absolutely —
almost
— on time when needed
not at ail x
absoluteiy —
almost x appropriate forthe needs ofthe population
not et ail —
absolutely —
almost
— offered to the right people who needed it
notatali x
absolutely —
almost x the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail
—
absolutely
—
almost
— safe for public health
flot at ail X
xi
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
complote I ok I I I
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
C I outputs I infrastructure 23 telephOflel
before the project fbefoœ andlor after ffie disaster):
assesses ifthe infrastructure for telephone system was appropriate and enough ta caver the needs of housing in the
community. lt also assesses flue damages caused by the disaster
infrastructure for telephone was
absolutely
appropriate for the context before the project
not completely X
absoluteiy
was enough to caver the needs of the population
not complet&y X
absolutely
was ftinctional after the disaster
not completeiy X
wfthin due project:
the performance in the construction 0f infrastructure for telephone systems. The indicator applies at two levels: public
infrastructure (for the benefit ofthe community) and individual infrastructure (in private property for the benefit of its
owners). Individuel infrastructure inciudes the activities and construction required for the connection to public services.
These indicators illustrate flue sustainability of the project and flue consideration of long term effects in public health and
safety
infrastructure for telephone
x not offered at ail ta the affected population (end)
— offered by a different program/organisation (end)
offered as oart of the oroiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
notatail —
absolutely —
aimost
— on time when needed
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
notatall —
absolutely —
aimost — offered ta the right peopie who needed t
flot at ail
absolutely —
almost — tue appropriate sttategy ta be used
not at ail
enough ta coverthe needs ofthe population
I incomplete I ok I 1 I
Ioutputs j communitv services 24 schOolsi
before the proiect (befom and!or after the disaster: -
pre-project conditions of factities
schools were
were
were
were
absolutely
flot comoletelv
absolutely
flot comnletelv
absolutely
flot compietely
absoiutely
not compieteiy
X
X
X
X
appropriate for the context before the project
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
safe (resistance to hazards)
functional after the disaster
wthin the Droiect:
the performance in th construction of facilities
schools were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
absoiutely
aimost
flot at ail
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
absoluteiy
aimost
not at ail
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
X
flot offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered bv a different oroaram/oraanisation fend)
offered as oart 0f the oroiect
achieved as pianned
on time when needed
appropriate forthe needs of the population
offered to the right peopie who needed them
the appropriate strategy to be used
safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
j incompftte I ok tixt I
C
pre-project conditions of facilities
Ioutputs I community services 1251 health centersi
heaith centers
before the oroiect tbefore and/or after the disaster):
were
absolutely
flot completeiy
were
X
absoiuteiy
flot completeiv
were
approptiate for the context before the project
X
absoluteiy
flot comoietelv
were
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
X
absoiutely
flot compietely
wfthin the nroïect:
—
safe (resistance to hazards)
the performance n the construction 0f facilities
X
functional after the disaster
health centers were X
were
absolutely
almost
flot offered at ail to the affected population (end)
offered by a different programlorqanisation fend)
offered as part 0f the proiect
not at ail
were
achieved as planned
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
absoluteiy
on time when needed
were aimost
not at ail
were
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
appropriate for the needs of the population
wete
absolutely
almost
not at ail
offered to the right people who needed them
were
absoluteiy
aimost
the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail
were
absoluteiy
almost
not at ail
safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
incomplote I ok j -1 I I
C
pre-project conditions of facilities
Ioutputs I community services 1261 community centers I religous bIdg.
community centers I rehgious bidg. were
before the nmiect (before and!or after the disaster):
absolutely
flot comoietelv
X
were
absoluteiy
flot comoietelv
were
X
appropriate for the context before the project
absolutely
flot completeiy
were
enough to coverthe fleeds ofthe population
X
absolutely
flot comoletelv
safe fresistance to hazards)
the performafice in the cofistruction of facil
X
functionai after the disaster
ties
commuflity centers I religious bldg.
wfthin the project:
were
were
flot offered at ail to the affected population f efld)
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
offered bv a different tJroaram/oraaflisation (efld
offered as part 0f the project
were
achieved as planfled
absolutely
ai most
flot at ail
were
Ofi time when fleeded
absolutely
almost
flot at ail
were
X
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail
appropriate for the needs of the population
were
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
offered to the right people who fleeded them
were
the appropriate strategy to be used
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
were
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
safe as offered (resist. to hazatds ofthe original product)
enough to cover the needs of the population
. incomplete I ok I rxt I I
oO
pre-project conditions of facilities
IoutPuts I communitv services 1271 police Ifire stationsi
police I lire stations
before the oroiect (befom andlor after the disaster
were
absoluteiy
flot compietely
were
X
absoluteiy
not completelv
were
appropriate for the context before the project
X
absoiutely
not comoleteiv
X
were
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
1’• ‘•i’.
absoluteiy
not completely
within the —
safe fresistance to hazards)
the performance in the construction of facil
X
police I lire stations
functional after the disaster
Lies
were X
were
not offered at ail ta +h ‘“ (end
absoiutely
al most
not at ail
“
offered by a different program/organisation fend)
offered as part of the prolect
achieved as planned
were
absoiutely
almost
flot at ail
on time when needed
were
absoluteiy
aimost
flot at ail
were
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
appropriate for the needs 0f the population
were
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
offered to the right peopie who fleeded them
were
absoiuteiy
almost
flot at ail
the appropriate strategy to be used
wete
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
safe as offered fresist. ta hazards 0f the original product)
enough ta coverthe needs ofthe population
incomploto I ok I nxf 1 I
( Ioutputs I housinp 1281 newlotsl
before the projectfbefom and!orafterJie disaster):
the pre-disaster level of access to land property; and/or pre- and post-disaster risks associated with the tenure of land,
oarticularlv due to location in zones of risk
lots were
absolutely
— appropriate for the context before the project
not completeiy X
land tenure was
absoiutely
— enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
not completeiy X
absoiutelyland was — safe (resistance to hazards)
flot compietely x
widelyland tenure was — accessible to residents
notwideiy X
wfthin the project: —
initiatives targeted to increase the residents capacity to acquire safe lots for housing; including bans or subsidies given for
purchasing land or the direct donation of lots
flot offered at ail to the affected oooulation (end
absoiutely —
aimost x achieved as planned
notatall —
absoluteiy —
almost x on time when needed
flot at ail —
absoiutely —
aimost — appropriate for the needs ofthe population
not at ail
absoiutely
aimost — offered to the right people who needed them
notataii —
absolutely X
aimost — safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
not at ail —
new lots offered by a different program/organisation (end) -
x offered as part cf the project
wete
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
X
absoiuteiy
aimost
not et ail
X
the appropriate strategy to be used
absoluteiy
aimost
not at ail
X
enough to caver the needs of the population
I complete I ok I I
Ioutputs I housinçi 1291 emergency sheltersi
before the pmject(befoœ and!or after Vie disaster):
pre-disaster arrangements and planning made by the organisations to adequately respond to the emergency. it represents
the access of the community to contingency plans by the civil defense, fire departments, Red Cross, etc.
emergency sheiters were
absoluteiy
— pianned, before the disaster, through contingency plans
flot completeiy X
.
. absoluteiy
emergency organisations were — prepared for a housing emergency
riot completeiy x
authorifies were
absolutely
— prepared for a housing emergency
flot compietely x
.
. widely
info about contingency plans was .
— accessible to residents before the disaster
flot wideiy X
within Vie project:
—
implementation of an emergency sheltering plan; including provision oftents, plastics or other matenals to build sheiters foi
the first days after the disaster
were
x not offered at ail to the affected poculation fend)
offered by s different programlorganisation (end)
absoiuteiy
almost — achieved as pianned
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost
— on time when needed
notatali —
absolutely —
almost — appropriate forthe needs 0f the population
not at ail —
absoluteiy
—
almost
— offered to the right peopie who needed them
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost
— the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absolutely —
aimost
— safe to short-term protection of residents
not at ail
—
absoiuteiy —
aimost
— enough to cover the needs ofthe population
flot at ail
offered as part of the project
emergency shelters were
were
were
were
were
were
were
I incomplete I ok I t
Ioutputs I housinq 1301 temporary housingi
before the project fbefore and!or after the disaster):
pre-disaster arrangements and planning made by authorWes and local NGOs to adequately respond to the requireness for
transitory housing
temporary housing was
absoluteiy
— planned, before the disaster in urban plans
not cornpleteiy x
. absolutely
emergency organisations were — prepared for building transitory housing
flot completely X
authorities were
absolutely
— prepared for building transitory housing
not completely x
info about temporary housing plans was — accessible to residents before the disaster
notwidely X
within the project: —
this might inciude the implementation of: (j) temporary units f .e. pre-fab and winterised units); (ii) adapted temporary housing
(public faciiities or rented apartments); or fil) self-provided temporary housing (homes of familles I frlends, user-buiit
sheiters, or second homes) —
x not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
temporaiy housing was — offered by a different program/organisation fend)
offered as part of the project
absoiuteiy —
were almost — achieved as pianned
notatail —
absoiuteiy
were almost — on Urne when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
were aimost — appropriate for the needs ofthe population
not at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — offered to the right peopie who needed them
not at ail —
absoiutely —
were airnost — the appropriate strategy to be used
not at ail —
absoiutely
were almost — safe for rnid-term protection of residents
flot at ail —
absoiutely —
were almost — enough to cover the needs ofthe population
not at ail —
incomplete I ok I I
o
Ioutputs I housinq 131 I new housesi
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
the pre-disaster level of access to housing (or the contrary: the level of housing shortage) and post-disaster homelessness
caused by the disaster
houses were
absolutely 1— accessible to ail residents before the disaster
not completely
absolutely I
new houses were t— unnecessary after the disaster
flot completely
j
x
within the project: —
initiatives targeted to facilitate the acquisition of new permanent housing, including (if necessary) relocation of residents
living in dangerous conditions. Permanent new housing can be obtained: (i) through trie provision of finished units; (ii) by
facilitating and organising self-help construction; or (iii) by faciiitating and organising the purchase of new housing existing in
the market
____________
-—
not offered at ail to the affected population fend)
offered by _djfçent prograrnlorganisation (end)
x offered as part ot the project
absoiutely
almost x achieved as pianned
not at ail
absolutely —
aimost x on time when needed
not at ail —
absolutely —
aimost x appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — offered to the right people who needed them
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
notatall —
absolutely x
almost — safe as offered (resist. to hazards ofthe original product)
notatall —
new houses were
were
were
were
were
were
wete
were
absolutely
aimost
flot at ail
X
enough b cover the needs of the population
I complote I ok I n I
C IOUtPLItS housinq 1321 reconstructed housesfbefore the omiect 1betor and!or aftr th -
houses were
the pre- and post-disaster nsks of coliapse of housing structures due to one or some ofthe foliowing reasons: fi) lack cf
maintenance; (ii) use cf inadequate materials; (iii) use of inadequate technologies; (iv) unsafe additions and structural
modifications to housing; (y) insufficient construction codes and standards
absotuteiy
net comoletelv
were
X
absoiutely
flot completely
functional afterthe disaster
were
X
absoiutefy
flot completelv
appropriate for tue needs cf the population
X
safe alter the disaster
the reconstruction of affected structures, inciuding minor repairs and major reconstruction
within the project:
the reconstruction cf affected houses was
X
was
not offered at ail to the affected ooouiation (endt
absolutely
almost
not at ail
offeredby a different erooramloroanisation (endt
offered as part of the project
achieved as pianned
was
absoiuteiy
almost
flot at ail
was
on time when needed
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot et ail
was
absoluteiy
almost
flot et ail
appropriate for the needs cf the population
was
absoluteiy
aimost
flot at au
offered to the right peopie who needed it
was
absoiuteiy
almost
flot at ail
the appropriate strategy to be used
was
absolutely
almost
not at ail
safe for long-term protectiofl of residents
enough to cover the needs of tue population
incomplete ok f - - -t -f I
ç joutputs I industrv /emp(ovm. 133 I bldgslinfras. for industry & income generationi
before the project (before and!or after the disaster):
the pre-disaster level of access to sources of income; and/or pre- and post-disaster risks associated with the buildings and
infrastructure related with income generation, particularly the nsks of collapse, destruction of infrastructure, destruction of plantations,
machinery or equipment, etc.
absolutely —
bldgs/infras. for industry & income generation were — appropnate for the context before the project
flot completeiy x
wide)y
were . — accessible to residents
flot widely x
absolutely
were — safe (resistance to hazards)
flot completely x
absoluteiy
were — ftinctional afterthe disaster
flot completely x
within the project
the construction of buildings and infrastwcture associated with the generation of income and employment at the scale 0f single famiIie
or smail clusters fexcluding the reconstruction of large industries/companies). It might include the reconstruction of shops, small
industries, smail scale infrastructure for production, processing or agriculture activities, etc., assessing the consideration 0f long-term
needs for economic recovery, the capacity of tue community to become economically independent, and in general, the sustainability 0f
the project. Oniy physical construction is considered, not including functioning and management of facilities
x flot offered at ailtothe affeçfç4population_(end)
absolutely
almost — achieved as planned
not at ail
absoluteiy
almost — on time when needed
flot at aIl
absolutely
almost appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail
absolutely —
almost offered to tue right people who needed them
flot at ail —
absolutely —
almost — Vie appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail
absolutely —
almost — safe as offered (resist. to hazards of Vie original product)
flot at ail —
offered by a different program/organisation fend)
offered as part of Hie project
bldgs/infras. for ndustry & income generation were
were
were
were
were
were
were
were
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
enough to cover the needs of Vie population
incomplete I ok I I I I
unemployment subsidies were
were
were
X
X
X
accessible to residents
appropnate fot the context before the project
enough to cover the needs of the population
unemployment subsidies were
were
were
were
were
were
were
offered by a different program/organisation tend)
offered as oart of the Droiect
enough to coverthe needs of the population
C Ioutputs I industrv /emplovm. 1341 unemployment subsidiesi
pre-disaster access to regular govemmental unemployment subsidies fequivalent to welfare)
— I.
widely
flot widely
absoluteiy
not timnItpIu
absolutely
flot completely
within the project:
—
initiatives targeted to the implementation of subsidies r people that h ve lost their jobs or sources 0f income during the disaster. This
indicator denotes the consideration of short-term needs for economic recovery
x flot offered at ail to the affected oulaUon (end)
absoiutely
almost
— achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
almost — on time when needed
flot at ail —
absoiutely —
almost
— appropriate for the needs ofthe population
flot at ail
absoluteiy
almost
— offered to the right peopie who needed them
notatali —
absoiutely —
almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
notatail —
absoluteiy
almost
flot at ail
incomplete I I I
C Ioutputs others 351 rescuel
before the project (before andlor after the disaste,:
the pre-disaster capacity of local institutions (the civil defense, the police, the army, the local NGOs, the local Red Cross, etc.) to
speedily and effectively teact to the destruction
local organisations were
absolutely
on time to conduct emergency and rescue
flot completely x
absolutely
— effectively conducted contingency and rescue
flot completely x
absolutely
external aid was — unnecessary for rescue activities
flot completely x
within the project
the implementation of rescue activities
i flot offered at ail to the affected population (end)
rescue activities were — offered by a different programlorganisation (end)
offered as part of the project
absolutely —
were almost — achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — on time when needed
notatall —
absolutely —
were almost — appropriate for the needs ofthe population
flot at aIl —
absolutely —
were almost — offered to the right people who needed them
flot atall —
absolutely —
were almost — the appropriate sfrategy to be used
flot at ail —
absolutely —
were almost — enough to cover the needs ofthe population
flot at ail —
incomplete ok I ext I I
t
Ioutputs I others 361 psychoogicai aidj
before the project (befom and!or after the disaster):
pre-disaster access to psychoiogicai aid. Even though this is a difficuit aspect to identify in urban contexts t is easier ta identify as
being absent in most of rural contexts
psychologicai alU was — accessible to residents
flot wideiy x
absolutely
was — appropnate for the needs of the population
flot completely X
absoiutely
was — enough to cover the needs of the population
flot completeiy X
within the project: —
initiatives targeted to provide psychologicai alU to the affected residents. This might include individuat or group therapies, giving advice
and information in newspapers or magazines
X not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
psychological alU was — offered by a different program/organis
adon fend)
offered as part ofthe project
absolutely —
was almost — achieved as planned
notatali
absoluteiy —
was aimost — on time when needed
notatail —
absoiutely —
was almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
was aimost — offered to the right people who needed t
flot at ail —
absoiutely
was almost — the appropriate strategy to be used
notatali —
absolutely —
was aimost — enough ta cover die needs of die population
flot at ail —
incomplete ok I next1 J
Ioutputs I others 1371 foodi
before the project (before and!or after die disaster): --
pre-disaster access to food, it highlights pre-disaster and post-disaster levels of malnutrition
food was
was
was
absolutely
flot completely
absoiutely
flot compietelv
absolutely
flot completely
X
X
X
accessible to residents
appropriate for the needs ofthe population
enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
wfthin die proiect:
initiatives targeted to provide food to the affected resic
food was
was
was
was
ents n the first
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absoiutely
almost
not at ail
absolutely
almost
not at ail
absolutely
almost
not et ail
ay
X
affer flue disaster.
was
was
was
absolutely
almost
not at ail
not offered at ail to the affected population (end)
offered by a different proqram/orqanisation fend)
offered as part of the proiect
achieved as planned
on time when needed
appropriate for the needs of the population
offered to the right peopie who needed it
the appropriate strategy to be used
enough to cover the needs ofthe population
, incomplote ok J
Ioutputs I others 381 medcal aidi
before the project (before andlor after ifie disaster):
pre- and post-disaster level of access to regular medical care. This vulnerability might consider the availabiiity o! health centers in the
region and a qualitative assessment of the capacity of residents to gain access to health insurances
medical aid
widely
— accessible to residents
not wideiy x
was
absolutely x
— appropnate for the needs of the population
flot completeiy —
was
absolutely
— enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
not compietely X
within lie project: —
initiatives targeted to the provision of medica! assistance in the first days after the disaster
flot offered at aIl to the affected population fend)
medical aid was — offered by a different programlorganisation (end)
offered as part of the project
absolutely
was almost — achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — on time when needed
notatali —
absolutely —
was aimost — appropriate for the needs of the population
flot at ail
absoluteiy —
was almost — offered to the right peopie who needed it
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy —
was aimost — tue appropriate strategy to be used
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
was aimost — enough to coverthe needs ofthe population
not at ail —
.
incomplete J ok J
O lOUtPUtS .1 others 1391 temporaryinfrastructurelbefore the project(before andîor afterthedïsaster):
the capacity of institutions to react to the destruction of public services and infrastructure, particularly trie reaction of governmental
organizations in charge of public services and roads
. absolutely
temporary infrastructure was — planned in contingency plans
flot completely X
local organisations were
absolutely
— prepared to react to the destruction of infrastructure
flot completely X
. absolutely
externat aid was — unnecessary after the disaster
flot completely X
wthintheproject
initiatives targeted to the implementation of temporary electrical and te ephone systems, temporary water supply, and temporary
bridges, dams or any other infrastructure required to guarantee the safety and recovery of residents. This indicator assesses the
capacity 0f residents to quickly resume daily activities
flot offered at ail to the affected population (end)
temporary infrastructure was — offered by a different program!organisation fend)
offered as part 0f the project
absolutely —
was atrnost — achieved as planned
flot at ail —
absotutely —
was almost — on time when needed
not at ail —
absoiutely —
was almost — appropriate for the needs of the population
not at alt —
absolutely
was almost — offered ta the right people who needed t
not at ail —
absolutely —
was alrnost — the appropriate strategy ta be used
flot at ail —
absolutely —
was almost — enough to cover the needs ofthe population
not at alt
incomplete I ok I riext I I
o
IoutPL1tS f others f40 I education and technical assistancel
before the project fbefore andlor after the disastar):
pre-disaster access ta technical education and knowledge. t might include assessing the average access to schooling and informai
education in the region
. widely
schooling (up ta secondary) was — accessible to residents
notwidely X
residents had
complete
— knowledge about construction -related subjects
nsuftlcient x
technical courses and informai education were — accessible ta residents
flot widely X
within the prcject:
Thie impiementation of plans for education and technic il assistance. It I igi t include educafion in disaster prevention, education in
better construction practices, formation on leadership, equity, human rights, protection ofthe environment, etc. and technical
assistance for developing befter construction practices or for the assembiy of construction components
not offered at ail ta the affected population fend)
offered by a different programlorganisation fend)
x offered as part of the oroiect
absolutely x
almost
— achieved as p?anned
flot at ail —
absolutely x
almost
— on time when needed
not at ail —
absoiutely
almost x appropriate for the needs of the population
not at ail —
absolutely x
aimost
— offered ta the right people who needed it
notatail
—
absolutely —
aimost x the appropriate strategy ta be used
flot at ail
—
education and technicai assistance was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absolutely
aimost
not at ail
enough ta caver the needs of the population
complete I ok f next I I j
joutpuft others 41 informationl
beforetheproject(beforeid!orafterthedisasteg:*
pre-disaster access to information reiated with risks, awareness, contingency and coping activifies. t might inciude assessing the
average access to the media fnews papers, internet, T’I and radio), the existence of campaigns of information and the access to local
and external publications
. .
. widely
information concerning risks, awareness etc. was .
— accessible to residents
not wideiy x
. . .
. widely
campaigns of intormation to the public were . — used in the region
not widely x
residents had
widely
— access to the media in general
flot wideiy X
within the project:
—
the implementation of plans for dissemination of information and knowtedge regarding the disaster or me reconstruction activities. it
might inciude publications, meetings wfth the community and information through the media to inform about the causes and effects of
the disaster, the projects in action, how to access to the benefits of the project, how to find a job, etc.
not offered at ail to the affected ooouiation tend’i
information
X
offered by a different program/organisation (end)
offered as part of the proiect
was
was
was
was
was
was
was
absoiuteiy X
aimost
— achieved as pianned
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
aimost on time when needed
not at ah —
absoiuteiy —
aimost x appropnate for me needs of the population
notatahi
—
absoiuteiy —
aimost x offered to me right peopie who needed it
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy —
aimost x the appropriate strategy to be used
flot at au —
absoiuteiy
aimost
flot at ail X
enough to cover me needs of me population
complete I ok f nxt I I I
( Iresuits I transfer 1421 bans given and subsidies albocatedibefore the project(betore and!or after Hie disastet:
within Hie project
o
the performance ri the transfer cf financiai soiuUons and funding, being useful te identify if the money flnafly reached the
beneficiaries
absolutely
bans and subsidies offered were abmost — abbocated as planned
notatail x
absolutely —
were almost — used at an appropriate time (as assumed)
not at ail X
absolutely —
were almost — used in the appropriate way (as assumed)
notatabi x
absoluteby —
were aimost — used by the people that needed them (as assumed)
net at ail X
complote I ok I n.ext I
Iresuits I fransfer 431 direct and indirect jobs createdi
beforetheproject(beforeandlorafterfliedisaster):
nia
within the project:
the consequences in the creation cf employment opportunities of having developed the different outputs. It denotes the
capacity ofthe project to facilitate the recovery cf the economy and the achievement ofthe economic independence ofthe
beneficianes
absoiut&y
new direct and indirect jobs were aimost x enough to faciiltate the recovery of the local economy
flot atall —
absoiutely —
almost x facilitated the economic independence 0f beneticianes
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
were almost x created at the appropriate time
flot at ail
absolutely —
aimost
— represented appropriate working conditions for residents
not at ail x
: complete I ok j nexi I
I resuits I transfer 1441 houses occupiedi
beforethepmjectfbeforeand!orafterUiedisaster):
n/a
within the project
the post-project rate 0f occupation of dweilings. itis particuiariy useful to identify the acceptabiiity ofthe houses provided
by the mu W-organisation
absolutely
fie houses provided were aimost x occupied by residents
flot at ail —
absoluteiy —
were almost X occupied at the appropriate time (as assumed)
not at ail —
absolutely —
were aimost x used in the appropriate way (as assumed)
not at ail —
absoiuteiy —
were aimost x used by fie peopie fiat needed them (as assumed)
not at ail —
complote I ok I I
oI resUitS transfer 1451 insurance policies takeni
befare the project (before andlor after the disaster):
nia
within the project
insurance policies are flot a common output of reconstruction ptojects in the context ofthe selected case studies. However, t s
considered here as a consequence of improving fie awareness and knowledge of residents and local organisations. Transferring
fie nsks cf destruction to insurance companies s considered here as a positive consequence cf educating and informing
organisations and individuais about the nsks 0f future disasters
very much
taking insurance policies for housing was slightiy — incremented after the disaster
notatall x
absolutely —
the risks of disasters was almost — reduced by fie government by sharing it with insurance comp.
not at ail X
complete I ok I nexl I
resufts I transfer 1461 emergency protocols impiementedi
beforetheproject(beforand/otaftertftedjsaster):-
-
n/a
within me project
emergency protocols are not considered as a common output of reconstruction projects in the context of the selected case studies.
However, it is considered here as a consequence of improving the awareness and knowledge of residents and local organisations.
Implementing emergency protocois (particularly in urban contexts) s considered here as a positive consequence of educating and
informing organisations and individuals about the risks 0f friture disasters
absolutely
emergency protocols were almost x implemented in the region among residential areas
not at ail —
absoiutely —
contingency plans and emer. protocols were almost x included in the agenda of local authorifies and organisations
not at ail —
complete I ok J n?Xt
C
eSUltS I transfer 47 increment of land ownershipl
before Hie project (befo, andIor after the disaster):
n/a
wfthin Hie project:
This is a context-sensitive indicator. It is consider in this context as a positive indicator of resuits as it denotes the capacity of the
project to secure safe land for residents at the long run. Increment of land ownership can be due to the provision of new lots, due to
the success 0f ban or subsidies programs or due to the successftil legalisation of illegally occupied land
absolutely x
land ownership almost increased in the region after the project
notatali
complete I ok I I I
I resufts
- I transfer 481 increment 0f home ownershipl
beforetheoroiectfbeforandIorafterffiedisaster——- ----.------ - - -------- --‘--- I
absoluteiy x
home ownership almost increased in the region after the project
flot at ail
complete I ok I nxt I 1
C
n/a
within the project - - -
This is a context-sensWve indicator. lt is consider in this context as a positive indicator of results. t can be due to construction 0f new
houses, by acquisition of existing housing stock, or by upgrading of squatter settiements and shacks. This indicator denotes the
capacity of the projectto guarantee secure safe sheltenng in the long term
C Iresuits I communit particip. 1491 designbeforetheproject(beforeand!orafterthedisaster):
nia
withinffieproject
Assesses the capacity of residents to actively participate in the design of their own dwelling
significantly
residents did partially
— decide the distribution of spaces oftheir own dwelling
flot
-
signiftcantiy
—
did partially
— decide the location and orientation oftheir own dwelling
not X
signitlcantiy
—
did partially
— select the finishes 0f their own dwelling
not x
significantiy
—
nU partially
— decide the size and conditions of the spaces their dwellings
flot
-
significanfly
—
did parfially
— select the technology of the structure and main components
flot
-
significantly
—
did partially — select the construction method to be used
not x
complete I ok j
IruIts I communityparticip. 1501 managementl
before the project (before and!or after the disaster): -
nia
wfthm the project
Assesses the capacity ofresidents to actively participate in the management of their own dwelling
absolutely
residents almost — could choose whether using self-help or hiring labor force
notatail X
significantly —
did partially — manage the economic resources
not X
significantly —
did partially — manage the contracts 0f suppliers
not x
significantiy —
did partially — determine the schedule and planning of activities
not x
signiflcantly
did partially — communicate direcUy with other stakeholders
not X
significantly —
did partially — organise people and resources in the construction field
not x
complote I ok I pext I I
Ç resufts I communitv particip. 51 financing of the projectibeforetheproject(befomandiorafterffiedisaster):
nia
within ffie project:
Assesses the capacity cf residents to activeiy participate in the financing cf their own dweliing
absoluteiy
residents did aimost seiect the financing system for the project
not at ail X
absolutely —
did aimost
— participate in coflecting fiinds
notatali X
absolutely —
did aimost — know the costs cf construction and materiais
notatali x
absoiuteiy —
did aimost — have the option of incurring in expenses directiy
not at ail x
absoiuteiy —
did almost — have the option to participate with own resources
net at ail x
absoiuteiy —
did aimost — participate in financing coiiectiveiy (or as a cooperative) —
notatail X
complote I ok I I
Ç
Iesui - --- r r communitpparticip. 521 production of componentsl
before the project fbefore andlor after the disaster):
nia
within the project
Assesses the capacity cf residents to active!y participate in the production 0f components for their own dweiling
absolutely X
residents did aimost — work in the production 0f components
flot at ail
absoluteiy x
did atmost — iearn the technique of production of components
flot at ail —
absoluteiy x
did almost — operate the machines for production of components
not at ail
absoluteiy x
the production 0f components did almost — optimise the skills and knowledge of residents
flot at ail —
complete I ok I I
(
resuits I community narticip. 1531 constructionl
belote the project (before and!or after the dïsaster):
nia
within the project
Assesses the capacity of residents to actively participate in construction activities for their own dwelling
absolutely x
residents did almost
— work in assembiy 0f coflStrUctiofl components
flot at ail
—
absoiutely x
did almost
— earn the method of construction
not at ail —
absolutely x
did almost — get remunerated fmoney, food or property) for labor force
notatail —
absolutely x
members offlie family did almost — have the option to work in the construction field
not at ail —
complete j ok I next I
t
Iresuits community rarticip. 1541 individual responsibllity cf decision making
f before the project (before and/or after the disaster):[a
withintheproject
Assesses the level of responsibility of decision making
absolutely
residents were aimost — responsibie for registering to the project (or program)
flot at ail x
absolutely —
were almost — responsible for applying for the services and products offered
flot at ail x
absolutely x
were almost — responsible for compieting ttie house
flot at ail —
absolutely
—
were almost — respofisible for the use of ftiflding
flot atail x
absoluteiy
were aimost X responsible for obtaifling disaster-resistance standards
flot at ail
—
absolutely
—
were almost X respofisible for obtaining afld uSiflg information and kflow-how
flot at ail
—
absolutely
—
were aimost — responsible for selecting where to iflvest the resources
flot at ail x
complote I ok I I ]
Iimpacts I projectqoals 1551 debtl
before Hie project fbefore andlor affer Hie disaster):
n/a
within Hie project:
the debt acquired by local organisations or the national government to develop the project. A low debt resulting from the project is
considered as a potential positive effect ofthe project
an insignificant x
the debt resuwng from tle projeot was a reasonable burden for local organisations or the national government
a very high
complete I ok I I I
impacts i proiectøoais i erivironmental impact
before the project (before andlor after Uie disaster):
nia
wfthin the project:
the positive and negative impacts ofthe project on the environment. This might include negative impacts due to the sprawl of
urbanisation, the over exploitation ofindigenous materials, and the effects offfie disrupfion of public infrastructure (particularly
sewage systems). This indicator denotes the assessment of long-term consequences on the sustainability 0f the project
flot at ail
the project almost had a negative effect in urban sprawl
absolutelv x
notatali
aimost x had a negative effect of over exploitation of natural resources
absolutely
notatali X
almost — had a negative effect in natural sources ofwater
absoluteiy —
not at ail x
aimost
— had a negative effect in natural forests
absolutely
—
flot at ail —
almost x had a negative effect in public health
absolutely
—
absoiutely —
almost
— contributed to urban/rurai organisation and consolidation
not at ail X
absolutely —
almost
— reduced the negative effects of hie disaster in the environment
not at ail x
absolutely —
almost x reduced the negative effects ofthe disaster in public heaith
________________________________
notatall —
___________________________________________________
complete I ok I I I I
C I imPaCte I projectoals 1571 recovery of normal activitiesibefore the project (befom and!or after the disaster):
n/a
within ifie project
the performance in terms of time for the recovery of normal acUvities. it inciudes assessing the time t took for the majority of the
community to resume daiiy activities (going to work, to schooi, do normally domestic activities, etc.)
absolutely
the project almost x facilitated the recovery of: people going te work
flot at ail
absoiutely
—
almost x facilitated the recovery of: people going to school
flot at ail —
absolutely
—
almost x faciiitated the recovery of: people doing domestic activities
notatali —
absolutely
—
almost x faciiitated the recovery of people: doing recreational activities
flot at ail —
complete I ok ext I I
impacts I proiect goals Ise I physicat resistance to hazarusi
before the p,oject (before and!or after the disaster): - -
n/a
within the project
cumulative performance in terms ofthe overat resistance to natural hazards. lt inclu
des flot only the resistance of the original units
(as buiit during the project) but aiso the resistance of later additions and modifications to the original units. This indicator compiles
ifie general resistance to hazards due to safe location, exposure to danger, awar
eness and mitigation of possible risks,
implementation of better building codes and standards, and in general ail the structural and non structural risks of unsafe
conditions. lt denotes the capacity ofthe projectto guarantee long term safe conditions of housing
absolutely X
original houses were almost safe (resistance to natural haza
rds) at the mid-term
notatall —
absoluteiy —
modified houses (inc. additions) were almost safe (resistance to natucal hazards) at
the mid-term
not at ail X
absolutely
infrastructure was aimost x safe (resistance to natural haza
rds) et the mid-term
not at ail
absolutely —
other buildings and facilities were almost safe (resistance to naturai hazards) at the mid-term
notatail X
complete I ok itxt ] I
Iimpacts I project çoas 1591 transfer of better building practicesi
before the project (before and!or after ffie disaster):
nia
within the pmject:
the performance in the assimilation of better building practices, particularly in self-help and this including better use cf materials,
improvements in local technologies, general awareness of risks, respect of building codes and standards, etc. This variable indicates Uie
capacity of the project to reduce the Iong-term physical vulnerabilities of the community (particularly if a great percentage 0f regular
housing is user-made)
absolutely
user-made constructions after the project were almost — safe fresistance to natural hazards)
notatall x
absolutely —
construction technologies were almost x improved in user-made constructions affer the disaster
notatail —
absolutely —
user-made constructions affer the project were almost — vigilant of construction codes and standards
notatali x
absolutely —
proper maintenance was almost x conducted to housing structures
not at aIl —
complete I ok I next I I
I impacts I project qoals 1601 institutional capacity and developmentl
before the project (before andlor after the disaster): -
n/a
wfthin the ptoject
the performance ofthe project in reinforcing the administrative metiiods, expertise, know-how, and management tools 0f local authorities
for disaster management. This indicator denotes the capacity of the projectto increase Vie level 0f development from Vie local authorities
point of view. It includes assessing: fi) the implementation or flot of programs of education, training, administrative cooperation and
information targeted to local authorities; and (ii) the level 0f participation of regular administrative units (municipalities, regular public
entities, etc.) in the reconstruction project. The creation of temporary public entities with the exclusive mandate of dealing wiVi
reconstruction activities - which dissolve once reconstruction is finished -is considered as a potential cause of loss ofthe know how and
expertise gained through the development 0f the project
absoiutely
almost
not at ail
X
edu cation and training programs
local administrative units
temporary enfities for reconstruction
new administrative methods and plans
local administrative units
were
were
were
implemented for local authorities and administrative units
absolutely X
almost — parlicipated in the design and management of the project
notatall
notatall x
almost — dissolved after the project
absolutely —
not at ail —
almost x implemented aftec the project
absolutely —
absolutely
almost
not at ail
x had responsibility of the good development ofthe project
complete I ok I flf’xI I I I
a fair method of selection of beneficiaries
women and men had
residents ftom different races had
residents from different social classes had
residents with different religious affiliation had
people without civil ID or flot registered had
residents ofthe lowest economic levels were
people without legal tenure were
non land owners or home owners were
people located in unsafe areas were
C I impacts proiect goals jel I eguality of gender and mfnoritiesj
before the preject(before and!orafterthe disaster): - ---
n/a
within the project
the performance ofthe project in selecting the beneficiaries ofthe project. lt highlights possible segregation by gender, race, social
status, religious affiliation, etc. It may also denote the selection of beneficianes according to other variables such as: capacity of acquiring
debts, family income, tenute of civil address or registered lD, land or home ownership, legal occupation of land, tenute of tilles of legal
property, location in safe areas, etc. This indicator denotes the performance of the project in terms of covering and scope
absolutely —
_______________________________________________________
was almost x implemented in the project
not at ail
absoiutely x
aimost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
not at ail —
absolutely x
almost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
flot at ail —
absoiutely x
aimost — the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
flot at ail —
absoiuteiy x
aimost
— the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
not at ail —
absoiuteiy x
almost the same rights to obtain products and services in the project
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
almost
— inciuded as beneficiaries of products and services
not at aIl —
absolute!y x
almost — included as beneficiaries 0f products and services
not at ail —
absoluteiy x
aimost — included as beneficiahes 0f products and services
notataii —
absoluteiy
aimost
not at ail
X
included as beneficiahes ot products and services
I complete I ok j gef j
C Iimpacts I projectoaIs 1621 aIl settiements in safe areasibefore the project (befom andlor after the disaster):
n/a
within the project
the contribution of the ptoject to eliminate housing located in dangerous areas. t highhghts the permanence of squatting sefllements in
risk-prone areas and remaining nsks dueto location. It denotes the capacity ofthe projectto achieve the uWmate goal of eliminating
physical vulnerability of housing
absolutely X
housing in the region was almost — built in safe areas
not at ail —
absolutely —
the project almost x contributed to reduce settiements in risk-prone areas
not at ail —
absolutely —
almost x contributed to reduce the physicai vulnerabilfty of housing
not at ail —
absoluteiy —
a simiiar disaster s aimost x uniikeiy to happen to the same population in the same region
not at ail —
complete I ok j I I
